Spiritual Health Learning Community Center Exploring Life's Horizons »   About Islam Menu Sam Harris, The End of Faith, & Absence of Reason - Part 3 Early on page 20 of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris claims: “If we better understood the workings of the human brain, we would undoubtedly discover lawful connections between our states of consciousness, our modes of conduct, and the various ways we use our attention. What makes one person happier than another? Why is love more conducive to happiness than hate? … Is the ego an illusion …? Is there life after death? These are ultimately questions for a mature science of the mind. If we ever develop such a science, most of our religious texts will be no more useful to mystics than they now are to astronomers.” To begin with, I'm not exactly sure how the issue of 'is there life after death' gives expression to a question “for a mature science of the mind” – unless, of course, one is presupposing one's conclusion by harboring a belief that the idea of “life after death” is nothing more than a fantasy or illusion or false belief … cognitive states generated through an improperly functioning neurochemistry. Is this possible? Yes, it is, but Mr. Harris and the other neuroscientists with whom he is currently studying are a long, long way from demonstrating that such is the case. Neuroscience is light years away from showing, if it ever can, that mind is nothing more than an epiphenomenon of biological functioning and/or that mind is entirely explicable in terms of the dynamics of the latter. Presently, neuroscience does not know what consciousness is or how it arises. Currently, neuroscience does not know what logic and reason are or how they arise. At the present time, neuroscience does not know how language, understanding, insight, genius, or creativity is possible. I say such things not as someone who is completely ignorant about what is going on in neuroscience but as someone who has taught courses on psychology, including units on brain functioning and neurochemistry, as well as someone who has read about these matters for years. Has science discovered many things about consciousness, logic, reason, understanding, creativity, language, and so on? Yes, it has. Has science established many lawful connections among states of consciousness, modes of conduct, and attention? Yes, it has. Is science likely to discover more about cognitive processes and lawful relationships among such cognitive processes in the future? Yes, this is very likely. However, none of the foregoing concessions is tantamount to demonstrating, showing, or proving that mind is nothing more than a dynamic set of mutually modulating neuro-biochemical and neuro-physiological events. None of what has been discovered in neuroscience shows that happiness, love, a sense of self, or life after death are nothing more than, and entirely dependent on, brain states – even if one were to accept the idea that neurochemistry may have shaping and modulating effects upon one's mood, sense of identity, capacity to love, or one's beliefs about the idea of life after death. Mr. Harris is of the opinion that if human beings succeed in developing a mature science of mind, then, “most of our religious texts will be no more useful to mystics than they now are to astronomers.” Aside from the fact that Mr. Harris has yet to discuss mysticism or mystics in his book, and aside from the fact that the conditional portion of his statement [namely, 'if we are ever successful in developing a mature science of mind'] is predicated on the coming into being of something that is a very “iffy” possibility as long as one stipulates that such a science must be rooted in some form of reductionistic materialism, and aside from the fact that even if a mature science of mind were to arise, we really don't have any idea of what it might look like, one wonders why Mr. Harris would argue that under such conditions, religious texts will prove to be of no more practical value to mystics than they are to astronomers. Mr. Harris doesn't specify what religious texts he has in mind, but I am not familiar with any religious texts that deny the importance of consciousness, awareness, attention, understanding, insight, wisdom, happiness, love, the ego, and so on. Furthermore, I am not sure why Mr. Harris would automatically assume that when a given religious text advocates, for example, the pursuit and development of: patience, tolerance, forgiveness, honesty, sincerity, integrity, compassion, humility, being charitable, judiciousness, courage, struggling for the truth, or other similar qualities, that, suddenly, neuroscience is going to be able to demonstrate that none of these qualities has any practical value. In addition, I am not exactly sure how whatever a mature science of mind might discover about the human condition that such a science will be able to demonstrate that one automatically can preclude practices involving, say, fasting, seclusion, prayer, chanting, giving thanks, service to the community, and so on as being of little, or no, practical value to an individual who is a mystic. Maybe a mature science of mind might discover that fasting, prayer, seclusion, and chanting have certain effects on the brain's biochemistry which help individuals become more inclined toward being positively and constructively motivated, attentive, or engaged with respect to life, as well as being more amenable to being happier, more loving, and having a deeper sense of 'self'. Maybe a mature science of mind might demonstrate there is a complementary relationship between brain functioning and those aspects of mind which touch upon, and are touched by, such brain functioning but which may exist independently from such physical processes. The fact of the matter is: Mr. Harris has absolutely no idea what a mature science of mind might be like. He is just speculating in a way that he believes lends support to his position without providing any evidence to back up his assertions. On page 20 of The End Of Faith, Mr. Harris states: “The problem that religious moderation poses for all of us is that it does not permit anything very critical to be said about religious literalism. We cannot say that fundamentalists are crazy, because they are merely practicing their freedom of belief; we cannot even say they are mistaken in religious terms because their knowledge of scripture is generally unrivaled. All we can say, as religious moderates, is that we don't like the personal and social costs that a full embrace of scripture imposes on us.” I must be missing something here because I'm not at all clear about why it is that so-called “religious moderation” does not “permit anything very critical to be said about religious literalism.” I'm also a little unclear why one must be pushed into the sorts of extremes toward which Mr. Harris wishes to maneuver people through his manner of framing a given question or problem. Contrary to Mr. Harris' way of stating things, I don't have to refer to the advocates of “religious literalism” as being “crazy” if I disagree with their perspective. Moreover, I can defend their right to believe whatever they like without necessarily feeling compelled to concede that such people have the right to impose their way of life on me or anyone else. In addition, Mr. Harris' contention that “one cannot even say that they are mistaken in religious terms because their knowledge of scripture is generally unrivaled” is not tenable. This is so for a number of reasons. While it is true that there are many individuals who could be categorized as coming under the rubric of “religious literalism” and who have memorized vast portions of the Bible, nonetheless, memorization does not necessarily presuppose a correct understanding of that which has been memorized. The fact someone can issue forth Biblical quotes for every occasion says nothing at all about the appropriateness or relevancy of such assertions. All one can be sure of is that the individual who utters the quotes has a good memory and that they are committed to a certain understanding of the Bible which in their minds they consider to be correct. What prevents one from saying that any or all of such an understanding is mistaken? What prevents one from putting forth arguments which may demonstrate the errors and mistakes in such a manner of understanding? Bart D. Erhman did precisely this in his book Misquoting Jesus. Ironically, Dr. Erhman originally started out from a perspective of “religious literalism”, and, yet, over a number of years of rigorous research into an array of subjects, he reevaluated his earlier approach to faith and came to a position which argued that there are many possible sources of mistakes and errors in the understanding advocated by “religious literalism”. On page 21 of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris goes on to claim: “Religious moderation is the product of secular knowledge and scriptural ignorance – and it has no bona fides, in religious terms, to put it on a par with fundamentalism. The texts themselves are unequivocal; they are perfect in all their parts. By their light, religious moderation appears to be nothing more than an unwillingness to fully submit to God's law. By failing to live up to the letter of the texts, while tolerating the irrationality of those who do, religious moderates betray faith and reason equally. Unless the core dogmas of faith are called into question – i.e., that we know there is a God and that we know what he wants from us – religious moderation will do nothing to lead us out of the wilderness.” I'm still waiting for something from Mr. Harris which substantiates his claim that “religious moderation is the product of secular knowledge and scriptural ignorance.” One suspects that, perhaps, one of the reasons why Mr. Harris appears so insistent on pushing the “religious literalism” angle is because without it, much of what Mr. Harris has to say with respect to religion is full of emptiness, signifying not much of anything. Indeed, and rather surprisingly, Mr. Harris appears to be a closet 'religious literalist' because he seems to be dead set against permitting any sort of hermeneutical engagement of religious scripture which is other than that of literalism as he wishes that term to be understood. One wonders why Mr. Harris insists that the 'literalist' approach to religious scripture is the only one which is permissible. Why should one accept Mr. Harris' claim that religious moderation – whatever that means – “has no bona fides, in religious terms, to put it on a par with fundamentalism”? What are the criteria that are to be used in determining such “bona fides”? What are the methods for determining those criteria? How should one go about evaluating the process of methodologically engaging such criteria? What does Mr. Harris mean by the phrase “religious terms”, and why should anyone feel inclined to accept his hermeneutical rendering of those terms? According to Mr. Harris, “the texts themselves are unequivocal; they are perfect in all their parts.” However, until one knows what was originally communicated to, say, Moses (peace be upon him) or Jesus (peace be upon him), and until one engages the original languages (for example, Hebrew and Aramaic) in all of their nuances, dimensions, or levels, and until one gains insight into the intentions and purposes of the One Who is communicating such texts, and until one can ascertain that one has grasped such intentions or purposes correctly, and until one has determined whether or not there have been any modifications of such texts and, if so, what those alterations involve, then, one is not in any position to make statements about what such texts mean unequivocally or what it even means to suggest that they are “perfect in all their parts”. Mr. Harris maintains that “by failing to live up to the letter of the texts, while tolerating the irrationality of those who do, religious moderates betray faith and reason equally.” Nowhere in his book, The End Of Faith, does Mr. Harris demonstrate why and how “the letter of the texts” constitutes the standard against which all things ought to be measured, nor does Mr. Harris prove or demonstrate anywhere in his book that religious moderates have remained silent with respect to any of the irrationalities which may arise in conjunction with those who insist on a literalist approach to engaging religion. Consider the following possibility. If one is commanded in one part of something which is considered a sacred text to defeat those who oppose one, but one is commanded in another part of that same presumed sacred text to love those who oppose one, then, what should one do? Why should one automatically assume that killing one's enemies should take precedence over loving one's enemies? What would be the argument favoring killing over loving? What are the operative principles here and why? What precludes the possibility that one might try to reconcile the two commandments by seeking to vanquish one's enemies by loving them? And, if one chooses to use love to vanquish one's enemies, how is this betraying the sacred text or how is it betraying reason? How would this, contrary to what Mr. Harris supposes, not be an expression of submitting fully to the Divine scheme of things? As much of the foregoing commentary illustrates -- albeit briefly -- Mr. Harris continually busies himself during the course of his book, The End of Faith, with proposing a variety of false dilemmas, oversimplifications, and 'strawman' arguments. His book is continually engaged in problematically framing various arguments in ways that he believes will irrevocably lead readers into the sort of philosophical cul-de-sac which he is seeks to fashion concerning issues of faith and reason, but his attempts at framing things in a manner that is deferential to his modality of understanding are infused with many arbitrary assumptions and presumptions, as well as with numerous logical errors, unanswered questions, and untenable conclusions. On page 23 of his book, Mr. Harris argues: “… every human being comes to desire genuine knowledge about the world. This has always posed a special problem for religion because every religion preaches the truth of propositions for which it has no evidence. In fact, every religion the truth of propositions for which no evidence is even conceivable. This put the “leap” in Kierkegaard's leap of faith.” What does Mr. Harris mean by “genuine knowledge”? Without ever being very precise in the way he goes about things with respect to this issue, Mr. Harris' perspective concerning the idea of knowledge is that in order for something to be considered genuine in the sense which he means, then that something must comply with either the principles of materialistic, physical science and/or that something must be expressible through principles of logic and reason. During the course of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris never defines logic or reason, nor does he defensibly explain and/or demonstrate why genuine knowledge must be a function of materialistic, physical science. Mr. Harris frames the situation according to his likes and dislikes, without ever really delving into any rigorous or critical detail about the characteristics, principles, theories, qualities, and properties he is using to frame his discussion. Throughout his discussion, he directs the reader's attention only toward what his frame permits one to discuss in a manner which must satisfy the properties and rules of that framing process. Mr. Harris never asks questions such as: What is logic and what makes it possible, or what is reason and what makes it possible, or what is understanding and what makes it possible, or what is memory and what makes it possible, or what is awareness and what makes it possible, or what is intelligence and what makes it possible, or what is insight and what makes it possible, or what proof is there that there is nothing more to reality than some form of material stuff however complexly this may be arranged, or why should one expect to ever discover anything more than variations on materialistic themes if materialistic presuppositions and methods is all one is willing to use? Mr. Harris doesn't raise such questions because he can't answer them and, instead, he wishes to frame the discussion in a way which suggests that these sorts of questions have little, or no, bearing on the claims he seeks to make concerning what is and is not genuine knowledge. Modern science presupposes logic, reason, consciousness, intelligence, insight, creativity, invention, and understanding but can explain none of these terms in a manner with which everyone can agree. Modern science, at least as presently conceived, has little, if anything, of universally demonstrable value to say about morality, justice, ultimate purpose, spirituality, community, and/or essential identity, and, yet, such issues are of much more pressing concern to the vast majority of human beings than are the sorts of questions with which science preoccupies itself … however important the latter kind of inquiry may be for certain dimensions of human existence. In his book The End of Faith, Mr. Harris deals with the idea of 'evidence' only in a prefabricated manner. For him, what counts as evidence is what he says counts as evidence according to the paradigm out of which he operates. The fact that he can point to others who operate out of the same paradigm proves nothing except the fact that there are those who share some of the same ideas about things as he does. What should count as evidence for the existence of God? We are faced with something akin to 'the glass is half full or the glass is half empty” sort of scenario. The perceptual filters through which one engages experience tends to determine what any given individual considers to count as evidence. Mr. Harris is inclined to critically elaborate upon the perceptual filters employed by people of faith, while leaving unexamined his own perceptual filters … in fact, he apparently would like to leave the reader with the impression that Mr. Harris perceptions are rooted in non-arbitrary, unbiased, without presupposition, totally objective, and value-free processes that allow him to see reality the way it really is. In his own way, Mr. Harris is a man of faith and has taken his own version of Kierkegaard's leap to which he referred in the earlier quote, except the things in which he has faith exclude the idea of God or Divinity. Mr. Harris has faith that science, reason, and logic – as he understands these things – will lead him to truth and genuine knowledge about the ultimate nature of things. Moreover, he has faith that 'people of faith' – the ones whose faith his faith rejects – have no access to either truth or genuine knowledge. However, Mr. Harris can't prove any of this. He counts certain things as evidence in support of his faith, and he rejects certain things as capable of counting as evidence for the faith of others, but he neither can prove the correctness of his way of defining the idea of evidence, nor can he disprove the way in which other people define the idea of evidence with respect to their own faith. Do any of the foregoing admissions necessarily make truth and reality a relative thing? Not at all! Someone's faith may, or may not, accurately reflect the nature of truth or reality. The fact that someone has faith does not, in and of itself, necessarily make the content of that in which one has faith congruent with, or correspond to, or a reflection of what the nature of reality actually is. As much as Mr. Harris might dislike the following claim, the fact of the matter is that he shares something in common with the people of faith with whom he has critically busied himself throughout his book. More specifically, both those who share Mr. Harris' brand of faith as well as those who advocate a faith which involves the idea of a Deity believe that reality has a certain nature which gives expression to some possibilities while not giving expression to other possibilities. Both sides of this argument believe there is a truth to things. They just have different faith approaches to trying to understand what the nature of that truth involves. On the other hand, there is a significant, potential difference between the two approaches to faith, broadly conceived, that are alluded to above. People of religious faith can make a place in their faith for the possibilities of science, but Mr. Harris has no place in his faith for the possibility of God. Although, sadly, not all people of religious faith are willing to entertain the possibility that science has the potential for revealing important truths about the nature of certain dimensions of the reality which Divinity has made possible, nonetheless, there need be no inherent contradiction between science and spiritual faith. Problems tend to arise in this regard when those who have certain vested interests in various theologies of science clash with those who have certain vested interests in theologies of spirituality. No person of faith – whether science based or spiritually based – should ever be afraid of discovering the truth. Unfortunately, what people of faith on both sides of the issue actually fear is that the truth – whatever that turns out to be -- will not support the particular theology of faith, whether scientific or spiritual in nature, to which they already may have committed themselves. Mr. Harris is an advocate for a theology of science which rejects the idea of God. This theology informs his faith with respect to the process of science. Through that faith he has prejudged the ontological and epistemological nature of reality despite the fact there is much we do not know and despite the fact there is much which has not, yet, been established in indisputable ways concerning that same reality. Mr. Harris, I believe, would like his readers to believe that the 'there is no God idea' is a conclusion which is based on positive evidence in support of his position. This is not so. Mr. Harris' entire position consists in trying to point out what he believes are errors in the logic of various people of spiritual faith. He seems to suppose that by doing this he somehow has demonstrated that God does not exist. He does not appear to consider the possibility that even if one were inclined to accept his arguments concerning the weakness of a given individual's argument about spiritual faith – and as the foregoing comments indicate, I am not always inclined to give Mr. Harris a pass on such things -- one can deduce nothing from Mr. Harris' criticisms of various individuals with respect to the existence of God issue. Mr. Harris is constructing an inductive argument. He, in effect, is saying: look at human beings A, B, C, D, E, F … Z, they all are committing logical, empirical, scientific, and rational errors … therefore, there is no God. Even if one were inclined to agree with Mr. Harris on every anti-religious theme about which he argues in The End of Faith – and I am not so inclined, although not everything Mr. Harris says in certain instances is necessarily wrong – neither God's existence nor God's nature is predicated on what people do or do not believe concerning the matter. Everything which any human being has ever said or ever will say about God may be filled with error, logical mistakes, questionable evidential considerations, irrationality, and more, but none of this, in and of itself, says anything about the existence or nonexistence of Divinity. God either is real or God isn't real. If God is real, then, God's nature either is as some people understand things, or God's nature does not reflect those people's way of understanding things. What is the nature of Mr. Harris' proof that God does not exist? He has none. He looks at fallible human beings and seeks to treat whatever may be the problems with the understanding of such individuals concerning the existence and nature of Divinity as evidence that God does not exist. The former has nothing to do with the latter. Mr. Harris has no evidence to offer concerning the existence or non-existence of God which is independent of the people he criticizes and wishes to count as evidence against the possibility of God's existence. There is no set of scientific or philosophical data to which Mr. Harris can point and indisputably assert which proves that God does not exist. Everything which Mr. Harris puts forth in this respect can be shown to be nothing more than an expression of his own faith system concerning the matter. People of religious faith cannot prove God's existence to Mr. Harris' satisfaction. Mr. Harris cannot prove the nonexistence of God to the satisfaction of people of religious faith. Where does this leave us? It leaves us with considerable uncertainty, but Mr. Harris does not shy away from seeking to portray his faith system as if it were totally logical, rational, completely empirically, non-arbitrary, verifiable, and true despite the fact that he cannot demonstrate this to the satisfaction of anyone except those who already think as he does or those who can be induced to accept Mr. Harris' way of framing the discussion. Mr. Harris proposes the following thought experiment in The End of Faith: “Imagine that six billion of us wake up tomorrow morning in a state of utter ignorance and confusion. Our books and computers are still here, but we can't make heads or tails of their contents. We have even forgotten how to drive our cars and brush our teeth. What knowledge would we want to reclaim first. Well, there's that business about growing food and building shelter that we would want to get reacquainted with. We would want to relearn how to use and repair many of our machines. Learning to understand spoken and written language would also be a top priority, given that these skills are necessary for acquiring most others. When in this process of reclaiming our humanity will it be important to know that Jesus was born of a virgin? Or that he was resurrected? And, how would we relearn these truths, if they are indeed true?” As usual, Mr. Harris both oversimplifies matters as well as frames his thought experiment in a way that serves his purposes instead of opening up the issue to any sort of genuine discussion. For example, let us suppose human beings do decide that growing food and building shelters should be at the top of the list of things about which they need to gain knowledge in order to regain their humanity. There is a litany of questions which Mr. Harris has not asked in his thought experiment. For example, what is the nature of the humanity which we supposedly are seeking to regain through such activities? To what extent does that sense of humanity depend only on having food and shelter? Does it matter what kinds of food are grown or what kinds of shelters are built or what impact that growing and building will have on the environment? How is humanity to decide the issue of who owns the land that the food is to be grown on or that the shelters are to be built upon? Who gets to decide who is to do the labor for these tasks and what compensation, if any, such individuals should receive for performing that labor? Where will people get the wherewithal for such ventures, and will credit be extended for those who do not have such wherewithal? Who will extend this credit and at what costs, and what justifies such costs? Will the food be grown for everyone or only those who can pay for it? What resources will be used in the growing and the building, and who gets to decide that this is how resources ought to be used? What happens if people become proprietary about the owning of land for the food and shelter? Who will adjudicate such matters and with what authority or justification? What should be done if people decide to use force to settle these issues? How should conflicts be handled or resolved? Is there a place in any of this for qualities and principles of: patience, humility, honesty, integrity, magnanimity, sincerity, nobility, tolerance, love, friendship, forgiveness, forbearance, equanimity, and charitableness? How are such principles and qualities to be understood and to be acquired? With respect to the machines that are to be used and repaired, what impact will their use and repair have on humankind and the environment? Who gets to decide what machines are to be used or where or when and by whom and for what purposes? Are these machines to be used only for the benefit of the few or for the benefit of everyone? How does one measure and evaluate such 'benefit'? If we are to learn how to understand spoken and written language, whose theory of hermeneutics concerning such understanding should one learn? Should language be used to deceive, mislead, manipulate, exploit, propagandize, or misinform other individuals? Who gets to set the standards of evaluating the uses to which language is put? Who gets to set the language curriculum? Should people be compelled to learn such a curriculum? What about conditions governed by: hatred, anger, contempt, jealousy, pride, selfishness, arrogance, or a desire to control others – will spoken and written language be used to help humanity learn to master such conditions? How should an individual's time and energy be spent? Should an individual only be allowed to use that time to grow food, or build shelters, or use and repair machines, or learn spoken and written languages for the purposes and in the manner that people like Mr. Harris set? Whatever one thinks about the idea of the importance of growing food or building shelters, one cannot treat these issues in isolation from asking fundamental questions about: what the nature and purpose of life are, or what it means to be a human being, or how human beings should determine the moral, social, political, economic, ecological, legal, and spiritual terms of how we go about the processes of growing food or building shelters or using machines or learning of language. Secular thinkers and spiritual thinkers have both addressed such issues in their respective ways, and, as well, they both have recognized that one cannot engage Mr. Harris' thought experiment without asking a lot more questions than Mr. Harris suggests is the case. One could agree with Mr. Harris that making efforts to ascertain knowledge concerning the status of Jesus' virgin birth, or issues involving the resurrection, may not necessarily have highest priority as one sets about seeking to reclaim one's humanity. On the other hand, if an individual were simultaneously to develop a relationship of faith with such matters and this hermeneutical orientation proved of value to the individual as she or he went about attempting to constructively engage the many questions that revolve about issues of food, shelter, technology, and learning language, then, how is Mr. Harris to argue that one cannot or should not do such things? Mr. Harris may find it hard to believe, but many human beings can actually chew gum and walk at the same time. As one goes about addressing the issues associated with the growing of food or the building of shelters, or the using of machines, or the learning of language, experiences happen; thoughts are thought; beliefs are developed; needs are assessed; judgments are made; actions are undertaken; results are evaluated. Faith arises in conjunction with one's hermeneutical engagement of the dynamic interaction among: experience, thought, belief, needs, judgments, actions and evaluations, and, over time, this sort of engagement generates a sense of confidence with respect to how one understands all of these things might be metaphysically, ontologically, and epistemologically held together, as well as the extent to which one feels that all of this accurately reflects the way reality makes such things to be possible. This is what faith is: a sense of things in which one has confidence but that can't be proven to the satisfaction of others but which, nonetheless, helps guide one through the day. Spiritual/religious people operate through this sort of faith, but so do secularists, scientists, agnostics, and atheists. Some theological ideas – whether scientific, philosophical or spiritual -- may be less helpful in this process than others. Individuals make their own decision in such matters. Truth and reality will be the final arbiter in all of this irrespective of whether one agrees with that process of arbitration or not. Mr. Harris has faith in a certain idea. More specifically, Mr. Harris has faith in the idea that truth and reality are functions of a universe which is physical, material, and biological in nature. Moreover, he is willing to acknowledge, I am sure, that while there may be much about the nature of this physical, material and biological universe that is not, yet, known, nonetheless, given enough time, resources, and effort, everything in the universe is capable, at least in principle, of becoming known and understood by human beings. People of religious faith are committed to the idea that there are dimensions to reality which transcend and are independent of physical, material, and biological realities, and, possibly, as well that human beings may not be able to grasp the truth and reality of all that is or which makes such being possible. Mr. Harris believes he can prove that his manner of faith is superior to the faith of the religious people he seeks to criticize. This is the purpose and nature of his book The End of Faith, but what he means by faith is the sort of faith which others have, not the sort of faith out of which he operates. Just as there are different species of philosophical, scientific, and secular faith [some more tenable and some less tenable], so too there are different species of religious and spiritual faith [some more tenable and some less tenable]. However, Mr. Harris is unwilling to accept such a state of affairs. He wishes to treat every species of religious or spiritual faith as the same … equally defective … equally irrational … equally illogical … equally problematic. He criticizes one's person's view and supposes, without demonstration, that the point can be universally applied to all species of religious or spiritual faith. This would be like saying that because scientist A is wrong about such and such a point, therefore, all scientists must be wrong. Or, it would be like saying that because, for example, one believed that John Locke was wrong about such and such a point, then, Kant and Hegel must also have been wrong with respect to whatever they might have said irrespective of whether one's criticism of Locke was at all relevant to either of the perspectives of Kant or Hegel. I feel relatively confident that Mr. Harris would reject the logical form of this kind of an argument in relation to scientists or philosophers. Therefore, why he would accept this sort of argument in the case of spiritual and religious matters is likely to have more than a little to do with the agenda which he has set for himself in his book and, consequently, serves as a source of bias in the way he filters issues and frames his discussion in that book. | Return to Menu | Part 1 | Part 2 | Next | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Copyright © 2008 Interrogative Imperative Institute. All Rights Reserved.