Measuring the temporal
Maxwell's
equations were accepted by scientists as reflections or embodiments of certain aspects of
the invariance inherent in the character of the laws governing natural phenomena. If one
treated time as an absolute, Maxwell's equations produced variable results as one moved
from one frame of reference to another.
Thus, if one
wanted to retain these equations, then, one had to make adjustments in the manner in which
one methodologically approached the issue of time. Einstein did this by requiring the
temporal component of a coordinate system to be subject to the same translation process as
the three spatial components of that same coordinate system.
One of the
mistakes which may have been made in classical mechanics is that the measurement of
time was considered to be absolute in the same way that time itself was considered an
absolute. Measurement is affected by a variety of forces operative in a given framework
(and time is but one such dimensional force), whereas time's ontology is not necessarily
affected by such things at all.
In other
words, the structural character of the ontology of time may be such that it permits a
range of possible dialectics between itself and various modes of measurement which may
engage it. While the mode of measurement will be sensitive to a variety of forces that
will affect its capacity to get an accurate reading of the character of time, the
dimension of time is not affected by any of these forces. As such, although time acts
upon, and shapes, whatever engages it, time may not, in turn, be affected by the activity
or character of any of the entities or forces that it engages. In this sense, ontological
time (as opposed to measured time) could be said to have perfect elasticity, since no
matter how it is engaged or by what it is engaged, ontological time retains its original
structure without displacement affects ensuing from such engagement.
In any
event, part of Einstein's revolution was to draw our attention to the extent to which the
measurement of time is extremely sensitive, under certain circumstances, to the effects of
motion, gravitational fields, and so on. Nonetheless, as indicated earlier, nothing which
Einstein said could be considered to carry any necessary entailments with respect to the
ontology of time itself.1
The
scientists from Galileo onward, up to the time of Einstein, made a mistake when they
assumed that because the ontology of time is everywhere the same, therefore, the measurement
of time must everywhere be the same. They failed to properly understand the relation
of methodology to ontology.
For
instance, they failed to understand that the hermeneutical engagement of time, as
expressed in terms of some mode of measurement, constitutes an operationalizing of the
temporal dimension and comes to be used as an index for such hermeneutical engagement.
This index of measurement is dependent on the state of motion, or on the state of the
conditions of gravitation, in which the measurement index is embedded. In other words, the
scientists from Galileo up to the time of Einstein failed to understand that the
measurement of time is relative to the frame of reference in which the measurement takes
place since the latter is affected by the conditions and forces which prevail locally
within that frame of reference.
Since the
time of Einstein, there also has been an erroneous assumption which has been made. This
faulty assumption is the reverse of the mistake by Galileo, Newton and others.
Whereas
Galileo, et. al., had mistakenly assumed that because the ontology of time is everywhere
the same, then, therefore, the measurement of time must everywhere be the same, Einstein,
and subsequent generations, have mistakenly assumed that because the measurement of time
will vary from framework to framework, therefore, the structural character or the
ontology of time also will vary from framework to framework. This need not be the
case.
The ontology
of time may be independent of one's mode of measurement. However, the mode of measurement
is not independent of the structural character of the ontology of time since the latter
establishes the parameters within which any given mode of temporal measurement must
operate.
The
confusion between the measurement of time and the ontology of time carries over into
another issue of some importance to the theory of relativity - namely, the problem of
simultaneity. In a sense, this problem is really only a variation on the measurement issue
discussed previously. As a result, there is a failure to keep a clear distinction between
the measurement of simultaneity and the idea of absolute simultaneity, in and of itself.
When one
says the word "now", the instant required to say that word exists simultaneously
everywhere in the universe. This is an intuitive example of absolute simultaneity.
However, once one undertakes to measure the instant in question and to attempt to compare
the measurements taken, then, one encounters all the problems of simultaneity about which
Einstein talked and wrote.
The idea of an order-field
If one
treats changes in the ratio of constraints and degrees of freedom as evidence of the
presence of one or more forces, then, several questions which need to be asked are these:
first, how does a force bring about a change in the ratio of constraints and degrees of
freedom? Secondly, what is the relationship between a force and a field?
These
questions will not be answered in their entirety within the context of the present essay.
What is being offered here is more like pointing in a certain direction and identifying a
few of the components. It is an unfinished sketch to which an increasing amount of detail
can be added over time as new data and understanding become available.
Part of the
answer to the foregoing questions concerns the idea of an order-field. An order-field is
generated through the dialectic of a set of dimensions. The structural character of these
dimensions is an expression of a spectrum of various ratios of constraints and degrees of
freedom which have been established by the underlying order-field. This underlying
order-field induces different aspects of the spectrum of ratios to engage one another.
The ensuing
engagement generates a further spectrum of ratios which give expression to the character
of the dialectic between, or among, different dimensions. This dialectic of dimensions
generates, in turn, a further spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom
which give expression to point-structures, in neighborhoods, and latticeworks on different
levels of scale.
At the heart
of any field theory - whether it be rooted in Faraday's idea of a force, or in Maxwell's
model of a mechanical ether, or in the geometry of Einstein's general theory of relativity
- is an antagonism to the concept of Newton's idea of action-at-a distance. Field theories
are all predicated on the principle that the dynamics of the field, the dialectical
activity of the field, is a function of contiguous events. Field theories differ from one
another in the manner in which they attempt to account for the structural character of the
contiguous relationship among various aspects of the field and how effects are propagated
through the field by means of such contiguity.
Consequently,
an order-field constitutes a field due to the way that the underlying order has contact,
in some sense, with, or is contiguous with, each aspect of the fundamental dimensions
which have been established. The order-field also gives expression to field properties in
the way it has contact with the dialectic which it induces these basic dimensions, and
from which emerge various point-structures, neighborhoods, and latticeworks. All of this
contact is accomplished through the spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of
freedom out of which dimensionality and dialectical activity initially arise.
Thus, the
order-field is present at each and every point of these spectrums, on whatever level of
scale one cares to consider - from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic. This presence
manifests itself as a field which organizes, arranges, shapes, directs, orients and
generates all structures and structuring activity.
These
structures and structuring activities are waveform manifestations of the way the
order-field gives expression to itself as a result of operating on itself. So, the
order-field is more akin to the contiguous character of Faraday's notion of a force field,
than it is to either, the action-at-a-distance field concept of Newton, or the bifurcated
matter/field concept of Maxwell.
Nevertheless,
the order-field being proposed here is different from Faraday's notion of a force field.
From the perspective of the theory being put forth in this essay, the idea of a force
is itself an index of the presence of an order-field, manifesting itself in a form
which results in a change in a given ration of constraints and degrees of freedom.
Consequently,
as such, force is not the basic constituent of the universe as it is for Faraday. Force
is, instead, itself a manifestation of something more fundamental - namely, order. The
structural character of any given force is a function of the ratio, or set of ratios, of
constraints and degrees of freedom which have been arranged through the presence of order.
The Range of a force
is described by the series of point-structures, neighborhoods, or
latticeworks whose altered character can be traced to the presence of a capability for
bringing about a transformation in the ratio(s) of constraints and degrees of freedom of
the observed kind. The path of a force is described by the vectoral or tensoral series of
point-structures, neighborhoods, or latticeworks whose alteration in ratio character can
be traced to the primary epicenter(s) of intensity of the force's presence, as opposed to
secondary, after-shock effects which occur away from the primary points of field
intensity. The structural character of either the range of a force or the path of a force
need not be simple or linear in nature.
The notion
of an order-field provides a potential means for any given point of time/space to be in
"contact" with any other point of time/space by means of the dialectic of phase
relationships through which the ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom are given
expression. However, these junctions of contact are not necessarily physical in character.
Furthermore,
the dialectic connecting various neighborhoods does not need to be construed in terms that
require the transmission of physical signals between points which are spatially separated.
The points of contact are manifestations of the dialectic of dimensions which have been
set in motion by the underlying order-field. Thus, 'points' may be in non-physical contact
on the level of the order-field, and this contact may manifest itself on the level of
scale of physical events as simultaneous events between, or among, physical points
separated by spatial distances.
Methodologically,
one may not be able to demonstrate the simultaneity of such events because of the sorts of
problems pointed out by Einstein concerning the measurement of simultaneity in relation to
points that are physically separated. Nonetheless, ontologically, the events may be
simultaneous expressions of certain facets of an underlying order-field. Consequently,
viewed from such a perspective, the ontological character of an order-field underwrites
the simultaneity of events, not the mode of measurement.
On a given
level of scale, a particular ratio of constraints and degrees of freedom expresses itself
as a point-structure. A group of related ratios manifest themselves as a structural
neighborhood.
In the
hermeneutical context, neighborhoods tend to build-up (e.g. through learning and memory)
around points of phenomenological engagement to which attention is directed and
identifying reference is made. Indeed, attention and identifying reference mark the
beachhead landing of the hermeneutical operator with respect to various aspects of the
phenomenology of the experiential field. Whether - and, if so, to what extent - a
neighborhood will bind the hermeneutical operator or whether the hermeneutical operator
will remain relatively unbound will be a function of the dialectical engagement between
(or among) the hermeneutical operator and a given neighborhood or neighborhoods.
Hermeneutical
point-structures are not geometric points. In other words, they are not necessarily
‘spatial’ or simple in character. Consequently, unlike geometric points,
hermeneutical point-structures cannot necessarily be construed as lacking an internal
structure.
A
point-structure is a ratio of constraints and degrees of freedom which give expression,
when taken all together, to a form that can have multiple facets and themes. This suggests
a potential for complexity of structural character.
A further
flavor of complexity comes from the fact that what is a point-structure on one level of
scale, may, on another level of scale, give rise to a neighborhood of point-structures or
even a variety of latticeworks. As such, point-structures have the capacity to manifest
fractal-like properties when engaged on different levels of scale.
Latticeworks
are the result of a collection of neighborhoods which are held together by a set of phase
relationships. These phase relationships establish identifiable patterns of focal
activity, as well as identifiable patterns of horizonal boundaries, within which the
collection of neighborhoods interact with one another.
Ratios of
constraints and degrees of freedom are related to one another by means of phase
relationships. More precisely, ratios are linked to one another by a spectrum of
constraints and degrees of freedom that establish parameters within which phase quanta are
exchanged between interacting ratios. Phase quanta are discrete arrangements of
constraints and degrees of freedom that are drawn from the spectrum of arrangements which
are possible in a given context of interacting point-structures, neighborhoods, and/or
latticeworks established through a given order-field.
At any given
time, if two point-structures or neighborhoods or latticeworks are linked to one another,
the structural character of the link is an expression of one aspect of the spectrum of
ratios which is generated by the underlying dialectic of dimensions. When such a link
manifests itself, this is known as a phase quanta exchange, and this exchange gives
expression to a state known as a phase relationship.
Thus, the
phase relationship state encompasses the following sequence of activity. (a) It begins
with first engagement of specific ratios; (b) proceeds through phase quanta exchanges; (c)
includes the alteration of the ratio character of the point structures, neighborhoods
and/or latticeworks involved in the engagement process; and, (d) ends with the
disengagement of previously interacting ratios.
Both the
process of phase quanta exchange, as well as the state of phase relationship in which that
exchange is embedded, are subject to the influence of differential, vectoral pressure
components. Sometimes the structural character of the way these vectoral pressure
components interact is complex.
When this is
the case, the dialectic of components gives expression to tensor components which
constitute a source of stresses capable of simultaneously pushing, pulling, twisting and
stretching any given phase quanta exchange or phase relationship state. This is comparable
to the manner in which Faraday's lines of force could be subjected to a variety of
stresses and pressures within the electromagnetic field.
Continuity In the context of the order-field
The
order-field is continuous in the sense that a relay race is continuous. In other words,
despite the presence of discrete elements (i.e., the runners for the different teams
competing in the race), these elements are organized or arranged in such a way that one or
more of the runners is always running throughout the race, although not all the runners
will be running at any given instant during the course of the race.
The
integrity of the continuity of the race is preserved because of the way the runners, taken
as discrete elements, are ordered within the context of the rules which govern the running
of the race. The primary characteristic of this ordering is that there should be an
overlapping of one discrete element with another discrete element at different points of
the race. This is the region within which the baton is passed on from one runner to the
next.
Similarly,
an order-field is continuous because the spectrum of ratios on any given level of scale
will always be giving expression to one or more particular instances of the ratios which
form that spectrum. Moreover, there is an overlapping of events which occurs between the
expression of one ratio and a subsequent expression of another ratio drawn from the same
spectrum.
This region
of overlap is contained either in the phase relationship which links the two ratios which
are being expressed, or it is contained in the mere contiguity of the events. In either
case, as one ratio, for whatever reason, ceases manifesting itself, other ratios
spontaneously will manifest themselves, or be induced to do so, even though there may be
no causal link between or among such contiguous events, and all of this is traceable to
the modes of manifestation being expressed through the order-field.
From the
perspective of field theory, the laws describing the fundamental character of physical
phenomena will be expressed in terms of a set of field variables, fv. Each
observer will map these field variables in a continuous fashion by means of a coordinate
system which gives representational expression to three spatial components and one
temporal component. However, each observer may use a different set of words or
hermeneutical functions (of which mathematics is but one modality) to describe such
space-time coordinate systems.
Irrespective
of what labels may be assigned to the coordinate system in each frame of reference, the
principle of relativity requires that the physical laws which are derived by various
observers in relative motion with respect to one another must, nonetheless, be in
one-to-one correspondence with each other. However, until one has devised a means of
translating from the coordinate language of one frame of reference to the coordinate
language of another frame of reference, one is in no position to establish whether or not
the physical laws deduced in the different frameworks which are in relative motion to one
another are capable of being placed in one-to-one correspondence.
On the other
hand, if one is successful in generating a set of translations that: (a) allow one to move
from one framework to another in a way that conforms to the invariant structural character
of the physical laws of nature, and (b) is independent of the state of motion of any given
observer relative to the state of motion of any other observer, then, such a set of
translations is known as a continuous transformation group.56
If
one has a set of homeomorphic analog mapping latticeworks which preserve the invariance or
symmetry of the laws of understanding independently of the state of dialectical engagement
of any given hermeneutical observer with respect to some given event or phenomenon, such a
set constitutes a continuous hermeneutical group. The methodology of special
relativity theory may, in fact, be a special limiting case of the more general principle
of hermeneutical relativity which is directed toward establishing invariance of structural
character in the context of dialectical engagement of ontology by a number of different
observational frameworks and their concomitant systems of measurement.
Intersubjective hermeneutical activity
One
encounters the social community of knowers and interpreters in the context of the
continuous hermeneutical transformation group. This occurs in the following way.
In order for
the invariance or symmetry of a given law of understanding to be preserved, one must
establish congruence with that which makes phenomena of such structural character
possible. The fact that various hermeneutical latticeworks of different observers are
analogs of one another is not sufficient.
They must
all preserve symmetry through generating congruence functions in relation to the
structural character of the phenomenon to which all observers are making identifying
reference. Only in this context of each hermeneutical framework having established
defensible congruence functions with respect to some aspect of the structural character of
reality would there be significance in being able to demonstrate that these different
frameworks are analogs for one another.
At the same
time, through the dialectic between, or among, different hermeneutical frameworks, members
of the community can work toward uncovering facets of invariance in different aspects of
the structural character of reality or ontology. In this sense, the hermeneutical activity
of the community considered as a whole takes on the form of a hermeneutical operator which
engages the point-structure products which are generated by individuals through the
activity of their own hermeneutical operator.
In other
words, the hermeneutical activity of the community as a whole forms a latticework in which
the hermeneutical activity of individuals forms complex point-structures or neighborhoods
(in the case of a number of people whose hermeneutical positions are similar but not
entirely the same) within that community latticework. Thus, the hermeneutical activity of
the community is an expression of the hermeneutical operator considered from a different
level of scale than that of the individual.
Consequently,
all of the basic components which are inherent in the individual's hermeneutical operator,
also are inherent in the community run hermeneutical operator. Furthermore, just as one
finds different kinds of attractors on the individual level of scale, one also finds
various kinds of attractors on the community level of scale.
Substance, events and invariance
When one
speaks of the invariance or symmetry of a law of understanding, it is important to
understand that one is not talking about an abstract structure which is divorced from a
concrete context. While invariant laws must be independent of the idiosyncrasies which may
characterize the hermeneutical framework of any particular observer, such laws are not
independent from the structural character of the aspect of ontology which is giving
expression to this sort of invariance. Indeed, only when the hermeneutical framework of a
given observer merges horizons with a certain aspect of ontology by means of congruence
functions, could one say that the individual has grasped something - on a given level of
scale - of the invariant structural character of that to which identifying reference is
being made.
In the
classical tradition of physics, the idea of a physical material or substance was something
which could be assigned a determinate, usually unique, location in space and time.
Moreover, this idea usually included an array of properties- the array varying with
different substances- which gave expression to various facets of the character of the
substance in question.
In addition,
whatever array of properties might be associated with a given substance, the traditional
view held that,
in general (although there were exceptions to this) such properties
would be conserved as the substance is exposed to, or moves through, a variety of changes
across time and space. Finally, by following the transitions undergone by a given
substance or set of substances, classical scientists believed the character of causal
relationships could be detected from which one could deduce universal laws, such as the
laws of motion governing physical substances or materials.
Einstein
rejected an essential portion of the classical idea of substance which has been outlined
above. For example, Einstein argued that one cannot make any unique
assignment of properties - such as mass, length, velocity, time, causality or simultaneity
- to any aspect of a field.
Instead, in
accordance with the transformation equations which Einstein had derived, not only will one
be required to assign different values to such properties in different frameworks, one
also will not be able to identify any of these assignments as being the 'true' or 'real'
one. Indeed, according to Einstein, one's methodology does not permit one to do anything
but treat all of the values as being equally real or true.
While
Einstein did not accept the idea of substance in the traditional sense, neither did he
believe that the assignment of values could be made arbitrarily. In fact, once one makes
an assignment of a value in some given frame of reference, all of the other values for
that frame of reference can be determined by means of the transformation equations.
Because, as
indicated previously, none of these assignments or determinations really can be said to be
rooted in some substance in the field, what was being described was an event. This event
could be observed to be characterized by a different set of property values in different
frames of reference.
Consequently,
Einstein had substituted the idea of: events with variable properties which,
nonetheless, conformed to invariant laws of nature, for the classical idea of: a substance
whose properties were conserved across time and space and which was subject to laws of
causality. In short, with Einstein's special theory of relativity, physics became an
exploration into the realm of invariance, which had no room for the notion of a physics
rooted in the fixed identity of some conserved substance.
There is a
difference, however, between: our methodological incapacity to establish the uniqueness of
the properties of matter and the field, and saying that there is no uniqueness of the
ontological properties of matter and the field. In a sense, the relativity principle
sacrificed the issue of uniqueness of property value on the altar of invariance.
In other
words, apparently, Einstein had to pay a price for having a methodological means of
establishing invariance in the laws of nature amongst a group of referential frames
exhibiting differential values of time, mass, length, simultaneity, and so on, with
respect to one-and-the-same event. That price was to lose any chance of determining an
ontologically unique set of property values in relation to that event.
Methodological field properties
As far as
Einstein's special theory of relativity is concerned, it's field aspects seem to be more a
reflection of the field properties of the methodology which is central to the special
theory, than they appear to be a reflection of any field properties of ontology. Said in
another way, the special theory of relativity is a field theory only in the sense that it
provides an account of how the measured properties of time, length, mass, velocity,
and simultaneity can be shown to be a function of the conditions which prevail at a
given locality of space, and, as a result, the descriptions given at those
localities are not dependent on any notion of action-at-a-distance. As the general idea of
a field concept requires, any given description of phenomena which is made with respect to
bodies that are in uniform motion relative to one another will be entirely dependent on
local conditions only.
More
specifically, local conditions include the way one's methodology engages the universal
laws that are given expression through the manner in which physical phenomena unfold under
a particular set of circumstances in a given locality of space time. Thus, such issues as
causality, force, energy distribution, substance, and so on, will manifest themselves as a
function of the manner in which the field properties of the methodology of
special relativity theory engage localized aspects of ontology.
The field
properties of the methodology of special relativity theory also are given expression in
the so-called Lorentz transformations which permit one to take the values that have been
measured in the context of a given inertial framework and translate those values into the
context of some other inertial frame of reference. In essence, the transformation
equations represent nothing more than a transfer of the field properties of the
methodology of the special theory of relativity from one inertial framework to another. In
fact, such transformation equations ensure that the special theory of relativity remains a
field theory in as much as the values which are to be assigned to the various physical
properties of a given inertial framework will always be a continuous reflection of the
local conditions which prevail with respect to that inertial framework.
In a sense,
the methodological flavor which characterizes Einstein's special theory of relativity
serves to lay the groundwork for the kind of field theory which is encompassed by
Einstein's later, general theory of relativity. In other words, the field concept of the
general theory of relativity also is rooted in methodological considerations - namely, the
geometry of space-time. This means the phenomenon of gravitation is reduced to being a
function of the methodological means (i.e., geometry) which Einstein chose to use in order
to give operational expression to certain universal laws of relationship among different
bodies of the physical universe.
Moreover, as
required by the general idea of the field concept, one can measure the gravitational
effect on any given point of space by taking into consideration the geometric properties
which manifest themselves in the local region of the point. Consequently, gravitation,
when expressed as a function of the geometric properties which prevail with respect to a
given set of conditions in a given region of space-time, transmits its 'influence' in
accordance with the characteristics of field theory - namely, on a localized,
point-by-point basis.
Although
there are obvious differences between the methodological character of the field properties
of Einstein's special theory of relativity and the field properties of his general theory
of relativity, there is an underlying, thematic sameness to them. Essentially, this
commonality or unity lies in the fact that Einstein's idea of a field in each case is
solidly embedded in the properties of the methodology used to operationalize and give
representational expression to certain aspects of ontology. Said in another way, the
underlying thematic sameness of the two theories of relativity lies in the way Einstein
makes field properties in each theory a function of methodology, rather than ontology.
One is able
to describe what occurs from one point to the next of space-time in the special theory of
relativity, by taking into account the effects of relative motion on measurement and/or
using an appropriate set of transformation equations which permit one to translate the
values generated by the measurement process in one framework into the values which will be
generated by the measurement process in another framework. In the general theory of
relativity, one is able to describe what occurs from one point to another in space-time by
taking into account the effects of the structural character of the geometry which
manifests itself in the context of a methodological engagement of gravitational phenomena
in a given locality.
In the
special theory of relativity, one is not able to establish, or know, the nature of
reality in and of itself. One only can interact with reality through the frames of the
methodological glasses one uses to engage that reality.
Therefore,
although the character of the relativistic lenses of the special theory permits one to see
the universality of physical laws in all frameworks, they prevent one from seeing just
what it is that is being governed in such a law-like way. From Einstein's perspective, all
that one sees are the values generated by the methodology of special relativity.
Similarly,
in the general theory of relativity, one is not able to make contact with reality in and
of itself. Again, one's vision is limited to the structural character of the frames of the
methodological glasses one uses to engage reality. Therefore, although the character of
the relativistic lenses of the general theory of relativity permits one to see that the
law of gravitation is universally applicable in all frameworks, one does not know why
space-time has the geometry it does, or what it is that is capable of warping space to
generate geometric characteristics of the kind that are observed in various cases.
One sees
there is a correlation among geometry, mass and gravitational phenomena, but one does not
know what it is that sustains this correlation. To say that gravitation is geometry, does
not account for how space comes to have the geometry it does, nor does it account for why
mass should be proportional to geometric properties.
Consequently,
the methodological strategy which Einstein used in the special theory of relativity to
develop his notion of a field had laid the groundwork for his doing the same sort of thing
when it came to the development of the field concept in the context of the general theory
of relativity. Moreover, by rooting the field concept in methodology, each theory of
relativity was able to permit one to describe certain universal properties and behaviors
which are manifested in the context of localized frameworks, while, simultaneously,
limiting one’s understanding of the underlying reality which made universal
properties and behaviors of such structural character possible.
FOOTNOTE
1.) There
are several experimental findings which often are cited to justify an ontological
interpretation of Einstein's special theory of relativity. One such finding concerns the
manner in which two atomic clocks that were synchronized initially, subsequently yielded
differences of measurement in the passage of time relative to one another after one of the
clocks had been transported by jet while the other remained stationary on the ground.
Supposedly, this experiment showed that as one approached (even in a modest fashion) the
speed of light, time slowed down, since the clock on the moving jet plane indicated that
less time had passed than did the stationary clock on the ground.
Another
experimental finding involves the manner in which the decay-rate of certain accelerated
particles is slowed down relative to the decay rate of these same sort of particles at
lesser velocities. Again, the tendency has been to suppose this demonstrates that the
structural character of the ontology of time is capable of being affected as velocities
approach the speed of light.
Neither of
these experimental findings, however, undermines the position being raced in this essay.
For example, although an atomic clock is a highly precise mode of
measurement, it is, nonetheless, a measuring device.
As such, it
is susceptible to being affected by the conditions of gravitation, velocity and so on that
surround it and to which it is subjected. The atomic clock experiment proves only that the
mode of measurement was affected by conditions of jet transport and says absolutely
nothing about the ontology of time being affected.
Thus, on the
one hand, the experiment is perfectly consistent with what Einstein's special theory of
relativity would predict. On the other hand, it offers no evidence to contradict what is
being advocated in the present chapter concerning the relationship between methodology and
ontology in relation to the temporal dimension.
The same
sort of result follows from the particle decay experiment. The rate of decay of a particle
constitutes a special kind of measuring device. The fact this decay rate can be speeded up
or slowed down merely means that it shares a property in common with other clock devices -
namely, that its mode of measurement is affected by the physical conditions to which it is
exposed.
Gravitational
fields and velocity affect the rate at which the internal structure of the particle
unfolds across time. Gravitational fields and velocity affect the manner in which the
phase relationships governing the rate of decay phenomenon manifest themselves.
However,
neither gravitational fields nor velocity has any effect whatsoever on the structural
character of the ontology of time. What is affected is the methodological engagement of
time. Return to Essay
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