Pages 5 and 6 -
Chapter One: "On the most external level, Islam is a religion that tells
people what to do and what not to do. Right and wrong practices are delineated and
codified by the Sharia, which is a compendium of systematic law based squarely on Koranic
teachings and prophetic practice, but adjusted and refined by generation of scholars....
"On a deeper level,
Islam is a religion that teaches people how to understand the world and themselves. This
second dimension corresponds to the mind. It has traditionally been called
"faith," because its points of orientation are the objects to which faith
attaches - God, the angels, the scriptures, the prophets, and so on....
"On the deepest
level, Islam is a religion that teaches people how to transform themselves so that they
may come into harmony with the ground of all being. Neither activity nor understanding,
nor both together, are humanly sufficient. Activity and understanding need to be focused
in such a way that they bring about human goodness and perfection. This goodness is
inherent and intrinsic to the original human disposition (fitra) created in God’s
image...."
Commentary: While
one could agree that one way of engaging Islam is as a compendium of ‘what to do and
what not to do’ which is "based squarely on Koranic teachings and prophetic
practice", nevertheless, there are only a little over 500 verses (out of some 6000+
verses) in the Qur’an which are directed toward Shari'ah-type injunctions, and,
moreover, there is a great deal in the life of the Prophet which extends beyond his role
as a custodian of Divine Law. Even in their most outward senses, the Qur’an and the
life of the Prophet were giving expression to models that were more than a function of
Shari'ah considered as a litany of permissions and prohibitions.
In fact, one might easily
argue that people (first in 7th century Arabia, and, then, subsequently, down through
history and throughout the rest of the world) were first attracted to, or
captivated by Islam, due to a set of readily accessible considerations other than Shari'ah.
More specifically, on the one hand, people were attracted to the way the Qur’an
informed human beings about God, themselves, their history, the universe, as well as the
spiritual possibilities inherent in life and, thereby, provided people with a manner of
being oriented to existence as a whole. In addition, people who became Muslim were
attracted by the numerous ways in which the life of the Prophet gave expression to love,
kindness, forgiveness, tolerance, patience, honesty, integrity, compassion, selflessness,
sincerity, commitment, gentleness, humility, friendship, loyalty, and a host of other
qualities. Finally, many people, especially those who knew Arabic, were attracted to the
incredible beauty - both in the sense of linguistic structure, as well as in terms of the
richness of meanings - of the recited Qur’an.
None of the
aforementioned considerations has anything to do with the constraints and permissions of Shari'ah, and, yet, they are among the most readily accessible features of the Islamic
tradition. Indeed, before someone commits herself or himself to struggling with the
requirements of Shari'ah, an individual must be motivated or induced to do so by factors
other than the Shari'ah taken solely in itself, and it is the general metaphysical, moral,
and spiritual models of the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet which provide such
motivation for the vast majority of people.
Now, one cannot
necessarily refer to this initial attraction, which arises out of exposure to the
non-Shari'ah facets of the Islamic tradition, as either knowledge or faith since the
individual may not have any insight into the nature of that which is attracting one or
which she or he finds attractive with respect to Islam. Nonetheless, there is an inclination
present which is capable of leading, in time (sometimes quickly and sometimes not), to
acknowledging or acquiescing or bearing witness, in some minimally necessary way, to the
truth of the first Pillar of Islam - namely, that there is no reality but God and that
Muhammad (peace be upon him) is the messenger of God.
The four other Pillars of
Islam follow from this starting point, and, indeed, give structured expression and
direction to this initial acceptance of the reality of the first Pillar. Consequently, the
author’s contention that the Shari'ah constitutes the most external sense of Islam
would seem to be incorrect, or, at the very least, in need of qualification.
The author goes on to
argue that "on a deeper level, Islam is a religion that teaches people how to
understand the world and themselves. This second dimension corresponds to the mind. It has
traditionally been called ‘faith,’ because its points of orientation are the
objects to which faith attaches - God, the angels, the scriptures, the prophets, and so
on."
The author is confusing
two different loci of understanding - mind and faith. Perhaps part of the reason for this
confusion is that both ‘mind’ and ‘faith’ are considered by many of
those whom are academically, philosophically or theologically inclined, to have to do with
belief systems that purport to give expression to knowledge or understanding concerning
the nature of some given focus of attention.
Approached in this
fashion, faith is one of the products generated by the activities of the mind in which a
firm conviction is invested in some given belief. In turn, the mind is considered to be a
function of an array of rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious, forces.
When the activities of
the mind generate an understanding which is said to reflect, more or less accurately, some
aspect of the world or experience, then, this result tends to be referred to as a piece of
knowledge or information concerning the world or experience. Critical reflection often
ensues, at this point, concerning whether, or not, such claims of knowledge are justified
in these sorts of instance, and, if so, to what degree or extent are they justified and
what are the criteria of justification.
‘Faith’ is
neither a belief system nor the product of mental processes. At the same time, however,
faith is something which can both shape beliefs and mental processes, as well as be shaped
by belief systems and mental processes.
For example, previously,
faith was characterized as a state, station, or condition which consisted of both a
certain kind of knowledge, together with some level of doubt (or absence thereof). When
knowledge is increased and/or doubt is decreased, faith is said to be greater, and when
knowledge is decreased and/or doubt is increased, then faith is said to have declined or
waned or wavered.
An enhanced condition of
faith can inform, color, shape, direct, and orient the processes of the mind. On the other
hand, the processes of the mind cannot only introduce doubt, questions, and confusion into
the realm of faith, but can, as well, offer up important information to be engaged by the
heart and explored in the latter’s search for greater certitude concerning knowledge
about the nature of truth or reality.
However, faith is rooted
in the workings of the heart. It is not a product of mind if the latter is understood to
be a factory of interacting, if not competing, rational, irrational, conscious and
unconscious processes.
When the mind seeks to
pass judgement on the processes of the heart, the mind is entering into a realm which is
beyond its grasp or understanding. Nevertheless, having said this, one cannot argue, as
previously noted, that any strongly held opinion or conviction an individual might have is
necessarily an expression of faith in the sense of a way of knowing that is rooted in the
workings, states, stations and conditions of the heart as a faculty of understanding which
is separate from the workings, states, stations and conditions of the mind.
Therefore, one could
agree with the author’s contention that faith often entails something deeper than the
Shari'ah considered as a compendium of prohibitions and permissions. On the other hand, the
author is incorrect when he treats ‘faith’ as an activity or product of the
mind.
In addition, the
author’s contention that this deeper level of Islam - which involves, from his
perspective, mind and faith - "teaches people how to understand the world and
themselves" is not quite correct. The process of teaching people a way of
understanding "the world and themselves" had, as noted earlier, already begun,
in all likelihood, upon initial exposures to the Islamic religious tradition -
irrespective of whether these initial exposures were through the Qur’an or the life
of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) or someone who was following the Deen of
Islam. Indeed, this kind of understanding about the world and themselves may have been
important parts of any decision to formally commit themselves to trying to live in
accordance with Shari'ah, rather than the other way around.
Of course, faith - in the
sense of a knowledge about some aspect of spirituality, Deen, fitra, or the like - would
also teach people about the world or themselves and would do so at a deeper level than
would be the case through initial exposures. However, as indicated above, this deeper
knowledge would not be mind-generated, and, moreover, this deeper understanding, which is
rooted in faith, actually would be closely linked to an individual’s observance of,
and commitment to, the various facets of Shari'ah which the author cited as being merely a
matter of the external level of the Islamic tradition.
The author also maintains
that this second, deeper level of Islam - a level he associates with the mind - "has
traditionally been called ‘faith’ because its points of orientation are the
objects to which faith attaches - God, the angels, the scriptures, the prophets, and so
on. To begin with, whatever one might think about "angels, the scriptures, the
prophets, and so on", God is not an object, but for the author to word things in this
way does tend to indicate he is looking at ‘faith’ as largely a mental,
conceptual issue.
Although somewhat
ambiguous in as much as the referent of "its" is somewhat unclear (i.e., does
"its" refer to the activities of mind or to faith?), the author states that
"its points of orientation are the objects to which faith
attaches". Presumably the form of this ‘attachment’ is a mental one or is
an expression of the operations of mind, however, the author does not elaborate on this so
one is left with a certain amount of uncertainty concerning the nature of this
‘attachment’.
Whether one treats
‘faith’ as a mental process or as a heart process or as some other kind of
process, the same set of questions can be asked. Is there a subject-object dichotomy
between faith and that which is known through faith, or is faith another kind of
relationship of knowing, altogether, quite apart from object-subject splits in which that
to which ‘faith’ attaches itself is some sort of object separate from the
activity of faith? And, if the latter should be the case, then, what is the nature of this
relationship of knowing that is rooted in something besides object-subject splits?
This set of issues and
questions will be encountered again during later stages of the examination of Sufism
- A Short Introduction and, God willing, shall be more fully elaborated upon at
those junctures. For now, let it be said that faith is a way of knowing something in
accordance with a condition of heart which is ‘open’ - to varying depths
(depending on the richness and quality of this knowledge), as well as to varying degrees
of clarity (depending on the amount of doubt present) - to the reality of what is known in
faith.
In other words, faith is
not the sort of knowledge which arises from the outside of that which is to be known.
Instead, faith operates from within whatever is being known and reflects, to varying
degrees of depth and clarity, the reality of what is known. From this perspective, faith
is not a form of knowing which attaches to some object of mental engagement, such as God.
Rather, faith is, in this case, a form of knowing which is rooted in some dimension of
Divinity.
Similarly, when faith is
considered in the context of "angels" "scriptures",
"prophets", and so on, the knowledge in question is not an understanding which
is constructed mentally and represents an ‘object’ of knowledge
which is removed from the knowing process. Instead, something of the reality of the realm
of ‘angels’, ‘scriptures’, ‘prophets’, and so on, is known
through the participation of faith in this realm of reality.
To borrow a phrase from
hermeneutics, faith ‘merges horizons’ with what is to be known through the
heart. The extent of this merging and the nature of the horizons involved depends on the
strength and quality of the faith involved.
The author of Sufism
- A Short Introduction maintains that on its deepest level, "Islam is a
religion that teaches people how to transform themselves so that they may come into
harmony with the ground of all being". This is not quite correct.
People cannot transform
themselves. Only God can bring about this transformation.
Just as the author points
out that "neither activity nor understanding [i.e.,adherence to Shari‘ah and the
knowledge of faith respectively], nor both together, are humanly sufficient" to lead
to the fulfilment of human potential, so too, the mystery of spiritual transformation is
beyond the ability of human activity and understanding considered in and of themselves.
The Will of God alone is both necessary and sufficient to effect such a transformation.
Nevertheless, the seeds
for the possibility of transformation are planted through, among other things, struggling
to establish Shari'ah and faith within one’s life. Human effort is a necessary
prerequisite for the possibility of subsequent spiritual transformation even though
struggle and effort, considered in themselves, are not enough to effect such changes.
According to the author
of Sufism - A Short Introduction, "activity and understanding [i.e.,
adherence to Shari‘ah and the knowledge of faith, respectively] need to be focused in
such a way that they bring about human goodness and perfection. This goodness is inherent
and intrinsic to the original human disposition (fitra) created in God’s image".
Irrespective of how an
individual might try to focus "activity and understanding", these will not, in
and of themselves, "bring about human goodness and perfection". Islam is not a
set of techniques concerning, for example, Shari‘ah, faith and focusing that can be
applied like some sort of complex algorithm which, merely through reiteration or
repetition, will permit the desired result of "human goodness and perfection" to
be forthcoming. Acceptance of human efforts lies entirely with the Will of God.
Furthermore, while one
could agree, in some broad sense, that the ‘potential’ for "goodness and
perfection" are inherent in, and intrinsic to, "the original human
disposition" or fitra, what is meant by ‘goodness and perfection’ may
extend, in part, beyond the realm of ‘ihsan’, as exalted as this latter stage or
station or condition may be. For, although the ability to worship or serve God as if one
saw Him, may be part of the equation, there may be more to the essence of goodness and
perfection than just this facet of things.
The Hadith cited by the
author does not prohibit this possibility. The Prophet was answering questions as they
were asked, and while ‘islam’, ‘iman’ and ‘ihsan’ are
fundamental aspects of the Deen being taught by Gabriel (peace be on him), the potential
of ‘fitra’ which is mentioned in the Qur’an (and to which the author also
refers in the quote with which the present Commentary began) may both
include, as well as extend beyond, the three aforementioned facets of Deen
The foregoing possibility
(i.e., that the potential of fitra may involve more than ihsan) is very much related to
the issue of being "created in God’s image" - a phrase which is mentioned
at the very end of the quotation, from the author of Sufism - a Short Introduction,
that forms the focus of the current Commentary. What is meant by the phrase
"created in God’s image", and what principles might be inherent in the
understanding underlying this phrase, may have a great deal of bearing on developing a
better sense of what is involved in the ‘reality without a name’.
In fact, it is
conceivable (and this will be explored later on in other Commentaries) that
the goal may not be "goodness and perfection" per se. The goal may be the
realization of the potential of fitra which gives expression to goodness and perfection in
accordance with the capacity of fitra to do so.
God alone is good and
perfect. So, whatever fitra may be, it fulfills its role or function or purpose or
potential by ‘being’ in accordance with what God’s goodness and perfection
require of it (i.e., fitra).
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