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"Another problem surrounding the issue of dispositional judgements concerning, say, violent behavior is the following. We often evaluate situations very differently depending whether we are talking about others or about ourselves.

"Frequently, we are quite prepared to label someone else's behavior as violent, while denying that the same kind of act done by ourselves is violent. We have a tendency to rationalize our acts and, as a result, we color them as reasonable or justifiable or appropriate.

"Generally, this process of cosmeticising our acts means that either we do not count our acts as violent or we call them legitimate acts of violence. In the latter case, we often like to argue that such legitimate acts of violence should not be considered as being relevant to any assessment, by ourselves or others, of our dispositional tendency toward violence.

"This process of rationalization and denial that allows us to dissociate our self-image from some of the acts we perform can lead to very bizarre situations. A person can be quite abusive of others, even to the point of torturing such people, and, yet, believe himself or herself to be a decent, peaceful, compassionate, non-violent individual. All it takes is a little creative emotional book-keeping in relation to whether we label our acts as liabilities or assets.

"One trick which is used to cook these emotional ledgers is the following. We say to ourselves the other person's acts of violence reveal something essential about that person. Such acts, we say, are inherent features of that person's being, like some species of original sin.

"Our own acts of violence, on the other hand, are judged to be nothing more than peripheral, temporary lapses. Momentary storms in an otherwise peaceful sea. We tend to always see ourselves as playing Abel to the other person's Cain."

Professor Donaldson started to lean on the rostrum but found it a little unstable. She straightened up and moved to the side of the rostrum.

"Not surprisingly," she declared, "we often do not extend to others the same liberties, privileges or degrees of freedom involving dispositional judgements that we generously extend to ourselves. Instead, we frequently label the explanations of others, concerning their behavior, to be expressions of denial or propaganda or mere excuses intended to help them avoid responsibility for the real nature of their acts.

"Judgements about whom does violence to whom can become quite problematic. For example, one person censors another and, in the judgement of the latter, the former is doing violence to the freedoms, rights or beliefs of the latter. On the other hand, from the perspective of the one whom is doing the censoring, the views of the one being censored do violence to fundamental values, principles or standards of the ones doing the censoring.

"Such differences of opinion concerning the perceived locus of violence about, in this case, the issue of censorship, often lead to other actions by the concerned parties. These further actions raise the same question of whom does violence to whom, in, yet, another context. The process is called 'escalation'."

Moving back behind the rostrum, she said: "The act of labeling can itself be an expression of violence. When rumor, gossip, slander, libel, innuendo, and unfounded speculation destroy a person's life, violence has been done to such an individual.

"Consequently, when governments or the media refer to an individual or an organization as a terrorist group, there are a number of questions which need to be asked and explored. For instance, what behaviors are being counted as constituting acts of terrorism?"

Dr. Donaldson scrunched up her lips in a way that suggested she were considering something. "Suppose," she began, "an organization is trying to defend itself against oppression or attempting to confront some sort of social injustice and, as a result, uses violence as part of its response to such perceived wrongs. Does the display of violence necessarily mean such an organization deserves to be labeled as 'terrorist'?

"Revolutionaries, freedom fighters, underground resistance groups, and guerrillas all use violence. When does their use of such violence qualify as acts of terrorism? How do we differentiate between possible legitimate uses of violence and illegitimate expressions of violence?"

She took another drink of water. This time she continued to hold the glass in her hand while expanding on her previous comments.

"Why were the mujahidin's acts of resistance with respect to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan widely considered to be the acts of patriots, but the mujahidin of Palestine or Lebanon are said to be terrorists? They both employed extreme acts of violence. In both cases, innocent people, along with not-so-innocent people, lost their lives as a result of the actions of the mujahidin. What factors are influencing our dispositional judgements to treat similar acts of violence in comparable situations in quite different ways?

"Consider another, related case. There were individuals who journeyed from various Muslim countries to Afghanistan in order to lend support to the mujahidin. They were said to be freedom fighters.

"Yet, when these individuals returned home and fought against injustices, oppression and abuses of human rights similar to those in Afghanistan, they became terrorists. What led to this transformation in our judgements of their dispositional behavior with respect to the use of violence?"

Professor Donaldson gave her question a chance to percolate in the minds of the audience. She returned the glass to the rostrum and quickly swept her eyes across the faces in the room, sighing slightly.

"When Jewish resistance groups, such as Irgun, Lehi or Haganah, took the lives of innocent people or Jewish collaborators, they were said to be fighting a war of liberation against British occupation. When the PLO took the lives of innocent people or Palestinian collaborators while trying to fight a war of liberation against Israeli occupation, the PLO was said to be a terrorist group. Why are we treating similar cases in very different ways?

"Between 1948 and 1956, various Israeli military operations massacred a total of over 1000 Palestinian civilians. These deaths occurred at places like: Deir Yassin, Doueimah, Qibya, al-Bureig, Kafr Kassim and Khan Yunis.

"The PLO did not come into existence until 1968, more than twelve years after the acts of Israeli violence against Palestinians to which I've just alluded.

However, between 1968 and 1981, various PLO military operations massacred a total of some 280 Israeli citizens. Yet, despite beginning quite a long time after the initial Israeli acts of violence against Palestinians, and despite being less than one-third as deadly as the attacks of their Israeli counterparts, the Palestinians are the only ones who are considered terrorists.

"There seems to be considerable inconsistency in the way the same kinds of acts of violence are being labeled in situations that bear many resemblances to one another. Considerations of race, religion, ethnic origins, national aspirations, political affiliation, economic interests, and media biases all can skew this labeling process."

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