Chronobiology - Part Five

Generating analogs for reality

According to Francois Jacob, a biologist, organisms generate a biological, space-time analog of reality. The structural character of this analog will depend on a variety of factors such as: the way in which an organism is sensorially hooked into the environment, as well as the manner in which such information is processed, transformed, organized, shaped, stored, oriented, and so on, once the sensory data has gone through the initial process of transduction.

Depending on the species and the circumstances, and, depending on what sort of sensory modalities an organism has available to it, an organism may generate a variety of spatial analogs of external reality. Thus, for example, one can speak in terms of acoustic space and aromatic space, as well as visual space or proprioceptive space.

Furthermore, temporal cues often shape the structural character and orientation of such spaces. For example, in the superior olivary complex, fairly subtle comparisons are made concerning time differentials for a given sound reaching each ear. These temporal differences are used to help construct acoustic space.

Each kind of sensory process will give expression to a characteristic ratio of temporal and spatial vectoral currents. All of these currents are woven together to produce a complex analog representation of external reality.

Acoustic space, visual space, proprioceptive space, and so on, are fundamental currents that shape and orient an organism's mode of analogically representing various aspects of reality. However, in human beings, one cannot reduce reality to a set of sensory analogs. In fact, sensory analogs become incorporated into even more complex hermeneutical analogs of reality.

Hermeneutical analogs are representations emphasizing various modes of valuation, signification, purposefulness, meaning, interpretation and understanding. Each mode of conceptualizing, understanding, theorizing or methodology gives expression to a characteristic ratio of hermeneutical constraints and degrees of freedom which feature, but are not reducible to being functions of, a variety of sensory modalities.

The spatial-temporal structures derived from sensory modalities constitute an important source of both constraints and degrees of freedom for the generation and construction of hermeneutical analogs. They are a source of constraints in as much as one has to be able to reconcile various aspects of one's hermeneutical analog with the structural character of various spatial-temporal analogs.

If one cannot produce such a reconciliation on some level of scale, then, one has to begin questioning the tenability of either the sensory analog or the hermeneutical analog or both. On the other hand, the spatial-temporal analogs constitute a source of degrees of freedom since they are starting points for exploration, inquiry, experimentation, analysis, reflection and so on.

Memory: the ratio of time-relevant to time irrelevant components

One of the most fundamental vectors shaping temporal identity is memory. Psychologists have distinguished two broad categories of memory: namely, short-term and long-term memory.

In human beings, short term memory last for about 10-15 seconds. In other species, short-term memory can cover a longer time period. For instance, the fruit fly has a short term memory of approximately 45 minutes, and the bee has a short-term memory of about five minutes.

In each of these cases, if what is stored in short-term memory is not converted into a long-term memory format, then, the data is lost to the organism. Moreover, short-term memory is quite vulnerable to various kinds of interference, and such interference disrupts the contents of short-term memory so that they are either permanently lost or they become garbled.

Just as there is a temporal set of constraints which characterize short-term memory, there also is a sort of quantitative constraint on the amount of data which can be stored in short-term memory. This is George Miller's magic number of 7 plus or minus 2.

In other words, approximately seven units of information, give or take a few such units, can be stored in the temporary buffer constituting short-term memory. However, depending on the meaningfulness of what is being stored in short-term memory, and depending on the kind of mnemonic strategy one employs, a unit of information can vary, to some extent, with respect to its size.

One other facet of short-term memory has a significance which is relevant to the discussion of temporal issues. This aspect concerns the way in which short-term memory retains the temporal character of the sequence in which events transpire.

Although there is considerable debate in the psychological literature, the currently prevailing view suggests there are three kinds of long-term memory. These categories of long-term memory are referred to as: semantic, episodic and procedural.

Semantic memory appears to be somewhat time-independent in the sense that it is concerned largely, if not exclusively, with the sort of data which gives expression to facts relating to numbers, mathematical expressions, formulas, addresses, laws, rules, dates, and so on. Moreover, semantic memory often has a symbolic form that can be divorced from temporal contingencies.

Episodic memory is quite different from semantic memory in this latter respect. In episodic memory, temporal relationships play an important role. The contents of this kind of long-term memory revolve around biographical events which occur in the life of the individual. What one did, where one did it, when one did it, who one did it with, what was done to one, and so on are all instances of the kind of material stored in episodic memory.

Episodic material plays a fundamental role in the individual's development of a sense of temporal identity. As the evidence concerning patients who suffer from, for example, retrograde amnesia indicates, the loss of episodic memory tremendously alters the way the individual interacts with the surrounding environment.

In addition, there can be tremendous flexibility, from individual to individual, surrounding the formation of this aspect of temporal identity. Each individual generates and establishes his or her own set of phase relationships with a given event or episode. Therefore, even though one-and-the-same event may be engaged by two, or more, individuals, the arrangement, number, shape, orientation and so on, of the set of phase relationships formed in each case, can vary greatly.

In a sense, the foregoing considerations are reminiscent of the methodology of Einstein's special theory of relativity. In that theory, observers in different inertial frameworks engage one-and-the-same event, arriving at different values for times, velocities, lengths, mass, and so on, as a result of the variable character of the phase relationships which their respective methodologies generate during the event-engagement process.

Procedural memory revolves about skill learning sorts of issues in which one has to acquire certain steps or procedures in order to gain mastery over a variety of physical, mental or social activities. Driving a car, rules of etiquette, playing a game, learning a new language, and so on, are all examples of skills requiring a substantial amount of procedural memory if they are to be mastered with any degree of competence or expertise.

This category of memory is somewhat like semantic memory in as much as one does not have to remember the context in which one learned a skill in order to have mastery of that skill. All that matters is retaining certain facts or data about how to do something.

On the other hand, there is a sense in which procedural memory is somewhat like episodic memory since the temporal sequence of the steps or procedures is important to retain. If one does not learn the correct sequence of steps for a given technique, if one does not grasp the rhythmic character(s) of a given procedure, if one does not develop the requisite set of phase relationships concerning a given skill , then, one will not be able to acquire either competency or expertise in the performance of the associated procedures, techniques or skills.

Procedural memory might be considered to be a sort of sub-category of semantic memory in which temporal issues assume a certain degree of ascendancy. Procedural memory also might be considered to be a sub-category of episodic memory in which biographical features become largely horizonal, with little focal importance. In either case, there would be two sorts of long-term memory rather than the three categories which are currently favored in many psychological circles.

A further possibility is as follows. There is a sense in which only one kind of long-term memory exists, but it consists of a ratio of time-relevant to time-irrelevant factors. However, because there can be different ratios of these factors, this gives the appearance of different categories of memories under different circumstances.

On the view being put forth here, semantic memory would be characterized by a ratio with a, relatively speaking, low time-relevant component and a high time-irrelevant component. Episodic memory, however, would have a ratio with a high time-relevant component but, relatively speaking, a low time-irrelevant component.

In neither of the above cases can one suppose a given component of the ratio is zero. There always will be a certain number of time-irrelevant themes present in memories which are largely time-dependent, just as there will always be a certain number of time-relevant themes present in memories which are largely time-irrelevant in character.

Finally as previously indicated, procedural memory constitutes a case combining elements of both episodic as well as semantic memory. Therefore, the temporal ratio for procedural memory will exhibit aspects of both time-relevancy as well as time-irrelevancy.

One advantage of conceptualizing things in the foregoing manner, is that instead of having to come up with experimental evidence supporting the existence of three mechanisms of memory, one only has to come up with evidence for one mechanism of memory. Moreover, the character of the mechanism one is looking for is, at least in general terms, fairly well specified.

In other words, the mechanism being sought must provide for a set of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom capable of varying with respect to themes of time-relevancy and time-irrelevancy. Another feature of this mode of conceptualizing things is the way in which it places temporal phase relationships squarely in the picture of all manifestations of memory, whether short-term or long-term.

A further possibility that may follow from the foregoing conceptualization of the structural character of memory has potential implications for educational issues. More specifically, phase relationships become very important to the efficiency with which things are learned and remembered.

For example, one possibility why suggestopedia or superlearning works, when it does work, is because of the emphasis laid - albeit, perhaps, unconsciously - on temporal phase relationships as a means of unifying the different components of the learning situation. When everything is in phase, then, memory or learning becomes more efficient both in terms of coding as well as in terms of decoding.

In any event, one might think about the possibility of seeking to improve the efficiency with which learning occurs by trying to alter the character of the time-relevancy to time irrelevancy ratio. This could be done by manipulating the set of phase relationships linking an individual with the learning situation.

Some phase relationships may be more conducive to the fixing of a memory than are other sorts of phase relationship. If so, the former kind of phase relationships will form the currents which will have to be manipulated through amplification, or by suppressing other kinds of phase relationship that may prove to be a source of interference.

People who suffer from Korsakoff's syndrome or from some other cause of anterograde amnesia may represent something of a problem for the theory of structural memory as a ratio of time-relevant to time-irrelevant components introduced earlier. People who suffer from some form of anterograde amnesia would seem to suggest cases in which the aforementioned ratio is zero since short-term memory apparently cannot be converted into either semantic memory or episodic memory.

On the other hand, people who suffer from Korsakoff's syndrome are able to learn certain kinds of new skills such as how to do a puzzle, although they will not remember how they came to learn to do the puzzle. This suggests procedural memory is, to some extent, still intact in such people.

Given that sufferers of Korsakoff's syndrome still have some degree of procedural memory, the existence of such memory capabilities could be seen as being consistent with the aforementioned ratio theory concerning the structural character of memory. In fact, the existence of such memory capabilities in the sufferers of Korsakoff's syndrome would seem to suggest the importance of phase relationships in helping to fix memory.

Procedural memory is required when a task has, relatively speaking, a time-relevant component and a time-irrelevant component which are roughly equivalent. The source of the time-relevant component is the phase relationships which establish the sequence of the steps that are necessary to solve a given puzzle. The source of the time-irrelevant component is the contents of the steps or procedures, taken individually and apart from the role which they play in a set of steps or procedures.

This fixing of a sequence in long-term memory would not have to involve an understanding of the relationship of the sequence of steps to the solution of the puzzle (i.e., a means-ends relationship). Quite possibly, the individual would have no recollection of having solved the puzzle before.

On the other hand, the increased speed with which the puzzle is solved over a number of trials would indicate a learning curve is present. This learning curve would be a function of: (a) the individual's capacity to transfer the phase relationships of short-term memory into long-term, procedural memory, and (b) the individual's capacity to transfer the content of individual steps, apart from their role in a sequence, to long-term, procedural memory.

Procedural memory cannot be reduced to either (a) or (b). Time-relevant components depend on time-irrelevant components for themes of structural content. In other words, specific ratios of time-irrelevant constraints and degrees of freedom establish a set of thematic parameters out of which phase relationships can emerge.

On the other hand, time-irrelevant components are shaped by time-relevant components, since transitions and shifts in phase relationships are established through these latter components. Consequently, in procedural memory both a time-relevant and a time-irrelevant component are needed.

In cases of anterograde amnesia, the ratio of the two components (i.e., time-relevant to time-irrelevant) is the key to being given access to long-term memory. If, in a given learning task, the requirements for the time-relevant component of the ratio is too high, as in the case of episodic memory, then, entry into long-term memory will be blocked or inhibited.

Alternatively, if, in a given learning task, the time-irrelevant component is too high, as in the case of semantic memory, then,, again, entry into long-term memory will be blocked or inhibited in the individual who is suffering from anterograde amnesia. In each case, the ratio provides the wrong sort of dialectical arrangement of phase relationships and structural content.

The question, then, becomes this: why are the memories of people suffering from anterograde amnesia still open to certain kinds of time-relevant to time irrelevant ratios, but not to other kinds of such ratios? Certainly, this is a question which has to be answered if one is to work toward having a full theory of the transition process between short-term memory and long-term memory. It is also a question which has to be answered if one is to develop a greater understanding of the problem of anterograde amnesia.

There is a second question that may be closely related to the foregoing question. Do the memory problems displayed by those who suffer from Korsakoff's syndrome have any implications for normal, everyday sorts of difficulties encountered by people when they try to commit something to memory? In other words, maybe the reason why there is often a hit or miss, almost random-like, character to whether we retain something or not has to do with the kind of phase relationships one has with the material which is to be learned.

Some kinds of phase relationship may be more conducive to the retention of material than are other sorts of phase relationship. Something of this sort already has been suggested when mentioning the data which indicated that children who were read a story in the mid-to-late afternoon seem to retain material in long-term memory better than do children who are read stories earlier in the day.

Closely aligned with the issue of whether or not the structural character of a phase relationships plays a central role in fixing something in long-term memory, is another issue. Maybe the ratio of time-relevant components to time-irrelevant components is of critical importance in determining whether or not something will or will not be fixed in memory and, therefore, learned.

The present inability to provide an answer to the foregoing question does not invalidate the ratio theory of the structural character of memory. In fact, if anything, the ratio theory proves to be a heuristically valuable tool since it not only has generated the question, but, as well, it provides an orientation or approach for engaging, exploring or probing such a question in the context of broader issues of memory, learning, structural character, phase relationships and focal/horizonal dialectical interaction.

Logic, temporality and phase relationships

According to Campbell, logic is essentially atemporal. This sort of perspective reflects a recurring theme in thinking about the nature of logic. From the 'traditional' perspective, logic generally is construed as some sort of universal set of principles which holds in all times and in all places and is, therefore, independent of spatial and temporal considerations.

Perhaps, this traditional perspective should be challenged. More specifically, one may have a fruitful line of exploration, if not explanation, if one were to suppose logic is intimately connected to certain aspects of temporality.

For example, logic could be conceived as a reflection of the structural character of the phase relationships to which a given point-structure, neighborhood, or latticework gives expression. By tracing out, or mapping, the way different aspects of the internal character of a given structure are related to one another, or by tracing out or mapping the way different aspects of various structures interact with one another, or by mapping the way the spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom of a given structure dialectically engage the spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom of other structures, one comes to grasp the 'logic' of these structures.

One of the reasons why, throughout years of philosophical discussion, the study of logic seems to have promised so much and, yet, failed so miserably, as well as proven, for the most part, to be so heuristically infertile an area of exploration, is because it has been treated as, or construed as, a static, unchanging entity which is atemporal. In point of fact, however, logic may be dynamic, dialectical and very temporal. This is the case since logic gives expression to the manner in which structures relate to themselves or to other structures, as a function of the transitions, shifts, transformations, alterations and so on, occurring in the manner in which spectrums of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom interact with one another.

While there may be certain constants associated with the dialectical interaction of structures, these constants occur in a context of change, transition, transformation and so on. One cannot understand the structural character of dialectical interaction by looking at only the constants. One also must look at the ratio of constants to parameters of variability.

The story of structural character and phase relationships is told through the way this ratio changes over time. In order to look at the ratio of constants to parameters of variability, one must map the way in which constraints dialectically play off against degrees of freedom in a given set of circumstances. Such mapping gives expression to the logic present in a given dialectical and structural context.

Viewed from the foregoing perspective, logic is not a search for, or study of, universal, static, constant, unchanging relationships among premises, situations and so on. Logic is a search for, or study of, the inferential mappings of the phase relationships manifested through a spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which exist within a given point-structure, neighborhood, latticework or set of latticeworks. Logic is the study of the orientation and vectoral/tensoral character of the phase relationships linking the themes of constancy and variability in and among, particular structures. Logic becomes a study of the manner in which phase relationships shift during the transitions and transformations brought about by the dialectics of structural engagement.

In addition, part of logic may involve the phenomenon of entrainment. During the entrainment process, certain aspects of a given idea's (or value's or principle's or rule's) spectrum of constraints and degrees of freedom establish a state of phase relationships with certain aspects of other ideas, values, principles, rules, and so on. The entrainment process serves to generate a synchronous set of phase relationships which have a particular orientation. This orientation is what gives expression to the logical character of a relationship.

In fact, the grasping of logical relationships may have something to do with the detection of the structural character of such entrainment processes. In other words, one is able to see how the entrainment process maps out an orientation among a set of phase relationships. By locating the logical counterparts to, or analogs for, a zeitgeber (i.e., time-giver), one is able to trace the phase currents generating hermeneutical orientation.

In a sense, traditional logicians have been seeking to do something akin to what Einstein accomplished in the special theory of relativity. Traditionally, logicians have attempted to identify and preserve universal laws of logic which are manifested during all transactions of thinking.

This is similar to the manner in which Einstein's methodology attempted to identify and preserve certain universal physical laws in relation to transactions involving different inertial frames of reference. Unfortunately, among other things, logicians have never been able to locate a constant like the speed of light in a vacuum which could anchor their systems as the velocity of light did for Einstein in his special theory of relativity.

The experience of past, present and future

William James' spoke of the notion of the specious present, so-called because of the tendency of people to construe the present as a mathematical-like point which has position but no size or quantity or structure. According to James, this sort of characterization is an illusion. It leads people to believe one can neatly separate the present from the past , when, in point of fact, the present overlaps with the past.

Thus, from James' perspective, the present is not a mathematical point. The present is a unit of duration which carries a certain amount of the past with it.

Treating the present as a unit of duration had certain implications for James. If one were to maintain that conscious experience were merely a sequence of autonomous events, there would be no psychological justification for connecting or relating experiences, one to another.

Yet, if the present is a unit of duration combining certain elements of the present as well as the past, then, one could not represent consciousness to be a succession of independent points of sensation, emotion, ideas, images and so on. There are linkages among these experiences because of the way the structure of the present encompasses certain aspects of the past.

Although James did not make use of the phenomenological and hermeneutical idea of the horizon, such a concept fits in quite nicely with his position concerning the treatment of the present as a unit of duration that includes elements of the past. In fact, the idea of the horizon allows one to modify the structural character of James' notion of the present as unit of duration.

More specifically, not only does the present contain elements of the past, it also, in a sense, contains elements of the future. This is due to the way one is hermeneutically oriented toward, and prepared to engage, whatever occurs next.

The present also can be said, in a sense, to contain elements of the future due to the goal-directed strategies or plans which one is in the process of implementing. The following discussion gives a concrete texture to the contention that the present contains, in a sense, elements of the future.

One of the problems which intrigued Karl Lashley was the phenomenon of serial behavior. More specifically, he wanted to know how human beings are able to generate behavior consisting of a rapid sequence of movements.

For example, when a person speaks a language, this involves a coherent, sequential assemblage of different semantical components, syntactical elements, as well as movements of the tongue, mouth, and so on. All of this complex activity occurs very quickly.

Another example is when an individual plays a musical instrument. This usually requires the performing of a rapid series of intricate movements of hands and/or mouth and, sometimes, feet. So, the question which Lashley and others asked was: what makes rapid serial behavior possible?

The prevailing theory of serial behavior, up to the time of Lashley, considered such a process to be an example of a feedback process. According to the feedback hypothesis, once a sequence of behaviors begins, each unit of the sequence induces the next step in the series to occur.

Lashley discovered, however, that in certain cases (e.g., the playing of a piece of piano music) the time interval between steps in the sequence of playing notes was too short to fit in with what would be predicted on the basis of a feedback hypothesis. Lashley concluded some mechanism or process besides a reflex chain would have to be invoked in order to account for serial behavior.

Lashley theorized that a series of actions, probably, formed a unified sequence under the command of some sort of integrated motor control system, the whole of which was set in motion by the first note. Nevertheless, he could not explain how this took place.

The answer to Lashley's unresolved problem was uncovered in the 1980s. More specifically, a system of biochemical oscillators has been discovered which is responsible for regulating rhythmic sequences of movement.

These biochemical oscillators drive an integrated motor system Such motor systems of oscillators have been found in an extremely varied number of species.