Spiritual Health Learning Community Center Exploring Life's Horizons »   About Islam Menu Sam Harris, The End of Faith, & Absence of Reason - Part 2 On page 16 of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris maintains that: “In places where scholars can still be stoned to death for doubting the veracity of the Koran [the] notion of a “loving concordat” between faith and reason would be perfectly delusional.” I disagree with Harris with respect to the foregoing. This is so for several reasons. However much I might disagree with some alleged scholar [and Mr. Harris is rather vague about what it actually means to be a scholar] who had doubts about the veracity of the Qur'an, I recognize that the condition of “doubt” concerning matters of faith is very much part of the human condition. Some people enter into the state of doubt and never re-emerge, becoming trapped in mazes of questions and unknowns. Other individuals wrestle with doubt and not only survive the struggle but flourish as a result of the challenges which doubt brings. Contrary to what Mr. Harris claims in the foregoing, the people who are delusional are not the individuals who seek to reconcile faith and reason in some productive manner despite the existence of a climate of unreasoned and ignorant hostility concerning such a project of reconciliation. The people who are delusional are the ones who believe that stoning someone is the best way to deal with the person who has doubts about where the truth lies in any given matter. Oftentimes, people kill others out of fear … fear of what the other signifies or means in the context of the lives of those who are of the belief that stoning someone is the solution of choice for dealing with such difficulties. For example, someone comes along and puts forth arguments as to why she or he doubts, say, the veracity of the Qur'an. If a person wants to stone that individual for stating or promoting such a belief, what is the motivation underlying this sort of inclination? There are a variety of possibilities. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to kill the doubter do not wish to be confronted with a variety of questions that they cannot adequately answer in their own minds and hearts concerning the nature of the Qur'an. Rather than recognize the problems of doubt which are present in their minds and hearts, it appears easier to such people to just remove the mirror which is reflecting back to them their private concerns, worries, and uncertainties in these matters. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to kill the doubter lack the understanding, insight, wisdom, or other tools of faith (such as patience, friendship, compassion, tolerance, forgiveness, and the like) that would permit them to engage the doubter in constructive rather than destructive ways. Under these sorts of circumstance, killing the doubter may just be an indirect admission of their own incompetence and inability with respect to the matter of faith and, thus, becomes a tragedy both for the one stoned, as well as for the ones who do the stoning. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to kill the doubter fail to appreciate that people come in all varieties of temperaments, understandings, abilities, weaknesses, interests, and purposes in matters of faith and doubt. The former may be anxious about the fact that everyone is not built to deal with matters of faith in the way in which they do, and, so, ignorance kills. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to stone the doubter lack insight and wisdom into the nature of reality and just don't get it that killing a person who has doubts denies that individual the right and freedom to continue the struggle which is at the heart of human existence. Whatever the problem may be with respect to the one who doubts, those who wish to kill the doubter compound the matter by interfering with that individual's hermeneutical and epistemological relationship with Being … how presumptuous and arrogant to believe that they have such a right. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to stone the doubter never were given a chance (or took the chance) in life to think for themselves. They may have suffered brain-death or heart-death (in the spiritual sense) from a very early age, and, therefore, don't know any better than to stone what they don't understand or what they fear. Blind obedience to some theology is all they know. On the other hand, perhaps in some of these people who may have suffered spiritual death in their own lives but who remain to walk the Earth as the living dead, there is some small part of them which recognizes that someone – namely, the doubter – is exploring issues that the ones who are inclined to stone doubters never were willing to investigate and there may be some trace of resentment or anger which fuels the stoning … to strike out at that individual who may be struggling with faith and who may, or may not, be doing a very good job with the struggle but who still is alive enough to exercise some degree of choice in the matter … something that the ones who stone may have left behind many years ago. Some individuals may be inclined to stone someone who is a doubter because the former believe that such an action is what others expect of them, just as some are inclined to kill innocents because they believe, according to others, that such actions are their patriotic duty, and in both cases these individuals do what they do out of fear of how others would react to them if they were not to do what is expected of them by others. In such instances, they stone or kill others not out of faith but out of a desire for self-preservation because they feel trapped in someone else's delusion. Perhaps some people are inclined to stone those individuals who have doubts about the Qur'an because the former believe they are merely following what they have been told are the prescriptions which are in the Qur'an, or they are just following what they have been told is the counsel of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in such matters. I don't know of any place in the Qur'an where is says that one should kill those who have doubts about the veracity of the Qur'an, although one is counseled that if one does decide to engage such matters, then one should do so artfully and with wisdom. Moreover, although the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) are used by many individuals in an attempt to justify why they believe they have the right to impose their views on others – and stoning someone is certainly an imposition – such would-be stoners appear to conveniently forget that the Qur'an specifically indicates that there can be no compulsion in matters of Deen or spirituality … the very issue with which doubters are struggling. Somewhat ironically, I find that quite a few of Sam Harris' pronouncements in The End of Faith appear to bear some of the same temperamental characteristics as the people against whom he rails – for example, those who are inclined to stone anyone who does not believe as they do or who have doubts about the veracity of the hermeneutical position of the would-be stoners. In most places, the stones which Mr. Harris seeks to throw are in the form of words or ideas, but there is no doubt in my mind that he wishes to kill – at least in a metaphorical sense – some of those who think differently than he does, and, more ominously, there are other places in his book where the desire to stone seems to be far less metaphorical and much more literal … and I will talk about these latter possibilities later in the commentary. Later on page 16, Mr. Harris claims: “The idea that any one of our religions represents the infallible word of the One True God requires an encyclopedic ignorance of history, mythology, and art even to be entertained – as the beliefs, rituals, and iconography of each of our religions attest to centuries of cross-pollination among them. Whatever their imagined source, the doctrines of modern religions are no more tenable than those which, for lack of adherents, were cast upon the scrap heap of mythology millennia ago; for there is no more evidence to justify a belief in the literal existence of Yahweh and Satan than there was to keep Zeus perched upon his famous throne or Poseidon churning the seas.” On the next page, Mr. Harris concludes by saying: “How is it that, in this one area of our lives, we have convinced ourselves that our beliefs about the world can float entirely free of reason and evidence?” One of the many problems with Mr. Harris' book, The End of Faith, is that although he often appeals, in a generic sense, to the idea of reason and evidence, as has previously been noted in this commentary, he never actually provides the details of what, precisely, he means by reason, nor does he provide any rigorous account of what should be accepted, and why, as being bona fide expressions of the rules of evidence in the matter of evaluating this or that position. By reading his book, one, of course, does come to understand that he believes that what he says is rational, reasonable, and based on evidential considerations while the positions of those with whom he disagrees are often referred to as being irrational, unreasonable, and lacking in evidential support, but in all too many cases all the reader has to go on is Mr. Harris' declarative assertion that this is so -- which is rather self-serving and circular in nature. Mr. Harris introduces the idea of cross-pollination to explain the similarities in beliefs and practices among various religious traditions. However, he does not seem to have considered the possibility that such similarities may be present because they constitute multiple manifestations of an underlying reality to which different spiritual communities have been exposed and about which they may come to speak in similar ways. In other words, without wishing to discount the idea that some kinds of cross-pollination may go on with respect to various spiritual traditions as individuals in one spiritual community develop modes of discourse that may be borrowed, to a greater or lesser degree, by other spiritual communities grappling with similar experiences, nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the different spiritual communities aren't trying to make identifying reference in relation to separate but similar experiences and engagements of Being. For example, if Mr. Harris were to see a beautiful sunset, and if I were to see the same beautiful sunset, and if Mr. Harris were to artfully or poetically or philosophically describe the experience of seeing the sunset, and I subsequently borrowed and used his description to try to give expression to the experience when speaking to others and, perhaps, embellished what he said with my own feelings and way of saying things, then, although cross-pollination is going on, this does not alter the fact that both Mr. Harris and I have had an experiential link to same underlying reality which exists independently of the descriptions which may have arisen in response to such an experience. Mr. Harris claims that “doctrines of modern religions are no more tenable than those which, for lack of adherents, were cast upon the scrap heap of mythology millennia ago; for there is no more evidence to justify a belief in the literal existence of Yahweh and Satan than there we to keep Zeus perched upon his famous throne or Poseidon churning the seas.” What are the criteria of tenability? What is Mr. Harris counting as evidence to justify his belief that “there is no more evidence to justify a belief in the literal existence of Yahweh and Satan than that was to keep Zeus perched upon his famous throne”? Why must the belief which one has concerning Yahweh or Satan be literal, and what does a belief in the “literal existence” of Yahweh and Satan even mean – literal in what sense? Why do some ideas – for example, that of gods – get thrown on the scrap heap of ideas, whereas other ideas – for instance, that of God -- stand the test of time and continue to exercise such an influence on the lives of so many? Is the idea of 'God' merely baseless mythology, or is there something real being given expression through that idea which transcends the possibility of mere mythology? Mr. Harris contends that the idea of God is no more tenable than the idea of Zeus or Poseidon. However, Mr. Harris' argument in this respect is largely an elaboration of his own belief about things concerning the question of the existence of a Divine Being … what is meant by 'tenability', 'reason', and 'evidence' are all functions of his belief system. Now, naturally, most of us, if not all of us, are caught up in the same dilemma as Mr. Harris – namely, trying to find some point of epistemological leverage which is independent of our beliefs about the nature of reality. However, this is a separate issue from the question of whether, or not, there is a Divine Being Who has an ontological status independent of our beliefs about that status. The former epistemological issues may suffer from any number of problems, but none of those problems necessarily demonstrates that there could not be a God which exists beyond our ratiocinative capacities to reason our way to the reality of that Being. Mr. Harris may not like to admit it, and the proponents of faith may not like to admit it, but reason, by itself, may not be capable of conclusively demonstrating the veracity of the position of either believers or unbelievers. However, viewed from within the familiar and comforting confines of the logic, evidential rules, and rational discourse of their respective paradigms, then, it often becomes all too easy to forget that we often engage Being through conceptual filters that both disclose and distort various levels of reality, and we are not always able to differentiate which is which. I am not proposing, nor am I proponent of, relativism. I am certain that reality has whatever properties, potentials, degrees of freedom, and qualities it has, but I also acknowledge the possibility that I may never come to know and understand what the nature of Being is, or I may only come to understand certain, limited facets of that reality. I also am willing to acknowledge the possibility, if not great probability, that there are those who have deeper insights into the nature of reality than I do. I may be right or wrong with respect to whom I believe these people to be. I am willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of some of Sam Harris' concerns with respect to how various individuals go about giving expression to their ideas of faith. At the same time, I am of the belief that some of Mr. Harris' arguments are not as well-reasoned, as evidentially based, or as tenable as he may suppose them to be. While I agree with Mr. Harris that some people have convinced themselves that their “beliefs about the world can float entirely free of reason and evidence” (and this is true both in relation to certain approaches to religion, as well as with respect to many approaches to politics, philosophy, education, law and economics). I and others whom I know or whose writings I have read but who are from different faith traditions than me make concerted efforts not to be among such individuals. We believe in reason and we believe in evidence, but, on occasion, we may approach such matters differently than does Mr. Harris, and this fact, in and of itself, says nothing about who might be right and who might be wrong in our respective forms of exercising reason or evidence or in our respective ways of characterizing reason or evidence or in our respective modes of critically examining our respective uses of reason and evidence. On pages 17-18, Mr. Harris begins his critique of religious moderates by saying: “Moderates in every faith are obliged to loosely interpret (or simply ignore) much of their cannons in the interests of living in the modern world. … In America, religious moderation is further enforced by the fact that most Christians and Jews do not read the Bible in its entirety and consequently have no idea just how vigorously the God of Abraham wants heresy expunged.” He develops his perspective by citing a passage from Deuteronomy concerning God's alleged guidance concerning the treatment of anyone, even a member of one's own family, who tries to induce one to believe in something other than Yahweh. Part of the passage which Mr. Harris quotes is as follows: “… you must not consent, you must not listen to him; you must show him no pity; you must not spare him or conceal his guilt. No, you must kill him, your hand must strike the first blow in putting him to death and the hands of the rest of the people following. You must stone him to death since he has tried to divert you from Yahweh your God ….” [Deuteronomy 13: 7-11] Like Mr. Harris, at various junctures in my life I have spent considerable time studying different philosophical and spiritual traditions. One of the topics which I studied and that overlaps both issues of philosophy and spirituality is the discipline of hermeneutics – which, loosely speaking, focuses on trying to understand how human beings come to understand any given theme, question, topic, problem, text, or issue. There are many theories of hermeneutics, and I am not trying to advocate one such theory as being superior to any other approach to the areas with which hermeneutics deals. However, some of the problems that need to be addressed by any theory of hermeneutics concerns the problem of translation which comes into play when we are trying to understand the meaning being communicated by some other author or speaker. Naturally, this is very relevant when it comes to considering the possible meanings of any 'guidance' which is alleged to have been transmitted to human beings from a Divine Being. Even in the case of human beings seeking to communicate with one another, there are many problems which arise concerning intention, purpose, meaning, and scope in relation to the one who is trying to convey some understanding to us. Such problems are multiplied when one does not have ready access to the original author or speaker and, as a result, one has to try to piece together possible meanings and intentions from different ways of engaging the given text or by augmenting such readings by this or that historical document or set of events. Is what someone is saying meant to be universal in scope or is it meant to apply only to a particular situation? Have we properly understood the meanings of the words being used as well as the intentions underlying those meanings? Are the words meant to be taken literally or are they metaphorical or could they be both? Are there nuances and subtleties entailed by the words which transcend the literal sense of the words being used? Are the words meant to induce us to act in certain ways, or are they intended to provide food for reflection and contemplation? To what extent are the words which are written or spoken at one juncture to be modulated or set aside by words which are written or spoken at other junctures? To what extent can we be sure that the words we may be reading or hearing about actually were said by a given individual, rather than doctored by someone else who is seeking to introduce problems of one sort or another into the process of translating and understanding? To what extent is that which is being translated – especially if from another language – a reflection of the original author or a reflection of the capabilities and interests of the individual doing the translating? Did Yahweh actually communicate the words of Deuteronomy that have been cited above or did someone else, for unknown reasons, introduce those words into the sacred texts? Were errors made in the transcribing of the original text from one generation to the next? For whom were the words intended? Were the words intended as universal prescriptions or were they intended for a specific, historical situation. Is the translation into English accurate? Are there nuances and subtleties of the original language which have been missed in the English translation? Are the words intended to be taken literally or metaphorically? Is there a mystical dimension to the original which is absent from a literal reading of the original text? Mr. Harris explores none of the foregoing possibilities in his book, The End of Faith. Rather, he approaches the whole matter with a preconceived agenda in mind and uses such passages as evidence in support of his preconceived notion of things. Until one can answer any of the foregoing questions with any degree of reliability, then, neither Mr. Harris nor those within the Christian or Jewish traditions who wishes to render the original, sacred text in ways which they claim serve as justification for invented theologies concerning their ideas about the intention, purpose, scope and nature of such 'communications', as well as presumed justification for treating harshly anyone who disagrees with their theological renderings of God's alleged meanings concerning one's relationship with Yahweh, have a demonstrated right to impose their ideas in this regard on anyone. Presumption is not the same phenomenological state as is knowing. In fact, even the term 'Yahweh' introduces distortion into the proceedings. The Hebraic equivalent of the letters YHVH (without any vowels, and this is known as a tetragramaton or tetragrammaton) is found in Hebrew texts as a linguistic stand-in, of sorts, for the actual name of the Divine reality because that name was considered to be too sacred to be pronounced. People from other religious traditions tend to by-pass the spiritual metaphysics surrounding this issue and simply use the term 'Yahweh' as the alleged name of the reality from which spiritual guidance arises. Many people suppose that when they name something, then, they understand what has been named. From the Jewish perspective since God is beyond human understanding, there is no way of naming that reality which does not lead to limitations in, and problems with, human understanding concerning the nature of such reality. Names like: Melech (King), Hashem (the Name), Adonai ('Lord'), and Elohim (the God of Life), are used as ways of referring to certain dimensions of the ultimate reality while avoiding actually naming or trying to pronounce that ultimate reality. Consequently, if problems such as the foregoing arise with respect to even the issue of naming or referring to Divine Reality – problems which Mr. Harris never alludes to or mentions -- then, what makes Mr. Harris think that he has got things right with respect to what that all-encompassing reality may have communicated to human kind through Moses (peace be upon him) in the form of a sacred text. He asks none of the right questions in this regard. He pursues none of the necessary hermeneutical issues with respect to the texts which he cites. Consequently, he is very, very premature in his attempts to use the passage from Deuteronomy which he 'quotes' as evidence for the position which he is attempting to put forth in his book. On page 19 of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris claims: “Religious moderation springs from the fact that even the least educated person among us simply knows more about certain matters than anyone did two thousand years ago – and much of this knowledge is incompatible with scripture.” Although the structure of Mr. Harris' argument is not spelled out, one suspects he may mean something along the following lines: namely, because those who are religious moderates supposedly recognize how inadequately religion stacks up against the knowledge of the 21st century, one has no choice but to back off from literal readings of scripture and try to cut one's losses by abandoning scripture where necessary and advocating only those aspects of scripture which might be reconcilable with the facts of modern life and science. One wonders what the empirical basis is for such an argument. I know of no scientific study which proves that at the heart of religious moderation is the fact which Mr. Harris cites in the foregoing quote. I believe one might be able to construct a much more tenable argument by arguing that religious moderation arises from an entirely different mode of hermeneutical engagement in relation to spiritual issues than does the literalist paradigm which Mr. Harris uses as his strawman argument. Even in relation to literalist approaches to, say, scripture [and I am not trying to defend such literalist approaches], what is the nature of all the knowledge to which Mr. Harris alludes which is allegedly “incompatible with scripture”? Does scripture necessarily deny quantum physics, electronics, mathematics, biological science, modern medicine, or the possibility of the internal combustion engine? Mr. Harris cites one lone issue in this regard. More specifically, he states on page 19 that: “Having learned about the known distance between objects in our universe, most of us (about half of us actually) find the idea that the whole works was created six thousand years ago (with light from distant stars already in transit toward the earth) impossible to take seriously. Such concessions to modernity do not in the least suggest that faith is compatible with reason, or that our religious traditions are in principle open to new learning; it is just that the utility of ignoring (or “reinterpreting”) certain articles of faith is now overwhelming.” Apparently, Mr. Harris is a little confused about things. Whether one accepts the Bible, in part or in full, or one rejects the Bible, partly or wholly, nowhere does the Bible say that the universe was created 6,000 years ago. The 6,000 figure is related to an estimate made by Bishop Usher (sometimes spelled 'Ussher') in 1650 based on calculations he performed with respect to the genealogies given in Genesis after making certain assumptions about, among other things, the length of life for various generations of individuals, as well as by making assumptions concerning whether anyone's genealogy was missing from the list, or whether the genealogies given were correct or when, precisely, those genealogies might have begun. One needs to draw a distinction between a given scripture and the manner in which that scripture is interpreted or used by this or that individual. The latter is not necessarily reflective of the former even if there may be certain points of commonality here and there between that which is being interpreted and the understanding of the one who is doing the interpreting. Even the issue of what is meant by the idea of a 'day' is not specified in the Old Testament. People have imposed their own interpretations on this term. While it may be true that the faith of some individuals might be incompatible with reason, Mr. Harris has not shown that faith, in general, is incompatible with reason. This assertion would remain so even if Mr. Harris were to have precisely defined what is meant by 'faith', 'reason' or 'compatible' anywhere in his book … something which he has not done, and this certainly remains so in light of the poorly argued example that Mr. Harris has given and which has been noted above. The word “reinterpreting” is used parenthetically in Mr. Harris' foregoing claim. Given the context in which that term appears within his book, the parenthetical expression seems intended to serve as something of a slight to any person of faith who decides to re-evaluate a situation and, in the process, arrives at a new understanding of her or his sense of faith. In point of fact, reinterpreting life due to changes in data is something which everyone does, including scientists and philosophers. In a sense, Mr. Harris seems to want to criticize people of faith no matter what they do. On the one hand, Mr. Harris wants to claim that “religious traditions are in principle” not “open to new learning”. On the other hand, he simultaneously appears to want to suggest that when people of faith engage in the process of “reinterpreting” data as new evidence is uncovered, then, this is merely a “utility of ignoring” or reinterpreting” evidence in an effort to salvage something from a situation which science and reason have shown contradicts faith. Thus, when a person of faith engages in the process of 'reinterpreting' evidence, Mr. Harris does not seem to want to interpret this as evidence of being open to new learning, or new possibilities, or new paradigms. Apparently, he believes that it is merely an exercise in rationalization. However, when scientists or philosophers engage in the process of reinterpreting their theories or hypotheses in the light of new data, this demonstrates their capacity to be open to new learning. Seemingly, Mr. Harris' manner of setting up the scales of evaluation concerning these matters is somewhat imbalanced and biased. On page 16 of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris maintains that: “In places where scholars can still be stoned to death for doubting the veracity of the Koran [the] notion of a “loving concordat” between faith and reason would be perfectly delusional.” I disagree with Harris with respect to the foregoing. This is so for several reasons. However much I might disagree with some alleged scholar [and Mr. Harris is rather vague about what it actually means to be a scholar] who had doubts about the veracity of the Qur'an, I recognize that the condition of “doubt” concerning matters of faith is very much part of the human condition. Some people enter into the state of doubt and never re-emerge, becoming trapped in mazes of questions and unknowns. Other individuals wrestle with doubt and not only survive the struggle but flourish as a result of the challenges which doubt brings. Contrary to what Mr. Harris claims in the foregoing, the people who are delusional are not the individuals who seek to reconcile faith and reason in some productive manner despite the existence of a climate of unreasoned and ignorant hostility concerning such a project of reconciliation. The people who are delusional are the ones who believe that stoning someone is the best way to deal with the person who has doubts about where the truth lies in any given matter. Oftentimes, people kill others out of fear … fear of what the other signifies or means in the context of the lives of those who are of the belief that stoning someone is the solution of choice for dealing with such difficulties. For example, someone comes along and puts forth arguments as to why she or he doubts, say, the veracity of the Qur'an. If a person wants to stone that individual for stating or promoting such a belief, what is the motivation underlying this sort of inclination? There are a variety of possibilities. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to kill the doubter do not wish to be confronted with a variety of questions that they cannot adequately answer in their own minds and hearts concerning the nature of the Qur'an. Rather than recognize the problems of doubt which are present in their minds and hearts, it appears easier to such people to just remove the mirror which is reflecting back to them their private concerns, worries, and uncertainties in these matters. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to kill the doubter lack the understanding, insight, wisdom, or other tools of faith (such as patience, friendship, compassion, tolerance, forgiveness, and the like) that would permit them to engage the doubter in constructive rather than destructive ways. Under these sorts of circumstance, killing the doubter may just be an indirect admission of their own incompetence and inability with respect to the matter of faith and, thus, becomes a tragedy both for the one stoned, as well as for the ones who do the stoning. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to kill the doubter fail to appreciate that people come in all varieties of temperaments, understandings, abilities, weaknesses, interests, and purposes in matters of faith and doubt. The former may be anxious about the fact that everyone is not built to deal with matters of faith in the way in which they do, and, so, ignorance kills. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to stone the doubter lack insight and wisdom into the nature of reality and just don't get it that killing a person who has doubts denies that individual the right and freedom to continue the struggle which is at the heart of human existence. Whatever the problem may be with respect to the one who doubts, those who wish to kill the doubter compound the matter by interfering with that individual's hermeneutical and epistemological relationship with Being … how presumptuous and arrogant to believe that they have such a right. Perhaps the individuals who are inclined to stone the doubter never were given a chance (or took the chance) in life to think for themselves. They may have suffered brain-death or heart-death (in the spiritual sense) from a very early age, and, therefore, don't know any better than to stone what they don't understand or what they fear. Blind obedience to some theology is all they know. On the other hand, perhaps in some of these people who may have suffered spiritual death in their own lives but who remain to walk the Earth as the living dead, there is some small part of them which recognizes that someone – namely, the doubter – is exploring issues that the ones who are inclined to stone doubters never were willing to investigate and there may be some trace of resentment or anger which fuels the stoning … to strike out at that individual who may be struggling with faith and who may, or may not, be doing a very good job with the struggle but who still is alive enough to exercise some degree of choice in the matter … something that the ones who stone may have left behind many years ago. Some individuals may be inclined to stone someone who is a doubter because the former believe that such an action is what others expect of them, just as some are inclined to kill innocents because they believe, according to others, that such actions are their patriotic duty, and in both cases these individuals do what they do out of fear of how others would react to them if they were not to do what is expected of them by others. In such instances, they stone or kill others not out of faith but out of a desire for self-preservation because they feel trapped in someone else's delusion. Perhaps some people are inclined to stone those individuals who have doubts about the Qur'an because the former believe they are merely following what they have been told are the prescriptions which are in the Qur'an, or they are just following what they have been told is the counsel of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in such matters. I don't know of any place in the Qur'an where is says that one should kill those who have doubts about the veracity of the Qur'an, although one is counseled that if one does decide to engage such matters, then one should do so artfully and with wisdom. Moreover, although the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) are used by many individuals in an attempt to justify why they believe they have the right to impose their views on others – and stoning someone is certainly an imposition – such would-be stoners appear to conveniently forget that the Qur'an specifically indicates that there can be no compulsion in matters of Deen or spirituality … the very issue with which doubters are struggling. Somewhat ironically, I find that quite a few of Sam Harris' pronouncements in The End of Faith appear to bear some of the same temperamental characteristics as the people against whom he rails – for example, those who are inclined to stone anyone who does not believe as they do or who have doubts about the veracity of the hermeneutical position of the would-be stoners. In most places, the stones which Mr. Harris seeks to throw are in the form of words or ideas, but there is no doubt in my mind that he wishes to kill – at least in a metaphorical sense – some of those who think differently than he does, and, more ominously, there are other places in his book where the desire to stone seems to be far less metaphorical and much more literal … and I will talk about these latter possibilities later in the commentary. Later on page 16, Mr. Harris claims: “The idea that any one of our religions represents the infallible word of the One True God requires an encyclopedic ignorance of history, mythology, and art even to be entertained – as the beliefs, rituals, and iconography of each of our religions attest to centuries of cross-pollination among them. Whatever their imagined source, the doctrines of modern religions are no more tenable than those which, for lack of adherents, were cast upon the scrap heap of mythology millennia ago; for there is no more evidence to justify a belief in the literal existence of Yahweh and Satan than there was to keep Zeus perched upon his famous throne or Poseidon churning the seas.” On the next page, Mr. Harris concludes by saying: “How is it that, in this one area of our lives, we have convinced ourselves that our beliefs about the world can float entirely free of reason and evidence?” One of the many problems with Mr. Harris' book, The End of Faith, is that although he often appeals, in a generic sense, to the idea of reason and evidence, as has previously been noted in this commentary, he never actually provides the details of what, precisely, he means by reason, nor does he provide any rigorous account of what should be accepted, and why, as being bona fide expressions of the rules of evidence in the matter of evaluating this or that position. By reading his book, one, of course, does come to understand that he believes that what he says is rational, reasonable, and based on evidential considerations while the positions of those with whom he disagrees are often referred to as being irrational, unreasonable, and lacking in evidential support, but in all too many cases all the reader has to go on is Mr. Harris' declarative assertion that this is so -- which is rather self-serving and circular in nature. Mr. Harris introduces the idea of cross-pollination to explain the similarities in beliefs and practices among various religious traditions. However, he does not seem to have considered the possibility that such similarities may be present because they constitute multiple manifestations of an underlying reality to which different spiritual communities have been exposed and about which they may come to speak in similar ways. In other words, without wishing to discount the idea that some kinds of cross-pollination may go on with respect to various spiritual traditions as individuals in one spiritual community develop modes of discourse that may be borrowed, to a greater or lesser degree, by other spiritual communities grappling with similar experiences, nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the different spiritual communities aren't trying to make identifying reference in relation to separate but similar experiences and engagements of Being. For example, if Mr. Harris were to see a beautiful sunset, and if I were to see the same beautiful sunset, and if Mr. Harris were to artfully or poetically or philosophically describe the experience of seeing the sunset, and I subsequently borrowed and used his description to try to give expression to the experience when speaking to others and, perhaps, embellished what he said with my own feelings and way of saying things, then, although cross-pollination is going on, this does not alter the fact that both Mr. Harris and I have had an experiential link to same underlying reality which exists independently of the descriptions which may have arisen in response to such an experience. Mr. Harris claims that “doctrines of modern religions are no more tenable than those which, for lack of adherents, were cast upon the scrap heap of mythology millennia ago; for there is no more evidence to justify a belief in the literal existence of Yahweh and Satan than there we to keep Zeus perched upon his famous throne or Poseidon churning the seas.” What are the criteria of tenability? What is Mr. Harris counting as evidence to justify his belief that “there is no more evidence to justify a belief in the literal existence of Yahweh and Satan than that was to keep Zeus perched upon his famous throne”? Why must the belief which one has concerning Yahweh or Satan be literal, and what does a belief in the “literal existence” of Yahweh and Satan even mean – literal in what sense? Why do some ideas – for example, that of gods – get thrown on the scrap heap of ideas, whereas other ideas – for instance, that of God -- stand the test of time and continue to exercise such an influence on the lives of so many? Is the idea of 'God' merely baseless mythology, or is there something real being given expression through that idea which transcends the possibility of mere mythology? Mr. Harris contends that the idea of God is no more tenable than the idea of Zeus or Poseidon. However, Mr. Harris' argument in this respect is largely an elaboration of his own belief about things concerning the question of the existence of a Divine Being … what is meant by 'tenability', 'reason', and 'evidence' are all functions of his belief system. Now, naturally, most of us, if not all of us, are caught up in the same dilemma as Mr. Harris – namely, trying to find some point of epistemological leverage which is independent of our beliefs about the nature of reality. However, this is a separate issue from the question of whether, or not, there is a Divine Being Who has an ontological status independent of our beliefs about that status. The former epistemological issues may suffer from any number of problems, but none of those problems necessarily demonstrates that there could not be a God which exists beyond our ratiocinative capacities to reason our way to the reality of that Being. Mr. Harris may not like to admit it, and the proponents of faith may not like to admit it, but reason, by itself, may not be capable of conclusively demonstrating the veracity of the position of either believers or unbelievers. However, viewed from within the familiar and comforting confines of the logic, evidential rules, and rational discourse of their respective paradigms, then, it often becomes all too easy to forget that we often engage Being through conceptual filters that both disclose and distort various levels of reality, and we are not always able to differentiate which is which. I am not proposing, nor am I proponent of, relativism. I am certain that reality has whatever properties, potentials, degrees of freedom, and qualities it has, but I also acknowledge the possibility that I may never come to know and understand what the nature of Being is, or I may only come to understand certain, limited facets of that reality. I also am willing to acknowledge the possibility, if not great probability, that there are those who have deeper insights into the nature of reality than I do. I may be right or wrong with respect to whom I believe these people to be. I am willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of some of Sam Harris' concerns with respect to how various individuals go about giving expression to their ideas of faith. At the same time, I am of the belief that some of Mr. Harris' arguments are not as well-reasoned, as evidentially based, or as tenable as he may suppose them to be. While I agree with Mr. Harris that some people have convinced themselves that their “beliefs about the world can float entirely free of reason and evidence” (and this is true both in relation to certain approaches to religion, as well as with respect to many approaches to politics, philosophy, education, law and economics). I and others whom I know or whose writings I have read but who are from different faith traditions than me make concerted efforts not to be among such individuals. We believe in reason and we believe in evidence, but, on occasion, we may approach such matters differently than does Mr. Harris, and this fact, in and of itself, says nothing about who might be right and who might be wrong in our respective forms of exercising reason or evidence or in our respective ways of characterizing reason or evidence or in our respective modes of critically examining our respective uses of reason and evidence. On pages 17-18, Mr. Harris begins his critique of religious moderates by saying: “Moderates in every faith are obliged to loosely interpret (or simply ignore) much of their cannons in the interests of living in the modern world. … In America, religious moderation is further enforced by the fact that most Christians and Jews do not read the Bible in its entirety and consequently have no idea just how vigorously the God of Abraham wants heresy expunged.” He develops his perspective by citing a passage from Deuteronomy concerning God's alleged guidance concerning the treatment of anyone, even a member of one's own family, who tries to induce one to believe in something other than Yahweh. Part of the passage which Mr. Harris quotes is as follows: “… you must not consent, you must not listen to him; you must show him no pity; you must not spare him or conceal his guilt. No, you must kill him, your hand must strike the first blow in putting him to death and the hands of the rest of the people following. You must stone him to death since he has tried to divert you from Yahweh your God ….” [Deuteronomy 13: 7-11] Like Mr. Harris, at various junctures in my life I have spent considerable time studying different philosophical and spiritual traditions. One of the topics which I studied and that overlaps both issues of philosophy and spirituality is the discipline of hermeneutics – which, loosely speaking, focuses on trying to understand how human beings come to understand any given theme, question, topic, problem, text, or issue. There are many theories of hermeneutics, and I am not trying to advocate one such theory as being superior to any other approach to the areas with which hermeneutics deals. However, some of the problems that need to be addressed by any theory of hermeneutics concerns the problem of translation which comes into play when we are trying to understand the meaning being communicated by some other author or speaker. Naturally, this is very relevant when it comes to considering the possible meanings of any 'guidance' which is alleged to have been transmitted to human beings from a Divine Being. Even in the case of human beings seeking to communicate with one another, there are many problems which arise concerning intention, purpose, meaning, and scope in relation to the one who is trying to convey some understanding to us. Such problems are multiplied when one does not have ready access to the original author or speaker and, as a result, one has to try to piece together possible meanings and intentions from different ways of engaging the given text or by augmenting such readings by this or that historical document or set of events. Is what someone is saying meant to be universal in scope or is it meant to apply only to a particular situation? Have we properly understood the meanings of the words being used as well as the intentions underlying those meanings? Are the words meant to be taken literally or are they metaphorical or could they be both? Are there nuances and subtleties entailed by the words which transcend the literal sense of the words being used? Are the words meant to induce us to act in certain ways, or are they intended to provide food for reflection and contemplation? To what extent are the words which are written or spoken at one juncture to be modulated or set aside by words which are written or spoken at other junctures? To what extent can we be sure that the words we may be reading or hearing about actually were said by a given individual, rather than doctored by someone else who is seeking to introduce problems of one sort or another into the process of translating and understanding? To what extent is that which is being translated – especially if from another language – a reflection of the original author or a reflection of the capabilities and interests of the individual doing the translating? Did Yahweh actually communicate the words of Deuteronomy that have been cited above or did someone else, for unknown reasons, introduce those words into the sacred texts? Were errors made in the transcribing of the original text from one generation to the next? For whom were the words intended? Were the words intended as universal prescriptions or were they intended for a specific, historical situation. Is the translation into English accurate? Are there nuances and subtleties of the original language which have been missed in the English translation? Are the words intended to be taken literally or metaphorically? Is there a mystical dimension to the original which is absent from a literal reading of the original text? Mr. Harris explores none of the foregoing possibilities in his book, The End of Faith. Rather, he approaches the whole matter with a preconceived agenda in mind and uses such passages as evidence in support of his preconceived notion of things. Until one can answer any of the foregoing questions with any degree of reliability, then, neither Mr. Harris nor those within the Christian or Jewish traditions who wishes to render the original, sacred text in ways which they claim serve as justification for invented theologies concerning their ideas about the intention, purpose, scope and nature of such 'communications', as well as presumed justification for treating harshly anyone who disagrees with their theological renderings of God's alleged meanings concerning one's relationship with Yahweh, have a demonstrated right to impose their ideas in this regard on anyone. Presumption is not the same phenomenological state as is knowing. In fact, even the term 'Yahweh' introduces distortion into the proceedings. The Hebraic equivalent of the letters YHVH (without any vowels, and this is known as a tetragramaton or tetragrammaton) is found in Hebrew texts as a linguistic stand-in, of sorts, for the actual name of the Divine reality because that name was considered to be too sacred to be pronounced. People from other religious traditions tend to by-pass the spiritual metaphysics surrounding this issue and simply use the term 'Yahweh' as the alleged name of the reality from which spiritual guidance arises. Many people suppose that when they name something, then, they understand what has been named. From the Jewish perspective since God is beyond human understanding, there is no way of naming that reality which does not lead to limitations in, and problems with, human understanding concerning the nature of such reality. Names like: Melech (King), Hashem (the Name), Adonai ('Lord'), and Elohim (the God of Life), are used as ways of referring to certain dimensions of the ultimate reality while avoiding actually naming or trying to pronounce that ultimate reality. Consequently, if problems such as the foregoing arise with respect to even the issue of naming or referring to Divine Reality – problems which Mr. Harris never alludes to or mentions -- then, what makes Mr. Harris think that he has got things right with respect to what that all-encompassing reality may have communicated to human kind through Moses (peace be upon him) in the form of a sacred text. He asks none of the right questions in this regard. He pursues none of the necessary hermeneutical issues with respect to the texts which he cites. Consequently, he is very, very premature in his attempts to use the passage from Deuteronomy which he 'quotes' as evidence for the position which he is attempting to put forth in his book. On page 19 of The End of Faith, Mr. Harris claims: “Religious moderation springs from the fact that even the least educated person among us simply knows more about certain matters than anyone did two thousand years ago – and much of this knowledge is incompatible with scripture.” Although the structure of Mr. Harris' argument is not spelled out, one suspects he may mean something along the following lines: namely, because those who are religious moderates supposedly recognize how inadequately religion stacks up against the knowledge of the 21st century, one has no choice but to back off from literal readings of scripture and try to cut one's losses by abandoning scripture where necessary and advocating only those aspects of scripture which might be reconcilable with the facts of modern life and science. One wonders what the empirical basis is for such an argument. I know of no scientific study which proves that at the heart of religious moderation is the fact which Mr. Harris cites in the foregoing quote. I believe one might be able to construct a much more tenable argument by arguing that religious moderation arises from an entirely different mode of hermeneutical engagement in relation to spiritual issues than does the literalist paradigm which Mr. Harris uses as his strawman argument. Even in relation to literalist approaches to, say, scripture [and I am not trying to defend such literalist approaches], what is the nature of all the knowledge to which Mr. Harris alludes which is allegedly “incompatible with scripture”? Does scripture necessarily deny quantum physics, electronics, mathematics, biological science, modern medicine, or the possibility of the internal combustion engine? Mr. Harris cites one lone issue in this regard. More specifically, he states on page 19 that: “Having learned about the known distance between objects in our universe, most of us (about half of us actually) find the idea that the whole works was created six thousand years ago (with light from distant stars already in transit toward the earth) impossible to take seriously. Such concessions to modernity do not in the least suggest that faith is compatible with reason, or that our religious traditions are in principle open to new learning; it is just that the utility of ignoring (or “reinterpreting”) certain articles of faith is now overwhelming.” Apparently, Mr. Harris is a little confused about things. Whether one accepts the Bible, in part or in full, or one rejects the Bible, partly or wholly, nowhere does the Bible say that the universe was created 6,000 years ago. The 6,000 figure is related to an estimate made by Bishop Usher (sometimes spelled 'Ussher') in 1650 based on calculations he performed with respect to the genealogies given in Genesis after making certain assumptions about, among other things, the length of life for various generations of individuals, as well as by making assumptions concerning whether anyone's genealogy was missing from the list, or whether the genealogies given were correct or when, precisely, those genealogies might have begun. One needs to draw a distinction between a given scripture and the manner in which that scripture is interpreted or used by this or that individual. The latter is not necessarily reflective of the former even if there may be certain points of commonality here and there between that which is being interpreted and the understanding of the one who is doing the interpreting. Even the issue of what is meant by the idea of a 'day' is not specified in the Old Testament. People have imposed their own interpretations on this term. While it may be true that the faith of some individuals might be incompatible with reason, Mr. Harris has not shown that faith, in general, is incompatible with reason. This assertion would remain so even if Mr. Harris were to have precisely defined what is meant by 'faith', 'reason' or 'compatible' anywhere in his book … something which he has not done, and this certainly remains so in light of the poorly argued example that Mr. Harris has given and which has been noted above. The word “reinterpreting” is used parenthetically in Mr. Harris' foregoing claim. Given the context in which that term appears within his book, the parenthetical expression seems intended to serve as something of a slight to any person of faith who decides to re-evaluate a situation and, in the process, arrives at a new understanding of her or his sense of faith. In point of fact, reinterpreting life due to changes in data is something which everyone does, including scientists and philosophers. In a sense, Mr. Harris seems to want to criticize people of faith no matter what they do. On the one hand, Mr. Harris wants to claim that “religious traditions are in principle” not “open to new learning”. On the other hand, he simultaneously appears to want to suggest that when people of faith engage in the process of “reinterpreting” data as new evidence is uncovered, then, this is merely a “utility of ignoring” or reinterpreting” evidence in an effort to salvage something from a situation which science and reason have shown contradicts faith. Thus, when a person of faith engages in the process of 'reinterpreting' evidence, Mr. Harris does not seem to want to interpret this as evidence of being open to new learning, or new possibilities, or new paradigms. Apparently, he believes that it is merely an exercise in rationalization. However, when scientists or philosophers engage in the process of reinterpreting their theories or hypotheses in the light of new data, this demonstrates their capacity to be open to new learning. Seemingly, Mr. Harris' manner of setting up the scales of evaluation concerning these matters is somewhat imbalanced and biased. | Return to Menu | Part 1 | Next | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Copyright © 2008 Interrogative Imperative Institute. All Rights Reserved.