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Freedom, Duties of Care, Principles, Constitutions, and Justice
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Constitutional Issues - Part Three
Sovereignty and Democracy
The issue of sovereignty involves the desire to have substantial control over, or play a fundamental role in, shaping one's destiny. Sovereignty involves the desire to have access to, and the opportunity to exercise, real power.
Such power enables one to structure, orient and color the character one's living will assume. Having access to real power in an unmediated fashion goes to the heart of the difference between representational and participatory democracy.
Representational democracy is about people giving up power to other people, i.e., the elected officials and those whom these elected officials appoint or hire. Representational democracy is mediated by, and filtered through, the understanding, likes and dislikes, weaknesses and strengths, ambitions and visions (if not delusions) of the people who are seeking power through elected office. Representational democracy does for the few - namely, the elected officials and their appointed helpers - what participatory democracy intends for the many: namely, to provide access to the power which is necessary to work toward controlling one's own sovereignty.
Representational democracy is indirect, unresponsive, and focuses on channeling power through the few. Participatory democracy is direct, responsive and focuses on sharing power with the many through a variety of channels that are specifically designed with such sharing in mind.
Participatory democracy is not a utopia, nor does it mean that everyone gets whatever one wants. However, it does come closer to the central principle underlying the historical reasons for moving toward democracy than does representational democracy.
More specifically, participatory democracy emphasizes the structural character of the process through which we arrange and regulate the social contracts that we forge with one another. The operative principle in these contracts revolves around the issue of reciprocal sovereignty-for individuals, for communities, for regions and for governments.
Often times, when people are asked about the meaning of democracy, the buzz words that are used are: "majority rules", "rights", "equality" and "freedom". Without wishing to downplay the importance of the concepts which stand behind these words, these ideas may be somewhat misleading.
For example, if by "majority" one means the people in general, then, with the possible exception of elections, very rarely does the majority rule in representational democracy. Even in the case of elections, if there are more than two parties contesting a given seat, the winner usually garners less than 50% of the vote. The majority of the people voted for the losing parties, but they do not rule.
In the case of a two-party election, the majority often still does not rule since: (a) not all eligible voters vote; and, (b) there are many people in the country who are not eligible to vote. As a result, the winning side may capture as much as 55% or 60% of the vote (which would be a huge landslide win) and still constitute the will of far less than a majority of the people.
Once elected, governments, especially in a parliamentary system, often are not run along democratic lines but autocratic ones in which power hoarding and manipulations of power tend to become paramount. The world of 'realpolitik' is about the seeking, gaining, wielding and hanging onto power. In this realm, the principles of democracy merely become watch words that are used to clothe the naked power game in order to create an illusion of democratic modesty when, in reality, nothing of substantive value actually exists as far as democracy is concerned.
When the members of the Supreme Court make judgements, or when Parliamentary committees cast votes, or when governmental boards and commissions arrive at decisions, although the rule of the majority holds within the restricted confines of the court, committee, board or commission, there is no guarantee that the respective judgements, votes and decisions reflect the wishes of the majority of the population. Consequently, all of these narrowly construed powers of majority rules constitute potential sources of encroachment upon the sovereignty of the people of a nation, province, region or municipality.
The individual often has little or no power to shape, constrain, modify or resist the aforementioned sorts of judgements, votes and decisions. Moreover, unless provisions are established that permit individuals, within certain limits, to have direct, unmediated access to the kind of power that will give them the opportunity to shape, constrain, modify or resist the process of realpolitik, then, democracy becomes a vacuous exercise for the majority of people.
At this point, an argument may be put forth which says, in effect, that if people want to have an impact on events, then, they should get involved in the political process: join riding associations, run for office, and so on. However, as indicated previously, indigenous to the idea of representational democracy is the fact that there tend to be strong forces which come into play and place severe constraints on the extent of participation that will be permitted.
While one may or may not agree with Lord Acton who spoke about the corrupting effect of power, the fact is that political/economic power carries with it a strong tendency toward being exclusionary of others. It is a tendency which can only be controlled with great strength of personal integrity and humility, and very few people who have walked the corridors of power have exhibited such strength.
The operative principle in a democracy is not that the majority rule. Instead, what actually rules is a set of principles to which the overwhelming majority of the people agree or to which they are committed as a means of defining, establishing and regulating the social contract that underwrites a democracy. This set of principles both determines boundaries of constraints as well as provides for a spectrum of degrees of freedom within which, or through which, individuals and the collective pursue their respective sovereignties.
Representational democracy tends to spin one kind of set of constraints and degrees of freedom, while participatory democracy generates another kind of set of constraints and degrees of freedom. Naturally, there is likely to be a certain amount of overlap in the structural character of these two different approaches to implementing democracy, but in many ways, these two perceptions have quite different sorts of priorities, emphases, interests, orientations and styles.
In effect, what rules in a democracy, whether of a representational or participatory variety,' is a process or procedural framework which is accepted by the majority of people. This process or framework must offer a countervailing influence against arbitrary, prejudicial or autocratic assaults upon, intrusions into, and usurpations of sovereignty.
Moreover, what permits such a process or framework to rule is the degree of confidence which people have in the capacity of that process/framework to provide a means of both protecting as well as helping to actualize the sovereignty of individuals and the collective alike. Presently, the Canadian public, on both an individual and a collective basis, is indicating that it has lost confidence in the capacity of the current approach to democracy in Canada to be able to resolve the problems which presently exist with respect to various aspects of the social contract-a contract that is supposed to bind us together within a common democratic framework.
Rights and Duties of Care
Another one of the buzz words of the mythology of democracy is that of the idea of rights. Everyone likes to talk about and assert their rights. Rights are expressions of our sovereignty as individuals and, therefore, we are jealous about any intrusion onto that sovereignty by the denial or undermining of our rights. On the other hand, an unrestrained and mindless assertion of rights on the part of everyone is tantamount to chaos and anarchy.
The reality of our situation is that not everyone's "rights" can be honored simultaneously. The claimed rights of one person often clash with the claimed rights of another person.
At a more fundamental level, democracy is not primarily about rights, per se. Democracy is about the search for a balanced, principled way of, on the one hand, protecting rights whenever possible and, on the other hand, of providing various means of resolving competing or conflicting claims of rights.
Unfortunately, people often conflate and confuse rights with their interests, desires and likes. Many people seem to assume that if they are interested in something, or desire it or like it, then, somehow, there must be a right that entitles them to pursue that interest, desire or like in an unhindered manner. Rights, however, are not a function of just any sort of interests, desires or likes.
Rights are about the constraints and degrees of freedom that are to structure our interactions with one another within the framework of the social contract to which we agree as a means of making government and society possible. Rights are about the sovereignty of the individual, but rights also are about the sovereignty of the collective. Rights are about the search for win-win situations such that the quality of sovereignty of both individual and the collective can be advanced and enhanced simultaneously.
Of course, a win-win situation may not always be possible or feasible. Sometimes the individual's rights will gain ascendancy over the rights of the collective. Sometimes the collective's rights will be promoted to the detriment of the individual's rights.
Nonetheless, in general, the emphasis should be on finding solutions to competing or conflicting rights that will protect and enhance the quality of the sovereignty of the different parties to a dispute. In order to work toward such win-win situations, the idea of rights, in and of itself, will not point the way to how to go about resolving disputes concerning conflicting and competing rights.
Another concept is necessary. This additional concept might be referred to as having a 'duty of care'. In order for the sovereignty of both individuals as well, as the collective to be protected and enhanced, there must be a balance established between rights and duties of care.
The social contract is not just about demanding rights. It is also about reciprocity. Reciprocity requires one to undertake the responsibilities of various duties of care toward other individuals and society in general.
Duties of care are not restricted to active respect for, and implementation of, the rights of other individuals or the rights of the collective. Duties of care are rooted in an understanding that acknowledges the need for sacrificing, within certain parameters, one's own interests. Duties of care involve a willingness, under various conditions, to place constraints on one's sovereignty in order to both enhance the quality of the collective sovereignty as well as to increase the likelihood that the quality of one's own long-term sovereignty will be enhanced.
A duty of care is the finger in the social dike which keeps out the relentless ocean of competing and clashing claims of rights. Duties of care reflect a sensitivity and responsiveness to the kinds of economic, social, cultural, physical, political, moral and intellectual destruction that can be wreaked on others by a self-centered insistence on one's rights irrespective of the costs. Duties of care are an index of the preparedness of both the individual as well as the collective to take on the responsibilities inherent in not just making the social contract work, but in helping it to flourish.
Diversity of Equality: A Principle
Along with "majority rules" and "rights", "equality" is a further entry in the lexicon of democracy. Usually, people understand equality to mean that everybody must be treated in exactly the same way. Another way of giving expression to the idea of equality is that no one should be given an unfair advantage or opportunity that permits him/her to enhance his/her position or circumstances at the expense of other people. Alternatively, equality also refers to protecting people against being unfairly disadvantaged with respect to opportunity, status, treatment, and so on.
A key feature of the idea of equality is a function of what is meant by, say, being given an unfair advantage or being unfairly disadvantaged. Moreover, implied in this judgement of unfairness is the idea that standards or criteria of fairness exist by means of which one can distinguish between, on the one hand, fair and unfair advantages, or, on the other hand, fair and unfair disadvantages.
For example, suppose one student works hard to pass an exam, while another student spends his or her time having a good time doing whatever pleases the individual except studying for the exam. The fact that the former person passes the test while the latter individual flunks the test does not confer an unfair advantage on the first individual, nor does it unfairly disadvantage the second person.
The element of unfairness only enters the picture if there are forces at work which corrupt the situation and skew it prejudicially. Thus, if, in the case of the two students, the person who studied hard is marked down because of color, race, ethnic origin, gender or philosophical beliefs, while the person who didn't study is given a passing mark largely, if not exclusively, on the basis of being liked by the teacher or because the person is a valuable athlete, then, one student (the one marked up) is unfairly advantaged, while the other student (the one marked down) is unfairly disadvantaged.
Let's pursue the student example a little further, but this time a few changes will be introduced. Assume that the two students have studied equally hard and that they are equally intelligent. Further, suppose that there are no untoward forces present-such as racism, sexism or bigotry-which would prejudicially differentiate between the two.
However, let us assume that person A does very well on essay type questions but does not do very well on multiple choice questions, whereas student B is just the opposite-doing poorly on essay questions but very well on multiple choice questions. If the teacher gives a test that involves only essay questions, then, student A is, in a sense, unfairly advantaged, while student B is, in a sense, unfairly disadvantaged. The teacher may not have intended this, but, nonetheless, a situation has been created in which unfairness of a sort has been permitted that treats the students in an unequal fashion.
The moral, so to speak, of the above example is that even if there should be no prejudice of any sort present, and even though people may be subjected to the same sort of condition and treatment, still, one may not have satisfied the conditions of equality. Equality is not necessarily about subjecting people to a monolithic process. In fact, real equality may only be possible in some, perhaps many, cases if one offers people an opportunity to choose, from among a set of alternatives, the one that best suits their circumstances or abilities.
For instance, let's return, for a moment, to the previous student example. Assume the teacher giving the test realizes students have different strengths and weaknesses. Suppose, further, the teacher really only is interested in finding out what the students know or do not know in order to be able to plan how, and what, to teach in future classes.
Under such circumstances, the teacher could provide the students with a choice: namely, they could select either several essay questions, or they could do the multiple choice section. In this way, the teacher allows the various students to put forth their best academic effort and obtains valuable information that will shape the content of subsequent classes.
The students are treated equally, but they have been allowed to go about things in different fashions. Consequently, the principle of equality does not necessarily mean that everyone must be treated in the same monolithic, rigid, unvarying, static fashion. There is room within the principle of equality for a spectrum of possibilities.
In the United States, there had been, in the past, an attempt to maintain segregationist practices by implementing a policy of "separate but equal". There are a number of fundamental differences between this idea of "separate but equal" and the principle of diversity of equality being discussed above.
In the case of the "separate but equal" policy, blacks were not given any choice in the matter. The policy was thrust upon them, and they had no opportunity to participate in shaping, affecting or regulating that ruling.
Moreover, the resources and finances made available to the black community were, in fact, not the equal of the resources and finances made available to the white community. Finally, the value of the end result of the two educational systems was entirely different, since white students would be given a multiplicity of opportunities to either get further education or to enter the work force. The same set of opportunities was not open to the black students.
In short, the policy of "separate but equal" was intended to give the appearance of freedom, while putting into play the reality of racist practices. The effect of this was to take away freedom from the black community.
The principle of diversity of equality alluded to above, on the other hand, is, in contrast to the idea of 'separate but equal', an exercise in participatory democracy. In this approach to equality, people are given access to real freedom of choice.
This sort of freedom permits people to exercise control, within limits, over how they interact with a given set of circumstances. It permits people to choose, from among a set of alternatives, those possibilities which are most conducive to, and congruent with, their needs, interests, capabilities and resources. Furthermore, the set of alternatives is not imposed on people, but can be developed in conjunction with the individual's participation in the structuring of those alternatives.
The principle of diversity of equality is a means of providing people with alternative routes to equality of treatment. No one is unfairly advantaged or unfairly disadvantaged.
Everyone is permitted to pursue their alternative of choice in a way that does not unfairly advantage them with respect to enhancing the quality of their sovereignty, nor does it unfairly disadvantage others in relation to the protection and/or enhancement of the sovereignty of the latter people. This is so because the alternatives from which people are permitted to choose, and which, ideally, they could have had a hand in developing, are to be pursued within the framework or boundaries established by the dynamic tension between rights and duties of care with respect to both individuals and the larger collective.
For example, by permitting Native peoples to have autonomy in the manner in which they conduct their affairs among themselves and with the rest of Canada, one is providing them with an alternative means of seeking an equality of treatment with respect to the protection, development and enhancement of their sovereignty as a people that is congruent with their needs, interests and inclinations as a people. Similarly, by permitting the people of Quebec to have autonomy in the manner in which they conduct their affairs among themselves and with the rest of Canada, one is providing them with an alternative means of seeking an equality of treatment with respect to the maintaining and realization of their sovereignty as a people that is conducive to who they are as a people. In this sense, Quebec is a special and distinct society. At the same time, the societies of the Native peoples are also distinctive and unique in character.
Indeed, the very idea of multi-culturalism is inextricably caught up with the acknowledgment that there are a multiplicity of special and distinct societies within Canada. Our task as a multi-cultural nation is to construct a set of alternatives from amongst which the different peoples of Canada can choose those which are most conducive to, and congruent with, the needs, interests and characteristics of different peoples and which will permit all of them the opportunity to preserve and enhance the quality of their respective sovereignties as a distinct and special people.
If one wishes to give meaning to the notion of sovereignty association, then, it would seem to involve the principle of diversity of equality. In activating this principle, we must provide the peoples of Canada with the opportunity to participate in the decision process. The activation of such a principle will generate the alternative pathways which will provide each people with equality of treatment in the context of a diversity of choices. Through these choices, people seek, secure and realize their sovereignty as communities which are different one from another.
Furthermore, all of this must be done within a balanced, though dynamic, framework woven by the dialectics of rights and duties of care. It is the balancing of the dynamic dialectic that establishes the conditions of association which mark the character of the social contract governing our relations one with another. Moreover, realization of the principle of diversity of equality is what underwrites our respective quests for sovereignty.
Senate Reform
The ways in which things are institutionally arranged in our present representational approach to democracy are inherently antithetical to the sort of steps that are going to have to be taken if the many problems facing us as a nation are going to be resolved in a direction that is more reflective of the needs of the different peoples of Canada. For example, the Senate is often neither representational nor participatory in character.
In terms of cost efficiency and providing tax payers with a fair return on their money, the Senate is probably one of the least productive and least effective Canadian institutions in existence. By and large, it is an old boys patronage club that on occasion, in spite of itself, accomplishes something of marginal value for the people of Canada.
On the one hand, the Senate is highly exclusionary in character and, on the other hand, it represents the people of Canada only sporadically and, more often than not, only as the spirit of political caprice happens to motivate some of them. It is a body over which the people of Canada have virtually no control and upon which people can exert little or no pressure.
Moreover, even if one could find a way to bring pressure to bear on the members of the Senate, such pressure, generally speaking, would contribute little more than a tilting at windmills since the Senate is extremely limited in real power. Its greatest claim to fame is that, at some considerable cost, it produces Royal Commission reports to which almost everyone alludes, few read, and to which almost no one within government pays any attention.
The idea of changing the structure of the Senate is not a new one. Furthermore, the winds of change in the current atmosphere of discontent with the institutions of democracy are blowing at gale, if not hurricane, force. Almost all of the proposals for change indicate that the Senate should be an elected body, but after this point of agreement, consensus gets blown to the four corners of political opinion. Consequently, while the suggestions which follow do not reflect any sense of unanimity among Canadians, the possibilities discussed below may constitute a way of helping to establish the process of participatory democracy which is necessary both to complement, as well as to act as a countervailing force against, some of the tendencies of representational democracy.
The Senate should consist of elected members made up of four individuals drawn from each of the provinces, as well as the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. Three of the individuals elected from a given province or territory should represent the largest traditional parties, namely, the Liberals, Conservatives and NDP.
The fourth person could represent a non-traditional party that commands the respect of, say, at least 10% of the population of the province or territory in question. Or, the fourth person might be drawn from a group, party or community that commands less than the indicated level of 10% support.
One should even entertain the possibility of permitting the fourth position to be a sort of independent category that could be contested by people who have no party affiliation but who do have a desire to participate in the shaping process of political activity. There is a fairly large percentage of people in Canada as a whole, as well as within individual provinces and territories, who do not share the values, commitments and orientations of any of the presently existing parties, but who, nonetheless, are deeply concerned with what goes on in Canada.
The latter possibility might serve to induce people to seek alternatives to traditional party politics by providing an opportunity for entry into the political process that is not otherwise available because of the numbers game of mainstream politics. This might especially be the case in provinces that tend toward a sort of monolithic power structure revolving around an entrenched, incumbent party.
There should be a certain amount of flexibility in the character of the political affiliations of these elected officials in order to reflect the current political realities of a given province or territory. For example, if the politics of a certain province or territory exhibited a party profile that was different from the traditional one of other provinces, then, obviously, the people elected to the Senate would have to reflect these differences.
In addition, regardless of from which party a person is elected, the individual would not be required to follow the party line while malting decisions concerning any given issue before the Senate. The reason for doing things in this fashion has two aspects.
The first aspect revolves around being able to introduce into the Senate a spectrum of philosophical perspectives with respect to issues, policies, programs and political style. These perspectives should be somewhat reflective of primary political/ philosophical currents running through the electorate. The second aspect underlying the reason for doing things in the way outlined earlier is to give the elected Senate officials some discretion concerning how and when they enter into dialogue, negotiation and co-operation with other members of the Senate.
From the point of view being advocated in the present document, the Senate should consist of six subcommittees (one subcommittee for each of the areas of responsibility to be discussed shortly) that are under the auspices of the Senate body taken as a whole. These subcommittees each should consist of eight members (assuming that four Senators have been elected from each of the 10 provinces and two territories) drawn by lot (more on this later).
Furthermore, although each subcommittee would operate on the basis of the principle of simple majority in any votes it takes, the decisions of the subcommittees would be subject to the full vote of the Senate in which a two-thirds majority would be required to pass measures in order for them to be implemented. Measures that are passed through subcommittees, but voted down by the full Senate, are returned to the appropriate subcommittee for further disposition.
Senators should be elected for a period of six years. This differs from the four-year period that is suggested later in this document for members of the House of Commons. There are several reasons for suggesting that things be done in this manner.
For instance, because the functioning of the two parliamentary bodies would be quite different from one another, if modified along the lines suggested in the present document, and because their respective spheres of responsibility and interest also would be different from one another under the proposals being put forth, the interests of Canadians might be better served if the Senatorial elections be kept as separate as possible from the election for the members of the House of Commons. This would give Canadians an opportunity to concentrate on the issues germane to each body and become more focused in their study of the problems surrounding the respective elections.
However, if the tenure period of office for each body is made too long, then, one loses the opportunity to infuse new energy, ideas and commitment into the political process. If, on the other hand, one sets the tenure period of office for each parliamentary body for too brief a time, then, one may prevent elected officials from having time to learn their jobs or do them with any degree of efficiency or proficiency.
Six years was decided upon for Senators, as opposed to four for House of Commons members, because there seems to be a need for a longer period of continuity for Senatorial duties than for the duties of the members of the House. At the same time, the needs of continuity have to be weighed and balanced against the need to revitalize the political process. In this respect, as well, a tenure period for Senators of six years seemed to be an appropriate choice for harmonizing the needs of continuity and revitalization.
The method of selection for these six Senate subcommittees would be as follows. The names of the 48 Senators (four from each province plus four each from the two territories) would be put into the technological equivalent of a hat. Names would be drawn from that process, one at a time, in a random manner.
Only one elected member per province could be on any subcommittee. Moreover, a maximum of two members from any party could be selected for a given subcommittee.
If a province was already represented on a given Senate subcommittee, or if a given party already had two representatives on a subcommittee, then, further names would be generated through the random selection process until an elected member from a new province and/or party had been produced. In this way, a maximum number of provinces would gain representation on the various subcommittees, while, at the same time, ensuring a balanced diversity of political philosophies.
The subcommittee for which random selections are to be made lastly would be the Appointments subcommittee (discussed shortly). Due to the character of a random selection process, one could end up with an unbalanced Appointments subcommittee both in terms of provincial representation as well as in terms of political philosophy. If this should occur, then, on a random basis, switches should be made with other subcommittees in order to achieve provincial and philosophical parity in each of the committees.
Although not every province would be represented on any given subcommittee, eight provinces would be represented on a specific subcommittee. Furthermore, every province would be represented on a number of different subcommittees. Consequently, there would be considerable diversity and breadth of provincial representation on any given subcommittee.
If the Northwest Territories subsequently were to be divided into two provinces, as has been proposed by some people, then, there would be an extra four Senate members to distribute among various subcommittees. This would mean that, for example, there would be four subcommittees with nine members each (instead of eight) and two subcommittees still with eight members each.
I suggest that the four subcommittees that are to have, under such circumstances, an extra member each, should be: (1) Education; (2) Environment; (3) Basic Research and Technological Development; and (4) Constitutional Issues. The other two subcommittees namely, Budget/Finance and Appointments-still would have eight members each. The arrangement is somewhat arbitrary, but I feel the first four areas deserve a greater number of provincial representatives than do the latter two subcommittee areas.
The compositional structure of the Senate, as outlined above, is predicated on the premise that the best government often, though not always, is a result of minority government. In minority government, elected officials are forced to find ways of entering into alliances with one another in order to make the process work. Similarly, establishing a context in the Senate in which the political process would be run along the lines of shifting coalitions from issue to issue, may well provide the opportunity for a process that is: (a) more likely to be reflective of the needs of a wider proportion of the electorate; (b) more given to compromise and negotiation rather than to ideologically rigid confrontations; and, (c) more likely to be focused on the strengths and weaknesses of issues per se rather than getting entangled in partisan politics.
Spheres of Senate Responsibility
The following pages outline the six areas of Senate responsibilities. Some of these areas are discussed in much more detail than others, especially in relation to the aspect of philosophical issues surrounding some of the proposed subcommittees. The discussion is intended to be suggestive rather than definitive.
The recommended spheres of responsibility of the Senate would be as follows. They fall into six basic areas.
First, the Senate should be responsible for all government appointments. This includes the members of the Supreme Court.
In addition, half of all such government appointments should be women, and these appointments should be equitably distributed across the board rather than restricted to certain areas of government activity.
The reasons for arranging things in this manner are fairly straightforward. It provides a countervailing force against the tendency of governments in power to, on the one hand, succumb to the practice of patronage, and, on the other hand, to choose people who will reflect their thinking or political inclinations. The interests of neither democracy nor the electorate are served well when governments in power are permitted to indulge themselves in either of these political pastimes.
By letting the Senate make such decisions, people are likely to be selected who are the best individuals available for the job. This is so because no one party or philosophy has a monopoly on power in the Senate. Therefore, appointment decisions will be based on consensus, co-operation, compromise and negotiation.
Secondly, the Senate should have the responsibility of approving the budget which is prepared by the government that rules the House of Commons. Included in this responsibility would be the power to: (a) suggest cuts, program deletions and modifications in the proposed provincial budget; (b) send the budget back to the House for further deliberations; and (c) ensure that the government in power stays within the parameters of its budget.
The House of Commons is free to take heed of, or ignore, the suggestions of the Senate, but the course of action pursued by the House must be done with the understanding that until the Senate approves the budget, the budget cannot be implemented. In effect, by placing the power of budget approval in the hands of the Senate rather than at the sole discretion of the ruling government, one is forcing the government to be more sensitive and responsive to a diversity of opinions which reflect a wider proportion of the electorate than does the party in power.
One also may wish to equip this Senate subcommittee with other kinds of watchdog powers with respect to the financial affairs of the federal government. For example, the activities of the Bank of Canada might be one of the institutions that could be subject to a review process, as well as some degree of regulatory control, by this subcommittee.
The third, fourth and fifth areas of responsibility of the Senate concern particular portfolios that are of fundamental importance to the welfare of Canada as a vibrant nation. These areas involve the environment, education, together with basic research and technological development. All of these areas possess the potential to have substantial impact on the quality of life of all Canadians, both now and in the future.
The above statement should not be interpreted to mean that other ministries of government have no importance or that they do not have the potential for having substantial impact on the quality of life of all Canadians. Obviously, neither of these interpretations is the case.
However, problems of environment and education, together with issues of basic research and development, touch on the lives of all Canadians in a way that may be far more fundamental and of essential importance than is the case with many, if not most, other ministries. Moreover, the aforementioned three areas tend to lend themselves more naturally to the potential for individual participation across all strata of society by non-politicians and non-government officials than do many of the other ministries which are either fairly exclusionary (e.g., Defense, Attorney General) or fairly narrowly conceived (e.g., Mining, Agriculture, Fisheries).
In addition, the three indicated areas of concern require not only a special sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of the people of Canada-which often are not provided by a ruling party, but these areas need to be removed from the shifting priorities and commitments that mark transitions in going from one ruling party to another ruling party. All three areas require constant attention and nurturing in a non-partisan fashion. Therefore, a revised Senate having the characteristics outlined earlier seemingly would be in a better position to provide the sort of care, concern, sensitivity, responsiveness and constancy than would the House of Commons or even provincial governments.
Each of the foregoing five areas of responsibility should emphasize the principle of participatory democracy. Indeed, the Senate, as here conceived, is intended to be a body that stresses, encourages and provides opportunities for participation by, and involvement from, the general public in a way that the government, in general, and the House of Commons, in particular, does not. The House of Commons operates on principles of representational democracy with little or no opportunity for participation by non-politicians, and, generally speaking, is not interested in sharing power. The emphasis is on controlling power in order to pursue whichever of the two species of representational government strikes the fancy of the members of the House. Naturally, this is especially true of the party in ascendancy in the House.
In any event, each area of Senate responsibility should operate on the premise of drawing into their sphere of activity and concern as many people as is possible, feasible and practical. For example, the subcommittee on appointments should actively go into the community and consult with professional groups, institutions, businesses, organizations, religious circles, unions, editorial boards and individuals that could provide the subcommittee with a list of candidates who might be well suited to the appointments to be made.
The subcommittee could, at the same time, gain insight into the needs, problems and concerns of the community. This understanding would help them arrive at decisions that might better reflect the issues that are affecting the communities they visit.
Consider another example that gives expression to the theme of participatory democracy which is to be stressed in a reconstituted Senate. Education is an area of fundamental importance to individuals and communities alike. Education plays an essential role in the establishing, maintaining and realizing of sovereignty.
The Senate subcommittee on education should manage a dynamic program of training, consultation, outreach, cross-fertilization, research, symposia and publication that would bring together, from diverse backgrounds, educators, theorists, as well as people who may have no professional experience but who are deeply concerned about educational issues. The idea would be to establish a national think-tank focusing on educational issues both theoretical and practical.
This think-tank could be centered in a variety of localities across the nation, but it also would be capable of moving around and setting up shop on a temporary basis in a variety of other localities and communities. The purpose of such efforts is to provide a venue through which the people of Canada could be united in a common cause: to improve the quality of education in Canada as a whole and at every level of educational opportunity. At the same time, a great deal of costly duplication might be eliminated.
The intent of all this would not be to take control away from the community or to impose, from above, a monolithic curriculum on all schools. Instead, the intent is to provide a powerful, multi-faceted, flexible set of resources which could be utilized at the discretion of the community. In addition, the intent would be to establish channels of communication that are conducive to a dialectical process of sharing: successes, failures, problems, needs, methods, expertise, theory, practice and goals.
One could continue the foregoing process of spelling out how each area of responsibility of a Senate could be developed in ways that emphasize the principle of participatory democracy. The foregoing discussion has been intended to be suggestive of the sort of things which are possible. However, there is no limit to the ways one could go about implementing social participation on a greater scale in each of the six areas of Senate responsibilities.
In all of these cases, the subcommittees become like so many boards of directors that oversee the operations and management of these exercises in participatory democracy. Ideally, not only would the Senate be a body that invites participation and extends power sharing to a diverse group of non-politicians, but it also could be a body that promotes national unity in the very process of making available opportunities of participatory democracy to people in every province or territory of Canada and on every level of scale of society.
Concomitant with the creation of Senate subcommittees for Environment, Education, as well as Basic Research and Technology, I propose that the provincial ministerial counterparts to these three areas should become regional expressions of a Senate presence. In effect, this proposal means that the provincial ministries which are counterparts to the three Senate subcommittee areas would no longer be provincial ministries, per se. Instead, they would become mediators and arbitrators between various Federal and Provincial themes and currents within the respective areas.
Each of these areas is of sufficiently fundamental importance to, and with essential ramifications for, all of Canada that they should not be left to the partisan politics of either federal or provincial governments. Therefore, there should be a strong centralist/ federalist component to the decisions made in these areas, but the nature of the centralist/ federalist component should not be left to the vagaries, inconsistencies and politics of representational democracy.
On the other hand, precisely because each of the three aforementioned areas are of interest and of value to all of Canada, there should be an attempt to permit as many Canadians as possible to contribute to, and thereby help, organize, shape, color and direct the decisions made in such areas. This suggests that the politics of participatory democracy assume significance here.
In both facets of decision making (that is, the centralizing and decentralizing tendencies in the areas of environment, education, as well as basic research and technology), a Senate reconstituted along the lines suggested in the present document would appear to be better placed to meet the challenges of the indicated areas than does representational government on either the federal or provincial level. This is so because what is needed is co-operation, compromise, consultation, and planning on a national basis.
However, this must be done in such a way that the process lays heavy emphasis on local/regional participation in, and shaping of, national policies and programs in the indicated areas. Representational government often has difficulty accomplishing these sorts of things, whereas participatory government rooted in a federalist/centralist framework would seem to be well equipped to accomplish what is required.
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