Chronobiology - Part Three

Oscillators, organization and temporal structure

One of the interesting things about an oscillator is the way it, simultaneously, can serve as a clock as well as a source of signals, information or messages. In this respect, there may be a sense in which both biological and epistemological/hermeneutical rhythms form oscillating systems that are somewhat like the clocks of Einstein's special theory of relativity.

In other words, they often give measured versions of rhythms, time, synchronization, signals and so on which are influenced by local conditions instead of being reflections of temporal absolutes that are unaffected by methodological considerations. At the same time, just as is the case in special relativity, there are elements of universal laws (involving rhythmic structures in the present case) which are being preserved during the process of methodological engagement. Thus, aspects of both variability and invariance are manifested in the chemical and hermeneutical oscillating systems that characterize human beings.

Although chemical clocks or chemical oscillators were first discovered in 1921 by William Bray, they were not systematically studied until the late 1950s and early 1960s by A. M. Zhabotinsky and B. P. Belousov of the Soviet Union. Essentially, a chemical oscillator (sometimes referred to as a Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction) will, if left to itself, spontaneously shift between several states in a periodic fashion. Usually, the periodicy of a chemical clock is noticeable because that periodicy is visually manifested as a color transition in the chemical system which is oscillating.

As is the case for any oscillating system, a chemical clock is sustained by a process of energy flow which enables the energy to: (a) be stored, at least temporarily, as potential energy, and (b) be converted from a potential form to an active or kinetic form of energy. One of the ways in which this process of energy flow occurs in chemical systems is by means of a series of cyclical transitions between the oxidized and reduced states of certain molecules in such systems.

Chemical oscillators are capable of producing a wide range of effects, including complex phenomena of communication. In other words, some networks of chemical/biochemical processes exhibiting various sorts of oscillating properties are capable of giving rise to a variety of systems that generate, store and transfer information.

The Acrasiales fungi or slime mold is, relative to human beings, a simple example of a chemical/biochemical clock that, under the right sort of circumstances, manifests many of the characteristics of a system of communication. Under environmentally favorable conditions, the slime mold exists as an single-celled amoeba.

However, when environmental contingencies become problematic (such as when food becomes scarce), the formerly independent slime molds begin to draw together and become transformed into a stalk. In time, this stalk yields spores that, eventually, break off and are dispersed by wind currents to more favorable environmental circumstances. When these more favorable conditions are reached, the spores undergo reproduction. This results in a new colony of slime molds being established.

The series of transformations and transitions undergone by slime molds is driven by a chemical oscillatory system in which cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cyclic AMP) plays a leading role. For unknown reasons, one of the slime molds in the colony begins to secrete cyclic AMP in rhythmic pulses. These pulses have the effect of entraining the other slime molds' production and secretion of cyclic AMP so that all of the members of the colony begin to secrete cyclic AMP in unison.

The over-all effect of the community production of cyclic AMP is to lead all of the individual cells to congregate around the initial cyclic-AMP-secreting- amoeba cell. The congregated colony, then, undergoes the series of transformations outlined previously in which there is a sequential expression of the base, stalk and spores stages of the slime mold.

Cyclic AMP is referred to as the 'second messenger'. It has this label because of its role of interacting with neurotransmitters which are considered to be the first-line messengers.

Generally speaking, when a given neurotransmitter attaches to a receptor site, one of the effects ensuing from this is the synthesis of cyclic AMP inside of the target cell. Cyclic AMP is, then, distributed throughout the cell. Apparently, its presence helps to communicate some of the message which has come to the cell in the form of a given neurotransmitter.

Among other things, cyclic AMP seems to help amplify, by an order of quite a few magnitudes, the relatively weak signal of the first messenger neurotransmitter. In addition, cyclic AMP tends to extend the period of duration during which the message conveyed by the first messenger is actively propagated. In other words, even though the neurotransmitter may have departed from the receptor site which initiated the synthesis of cyclic AMP, nonetheless, the cyclic AMP continues to serve as a sort of proxy for the message/signal carried by the neurotransmitter.

The second messenger, cyclic AMP, operates more slowly, relative to the pace at which a great deal of other neural processes take place. Consequently, the activity rate of cyclic AMP may lend itself to helping to maintain those mental states that are more enduring such as memory, learning and consciousness.

In 1955, M. Calvin and A. T. Wilson detected, for the first time, an instance of a biochemical oscillator. The oscillator forms part of the process of photosynthesis. More specifically, the oscillator is located in the portion of the cycle known as the dark reactions.

Approximately ten years later, another example of a biochemical oscillator was discovered. During the process of glycolysis, the primary means by which cells in many different organisms catabolically degrade glycogen, there are several enzymes involved in the breakdown of glucose that form an oscillating system.

Cyclic AMP and its associated catabolic enzyme, phosphodiestrases, may form an oscillating system somewhat comparable to the systems existing in glycolysis and the dark reaction of photosynthesis. Moreover, cyclic AMP may play a fundamental role in entraining a variety of biological rhythms of the body and mind. This possible role emerges in the light of its pervasive, almost ubiquitous, rhythmic activity in so many parts of the body.

Hermeneutics, attractors and brain activity

There is substantial evidence (and chronobiology is but one part of this evidence) to indicate there are underlying sets of oscillating systems in the form of various kinds of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom that leave their imprint on the structural character of behavior. The ebb and flow of concentration gradients for cyclic AMP may form a part of some of these systems.

In many cases, the underlying oscillatory activity seems to be in the form of chaotic attractors. This is so since the behavior associated with such oscillatory activity often tends to be self-similar rather than self-same.

Various kinds of biological and hermeneutical oscillating systems in human beings may form a series of horizonal attractor basins which engage, and are engaged by, the self-similar activity of focal attractor basins. Sometimes this dialectic is dominated by one or more horizonal attractor basins which simultaneously bring focal activity into their sphere of influence.

The effect of such influence would be to color, orient and shape that focal activity from a number of different vectoral directions. At other times, the activity of the focal attractor basin dominates and selects the horizonal attractor basin or basins which it wishes to interact with, be colored by, be oriented by, and so on.

In both cases, however (that is, irrespective of whether the activity of the focal attractor plays an active/shaping role or passive/malleable role), the activity of the focal attractor basin has the capacity, within certain limits, to fine-tune the way it is engaged by, or engages, the different horizonal attractor basins. In other words, the activity of the focal attractor basin has the capacity, within certain limits, to make adjustments in the manner in which it is being modulated by the different attractor basins. Moreover, the activity of the focal attractor basin has the capacity, within certain limits, to make adjustments in: (a) the manner in which it is oriented toward horizonal attractor basis; as well as (b) the extent to which it wishes to open itself up to the influence of a given horizonal attractor basin.

In the light of the foregoing comments, one way to construe brain activity is in terms of the way such activity helps generate a variety of horizonal attractor basins of varying biological rhythms. These biologically dominated horizonal attractor basins are capable of shaping and modulating behavioral currents involving motivations, emotions, sensations, dreams and so on. Indeed, early in life, innate biological horizonal attractor basins dominate focal activity and form the primary components of the horizon of focus.

As the individual develops, the activity of the focal attractor basin begins to take on an increasingly active role across a wide range of issues and situations. As a result, the hermeneutical operator begins to pick up steam and generate a variety of hermeneutical themes, attractor basins, and so on, which may become increasingly independent of, though not necessarily entirely unrelated to, purely biologically driven attractor basins. These hermeneutical attractor basins also become part of the horizon.

Consequently, part of the maturational process shows a change in the ratio of purely biological rhythms to hermeneutical rhythms. This change in the ratio of hermeneutical to biological rhythms may be reflected, to some extent, in various stages of development.

A brief exploration and critique of Piaget

At this juncture, a useful exercise might be to pursue a discussion concerning some of the differences, with respect to developmental issues, that exist between the perspective being advanced in the present dissertation and some of the views of Jean Piaget who has had a considerable impact on certain aspects of educational theory. Hopefully, such an exercise will help to develop, somewhat, different facets of the position being advocated in this article, as well as lay down a foundation for the sections following this one.

The following discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. It is intended to be illustrative of some of the differences in perspective that exist between Piaget and myself.

Piaget believed the intelligence of an organism is rooted in a set of structures which had the potential capacity for unfolding or developing under appropriate circumstances of interaction between the organism and the environment. However, he did not believe the organism was merely a passive entity in this developmental process. He maintained, instead, that development was a complex activity involving a tension between assimilation and accommodation as the organism sought to restore equilibrium. (see the note following the source entry)

Piaget collectively referred to the developmental dialectic outlined above by means of the term action. Action encompasses all the variations on one, fundamental theme - namely, the way in which the organism both restructures and is restructured by its interaction with the environment.

Piaget considers action to be inherently intelligent activity. Piaget also maintains, however, that action is inherently stage-governed. This latter characteristic means action gives expression to intelligent activity with qualitatively different operational or structural characteristics at various points of development.

Moreover, for Piaget, the idea of stage incorporates a sequential element in which some stages precede other stages in a fixed, biologically given order of development. Thus, according to Piaget, stage 3 operations will not begin to establish themselves until stage 2 operations have been mastered. Similarly, stage 2 operations will not begin to emerge in any consistent, pervasive sense until stage 1 operations have been established.

During the sensorimotor stage of operations, the child physically interacts with the world through various parts of the body, such as mouth, hands, eyes, ears and so on. This interaction results in a series of schemata being formed which constitute, in a sense, action mappings linking the child with his or her world.

These schemata become progressively more sophisticated and integrated with the passage of time. Out of these mappings emerge the child's initial conceptions of space, time, objects, causality and so on.

The next stage of development is referred to as the concrete stage of operations. During this stage, the individual gradually acquires an understanding of certain principles of conservation and operational reversibility. During this stage there is also a further consolidating and expanding of various themes which had been introduced in the sensorimotor stage.

Moreover, although the individual's action is still very much focused on concrete, physical aspects of interaction with the environment, there is an emerging theme of interiorization of action. In other words, objects are mentally operated on, not just physically operated on. Acquisition of, and utilization of, the idea of operational reversibility, for example, is one expression of the increasing tendency toward the interiorization of action.

The final stage of development, known as the formal stage of operations gives expression to the transition from a largely concrete mode of interacting with the environment to a largely formal or symbolic way of dealing with the environment. This stage of development also marks the continuation of the trend toward the interiorization of action which began to play a substantial role during the concrete stage of operations. In the formal stage, the individual becomes increasingly able (a) to operate on symbolic and/or linguistic representations of the physical world, as well as (b) to pose purely hypothetical if-then, questions in an attempt to grasp the structural character of the world.

Piaget stipulates, however, that one cannot bifurcate these various stages into isolated, independent units. There is a certain amount of overlap from one stage to another. As a result, harbingers of themes assuming more focal prominence in later stages will make appearances in earlier stages.

Thus, for example, one sees remnants of the formal stage of operations in the emergence of various aspects of language functioning during late sensorimotor/early concrete operational stages. Or, one sees the introduction of operational reversibility during the concrete operational stage, despite the fact that operational reversibility does not reach its full potential until the formal stage of operations is in full bloom.

According to Piaget, there is a further theme of development running parallel to the intellectual side of action. This further theme concerns the issue of egocentrism. Egocentrism refers to the way, and extent to which, the individual tends to see, feel and understand things strictly from his or her own perspective.

However, Piaget indicates egocentrism is not a matter of selfishness. He attributes it, instead, to the individual's assumption that everyone else sees, feels and understands things pretty much in the same way as he or she does.

Piaget believes this assumption is rooted in the individual's inability to differentiate self from environment. However, as the individual begins to grasp (and apply) the structural character of reversible operations in (to) a wider and wider variety of contexts, the influence of egocentrism gradually diminishes until it reaches its lowest point in the formal stage of operations.

There are three major trends in Piaget's stage theory of development. One trend concerns the aforementioned tendency away from egocentrism as one proceeds through the various operational stages. A second trend involves the manner in which there is an increase of interiorization of action schemata over time, as one moves from purely surface, immediate physical modes of interacting with the world, to interiorized modes of interacting with the world. These latter modes take the form of various kinds of mental schemata. Mental schemata place distance or buffers between the individual and his or her environment. Finally, there is a trend which moves from reliance on overt, concrete activity to a reliance on formal, symbolic operational activity when interacting with the world, both social and physical.

All three of the thematic trends outlined above need to be examined critically. For instance, one might disagree with Piaget's contention that there is a tendency toward increasing interiorization of action schemata. One might just as easily argue such interiorization is present from day one and that the generation of action schemata of whatever stage presupposes such a capability.

In fact, if one does not make the foregoing sort of assumption concerning the presence of interiorized, mental activity from the very beginning, one is faced with a problem. One must provide an account of how purely physical/biological action schemata become transformed into interiorized phenomenological schemata.

Either one has this capacity from the very beginning, or one has to explain its emergence as a function of processes that do not seem capable of accounting for its emergence or its existence. This is a problem Piaget never adequately resolves in any clear-cut fashion.

A second trend of development in Piaget's perspective, concerning the alleged movement away from egocentrism as one increasingly comes under the influence of formal stage operations, also seems rather argumentative. For example, all through the history of ideas, as well as in the midst of everyday life, one repeatedly comes across cases of people who appear to be operating at extremely sophisticated levels of formal operations, yet, these people either: (a) cannot comprehend why everyone doesn't see things the way they do, or (b) insist everyone must accept their point of view as being the only correct way of thinking about a particular issue.

Both (a) and (b) seem to be obvious expressions of, or variations on, the egocentric theme. Consequently, the fact that an individual is thoroughly entrenched in the formal stage of operations is no guarantee such an individual will not also manifest considerable egocentric behavior. Indeed, egocentric tendencies tend to be imbued with emotional and motivational currents which often prove intractable to rational efforts to transform or constrain them.

One could take exception, as well, with a third trend of development emphasized by Piaget. In this third trend there is, supposedly, a progressive move away from the from the immediacy of physical operations on the objects of experience, and toward a more symbolic mode of operations with respect to the objects of experience.

From the perspective of the present article, the core feature of thinking is rooted in the hermeneutical operator (which gives expression to the dialectic of: reflexive awareness, identifying reference, characterization, interrogative imperative, inferential mapping, and congruence functions). This operator is present in thinking from the very beginning of post-uterine existence (and, quite possibly, much earlier than this). It is responsible for the generating, shaping, transforming, and organizing of the structural character of the individual's understanding of various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field.

All components of the hermeneutical operator are present from the beginning of life outside the womb (and, perhaps, even in the womb). Nonetheless, the passage of time is required for the individual to develop facility with the use and application of that operator system.

As a result, in the beginning, identifying reference may be vague, rather than refined. Reflexive awareness may be sporadic and fleeting. Characterization may be distorted, rather than accurate.

In addition, certain kinds of questions may not be asked, or the wrong kinds of questions may be asked, or questions may be asked which are in the service of self-interest rather than a desire to understand. Furthermore, inferential mappings may be more a matter of imaginative projections or speculations, rather than a matter of entailment. Finally, congruence functions may be limited to localized, narrow, analog reflections rather than be allowed to develop, and be extended to, latticework analog relationships.

In any event, formal, symbolic operations of the sort Piaget has in mind constitute only one mode of utilizing or approaching the hermeneutical operator. Indeed, there are an indefinite number of possibilities for combining different components of the hermeneutical operator to generate a latticework of phase relationships intended to reflect, in analog form, different aspects of the structural character of various facets of reality on different levels of scale.

Mathematical/logical systems of symbolic operations are extremely limited in the sorts of problems with which they are capable of dealing. Morality, religion, art, meaning, mysticism, historiography, purpose, interpretation, and so on, all appear to fall beyond the horizons of Piaget's brand of formal operations.

Piaget also speaks of three different kinds of fallacy which are manifest in the thinking of children in the first stage of operations. He calls these fallacies: realism, artificialism and animism.

The fallacy of realism comes in three varieties. One form of this fallacy is when the child confuses a mental state, such as a thought or dream, with the thing for which the mental state is a representation.

A second form of the fallacy of realism is manifested when there is a confusion in the child between internal and external. For example, children go through a stage when they think that a dream is external to themselves. Only later do they believe the dream comes from within them.

The third form of realism fallacy is when the child attributes substantive reality to a thought or dream. In other words, rather than maintain that thoughts and dreams are insubstantial in nature, they suppose thoughts and dreams are made of some sort of substantive material or substance.

There are several considerations which emerge when reflecting on the foregoing fallacy of realism. First of all, one might argue that many scientists and mathematicians are guilty of the version of the fallacy of realism in which there is confusion between the individual's idea of something and the thing which is being represented through that idea.

The model is not the thing (or event, process, state, condition, etc.) being modeled. Yet, one often hears from scientists and mathematicians that if the model has a certain property, then, reality also must have such a property.

As far as the second fallacy of realism is concerned, one needs to raise the following question. Where, in fact, do dreams occur?

Of course, the prevailing, generally accepted position on this issue is to contend dreams occur in the head and are a function of neurobiological activity. However, there is absolutely no evidence demonstrating this to be the case.

In fact, whatever data exists with respect to this point could be interpreted in a variety of ways. To be sure, there is a strong correlation between dream activity and certain neurophysiological states, but there is nothing to indicate the neurophysiological states are the cause of the dreams, rather than vice versa, or rather than both being caused by some further factor not yet understood.

Finally, the third fallacy of realism concerns the way a child mistakenly, according to Piaget, attributes some sort of substantive reality to dreams when, according to the prevalent belief system of modern civilization, dreams are insubstantial in character. As was true in connection with the second fallacy of realism, Piaget's biases are clearly in evidence in the third fallacy of realism.

Many cultures (that of the Oglala Sioux Indians being one which comes readily to mind) believe dreams have a substantive reality which extends beyond the individual's experience of that dream. Only because of his scientific prejudices, could Piaget attempt to maintain that the insubstantial nature of dreams is beyond question and that anyone who thinks otherwise is committing a fallacy.

The fallacy of artificialism refers to the tendency of children in a certain stage of development to maintain that everything in existence is an artifact which has been made for a specific purpose. Thus, nature is invested with purposeful activity in which all things are inclined to seek out some goal or purpose.

The idea something could happen just as a result of random occurrences or as the result of purely mechanical cause and effect sorts of events does not seem to enter the mind of children who commit the "fallacy" of artificialism. Moreover, this sort of fallacy involves a confusion between physical events and moral events such that the former are often seen as serving, or giving expression to, some underlying moral purpose.

Again, Piaget may be letting his own biases influence him in his interpretation of things. Although the child's understanding of the precise manner in which everything is purposeful may not be correct, the principle that purpose (as is reflected in the teachings of, say, most religions and mysticisms) is central to the character of the universe cannot be rejected out of hand as Piaget seems to be doing.

Randomness is not a fact. It is an interpretation of events.

Furthermore, to assume certain events can be reduced to a purely mechanical and/or biological set of forces, is, again, to impose an interpretation onto those events. Piaget is presuming that the child's account of things is very primitive and unsophisticated, when, in point of fact, it may very well not be mistaken - at least, in principle, although the details of the child's interpretation of that principle may be erroneous.

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According to Piaget, the newborn infant begins life with a set of reflexes (such as crying, sucking, swallowing and so on) which are, within certain limits, capable of adapting themselves to current circumstances. Piaget uses the term accommodation to refer to this capacity for, and process of, modifying biological or psychological structures in order to adjust to a situation.

Assimilation, on the other hand, is Piaget's term for referring to those manifestations of an organism's action schemata which operate on some aspect of the environment or the phenomenology of the experiential field. These schemata are employed in order to modify aspects of the environment for the organism's own purposes, ends or goals.

For example, initially, the sucking reflex accommodates itself to the situation presented to it, namely the mother's breast. Within a short time, however, the infant introduces a number of variations on the initial sucking theme.

These new variations are the result of the infant's operations on, and modifications of, the sucking reflex. Such constructed variations on a biologically given theme are instances of assimilation in action.

According to Piaget, an action schemata - in this case, the sucking scheme - is not a matter of any particular instance of sucking activity. The action schemata encompasses the stable elements that persist across a wide variety of sucking activities. In a sense, these stable elements define or characterize, the fundamental components which all sucking activities have in common, their individual differences notwithstanding.

The next step up the developmental ladder occurs when primary circular reactions begin to emerge. These represent systematic co-ordinations of different action schemata or behavioral patterns into a unified whole.

At first, of course, the co-ordinations are very rough. Subsequently, however, they become refined and the integration of action patterns is mastered by the individual.

Primary circular reactions are supplemented by secondary circular reactions. In this latter kind of activity, the infant begins to use (although not necessarily in any self-conscious or intentionally purposeful way) the structures generated through primary circular reactions. These structures are used to probe various aspects of the environment.

Over time, the results and consequences of such probing activity begin to register with the child. Thus, secondary circular reactions build up a sort of action-schemata-network which is made up of: (a) primary circular reactions, (b) the use of circular reactions as probes in relation to experience, and (c) a gradual awareness of the results ensuing from such probing.