Building Models - Part Seven
The Problem of Relativity
When considered in terms of the foregoing pages of discussion (as well as in terms of the rest of the present essay's analysis of Quine's position in the first part of Word and Object), one may not feel as confident about matters as Quine seems to be when he argues as follows:
"It is ... when we turn back into the midst of an actually present theory, at least hypothetically accepted, that we can and do speak sensibly of this and that sentence as true. Where it makes sense to apply "true" is to a sentence couched in terms of a given theory and seen from within the theory, complete with its posited reality.... Have we now so far lowered our sights as to settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth - rating the statements of each theory as true for that theory, and brooking no higher criticism? Not so. The saving consideration is that we continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular word theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be. Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs of the moment, even in the midst of philosophizing, until by what is vaguely called scientific method we change them here and there for the better." (pp. 24-25)
The 'reality' which a theory posits only has hermeneutical/epistemological value if the character of such positing permits or helps one to arrive at an accurate understanding of the character of that to which the theory makes identifying references. Such assistance would be made possible if the positing in question were able to produce a framework that either: a) reflected, or was congruent with, the character of the focal objects being referred to through the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field; or, b) allowed the individual to see the disparities between the character of his or her theory in relation to the character of that to which he or she makes reference, as the character of the latter is mediated by the phenomenology of the experiential field (both that of the individual as well as that of the experiential fields of others).
A sentence which is said to be true is not true because of a theory qua theory (although, obviously, there is a sense in which a sentence may give accurate expression to what a given theory maintains, but significant or ontological truth extends beyond this self-referential dimension of the way sentences relate to a theory). A sentence is true to the extent that the character of the hermeneutical framework in which the sentence's underlying intentionality is rooted is capable of accurately reflecting the character of that aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the sentence is making identifying reference.
This reference could be in terms of that phenomenological aspect being considered strictly within the context of the phenomenology taken in, and of, itself. On the other hand, the reference could be in terms of that phenomenological aspect which is being considered from the point of view of trying to establish the ontological nature of what makes a phenomenological aspect of such hermeneutical character possible.
If, at some point in one's proceedings, one does not discover a certain base line of non-theoretical, experiential data against which to compare theoretical positings for the degree of congruency which the latter manifested in relation to the aforementioned evidential base line, then, "truth" becomes a rather amorphous term. As a result, under these circumstances, one has great difficulty in understanding what the character of the connection is between truth and theory.
One encounters difficulty, as well, with respect to being able to understand how a sentence derived from a theory could be said to be true in any non-trivial sense. The application of the term "true" to a sentence seems to carry with it more than just the determination that the character of the sentence in question is congruent with the character of a certain facet of given theory.
Truth is not about what one believes to be true unless what one believes to be true is an accurate reflection of what is the case vis-á-vis the focal/horizonal character of that to which one is making identifying reference in the con-text of the belief's character. In seeking the truth, one is not asking if a given sentence truly represents what a given theory holds. One is asking whether what the sentence says the given theory holds is truly reflective of, or congruent with, that to which the theory, via the sentence in question, supposedly is making reference by virtue of its identifying character, structure, or logic.
Without this extra-theoretical dimension of the phenomenology of the experiential field in which at least some of the components of the phenomenology are not a function of theoretical positing, and, thereby, can be considered somewhat ‘independently’ from any specific set of theoretical positings, then, one has considerable difficulty in understanding what Quine means when he says: "we can and do speak sensibly [my emphasis] of this and that sentence as true" when that is "couched in terms of a given theory and seen from within the theory". And, the use of "independently" in the previous sentence gives implicit reference to that aspect of phenomenology - or that aspect of reality which makes phenomenology of such character possible - about which one theoretically posits.
Quine's position, at this point, seems to reduce down to treating 'theory as belief'. As such, it provides no means for identifying whether, or not, a theory says anything accurate about, or reflective of, or congruent with, the character of reality.
In fact, Quine's above position does not provide even a means of determining if there is any reality other than the belief system constituting the given theory. Indeed, despite his protestations to the contrary, Quine's position here appears to be inextricably mired in a relativistic quagmire.
According to Quine, the consideration which saves him from the charges of relativism "is that we continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular world theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be". However, no matter how seriously we might take "our own particular aggregate science", 'seriousness', in and of itself, is not going to remove one from beneath the specter of relativism's haunting presence. What one needs is a means of investigating, analyzing, questioning and assessing such aggregate science which is not dependent on, or a function of, the theories of such science which are being investigated, analyzed, questioned or assessed.
There are a number of distinctions which need to be made in relation to the idea of science - aggregate or otherwise. "Science" can be used to refer to the purely methodological dimensions of inquiry, irrespective of what is yielded by the application of such methodological considerations. "Science" also can be used to encompass the "findings" of the application of scientific method in any given set or sequence of circumstances. In addition, "science" can be used in reference to the processes that are involved in the generation of theoretical posits concerning various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field, and "science" can be used, as well, to refer to some composite structure of methodology plus "findings" plus theoretical organization or systematization of such methodology and findings.
In instances where one wishes to assess or evaluate the tenability, soundness, weaknesses or reliability of the findings which have been woven into a theoretical framework, one cannot use the theory in question to evaluate itself without running the risk of being charged with a conflict of interest that taints the credibility of the assessment or evaluation processes one uses to judge the tenability of the theory. There must be a clear line of demarcation between the methodological dimension of science and the dimension of science concerning theoretical positing.
One needs something independent of the specific theories involved as a means of conceptually cross-referencing or cross-checking one's hermeneutical investigation in relation to more than one set of conceptual co-ordinates. This technique of cross-checking could be in the form of analyzing the reported experiences of other individuals that bear upon the issues in question, but which might, or might not, arise out of the same - or even similar - theoretical background as the one being investigated by the individual in question. A technique of cross-checking also could be in the form of questions that are manifested through the phenomenology of the interrogative imperative which gives expression to problems or difficulties or which points out apparent short-comings, inadequacies or lacunae of the theories being considered, as measured against a variety of inter-subjective or inter-phenomenological experiential data.
In whatever way the cross-checking or cross-referencing process is accomplished, it is intended as a means of bringing independent experiential data to bear upon the evaluation of a given theory in order to get a better conceptual fix on, or appreciation of, the character of both the given theory in question, as well as of those aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which such theoretical considerations are attempting to make congruent or accurately reflective identifying references. In this way one can use various methodological considerations as a means of trying to assess a given theoretical positing of specified character.
Alternatively, one might use a wide variety of non-theoretical experiential data to assess the tenability of a given theory. Finally, one could use certain theoretical positings as a means of organizing or interpreting or characterizing various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
However, one need not restrict oneself to only one facet of such a cross-referencing or cross-checking process. Instead, one could combine them all in a continuous process of checking and rechecking across the spectrum of theoretical, methodological and experiential dimensions of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
The foregoing complex of hermeneutical, investigatory considerations may or may not be related to what Quine, ultimately, had in mind when he spoke of "our own aggregate science, our own particular world theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories". On the other hand, the fact of the matter is that, up until, and including, the present juncture, Quine has not provided a tenable basis for permitting one to conceptually travel, in an unhindered manner, from the point at which Quine began his investigation into the relation of Word and Object, to the sorts of assertions he now seems to be making.
After all, if sentences are, from Quine's perspective, "meaningless inter-theoretically", then, just how does one go about approaching or conceptualizing the notions of an "aggregate science" or of a "loose total fabric of quasi-theories"? There would seem to be, in Quine's view, no common denominator through which one could establish inter-theoretical meaningfulness for either the same sentence or difference sentences with which any given speaker/hearer dyad might be concerned.
In other words, Quine's position, at this point, appears to make all theoretical considerations totally insular. Such considerations are rendered insular in the sense of being methodologically cut off from developing a means of determining whether, or not, one's theoretical positing have any congruence with the reality which makes that positing (and that which it is about) possible. Such theoretical considerations are rendered insular, as well, in the sense of being isolated from any sort of meaningful exchange of perspectives, values, ideas, understandings, analyses or inquiries between, or among, diverse theoretical/experiential frameworks.
Consequently, Quine has not provided any clear indication of just what is meant or entailed by his notion that "by what is vaguely called scientific method we change them [i.e., "our beliefs of the moment"] here and there for the better", nor has Quine really provided any defensible criteria by means of which one could establish what makes one belief of the moment" better" than some other belief of the moment.
By "better", Quine may mean "simpler" in some sense. However, his whole concept of "simpler" remains quite obscure so long as 'something other than' the truth of reality itself serves, mysteriously, as the final arbiter of what counts as being simpler in this regard - especially in view of the fact that, for Quine, the "something other than" is scientific method, which remains unclear, if not obscure.
Furthermore as long as Quine maintains that "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process", Quine has made something other than the truth or reality as the final arbiter of the experiential process. This is the case for, in effect, Quine has made the theory building process as the final arbiter of ontological/metaphysical matters.
Yet, he has provided no means of escape from the theoretical mazes which are generated. Therefore, if one follows Quine's prospectus, one has no way to distinguish between myth and reality in any given instance of the theory building process.
Conclusion
A number of important themes have emerged in the context of the previous discussion of various aspects of Quine's position in Chapter One of Word and Object. To begin with, and in the most general of terms, model/ theory building has been depicted in the present essay as a process which involves the generation and development of certain dimensions of understanding concerning either some facet of the phenomenology of the experiential field, or some facet of that (i.e., reality) which makes a field of such character possible.
Not all of the dimensions of understanding that could be generated and developed during the model/theory building process have been discussed in the present essay. Nonetheless, among those dimensions which have been explored, there are several which have been shown to play fairly important roles.
For example, a key ingredient in the model/theory building process is a function of the tensions that surround the conflicts which exist in any given model/theory building process. These are between, on the one hand, the requirements of simplicity and, on the other hand, the demands for accuracy.
When developing a theoretical network, one wants, for a variety of heuristic, practical and aesthetic reasons, a network that will express the simplest story line with respect to the available data. Yet, at the same time, one wants something more in a story line than simplicity.
One wants, as well, a story line that accurately reflects the character of the data it intends to describe or explain. In short, one wants a story line which is the simplest possible schematization of that to which it refers, while simultaneously being a story line that maximizes accuracy and minimizes distortion.
The tensions between simplicity and accuracy often manifest themselves in the form of problems, puzzles, difficulties and so on that challenge the tenability of the model being developed. Thus, simply story lines aren't always accurate, and what appear to be accurate story lines aren't always simple.
As a result, the interrogative imperative tends to emerge in the midst of such conflicts, probing for incongruencies, seeking clarification, inquiring about evidential and conceptual lacunae, and so on. In effect, the interrogative imperative raises questions about, among other things, the tenability of the tension or balance which exists between the dual features of simplicity and accuracy which characterize any given model or theory network.
In an attempt to meet the queries and probing of the interrogative imperative, the individual who is generating and/or developing a theory makes use of the mechanism of hypothetical positing. As pointed out in this essay, there are at least two broad kinds of positing processes.
In one kind, the individual hypothetically posits the existence of, say, an object, process, state, condition, etc. that actually might, or might not, exist. The purpose of this sort of positing is to try to account for a certain range of available data.
For instance, if one noted perturbations in the orbit of a planet, one may posit the existence of an, heretofore, unknown celestial body to account for such perturbations. In actuality, the reasons for the perturbations in the orbit of the planet may be due to some other cause or influence. However, the effect of the kind of positing process is to organize and structure the available data in a way that makes surface sense, even though such a suggested structuring arrangement may turn out to be untenable.
In the second kind of positing alluded to above, the individual starts with the acknowledgment of the existence or reality of some given phenomenon. The individual, then, proceeds to try to determine the character of that phenomenon.
One does not hypothesize the phenomenon in question. Instead, one uses it as a starting point from which one begins to seek insight into the character or nature of that phenomenon.
Thus, if one observes that volcanoes behave in a certain way, one doesn't posit the behavior. One accepts the behavior, per se, and proceeds to inquire why that behavior has the character it does and whether that behavior varies under different circumstances and conditions. In the case of this kind of positing, one also seeks to organize and structure the available data in a manner that renders the data intelligible.
However, in this second sense of positing, one does not necessarily posit the possible existence of some, heretofore, unknown entity, force, etc. to account for such behavior. One simply takes what is observable and attempts to determine how those factors interact to give expression to the character of the behavior in question. That is, one is seeking to posit the nature of the relationship among givens or observables without necessarily resorting to unseen entities, forces, or processes.
Yet, as is the case with the other kind of positing, to contend that the mode of structuring the data renders such data to be intelligible is not enough. The mode of structuring must be defensible or tenable as well.
In terms of the foregoing considerations, the character of the model/theory building process is shaped by: a) the tensions between simplicity and accuracy (together with concomitant issues of characterization and congruency); b) probing activity through the interrogative imperative; and, c) the organizing and orienting capabilities of the two kinds of hypothetical positing. All of these factors bounce off against one another, as well as against other aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to create a dynamic interaction of focal and horizonal features that help generate the structures and structuring process of understanding.
Irrespective of whether one is talking about the model/theory building process that occurs during the course of learning a language, or one is discussing the model building process in the context of developing a scientific theory, the essential features of that process remain the same. Moreover, in both kinds of model/theory building, the methodological starting point is the phenomenology of the experiential field.
The various ways in which that field manifests itself over time set limits or boundaries on the set of structures and structuring processes which can be generated, tenably, by the model/theory building process. In this sense, the phenomenology of the experiential field is an expression of reality, and, consequently, it represents something of a base line arbiter concerning the way in which the model/theory process can proceed in a defensible manner.
After all, two of the central themes that have set the model/theory building process in motion concern the fact that: a) there exists a phenomenology of the experiential field of given character to which attention has been, or is now being, focused; and, b) one desires to know what it is that makes a field of such character possible. Therefore, whatever structures are generated by the model/theory building process will have to reconcile themselves, eventually, with the realities of both of the above mentioned themes. In this respect, the character of the phenomenology of the experiential field and that which makes a field of such character possible both act as ulterior controls or limits that act as the final arbiters in determining the appropriateness of any suggested theoretical relationship between simplicity and accuracy.
The foregoing brief overview of the character of the model/theory building process which has been developed in this essay is at odds with any number of facets of Quine's position that has been advanced in Chapter One of Word and Object. For example, the nature of language, the significance of simplicity, the role of hypothetical positing, the relationship between language and theory, as well as the importance of scientific methodology, are some of the recurring themes of contention out of which emerge considerable differences concerning the way in which Quine and this essay I characterize the model/theory building process.
As a result, I have argued throughout this essay that, due to Quine's failure to grasp the character of that process, his understanding of the relationship between Word and Object has been skewered in an untenable structural direction during the presentation of his views in Chapter One of Word and Object. Presumably, if my contention is correct that Chapter One represents a miniature representation of the sort of issues with which Quine is concerned in the remainder of his book, then, one fully can anticipate that the problems and flaws which showed up in the first chapter will affect, adversely, the structural character of the rest of his more detailed exploration of the relationships between Word and Object.
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