Building Models - Part Six
Scientific Method: The Last Arbiter of Truth (?)
As quoted earlier, Quine believes:
"... scientific method, whatever its details, produces theory whose connection with all possible surface irritation consists solely in scientific method itself unsupported by ulterior controls. This is the sense in which it is the last arbiter of truth." (p. 23)
In view of the line of argument developed in the last several pages, one might contend, just as well, that the last arbiter of truth is truth itself, just as truth also represents, as indicated previously, the "simplest story". "Scientific method, whatever its details" is effective to the extent it is capable of establishing a framework of demarcated understanding. The character of this framework must reflect, be congruent with, or be capable of merging horizons with the phenomenon, particular or condition which is the subject or object of attention of a given exercise of scientific methodology.
The "ulterior controls" which monitor the nature of the theoretical connection between "all possible surface irritation" and scientific methodology is not "scientific method itself unsupported by ulterior controls". Reality itself sets ulterior controls on scientific methodology. Problems, puzzles, mysteries, questions and unknowns arise by virtue of their being expressions of what reality makes possible, and, thereby, they become the focus of hermeneutical methodology - scientific or otherwise.
Through reality, the phenomenology of the experiential field expresses itself - that is, the latter is an expression, manifestation, or function of the former. The phenomenology of the experiential field constitutes the means by which individuals encounter those aspects or dimensions of reality that show up in their phenomenologies.
Therefore, the phenomenology of the experiential field represents the means by which they participate in, and are aware of, the character of their participation in certain aspects and dimensions of reality. Consequently, the structural or logical character of the phenomenology of an individual's experiential field tends to set limits or controls or restrictions on what scientific methodology will concern itself with.
Moreover, in a sense, the phenomenology of the experiential field becomes a standard against which scientific method must operate. The sense in which this field acts as a standard of sorts concerns the way in which scientific methodology needs to generate, among other things, a theory or understanding whose character is capable of accounting for, and being congruent with, the character of whatever transpires within the focal/horizonal context of the phenomenology of the experiential field. This, after all, is the starting point from which scientific methodology is to proceed in its program of positing, testing and so on.
One should not construe the above as asserting that the phenomenology of the experiential field is the bedrock of reality. At the same time, this phenomenology is, most certainly, at least one of the manifestations made possible by reality. In this respect, it is the medium of mediation between the aspect of reality which this phenomenology gives expression to and the rest of reality that lies at, and beyond, the horizons of any given phenomenological framework or context. Therefore, if one wants to ask what makes that which transpires in the phenomenology of the experiential field itself possible, one, first, has to establish or identify, to some extent, the character of the aspect of the phenomenology one wishes to investigate, explore, analyze and so on.
Once having set, or identified, the character of the experiential parameters within which one is intending to methodologically operate, the substantive nature of those parameters and all they encompass represents an ulterior control on scientific method in the following sense. Whatever that methodology comes up with, this will have to be reconciled with, or considered against the backdrop of, or examined in the light of, the character of those aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field which have been singled out by the focal/horizonal character of the parameters one has established for purposes of study or inquiry.
In this respect, scientific methodology is not the last arbiter of truth. Scientific methodology is itself answerable to, and must conform with, the aspects of reality with which it is concerned, according to the manner in which such reality is mediated by the phenomenology of the experiential field within which scientific method is conducted.
If the theory produced by scientific method were not answerable to, or supported by, something beyond itself, then, the standards of control by which one is to assess the accuracy or inadequacies of a given theory become entirely arbitrary, and one, seriously, would have to question, where possible, the relevance of such a theory in conjunction with a quest for discovery the nature of reality. Theory is not autonomous and self-contained. The fact that a theory is a theory of ‘something’ within the context of a phenomenology of experience is what constitutes the ontological base line against which the theory pushes and from which the theory derives its themes of focal preoccupation as it attempts to delineate the character of the base line against which it is pushing.
At one point in the waning stages of the argument put forth in the first chapter of Word and Object, Quine maintains:
"If there were ... an unknown but unique best total systematization theta of science conformable to the past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind, so that we might define the whole truth as that unknown theta, still we should not thereby have defined truth for actual single sentences. We could not say, derivatively, that any single sentence S is true if it or a translation belongs to theta, for there is in general no sense in equating a sentence of a theory theta with a sentence S given apart from theta . Unless pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation, a sentence S is meaningless except relative to its own theory; meaningless inter-theoretically" (p. 24)
In the foregoing quote, one re-encounters a variation of a problem discussed earlier. The problem is that Quine wants to reduce understanding and truth to being functions of sentences mysteriously learned in a certain context of conditioning.
If ‘A’ constitutes "an unknown but unique best total systematization theta of science conformable to the past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind, so that we might define the whole truth as that unknown theta", then, one cannot refer subsequently, to ‘A’ as a theory, as Quine does above. In the foregoing context, theta does not constitute a theory of the significance and interrelationships of nerve-hits, one with another, as much as theta represents a delineation of the character of certain aspects of reality. As such, theta extends beyond the tentative and uncertain horizons which characterize the idea of "theory".
Under these circumstances, theta cannot be said to "define the whole truth". Rather, it displays a character which is reflective of the character of those aspects of reality to which "the past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind" are connected through the medium of the phenomenology of the experiential field. This field is that to which those nerve-hits make their various contributions and in which the nerve-hits assume differential phenomenological character according to the nature of the nerve-hits in question.
Truth is not a function of the "best total systematization theta of science conformable to the past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind". Quite the opposite is the case. Theta is true to the extent the character of its manner of systematization organizes and assigns significance to "past, present and future nerve-hits" in a way which is reflective of the actual character of all such nerve-hits, taken collectively and/or individually in related sub-groupings.
Theta‘s participation in truth is dependent on its conforming to something independent of theta - namely, "past, present and future nerve-hits". The only way theta actually can conform to this 'something' is to faithfully reflect various aspects, dimensions, features, themes and characteristics of the character through which the nerve-hits in question give expression to this ‘something’.
Even when all "past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind" are considered collectively and when they are properly represented, this collective representation does not constitute the "whole truth". At least this is so unless by "whole" one intends to restrict the scope of truth to the experiential contexts encompassed by nerve-hits and whatever these nerve-hits reveal about the character of the reality which makes both the nerve-hits and one's theta-systematization of them possible.
One only can know of reality what one experiences of it and what the character of that experience permits one to infer, intuit or perceive about the nature of the reality of which the experience is a part. Therefore, truth is not a function of the "past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind". These nerve-hits are the access routes that serve as our sensory interfacing with whatever aspects of reality to which these nerve-hits are connected, tied or related.
As such, the possibilities/limitations inherent in the character of such nerve-hits, together with the possibilities/limitations inherent in our means and manner of characterizing, organizing and interpreting these nerve-hits, set upper limits on the extent to which one can probe the character of the reality underlying nerve-hits. In other words, one can know only as much of the truth about the character of the reality which makes nerve-hits and our systematizing of them possible, as is allowed by the character of these nerve-hits and one's modes of systematizing them.
In short, one sees through a window only what the window and the seeing permit one to see. As such, the character of the window and the character of the seeing set objective limits on the sort of experience one could have.
However, those limits cannot define what the nature of reality is which is there on the other side of the window. All these limits can do is modulate or mediate or reflect the nature of how one phenomenologically engages whatever is there, if anything at all.
Just as truth is not defined in terms of a given theta -systematization, so, too, the "truth for actual single sentences" is not defined in terms of, or derived from, a given theta-systematization. What makes "any single sentence" true is not a matter of whether "it or a translation belongs to theta". What makes a single sentence an expression of truth is precisely the same 'thing' which makes a given theta-systematization an expression of truth - namely, each has a character that accurately reflects some aspect(s) of the character of the reality to which each identifyingly refers.
Quine claims: "unless pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation, a sentence S is meaningless except relative to its own theory; meaningless inter-theoretically". Thus, Quine believes "there is in general no sense in equating a sentence of a theory theta with a sentence given apart from theta".
Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that the sort of theories which Quine is talking about are not self-referential in nature (i.e., they do not have themselves as the main theme of their phenomenological focus). They entail references to the 'world' of nerve-hits, as well as references to the characterizing, organizing and interpreting of such nerve-hits.
Consequently, there is absolutely nothing in what Quine says to rule out the following possibility. Theory theta (which, in actuality, is not really a theory) and "a sentence S given apart from theta" could be referring, each in its own way, and independently of the other, to the same aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field. The only difference would be that the character of theta is much more encompassing than the character of any single sentence could be ( This is so, given that theta is about all the "past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind", while S is likely to be only about one small sub-set of theta 's scope of concern.).
In fact, if theta is really as complete as Quine has described it to be, then, the only way in which "a sentence S given apart from theta" could not be either a sentence from theta or an equivalent translation of some sentence which could be generated from within the perspective of theta, is if either of the following possibilities were the case. In one possibility, sentence S would have to be erroneous and not be reflective of the character of the nerve-hits to which it made identifying reference. The other possibility would be if sentence S had a character that was not about nerve-hits, and, as a result, shared nothing in common with the range of the concerns of theta-systematization.
In both of the foregoing cases, one could agree with Quine that "there is in general no sense in equating a sentence of a theory theta with a sentence S given apart from theta". However, this concession does not force one to admit, as well, that "unless pretty firmly and directly conditioned to necessary stimulation, a sentence S is meaningless except relative to its own theory; meaningless inter-theoretically".
To begin with, Quine has not explicated, in a clear fashion, precisely what he means by, or what he believes is entailed by, the notion of being "firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation". More importantly, according to Quine's foregoing quote, theta is to be construed as unknown, but still as something which is uniquely tied ("uniquely" in the sense of being the most accurate and complete representation possible) to the area of study which it represents or refers to (i.e., nerve-hits of mankind).
Therefore, theta is to be construed as something which is the "best total systematization" possible (i.e., the "simplest story") of the issues in question. Yet, if the foregoing is the case, then, there seems nothing amiss in contending that any two sentences S1 and S2 taken apart from theta may have characters which constitute equivalent expressions of some sub-aspect of the unknown theta-systematization.
In order to understand the foregoing, consider the following. Let us assume that a theta -systematization of the kind to which Quine alludes actually could be achieved when considered from the perspective of absolute reality. Let us also assume that Quine has stipulated such a theta-systematization actually is unknown when considered from the perspective of human epistemology. Nevertheless, despite these suppositions, the unknownness of theta-systematization would not, in and of itself, inhibit in any way one's developing a framework of demarcated understanding concerning some limited aspect of the world of nerve-hits. Moreover, the unknownness of theta-systematization would not prevent one from using such a demarcated framework to derive "a sentence S given apart from theta" whose character was capable of accurately reflecting some aspect of the world with which it was concerned.
In these instances, sentence S would be equivalent to some as yet unknown sentence of theta concerned with the same aspect of reality. This is the case because there seems to be no alter-native but to conclude that sentences whose characters bear the same congruency relationship with a certain aspect of reality of the world of nerve-hits are equivalent to one another.
The only thing which prevents one from "equating a sentence of a theory theta with a sentence S given apart from theta" is the 'fact' that theta is presumed to be unknown. Consequently, one would have difficulty producing a sentence from an unknown theta. However, if this is what Quine means when he says "there is in general no sense in equating a sentence of a theory theta with a sentence S given apart from theta", then, his meaning surely is devoid of significance. As such, it represents nothing more than the logic of an artificial and highly contrived illustration which, by design, has made equivalency between a sentence and theta and "a sentence S given apart from theta" impossible.
On the other hand, if a lethal dose of arbitrariness has not been injected into the context Quine is discussing concerning potential sentences from theta and any given sentence S taken apart from theta, then, the character of the situation being considered (although it is clearly contrary to fact, given that theta is unknown) would seem to force Quine to concede the following possibility. There is an equivalency between a theta-derived sentence and "a sentence S given apart from theta" when the character of each sentence accurately reflected the character of the same aspect of reality to which both sentences were attempting to give identifying reference. If this concession were not forthcoming, then, Quine must specify precisely, and much more clearly than he has done already, why "there is, in general no sense in equating" sentences of the kind in question.
One could imagine instances in which two sentences referred to the same aspect of reality and in which both sentences accurately reflected the character of the aspect of reality to which the sentences gave identifying reference, and, yet, the two sentences still might not be equivalent. For example, if, say, a red ball were the object of focus, and one person said: "The object is round," and another individual said: "The object is red," and a third individual said: "The object is a ball," all three sentences have a character which accurately reflects the character of the object in question.
Nevertheless, one might be reluctant to say that the sentences express equivalent characters, despite their making identifying reference to the same object in each case. The problem here is that the object has a character which is complex, yet, each of the sentences has a character which singles out only one facet of the object's multi-dimensional nature. Thus, the ‘equivalence’ of sentences is horizonal, rather than focal, because it depends upon the character of the respective sentences being reflective of different facet(s) of one and the same object's multifaceted character.
The difficulties swirling about Quine's position in the previously cited quote may, to some extent, be the result of Quine's choice of language in certain instances. For example, one wonders exactly what is entailed by the idea of "a sentence S given apart from theta".
Because Quine believes sentences are learned through contextual conditioning, and because, by stipulation, Quine has said theta is unknown, then, theta could not have any actual sentences associated with it. This is so because theta signifies only what Quine is asking us to assume, for the sake or argument - namely, some unknown theta-systematization exists which is unique and constitutes a "best total systematization" of all "past, present and future nerve-hits of mankind". From Quine's perspective on language (at least as outlined in the first chapter of Word and Object), sentences could not be generated in relation to theta until theta became known.
Once theta becomes known, sentences would be learned, supposedly, through contextual conditioning. However, "a sentence given apart from theta" which was an accurate reflection of some aspect of the world of nerve-hits to which the sentence made identifying reference would, in effect, be an expression of theta.
This is so, for if we are assuming, with Quine, that theta encompasses the total truth on the matter of all past, present and future nerve-hits, then, in order for "a sentence S given apart from theta" to be correct or accurate, to whatever degree it is, the sentence's character must express something which is encompassed by theta. If this were not the case, one would wonder how such a sentence S could be said to reflect the truth.
That is, one would wonder how S could reflect truth in a way which was not encompassed by theta, given that theta is presumed to represent the total truth on the matter of nerve-hits. Thus, in the light of the foregoing considerations, one has trouble understanding what is meant by the idea of "a sentence S given apart from theta".
Similarly, when Quine asserts that "unless pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation, a sentence S is meaningless except relative to its theory; meaningless inter-theoretically", one also encounters a certain amount of difficulty in understanding just what Quine has in mind. The implication of the above quote seems to be that a sentence S can have meaning in just two contexts: a) in those instances in which the sentence is "pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation"; and, b) in those instances in which a sentence S is considered "relative to its own theory".
Aside from the obvious point that there appears to be no good reason (other than Quine's saying it is so) for maintaining that every sentence S necessarily presupposes, or is an expression of, some underlying theory, one also might question what is meant by the idea of a theory which is not "pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation".
Because "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process" (p. 22 of Quine), then, if one accepts the logic of this premise, sentences would appear to be hooked up, in some necessary manner, to the theory building process. This is the case since all sentences become a function of the character of the posit generated in any given experiential context in which the theory building process was being engaged.
A problem arises, however, when one tries to reconcile this assertion with Quine's belief that sentences are learned through contextual conditioning. If the context in question is entirely the product of positing by the theory building process, then, one wonders where, how and if the individual comes into contact with any reality independent of such theory building processes.
One wonders as well about the precise nature of that to which the individual is being conditioned. One wonders about this because, seemingly, the individual is becoming conditioned only to a context which has been posited theoretically.
As a result, one wonders how the individual could ever come to understand or learn the meaning of a sentence. After all, unless one were to adopt a solipsistic position, the capacity to generate a sentence and/or its meaning are not posits of a theory building process. Rather, they are the givens with whose character the individual's theory building process must presuppose during the course of contextual conditioning. Such an admission seems incongruous with Quine's insistence that "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of theory building process".
If, on the other hand, the context involved in a given instance of contextual conditioning is not entirely the function of the various positings of a theory building process, then, Quine cannot argue, tenably, that "everything to which we concede existence is a posit" - although, quite conceivably, "everything to which we concede existence", the theory building process may make posits about.
In any event, one has difficulty understanding why one should suppose that a child (or anyone, for that matter) who says, "See the ball," when a ball is present must be described as having some theory in mind - focally or horizonally. To use "theory" in such a manner seems to so totally abuse the term that one loses all sense of perspective and reference in relation to the term. As a result, one becomes unable to pinpoint the character of the parameters of reference to which the term supposedly is drawing one's attention, or to which one wishes to draw someone else's attention, when the term is used.
If the inter-animation of sentences (which marks, for Quine, the way one's theory building process is "actuated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations as they reverberate through our theory from present sensory stimulations" - p. 18 of Quine) does not tie into, at some point, that which makes various chain stimulations possible, then, just what kind of understanding is one supposed to have concerning the significance of the theory which such an inter-animation of sentences supposedly gives expression to? What relevance, if any, does such a theory have to anything beyond itself?
Does the theory reflect the character of some aspect of reality independent of that theory, or does the theory merely reflect the reality of its own character? If the latter is the case, then, it would be without any reference to anything beyond the theory qua theory, and it becomes a closed, self-referential, somewhat monadic conceptual system.
Presumably, any worthwhile theory will manifest a character that, in some way and to some degree, will reflect something of the character either of the aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which it attempts to give identifying reference, or of that aspect of reality which is thought to make a phenomenology of such character possible, or to both. If a theory cannot do this, and if a theory building process cannot generate theories which can, then, what purpose or value does either have? Under these circumstances, one might as well pack up one's philosophical tent and silently steal away into the metaphysical night because all theory building becomes an arbitrary exercise in futility (theoretically speaking, of course).
In order to avoid becoming entangled in the foregoing difficulties, part of the criterial conditions one might seek to establish in attempting to assess the value of various theoretical networks would be to identify and separate those theories which contained sentences that could be "pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation' from those theories which could not accomplish this or meet this requirement. One might suppose that theories containing sentences which did not seem to be reconcilable with this aspect of experience should be questioned with respect to their tenability and with respect to what point was served by entertaining them - and we also should remember that sensory stimulation is but one expression of a variety of different experiential dimensions that may be possible.
One also might take issue with Quine's idea that "a sentence S is meaningless except relative to its own theory", or that different sentences arising from different theories are "meaningless inter-theoretically". One could agree that a correct understanding of any sentence S is tied to an appreciation of, and insight into, the character of the hermeneutical perspective which stands behind S.
Consequently, one needs to determine, to some extent, the nature of the focal/horizonal perspective out of which, or in relation to which, a given sentence is uttered. However, this makes S a function of the character of the focal/horizonal dynamic occurring in the phenomenology of the experiential field of the individual.
This dynamic is what sets the intentional context from which sentence S derives its semantic orientation through means of the character that is conveyed by S having the syntactic/semantic structure it has. Moreover, the character of such a focal/horizonal dynamic may or may not be theoretical in nature because "theory" is a term which applies to only a subset of the possibilities encompassed by any given experiential field over the course of time.
If one and the same sentential form means different things to different individuals, then, the character of the focal/horizonal orientation from which the sentential form is hermeneutically approached in each in-stance is different, one from the other. Yet, these differences need not preclude two or more people exploring the differences in the character of the various focal/horizonal orientations in question and coming to understand the way that sources of sentential stimulation which are seemingly held in common by any given group of speakers and hearers can give rise to different hermeneutics.
In short, sentences need not be meaningless when considered inter-theoretically. This is so because the understanding of a sentence is merely a matter of understanding the character of the underlying hermeneutical perspective that establishes the context out of which the sentence emerges.
Where more than one hermeneutic is tied to a common sentential stimulus, one merely notes the character of the various hermeneutical frameworks involved and observes where, how and why those frameworks differ from one another. In the latter case, the character of the hermeneutical focus upon a given sentence may be the same for both speaker and hearer, however, differences might appear when one takes horizonal considerations into account. These factors may orient or modulate the hermeneutical contexts surrounding the focal aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field in a differential manner.
We are assuming, for the present, that this focal aspect is shared in common by some speaker/ hearer dyad and that they each have characterized or particularized this aspect in a way that generates, in their respective phenomenological fields, a dimension or feature of agreed upon character. In short, the differences between the theoretical settings may not manifest themselves at the conceptual juncture represented by the sentence in question. Moreover, in the event differences between two theoretical settings do happen to manifest themselves at the conceptual juncture expressed through a given sentence S, these differences need not make the sentence "meaningless inter-theoretically".
An individual's mapping out of the conceptual geometry is derived from the experiential co-ordinates that emerge in the particularizing or identification/re-identification of various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field. This occurs during the course of the individual's hermeneutical interaction with the given sentence, and it establishes a framework of demarcated understanding of a specific character. This framework provides an epistemological/phenomenological base line against which to compare and contrast the character of the other individual's framework of demarcated understanding which has arisen during the course of that individual's hermeneutical processing of the same sentence in question.
Under such circumstances, the sentence S can be meaningful when it is related to the conceptual geometry of someone else's hermeneutical framework, once one grasps what the character of that geometry is. In fact, the recognition that a sentence S can have, potentially, a multiplicity of meanings serves as something of an inducement to begin exploring the character of the various hermeneutical approaches to the sentence in question.
Furthermore, once such exploration is under way, one begins to try to determine the extent to which these hermeneutical efforts appear to be tenable in the light of one's own experiences and the reported experiences of others. In other words, one makes use of the multiplicity of meanings which may be associated with a given sentence S.
One does this by analyzing how the character of the conceptual geometries entailed by different meanings compare with one another. One such standard of comparison would be in terms of the ability to reflect accurately the character of the overlapping aspects of the phenomenologies of the experiential fields of human beings taken collectively, X to which the aforementioned multiplicity of meanings is attempting, to some extent, to make identifying reference. And, here, "Collectively" is to be construed either in the context of those who are participating in the current discussion or in the context of those who are willing to acknowledge having had experiences which bear upon, in some way, the issue under discussion.
The communicational interchange between two individuals as they switch roles in the speaker/hearer relationship surrounding their respective hermeneutical explorations of the sentence in question can provide the sentence S with a dimension of phenomenological meaningfulness which is quite apart from any meaning the sentence may have, in and of itself, as an identifying reference to, say, some facet of the world of nerve-hits. Sentences are not just a means of conveying information about some aspects of the world to which they make (or try to make) identifying references.
Sentences also are a means of linking, if only somewhat indirectly, the phenomenologies of two or more experiential fields. As a result, sentences can have meaning simply by virtue of their being an expression of the medium through which such linking is made possible.
They become objects or particulars that can become the focus of shared experiences in which there is a certain overlapping of at least part of the character of various aspects of the phenomenologies of the experiential individuals involved in any speaker/hearer interchange. In this sense, sentences becoming meaningful inter-theoretically even though the sentence may be differently construed by the various which simultaneously are attending to a sentence stimulus. Despite these differences, the character of the sentence stimulus can be agreed upon, at least in part, through acknowledging, for example: the syntactic structure of the sentence; the general (and, sometimes, specific) nature of the semantics of the words which are expressed through the syntactic framework; and, perhaps, even, to some degree, the character of those aspects of their respective phenomenologies to which a given sentence is believed to give identifying reference.
These features of having someone to talk with, of being able to exchange ideas, values, experiences and so on, give sentences a meaning that extends beyond their purely substantive character. These features make them inter-theoretically meaningful both through their shared dimensions, as well as through their dimensions of conflict and differentiation.
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