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Dr. Jameson was thoughtful for about 15 seconds and, then, started to speak. "I would agree with you, Dr. Clarke, that the Iraqi people are oppressed by a brutal dictator who depends on violence in a fashion similar to the way an alcoholic depends on booze. I'm not sure I would agree with you on much of anything else you have said."

Before launching into her reply, Professor Donaldson was quiet for about twenty seconds. She looked at some of the walls of the room as well as the floor. Her eyes were traveling about the room, but her attention appeared to be focused on something within her.

She pulled out of her brief, reflective mode and started with: "Both during the time leading up to the Gulf War, as well in its aftermath, lots of analysts seemed to assume, almost automatically, that Iraq had nothing but grandiose delusions of grandeur driving it. These commentators all jumped on the bandwagon of a popular theory going around at the time which claimed that Iraq's intentions were to absorb all of the Gulf region into the greater glory of an expanding Iraqi empire that, subsequently, would proceed to bring the hated West to its knees.

"I'm not sure the evidence necessarily supports such a view. First of all, look at the parallels between the conditions which started the Iran-Iraq War and the circumstances that initiated the Gulf War. I alluded to these parallels earlier.

"In both Gulf wars Iraq invaded another country for very similar reasons. In each instance, Iraq desperately wanted access to the sea in order to supplement, if not replace, the more costly and cumbersome piping of oil through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, in the circumstances leading up to both Gulf wars, there was a dispute over boundaries that carried significant economic ramifications for Iraq: the Shatt al-Arab boundary in the case of Iran and the Rumeila oilfield in the case of Kuwait.

"In both the Iran-Iraq War and the second Gulf war, Iraq was extremely upset with the problems which the country being invaded was creating for Iraq. In the first Gulf War, Iraq was angry with the social and political difficulties that the Iranian Revolution was stirring up among the Shi'a majority of Iraq.

"In the second Gulf War, Iraq was angry at Kuwait for playing havoc with the Iraqi economy, which had been run into the ground as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. Kuwait was dumping quantities of oil onto the world markets far in excess of the agreed-upon quotas and, as a result, driving down the price of oil at a time when Iraq needed money to rebuild its economy and country.

"In addition, Iraq felt Kuwait was not only trying to wage economic war against Iraq but that Kuwait seemed to have a very short memory, and little sense of gratitude, concerning the sacrifices that Iraq had made during the Iran-Iraq War. These sacrifices of Iraqi life, property and economy had considerable direct benefits for Kuwait and the whole Gulf region."

Having laid the foundations for what was to follow, Professor Donaldson gave the audience a short mental break, before developing her position further. When the mini-break ended, she asked a series of questions.

"If Iraq had a mind-set focused on conquering Kuwait, why did it bother to stop at the border for a number of days in order to give Kuwait an opportunity to reconsider its intransigence? Why was Iraq open to the negotiating efforts of a number of Arab intermediaries? Why was Iraq willing to attend a mini-summit in Jeddah in order to discuss the matter?

"If I were a brutal dictator with imperialistic designs on conquering the whole Middle East, I wouldn't think twice about running roughshod over whatever stood in my way. I certainly wouldn't hang around a disputed border region and give my intended prey, or anyone else, an opportunity to prevent, or interfere with, my plans to seize my intended targets."

She shifted gears and steered in a slightly different, but related, direction. "A number of people have suggested that Iraq was trying to extort or blackmail Kuwait into concessions. As such, the show of force along the border was intended to intimidate Kuwait and elicit the desired response from them.

"If the foregoing is the case, then the intention of Iraq would not appear to be one of conquering Kuwait and, subsequently, the rest of the Middle East. Rather, Iraq had a specific purpose: namely, to gain access to the sea; to have a favorable settlement to the boundary dispute issue; and, thirdly, to get Kuwait to either forgive Iraq's war debt or to stop driving the price of oil down or both.

"In other words, the available evidence suggests Iraq may have been playing the situation straight up, although rather brutally. Iraq was not merely going through the motions of massing on the Kuwait border. If Kuwait refused to deal with Iraq in a way in which Iraq felt was fair under the circumstances, then Iraq, by force, would take steps to convince Kuwait of the desperateness and urgency of Iraq's economic problems.

"In short, Iraq was not bluffing. It was fed up with the situation. Iraq was fully prepared to take action immediately if Kuwait did not respond with what Iraq considered to be signs of good faith concerning Iraq's specific complaints against Kuwait.

"I believe the evidence that has been cited previously is quite consistent with my somewhat less sinister interpretation of Iraqi intentions and actions in relation to Kuwait. But, let's explore a few other possibilities."

She spent a short time collecting and organizing her thoughts. When she was ready, she began exploring some of the possibilities to which she had alluded.

"If I were a brutal dictator with aspirations to conquer other countries in the Middle East, and if I had several hundred thousand troops at my disposal, half of which were stationed along the Saudi border, then, after having secured Kuwait, I wouldn't have hesitated to move into Saudi Arabia and conquer it, while the opportunity presented itself, especially since there would not have been anyone available to stop me.

"If I'm willing to run the risk of invoking the wrath of the world for my invasion of Kuwait, then do I have anything more to lose, as far as world condemnation is concerned, by adding Saudi Arabia to my list? 'In for a penny, in for a pound', would be my motto if I were a brutal dictator intent on conquering and controlling the Gulf region."

As a sort of afterthought to what had been said previously, she declared: "Incidentally, in passing, one ought to remember that US intelligence actually misled the Saudis concerning the alleged offensive posture of Iraqi forces. More specifically, among other things, the US satellite photographs of Iraqi troop deployment along the Saudi border could only show possibilities. Those photos couldn't possibly have disclosed what the intentions of the Iraqis were concerning Saudi Arabia.

"The significance of the photos had to be interpreted in order to forge a link between troop deployment and Iraqi invasion intentions vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. As it turns out, these interpretations of the satellite photos were wrong because Iraq never did invade Saudi Arabia.

"This misdirection by the United States played a key role in convincing the Saudis that an invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraq was imminent. As a result, the Saudis acceded to US pressure to begin deploying US forces on Saudi soil.

"Whether the misdirection was intentional or inadvertent is not really clear.

"Irrespective of which may be the case, it is unfortunate that the Saudis didn't appear to ask themselves a few questions.

"For instance, if Iraq really were intent on invading Saudi Arabia, why didn't the Iraqi forces take the plunge when it could have done so with a minimum number of casualties? Why didn't the Iraqis go ahead and invade Saudi Arabia when its international public image would not have taken much more of a beating than already was the case for having invaded Kuwait?

"There are quite a few people, both within Saudi Arabia as well as outside of that country, who would not shed any tears if the ruling Saudi monarchy were to be removed from its throne of power. An Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia might have brought a surprising mixture of responses from the four corners of the Muslim world, with the reaction of people in the streets being, very possibly, markedly different than the official statements issuing from those countries.

"In any event, the United States' rapid deployment force would not have been able to adequately defend Saudi Arabia. It would have been up against a much larger Iraqi army with already established lines of communication and logistical support."

"All of the foregoing is predicated on the alleged 'fact' that American satellite photos showed the Iraqis to be massed along the Saudi border. However, to deepen the plot, the fact of the matter is that Russian satellite images of the same Middle East region at the same time show no Iraqi troops massed along the Saudi border ... obviously, someone is manufacturing 'evidence' because both sets of satellite phots cannot be true simultaneously."

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