The
Central Problem
What might
be referred to as interactionist theme is a hallmark of Piaget's genetic epistemology. As
Piaget states very early in Biology and Knowledge:
"... no
form of knowledge, not even perceptual knowledge constitutes a simple copy of reality,
because it always includes a process of assimilation to previous structures." 1
There is a
certain amount of ambiguity in the foregoing statement because it is not clear whether
Piaget is saying: (1) he is advocating a copy theory of reality (although not a simple
one); or, (2) he is not putting forth a copy theory of reality - simple or otherwise;
rather, he is suggesting that assimilatory activity interferes, to varying degrees, with
determining the nature of reality.
This
ambiguity remains unclear after noting that Piaget claims:
"Knowing
does not really imply making a copy of reality but, rather, reacting to it and
transforming it (either apparently or effectively) in such a way as to include it
functionally in the transformation systems with which these acts are linked." 2
Although an
individual is said to be capable of transforming reality, one is still uncertain about the
relationship between the nature of the transformation and the degree to which it
accurately reflects, represents or captures various qualities of that which is
transformed.
A short
while later, however, one runs into a brief discussion of certain kinds of transformations
which seems to indicate that Piaget does allow for the possibility of a copy theory of
reality, even if such a theory tends to be complex in character. More specifically, when
Piaget talks of mathematical/logical transformations, he does convey the distinct
impression that one is potentially capable of penetrating to the true nature of reality.
For example, consider the following:
"It may
be said that... mathematics acts simply as a kind of language. But mathematics is much
more than that since it alone can enable him to reconstruct reality and to deduce what
phenomena are, instead of merely recording them... Mathematics consists not only of all
actual transformations but of all possible transformations. To speak of transformations is
to speak of actions or operations the latter being derived from the former..."3,
and, when
discussing the nature of logic, he stipulates:
"Logic,
for its part, is not to be reduced, as some people would have it, to a system of notations
inherent in speech or in any sort of language. It also consists of a system of operations
(classifying, making series, making connections, making use of combinative or
‘transformation groups’ etc.) and the source of these operations is to be found
beyond language in the general co-ordinations of action."4
Apparently,
on the basis of the foregoing, reality can be reconstructed through the application of
operations that are derived from activity rooted in systems having mathematical/ logical
properties which co-ordinate such action. Thus, as a first approximation of what Piaget
may be getting at here, he seems to be saying that mathematical/logical transformations
yield results in which the understanding (in this case a mathematical/logical
one) bears an analogical relationship to that aspect of reality which to which the
transformation gives expression such that the actual object, situation, or event is
accurately represented to some degree.
According to
Piaget, the thread that runs through the whole epistemological process - giving it its
direction and tying it together - is "action". Through certain features of
actions (once repeated, differentiated, recombined, and so on, in particular ways from one
situation to another), a context of assimilation is established consisting of various
sorts of themes.
Since such
themes are rooted in, and result from, actions, Piaget refers to them as "action
schemata". Consequently, according to Piaget "to know an object implies
incorporating it into action schemata" (pp. 7-8).
There are,
however, several questions which are raised by this latter contention of Piaget's. First
of all, although the term 'action schemata' gives implicit, if not explicit, reference to
the notion of organization, the source and nature of such organization remains somewhat
vague.
Even when
one invests such organization with a mathematical/logical quality, one is, at this point,
unclear about a number of things. For example, does Piaget hold that: (1) the various
transformations which produce (as well as being derived from) still other transformational
processes, somehow generate the mathematical/logical character of the existing
organization without themselves being mathematical/ logical in nature - and if this is the
case, how does one account for a non-mathematical/logical transformational context being
able to produce a transformational structure having a mathematical/logical dimension?
or,(2) the various transformational contexts have an inherent mathematical/logical
structural and/or functional character which they transmit to subsequent action schemata.
Presumably,
Piaget would claim (1) is the case since (2) contains a strong flavor of preformation -
which, in such circumstances, he tends to reject. Therefore, following the course of his
arguments in order to examine how he attempts to bridge the apparent gap between
qualitatively different transformational contexts may prove instructive.
Piaget's
contention about knowing - that is, knowing implies that the process of incorporating,
into action schemata, a given thing or event which is to be known - raises various
questions with respect to the nature the knowing which precipitates out of such
incorporating activity. Seemingly, merely assimilating, for example, an object into action
schemata is not enough to guarantee or necessitate the object's being known in any
significant manner - at least not without further transformations being performed in
conjunction with what is being assimilated. If this is so, then, the generation of
knowledge implies that not just any sort of incorporating activity is sufficient, and the
acquiring of knowledge also implies that not just any action schemata will do - rather,
one must have an ‘incorporating activity’ and an ‘action’ schemata
which give rise to something which constitutes a change in understanding concerning some
aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
Presumably,
for Piaget (given his previous statements on, for instance, mathematics) the character of
both must be of a mathematical/logical nature However, asking why the nature of the
incorporating activity or the action schemata must be of a mathematical/ logical sort in
order for one to be able to legitimately speak of knowledge, does not appear to be
unreasonable In other words, what demands that all knowledge must be an expression of
mathematical/ logical structures and processes?
For example,
when a mystic speaks of love of God as being immersed in the knowledge of God, how does
one reduce this to the sort of mathematical equations or logical relationships to which
Piaget is alluding? Or, when someone writes a poem, or paints a picture, and so on, what
is the mathematical or logical character of creativity?
With respect
to questions concerning the origins of the property of 'organization' in the knowing
process, Piaget wishes to concentrate upon the biological basis of epistemology. Although,
in the matter of the formation of action schemata, he has no intention of overlooking the
roles played by the general environment and the particular nature of the objects or events
to be known, Piaget, clearly, wants to emphasize the importance of "internal",
biological factors in generating action schemata - in terms of both the structural form of
such schemata as well as their concomitant functions.
Among the
most basic of these internal factors, Piaget lists the general neurophysiological
framework, including certain reflexes and instincts - which in the case of human beings
are considered minimal in number and influence. Nevertheless, what reflexes and instincts
do exist in humans, together with the spontaneous movement that occurs as a result of
general activity in the nervous system, represents, according to Piaget, the foundations
from which, among other things, cognitive schemata will gradually emerge.
In addition
to the foregoing sorts of internal factors, Piaget also emphasizes an organizational
dimension of biological activity which tends to frame all such phenomena - from the
simplest to the most complex. This is known as auto-regulation or equilibration.
Auto-regulation
refers to what seems to be a characteristic feature of organic processes on all levels.
This involves the feedback systems within any given biological unit (the organism taken as
a whole, or considered in terms of some portion thereof such as a given organ or cell)
that modulate or regulate the biological unit's internal processes with respect to the
immediate environment.
Moreover,
according to Piaget, a given biological entity develops and the related species - taken as
a whole - evolves (see Biology and Knowledge, pp. 23-26) through the increasing
differentiation of organic and cognitive networks. Such differentiation come about as a
result of the gradually broader base of activity to which auto-regulatory structures and
functions are applied.
When
examining the issue of organization in biological systems (whether in terms of various
structures and functions or in terms of the feature of equilibration) , one might keep in
mind that Piaget distinguishes between organic and cognitive systems. That is, the latter
are not, strictly speaking, reducible to the former.
To be sure,
cognitive systems would not be possible without the organic foundations which they
presuppose and out of which they gradually emerge. However, a crucial part of Piaget's
theoretical framework stresses the importance of differentiating between organic and
cognitive dimensions.
For Piaget,
the most essential aspect of this differentiation concerns the notion of
"epigenesis" which, generally speaking, refers to the idea that some, if not
all, biological structures and functions (either organic or cognitive) develop in relation
to, but somehow separate from, the hereditary underpinnings that initially generate such
structures and functions.
In addition
to using the notion of epigenesis to explain cognitive development - and following
Waddington - Piaget also extends the epigenetic notion to the evolutionary context in
order to account for the gradual differentiations of organisms - both in terms of within a
given species, as well as in terms of the transformations from one species to the next.
Furthermore, just as general organic and cognitive networks are governed by, and organized
according to, auto-regulatory or equilibratory systems, so too, are genetic networks
(i.e., genomes) regulated and organized according to such systems.
Thus,
according to Piaget, there is an isomorphic continuity from one context to the next - from
the genetic to the embryological, and from the morphological to the physiological and the
cognitive. These various levels of functioning are tied together by the epigenetic and
equilibration features which they hold in common and which conserve the organism through
the various transformations, and yet, these same features of epigenesis and equilibration
give expression to the differentiation which takes place as one goes from one level to the
next within a given organism, and from one species to the next within the evolutionary
context (see, for example, Piaget's discussion on pages 120-125 in Biology and
Knowledge).
However,
these notions of epigenesis and equilibration - especially the former - are among the most
problematic aspects of Piaget's theoretical framework. While one can easily acknowledge
that the cybernetic characteristics of many organic networks are fairly well documented in
the biological literature, the precise meaning of equilibration with regard to cognitive
and evolutionary networks is much more hypothetical in nature.
To be sure,
with respect to cognitive structures and functions, Piaget conceives the various stages -
extending from the pre-sensorimotor period to the level of formal operations - to be a
series of equilibrations which tend toward greater and greater stability (the most stable
being the stage characterized by mathematical/logical structures and functions). However,
there are, at least, two points of contention concerning Piaget’s perspective.
(1) Why
should one treat the mathematical/logical structures and functions of the formal stage of
operations as the most stable, or even the highest, form of the equilibration process? (2)
Is cognitive development more accurately depicted in terms of a process of 'progressive'
equilibration in which one, somehow, goes from one level, with one set of properties, to
another level, with a different set of properties, or is cognitive development more akin
to a process of unfolding in which inherent capabilities are brought to fruition according
to a complex interaction of motivational, emotional, intellectual, and environmental
factors - process of ‘complex interaction’ that are not necessarily a function
of any equilibration process (although, on occasion, this may be the case)?
Both areas
of contention above relate to similar sorts of questions which can be raised in connection
with Piaget's proposed relationship between equilibration and evolutionary phenomena.
Perhaps, the most important of these questions concerns why one should either characterize
such phenomena as a function of auto-regulatory processes or, better yet, why one should
accept the presupposition on which such a characterization is based: namely, that
evolutionary phenomena occur at all.
This latter
point leads directly to the issue of epigenesis, for much of Piaget's theoretical
foundations depends heavily on whether he can build a tenable theory on the basis of the
epigenetic notion. If Piaget could accomplish this, then, among other things, he might be
in a strong position to argue that:
(a) one
should treat mathematical/logical structures and functions as the most stable of the
equilibration processes; (b) equilibration did accurately characterize the developmental
process, and (c) there was strong evidence in favor not only of the existence of evolution
but of its having an auto-regulatory nature.
Moreover, if
successful in the foregoing quest, Piaget would have provided a plausible scenario for the
source and nature of the organizational dimension that permeates biological activity on
every level: evolutionary, organic and cognitive, and, in so doing, constitutes a theme of
continuity - as indicated previously - that links the various levels one to another, even
while providing for their differentiation, both within and between levels. Clearly, the
notion of epigenesis is a very powerful and essential, theoretical tool for Piaget.
Piaget
himself states the nature of the problem very well when he says:
"...
cognitive functions, seen in this light, are specialized organs of auto-regulation
controlling the exchanges underlying all behavior. But having said as much, if we are to
continue the argument in biological terms, we shall have to explain how such cognitive
auto-regulations might be formed... What needs to be explained is where cognitive
functions get the instruments of auto-regulation which they are to exert."5
Furthermore,
although Piaget seems to feel the answer to the foregoing problem is fairly simple when he
contends that:
"...
cognitive auto-regulation makes use of the general systems of organic regulation such as
are found at every genetic, morphogenetic, physiological and nervous level, and forthwith
adapts them to their new situation..." 6
he merely
has pushed the problem back one space. He has not removed it. Now, he must explain, on the
one hand, where the "general system of organic regulations" comes from, and, on
the other hand, he must account for how the system of cognitive auto-regulations develops
the ability to adapt the general system to new situations.
