Part Three

Surprisingly enough, after denouncing the mutationist perspective through much of Biology and Knowledge, Piaget does advance a sort of modified version of mutationism - although quite different from the classical mutationist position of someone such as de Vries. Piaget's approach to this issue, however, is couched in the context of his own epigenetic models, in which the basic focus is on the importance of recombinations within a cybernetic system. Piaget states:

"The first thing to notice here is that recombinations can have no effect unless.... applied to the differences between the elements that are being reorganized. Now, unless we assume that there are perpetual new formations in the genes, we have to say that new genes are engendered from their predecessors by means of the progressive addition of specific and limited mutations. There must, therefore, be a process of intra-genetic variation at the DNA nucleotid level. In view of, this, the way in which recombination exploits mutation by means of efficient combinatorial systems is of capital importance for the process of evolution... recombination provides an explanation for those vital initiatives taken by living creatures in the course of evolution, whereas chance or selection alone offer none."¹⁶

To be sure, recombinations would provide an explanation of vital initiatives if they were of such a nature that they could generate such initiatives, but Piaget tends to gloss over a few problems too quickly and, as a result, one is left puzzling over certain aspects of his exposition. For example, in a footnote, Piaget indicates that

Darlington, Lewis and John all:

"... calculate the recombination index in terms of the sum of the haploid number of chromosomes and the average number of crossings-over per cell."¹⁷

Without delving into what causes cross-overs or what cross-overs are possible or whether such cross-overs are governed by any laws of transposition - and, if so, what those laws are and why - or whether such cross-overs could really produce anything not already present, in principle, in the genetic givens (of either the individual or the population), Piaget seems to feel that the idea of recombination is sufficient to lay the foundations for a theory capable of explaining evolutionary change. Of course, he carefully notes that recombinations "can have no effect unless applied to the differences between the elements that are being reorganized", but even having said this (aside from leaving unanswered the question of exactly what sort of differences between elements are to be considered appropriate -that is, differences considered from what perspective), Piaget seems to be alluding to some rather sophisticated differentiating capabilities on the part of whatever is responsible for the recombination process at the sub-cellular level.

This "whatever is responsible for recombinations" is another dimension (although presumably represented somewhere in the cybernetic aspects of the genome) that is devoid of crucial details with respect to how, for instance, the analysis of differences actually takes place. Moreover, even if one overlooks the vagueness of the meaning of "neoformations", one still has difficulty in understanding:

(a) what is meant by a "specific and limited mutation"; (b) how they occur; (c) whether there are limits on the kind of mutations which can occur, and (d) why one should treat recombinations as being of fundamental when: (1) a cybernetic system (which, according to Piaget a genome is) represents a relational totality in which everything is an integral part of the overall system, and (2) recombinations are functionally dependent on "specific and limited mutations" since "new genes are engendered from the predecessors by means of the progressive addition of" such mutations.

Conceivably, as far as (d) above is concerned, one could counter this by arguing that without such mutations, Piaget, or someone arguing on his behalf might maintain that recombinations "exploit mutations by means of efficient combinations systems". However, this position could, itself, be countered by arguing that without such mutations there would be nothing to exploit except the possibilities inherent in the individual or the population - which may be limited to the reaction norm and some recessive variations on either side of the norm.

Even allowing for a wide latitude of combinations, how anything will be produced which is sufficiently new that the new structure differs from the reaction norms (plus variations) in a way that will lead to the foundation of new species, classes, phyla, and so on, is something of a mystery. Furthermore, one tends to be curious about how such "efficient combinations systems" even come into existence without: (a) assuming very much like a preformationist perspective, or (b) assuming they come about by chance.

Surely, if one rejects (a) - as Piaget, undoubtedly, would - and given that "new genes are engendered from their predecessors by means of the progressive addition of specific and limited mutations" then, how else is one to explain the appearance of systems" except by happy circumstance and chance since there exists no systematic means for exploiting such mutations.

Of course, as far as the credibility of Piaget's thesis is concerned, the forced choice between (a) and (b) is equally disastrous. Seemingly, however, at least (a) might allow him to continue on theoretically without being totally inconsistent - although, presumably, he might have to considerably alter or re-think some important aspects of his position - especially concerning epigenesis.

While discussing the mutationist position, Piaget launches an attack against the notion of preformation which tends to be caught-up with the mutationist's position. In other words, given that the early mutationists believe that variations of a lasting sort (i.e., genotypic) - and not a temporary kind (i.e., phenotypic) - are caused by events inside the gene and given that they believe such events are not connected, in any significant way, with external or environmental circumstances and, therefore, are not part of any cybernetic genome/environment interchange, then, according to Piaget, such a position is committed to maintaining that all future possibilities are already present, in some sense, in the gene.

Piaget views such a position as being of a preformationist kind - a thesis which he already has indicated, on several previous occasions in Biology and Knowledge, as being nothing short of preposterous. For example, at one point in the first chapter of his book, when discussing how mathematical/logical operations are rooted in the coordination of actions, he argues:

"... do we have to conclude that the whole of mathematics is laid down in advance to our nervous system? Not only is this unthinkable, but the facts prove that logic itself, even in its most "natural" forms, is by no means innate in human beings in the sense that it exists at any age."

Piaget continues his critical analysis of preformationism by discussing the position of Konrad Lorenz (see page 117 ff. in Biology and Knowledge), who Piaget characterizes as being both neo-Darwinian and Kantian. With respect to the latter aspect of this characterization, Piaget argues that the preformationism notion is really only a variation on Kantian apriorism in which the individual comes to any given situation with a set of ready made structures (i.e., categories) that frame and color experience and give to such experience its "necessary" qualities.

Piaget, however, may be premature in his equating preformationism with Kantian apriorism, for while one could easily contend that apriorism does represent one kind of preformation thesis, one is not obligated to claim that all cases of preformation must be instances of apriorism in Kant's sense.

During his analysis of Lorenz' preformationist position (which does have Kantian overtones), Piaget refers to Lorenz' interest in instinctual phenomena and outlines what he feels is a serious difficulty for such a position. This problem concerns the issue of necessity:

"In the biological field there is nothing biologically necessary about instincts, since they vary from one species to another, and there are no instincts common to all the species except, maybe, the preservation of life, which, lacking special organs, has nothing specifically instinctive about it, whatever people say, and is merely a functional continuation."¹⁸

Aside from wondering why something must have a special organ in order to be a candidate for instinctual phenomena or why the notion of "functional continuation" - even if one were to accept such an idea - could not have an instinctual dimension or character, regardless of what Piaget says, there is a much more immediate problem in Piaget's statement . More specifically, this problem revolves about Piaget’s assumption that for something - in this case instincts - to be necessary, they must be identically evident from one individual to another or they must be held in common by all individuals.

The nature of necessity may be clothed in different contingencies from situation to situation, but such contingencies should not be confused with the underlying set of factors or themes that may constitute the. dimension of necessity. Piaget, himself, readily admits (e.g., see page 215, 1st paragraph, Biology and Knowledge) that the origins and generative principles of instincts are completely unknown, and, therefore, for him to claim that "there is nothing biologically necessary about instincts" seems rather presumptuous.

On the basis of the kinds of problems which have been thrown at Piaget in the last several pages, even if one were to agree with him concerning his basic criticisms of Lamarck's theory (i.e., it underestimates activity of organism and overlooks the dimension of interaction between organism and environment) and the mutationist position (i.e., it is unreconciled with modern data indicating the cybernetic quality of biological phenomena as well as being based on a rather far-fetched account - i.e., randomness - of evolution), Piaget is not in any position to claim that the epigenetic account of evolution is superior to other alternatives. Perhaps, one would be more accurate if one were to say that while one might agree that the synthetic approach to evolution is more comprehensive and adequate, in some sense, than either of the other two evolutionary positions outlined above, the synthetic approach still hasn't established that an evolutionary theory based on an epigenetic approach to biological phenomena is more adequate, with respect to accounting for the available evidence, than is a preformationist theory based on, say, a creationist approach to biological phenomena.

One reason for claiming the foregoing is that there is nothing to prevent a preformationist from adopting large portions of the synthetic approach and, then, adjusting various facets of the synthetic position to a preformationist perspective. In other words, much of the evidence compiled by modern genetics represents data that fit equally well into either an evolutionary or a preformationist framework and, consequently, doesn't necessarily give the former approach any edge over the latter one.

In any case, a preformationist can subscribe to many genetic discoveries and principles (including the cybernetic models which Piaget values so highly) without necessarily becoming involved in any inconsistency or contradiction. The difficulties, of course, arise when one comes to the issue of whether the different genealogical levels are the result of evolutionary transformations over time (going from simple to complex) or whether the various species, families, classes; phyla and kingdoms resulted from instantaneous creation (either all at once or in periodic 'bursts').

Piaget, by rejecting Lemarckian, mutationist and preformationist views, obviously believes that the notion of epigenesis can provide an adequate account of evolution and represents a valuable means of getting at unsolved biological problems as well. However, there is still, at least, one remaining major obstacle which must be removed before one might be more favorably disposed toward Piaget's position. One still does not know what epigenesis entails, or even what it means, on a biological level. That is, while one understands in general terms what Piaget is trying to get at by employing the notion of epigenesis, one does not know how this concept is to be translated into a workable biological mechanism or principle capable of explaining how either life arose or intelligence evolved.

For example, consider the following quote:

"As soon as it is recognized that selection is brought to bear only on phenotypes and that, throughout their period of development, all phenotypes continue to be a series of directed by the environment, then it becomes possible to speak of... ‘cybernetic circuits’, and development can be seen as a series of organizational ladders, all different and all perpetually subject to cyclic causality."

In general terms, the essential principle of epigenesis stipulates that: all organization is a development and all development is an organization, and this principle represents the ‘tertium quid’ that, according to Piaget, allows evolution to float, so to speak, between the fixed hereditary system of preformation and the dominating influence of Lamarck's environmental functionalism (e.g., see Biology and Knowledge, pp. 120-125).

Nevertheless, after all is said and done, one is left with a rather uneasy feeling that evolution still remains a mystery. To use some terminology favored by Piaget, how does one explain a genomic response to environmentally created tension that falls outside (as it must if Piaget is not to be charged with harboring a preformationist position) both the reaction norm of the individual organism's genotypes as well as the population's reaction norm? Even if one were to add depth and breadth to the notion of "reaction norm" and allow for a wider range of phenotypic possibilities based on 'multiple' variations, one is still puzzled about how, for example, 'new' species would be created on the basis of the allowable combinations with respect to a given genome or a population of such genomes.

At one point, Piaget says:

"The genes as a whole, which are often thought of today as being structural and regulatory, simultaneously and without exception, do not exist in a fixed state but are continually breaking down and making new formations, by some internal metabolism, in the course of genetic transmission."

However, precisely this internal metabolism of the gene is what must be known in order to understand how recombinations of the possibilities within the gene could lead to formations that were significantly different from existing reaction norms to lead toward, given time, new species.

In short, if Piaget wishes to avoid being forced into a preformationist position, he must be able to account for - in epigenetic terms - the emergence of totally different reaction norms which would be capable of, eventually, leading to what would be characteristic of, a new species, or new class, or new phylum, or new kingdom. Apparently, this may be as much a mystery to Piaget as it is for someone trying to understand what Piaget means here.

16. The major exception to this is the case of radiation from an external source which effects the gene. Obviously, such an admission means we no longer are talking about a 'pure' mutationism involving only endogenous factors. In any event, the point to emphasize here is that the mutationist position, even with this acknowledgment, is a considerable distance from the sort of cybernetic process which Piaget has in mind.[Back to Text]

17. When considering Piaget's position vis a-vis epigenesis, one might keep in mind a certain amount of evidence collected by Luthur Burbank and others. These data indicated what seemed to be a principle inherent in the breeding experiments they had performed - namely, the tendency of a species, when pushed along various lines of phenotypic transformations, to encounter certain limits beyond which the species, apparently, could not go without becoming sterile and/or dying out.

Closely related to this principle is what has been referred to by some as the 'law of reversion to average'. This has been observed to occur after the products of extended breeding experiments were returned to a natural setting and their descendants, subsequently, manifested the tendency, within a few generations, to revert to the boundaries of the reaction norm for the given characteristic of the species in question.

Both of the above points tend to add to the puzzlement one encounters when trying to come to grips with how epigenesis works since they represent counter-evidence to the sort of explanation Piaget is trying to establish. That is, they lend strong support to the possibility that there are limits which are built into the genetic system of any given species.

In order for Piaget to have a plausible theory, he must explain how it is possible to by-pass what seem to be the structural and functional limitations that are intrinsic to the genome. Vague references to the internal metabolism of the gene, however, do not accomplish this task.[Back to Text]