Building Models - Part Five
According to Quine, "contextual conditioning" is the means by which one learns the sentences that are to populate the inter-animation process. In addition, presumably, "contextual conditioning" also represents the regulatory force that is directing the inter-animation process and providing it with its observed character in any given set of sentential circumstances. However, the mechanism or process of this inter-animation or the principles which regulate it do not seem to be explainable in terms of the rather vague notion of "contextual conditioning" that Quine proposed to handle the matter.
In the terminology of the discussion on "simplicity considerations", there seems to be a serious imbalance in the hermeneutical tension between the character of Quine's model or theory of language at this point, and the character of a wide variety of horizonal considerations impinging upon that model. As a result, when both of these components are pursued through the agency of the interrogative imperative, the "simplest story" line which Quine has devised seems to be incongruent with any number of horizonal considerations that bear upon his position.
This suggests the requirements of accuracy have not been attended to adequately in relation to Quine's model of language as so far outlined. Moreover, to the extent Quine's theory does depart from what is correct or accurate concerning the actual character of the aspect(s) of reality to which language phenomena give expression, then, to that extent Quine's perspective does not constitute the "simplest story" concerning this set of phenomena.
Improving Upon a Theory Theta
Quine follows up his comments on "simplicity considerations" in the following way:
"We may think of the physicist as interested in systematizing such general truths as can be said in common-sense terms about ordinary physical things. But within this medium the best he achieves is a combination theta of ill-connected theories about projectiles, temperature changes, capillary attraction, surface tension, etc. A sufficient reason for his positing extraordinary physical things viz. molecules and sub-visible groups of molecules, is that for the thus-supplemented universe he can devise a theory theta-prime which is simpler than theta and agrees with theta in its congruences for ordinary things....
"Actually the truths that can be said even in common sense terms about ordinary things are themselves, in turn, far in excess of any available data. The incompleteness of determination of molecular behavior by the behavior of ordinary things is hence only incidental to this more basic indeterminancy: both sorts of events are less than determined by our surface irritations....
"Everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process, and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built. Nor let us look down on the standpoint of the theory as make-believe; for we can never do better than occupy the standpoint of some theory or other, the best we can muster at the time.
"What reality is like is the business of scientists, in the broadest sense, painstakingly to surmise; and what there is, what is real, is part of that question. The question how we know what there is simply part of the question ... of the evidence for truth about the world. The last arbiter is so-called scientific method, however, amorphous.
"... scientific method, whatever its details, produces theory whose connection with all possible surface irritation consists solely in scientific method itself unsupported by ulterior controls. This is the sense in which it is the last arbiter of truth." (pp. 21-23)
Although the foregoing represents a compressed version of the position which Quine develops over three pages toward the end of the first chapter of Word and Object, I do not feel it really distorts Quine's basic perspective, despite the fact that certain details, elaborations and provisos have been deleted. As such, the above quote constitutes a good running summary of the character of Quine's orientation at this stage in his general argument. Consequently, it will provide a strong source of ideas, values and assumptions against which to apply the interrogative imperative in order to probe the tenability of what Quine is advocating at this point.
The devising of "a theory theta-prime which is simpler than theta and agrees with theta in its consequences for ordinary things" might be a "sufficient reason" for someone's "positing extraordinary physical things, viz. molecules and sub-visible groups of molecules". Nevertheless, one is not necessarily convinced that "simplicity considerations" are really the driving force behind why most individuals posit extraordinary theoretical entities, physical or otherwise.
This lack of conviction remains even if a given hypothetical positing should result in a theory theta-prime that is both simpler than some theory theta, as well as equally capable, if not more so, as theta is, in relation to predictive and explanatory powers. The reasons for this lack of conviction are several.
For one thing, one often cannot gauge, immediately, the true extent of a theory's ability to satisfy "simplicity considerations". One requires a certain amount of time to assess the nature of the problems which such a theory may run into in the context of incoming data and subsequent experimentation.
What appears initially to show theoretical promise may fade in the light of forthcoming experiential/experimental evidence which creates insurmountable difficulties for the theory to plausibly handle. For instance, the positing of, say, phlogiston, epicycles, or an ether to help account for certain observed phenomena might work very well when considered within a certain restricted range of data, and, as a result, satisfy "simplicity considerations" for that range of data.
However, when these hypothetical entities are considered against an expanded backdrop of data and evidence, one often finds that these theoretical positings create more problems than they solve. The history of science is replete with the discarded remains of hypothetical positing with unfulfilled promise.
If theta is just some kind of combination "of ill-connected theories about" whatever aspect of the world on which one is focusing, then, one of the main impetuses behind the positing of, for example, "extraordinary physical things" very well may be in order to seek a means of accounting for the problems, difficulties, lacunae and so on which surround theta but which theta itself doesn't appear able to adequately handle. Theta represents a conceptual geometry whose various co-ordinate points of experiential reference and logical links between such points gives expression to an hermeneutical/epistemological shaping and structuring of different facets of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field.
At the same time, there frequently are horizontal elements impinging upon this conceptual geometry which are incongruent with the latter. In other words, the character of the former does not seem to fit in with the character of the latter. As a result, a certain amount of hermeneutical tension is generated when the two are juxtaposed.
The tension of incongruency is pursued through an individual’s hermeneutical capacity - when assisted by the interrogative imperative - to isolate important areas (or areas deemed to be important) of difficulties, problems, inconsistencies, oversights, evidential weaknesses and so on. The ability of the interrogative imperative to isolate important areas in this manner is done through the questions that are raised in relation to perceived incongruencies between the characters of theoretical framework and experimental data.
In raising such questions, the individual is attempting, among other things,* to discover a means of resolving the problems which emerge during the course of the exploration/investigation. This search likely is to be guided by efforts to find the reasons for the existing incongruities and eliminate, or posit, whatever seems necessary to get the character of theory to more closely approximate, and less problematically handle, the character of the available data. Therefore, a "sufficient reason for ... positing extraordinary physical things" is if such positing helps one's program of achieving a better maxi(reflective)/mini(distorting) balance between the character of theory and the character of the experiential data on which such theory referentially, descriptively and explanatorily focuses.
Whether, or not, any given positing will, in the long run, lead to a simpler story line (that is, one which is closer to the truth) is something that will take time to properly assess. Of course, the underlying hope in positing a hypothetical entity may be to achieve such a simplified story line.
Nevertheless, the immediate reason for positing these entities is because they have a character which is believed to be a means of enhancing the degree of congruency between the character of one's conceptual geometric representation of the world and the character of the available evidence gained through various experiential encounters. This issue of congruency in the context of theory construction or model improvement is important to keep in mind, and Quine's apparent failure to do so has led him to commit some basic mistakes.
For instance, Quine claims (as quoted earlier): "the truths that can be said even in common-sense terms about ordinary things are themselves, in turn, far in excess of any available data. The incompleteness of determination of molecular behavior by the behavior of ordinary things is hence only incidental to this more basic indeterminacy: both sorts of events are less than determined by our surface irritations." Yet, after considering Quine's perspective in this quote, one needs to ask: what allows one to say any truth at all - "even in commonsense terms - about ordinary things"?
Surely one's insight into, or understanding of, the character of the "ordinary things" upon which one is focusing is what permits one to arrive at "the truths that can be said even in common-sense terms". If these truths were not dependent functionally upon the character of the "ordinary things" on which one was focusing, then, from whence would these truths arise, and on what would they be based?
One cannot get more truths out of the character of either "ordinary things" or "extraordinary physical things" than exist in the ontological facticity of something's being what it is. Indeed, because something is what it is, its character is what it is, since the character of that 'thing' is an expression of that thing's 'being' being what it is.
"Available data" is a function of the existential encounters which emerge in the form of aspects of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field having the character they do. This data serves as the inferential basis in which the individual's positing, hypothesizing, model building, and theorizing processes are rooted. These processes generate a conceptual geometric representation of the nature and significance of the available data, both in and of itself, as well as in relation to the reality which makes data of such determinate character possible.
The more this data's character is reflective of that which underlies it and makes it possible, and the less such data's character is distorting of that which underlies it, the greater is the degree of congruency possible between the character of the individual's understanding of, or insight into, the character of that (i.e., reality) which makes data of such determinate nature possible. As a result, "the truths that can be said even in commonsense terms about ordinary things" cannot be "far in excess of any available data". In fact, they cannot be even slightly "in excess of any available data".
This is so because the available data is the gateway through which one derives whatever truths one is capable of. Therefore, the upper limit on the quantity of truths one can come up with in relation to this data will be regulated strictly. This regulation will be according to the extent to which the manifested character of this data permits one, under the best of inferential circumstances, to have or gain an insightful understanding of those aspects of reality to which one is experientially linked by the data in question. Whatever truths we are able to generate with respect to this data are a function of what the character of this data permits one to generate in the way of discovering the right hermeneutical or epistemological stance, orientation or approach to the actual ontological/metaphysical significance of the given data.
In this sense, the framework within which the rational determination of truth is to take place is established, to a great extent (and in contrast with Quine's aforementioned position) through our "surface irritations". The character of these surface irritations help set up and structure a significant portion of the experiential parameters within which one infers, intuits, and/or perceives the character of the sort of world one believes or understands to be necessary in order to establish parameters with the character one observes in the focal/horizonal interplay of the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which one is currently attending. This is not so much because "surface irritations" determine what the truth is, as much as it is because these "irritations" are one of the primary access roads through which we approach reality. To a very great extent, our understanding of reality is restricted by the character of the inherent limits in the 'scenery' which these access roads permit one to be exposed to and reflect upon.
Therefore, "the truths that can be said even in commonsense terms about ordinary things" must be a reflection, in one way or another, of what the character of the "available data" allows one to infer about the character of that which makes data of such character possible. In other words, the character of these truths must be congruent, more or less, with the character of the available data if anything of any minimal degree of accuracy or correctness is to be said "even in common-sense terms about ordinary things". Only by overlooking or disregarding the crucial role which this sort of congruency determination plays, as Quine appears to have done in the foregoing quote, could Quine feel comfortable in saying what he does about the alleged undetermined nature of the relationship between stated truths and "available data" and/or "surface irritations".
The kind of problem outlined above with regard to Quine's perspective and the manner in which his perspective apparently fails to appreciate the nature and central importance of congruency relationships in establishing epistemological frameworks, emerges in a slightly different form later on in his argument. At one point, Quine contends: "anything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process, and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built."
Just because "from the standpoint of the theory that is being built", something is being conceded existence, this concession may not mean, in and of itself, anything more than the following. The character of the theory has made room for an entity of a designated character to play some sort of role with respect to the way in which the theory depicts an alleged corresponding part of reality to: be, behave, manifest itself, or be linked with other facets of the character of the theory which is being projected onto reality as a supposedly congruent, representational expression of the latter's character.
This theoretical sense of "real" means that "everything to which we concede existence" in the theory is considered, rightly or wrongly, by the individual proposing the theory, to have an actual counterpart in reality. Supposedly, this 'ontological' counterpart manifests a character displaying similarities to the character of that to which one is conceding existence within the context of the theory. The task, then, becomes one of determining, as best one can, the extent to which that to which we are conceding existence in the theory actually reflects anything of the true nature of reality to which such a theoretical entity supposedly makes identifying reference.
As pointed out previously in the present essay, one creates a very great potential for confusion if one assumes that the character of the "reality" of an 'entity' within a theoretical context is necessarily, or even presumptively, on an ontological par with the reality of an entity, thing or whatever, independent of such a context, but for which that hermeneutical context serves as a representation of the latter kind of entity, etc. To be sure, the conceptual reality of the posited entity to which one is conceding theoretical existence in the ontology of the extra-theoretical world may reflect some aspect, partially or fully, of the character of the latter's actual reality. To the extent this reflection is accurate, then, the character of the conceptual reality becomes rooted in a defensible basis for inferentially establishing the actual ontological existence of something which manifests a character that is akin, to some degree, to the character of the theoretical entity which one is currently positing as having existence.
Having said the foregoing, I'm not sure one can tenably argue that "everything [emphasis mine] to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process". Perhaps one of the most pertinent questions one can ask at this juncture in order to cast doubt upon the tenability of Quine's perspective is to inquire about the source of the character of the things to which we are conceding existence in any given instance and which Quine claims is the function of a process of theoretical positing. In effect, one is asking how and where a given theoretical posit derives its character.
The Nature of Positing
Not everyone sees or approaches the existence of "everything ... from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process". For, although human beings have theories about almost, if not, everything, not everything we have a theory about owes its existence to a theoretical posit.
Quine appears to want to argue that theory, in some sense, precedes existence in all instances. If this is not what Quine wants to argue, one has difficulty in understanding how else one is to interpret his statement that "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process".
This gives the impression that whatever we concede existence to is a function of some positing dimension of the theory building process. As a result, 'somehow' the existence of the "thing" in question derives from such a theoretical positing process. This contention seems to imply that theory preceded the ontological 'birth' of the thing so posited.
If the foregoing is correct characterization of Quine’s position, then, one begins to sink into something of a metaphysical quagmire. If that to which we concede existence is a posit of a theory building process, then, one wonders what the ontological status is of the theory building process itself.
On the one hand, the theory building process would seem to have to presuppose its own unposited existence in order to be able to posit anything at all. Otherwise, one would have to argue that the theory building process posited its own existence out of nothingness.
On the other hand, if we were to concede existence of some sort to the theory building process, then, in order to accept what Quine appears to be saying, our very act of conceding existence to the theory building process requires us to maintain that such existence is a "posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process". This appears to suggest that in order to exist, a theory building process would have to posit its own existence (that is, the process, itself) - not just conceptually, but ontologically.
Part of (and maybe a large part of) the problem here surrounds the issue of 'positing' and just what it means to posit something. If one is not very careful, one quite easily can be misleading, or become misled, when discussing or using this term.
There is one sense of "posit" in which one is hypothesizing the existence of an entity, process, phenomenon, state or condition. This sense of positing is not because such an entity, process, etc., actually exists, but because the available experiential data suggests to one this may be the case.
In this instance, that to which we concede existence is a "posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process" since one is projecting theory onto those aspects of the experiential field to which one is referring or attending. Furthermore, one is proposing there is an actual metaphysical/ontological thing, process, phenomenon, state or condition which answers to the description of that which one is theoretically positing.
There is another, slightly different sense of "posit" which acknowledges the reality of that to which a certain aspect of the phenomenology of one's experiential field is currently attuned or attending. However, in this sense of positing, one characterizes and/or interprets this reality according to the nature of the theory building process to which one is committed or inclined. By means of this process, one posits the existence of "atoms", "molecules", "forces" and so on, as would-be representations of the logical character of that to which one is attending.
In this view, instead of claiming that, say, atoms exist, one is saying something like the following. There exists an aspect of reality whose manifested character is such that a theoretical construct, "atoms" (with a posited character of "abc ... z") seems to reflect or capture, accurately, the various dimensions of the observed manifested character of the aspect(s) in question to which one is attending. Thus, rather than say "atoms" actually exist, one is saying the theoretical positing of "atoms" helps make sense of the aspect(s) of reality to which one is attending - that is, the idea of ‘atoms’ has a heuristic value which helps one to make sens of experience in a better manner than previously had been the case, even while acknowledging that what one is positing may have no actual ontological counterpart.
In the first sense of "posit", one is, on the basis of theoretical considerations, conceding existence to something which actually may not exist, but which one's hermeneutic of the phenomenology of one's experiential field is proposing as an accurate representational expression of what is observed or experienced. In this sense, one might posit an, heretofore, undetected planet to account for the perturbations in the orbit of a known planet. Or, one might posit an, heretofore, undetected subatomic particle in order to account for some irregular aspect of the behavior of subatomic particles of known characteristics.
In the second sense of "posit", one is not conceding the existence of something on the basis of theoretical considerations. One is conceding that some aspect(s) of the phenomenology of one's experiential field is a function of an undeniable reality. Moreover, in conjunction with this concession, one is positing a theoretical construct as a representational model of that aspect(s) of reality which one is acknowledging and not positing.
The positing that occurs in this case concerns the character of the hermeneutical model one has developed through one's theory building process. It need not involve any claims concerning the precise ontological character of reality with respect to which one's positing refers. Thus, in the second sense, one might posit a theory of gravity to account for the way, say, bodies on Earth act under various circumstances, or to account for the way celestial bodies interact.
In this sense of positing, one does not question the existence of the objects being considered. One also doesn't question the reality of the actions and interactions of such objects. What one is questioning, and what gives rise to the theoretical positing, is curiosity concerning the actual nature of the reality underlying such objects and interactions.
If we construe "posit" in the first sense, then, "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process". If we construe "posit" in the second sense, then, "everything to which we concede existence" becomes the starting point or given about which, "from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process", we posit various theoretical representations as possible interpretations or characterizations of the ontological given in question on which we are focusing.
The fact of the matter is, we tend to use "posit" in both senses in virtually all of our hermeneutical/epistemological discussions. Unfortunately, we often do not distinguish clearly which sense we are employing in any given instance. Not surprisingly, when this occurs, a great deal of confusion frequently emerges concerning whether one's theoretical positing is about potentially non-existent entities, processes, etc. whose ontological reality we are attempting to establish, or whether this positing is about ontological realities whose existence is not in question, but with respect to which, the precise character of their underlying ontology is in question.
From the vantage point of the second sense of "posit", and in opposition to what Quine appears to believe, "everything to which we concede existence" is not necessarily "a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process". This is the case because, on the basis of the second sense of "posit", there would seem to be certain dimensions of the phenomenology of the experiential field which either express or in some way are tied to 'things' or phenomena, the existence of which we concede prior to any theoretical positing which may take place.
In fact, any positing which occurs in such instances, as a function of the theory building process, will not transpire until after a focal context has been established within the phenomenology of the experiential field. Usually this is a context which can, within certain limits, be un-problematically identified and, if necessary, re-identified with respect to at least some aspects of its (that of the context) character.
One might be enticed to suppose pre-linguistic children - or children just beginning to gain some degree of rudimentary linguistic competency, or children who have achieved something more than a rudimentary competency in language capability - are actively engaged in theory building processes in which everything to which they theoretical posit in the first sense outlined earlier. This kind of supposition is alluring because it lends a certain degree of continuity to a model of human intelligence and conceptualizing which holds that scientific method - in which theory building processes play a prominent role - is merely a more sophisticated version of what infants do, in more primitive fashion, from the moment of birth onward. Yet, intuitively, one might strongly suspect that the foregoing sort of supposition could be somewhat incongruous with what actually may be going on in the mind of the infant or young child.
One tends to be on somewhat dangerous grounds even when one tries to assess what is going on in the mind of another human being who is capable of clearly articulating his or her mental processes. Therefore, the difficulties are quite prodigious when one tries to resolve the problems which surround judgements about the mental processes of children who usually aren't all that articulate about what's actually happening conceptually at any given time.
To assume children (and, perhaps, even adults) 'posit' only in the first sense of "posit" discussed above seems to entangle one in a series of infinite regresses. As a result, one cannot identify or fix the character of the starting point from which the individual posits the existence of something. Moreover, one cannot provide a tenable account of why a given ontological positing has the specific character which it has.
Let us suppose that an individual, in response to the latter issue, adopted the first sense of "posit" describer earlier. Let us further suppose that the individual were to maintain that the character of any given ontological positing was merely a random, arbitrary, haphazard collecting of features which were 'floating' about in the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field. At the very least, this individual would have some substantial problems explaining how these features came to be 'floating' about the phenomenology of the experiential field.
Furthermore, he is confronted, equally, with the problem of accounting for how such features came to have the characteristics which they seem to have. Seemingly, this individual has to contend that the features which were 'floating' about owed their existence to the positing mechanism of some theory building process. Yet, when such an individual began investigating the character of the theory building process, he or she would have to suppose that this kind of conceptual or hermeneutical process owed its existence to the positing of some still more subtle theory building process, and so on ad infinitum.
An undeniable consequence of the delineation of the character of "posit" in the first sense seems to be that if "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process", then, the theory building process whose standpoint is being described in a given instance is itself but a posit. Consequently, when one begins to unravel the various layers of positing, one tends to discover that the phenomenon or process of positing is a bit like peeling a metaphysical onion.
For after all is said and done, there doesn't seem to be anything substantive at the core of the positing process to which one can point and say: 'this' is what gives the positing process its character; or, 'this' underlies any specific instance of positing having the character which it (i.e., positing) does. One merely is left with a series of mysteries in which positing presupposes itself in an unknown manner. Thus, if this is what Quine had in mind, then, the criteria of intelligibility requires, if not demands, an explication or resolution of the mysteries which this sense of positing encompasses.
A less problematic approach to speculating about what goes on in the mind of a child (and adults) might be the following. A child, to the extent he or she posits about anything, posits in relation to features that appear in the phenomenology of the experiential field. These features need not be themselves a function of such positing (although, in some instances, they may be).
As a result, the ontological status of these features is traceable, presumably, to something other than the positing process. Although the positing process may shape and structure how one perceives or conceptualizes these features, under the present interpretation, one is not left in the untenable metaphysical position of having to concede the existence of these features on the basis of something, the very existence of which is itself the result of some mysterious, bottomless positing process.
Rather, these features become the experiential givens around which one's theory building processes begin to weave their story line, simple or otherwise. Moreover, one of the tasks of such a story line is to try to discover, by means of one's capacity to posit (as well as through such means as the interrogative imperative, inferential mapping, and establishing congruency relationships) why such features have the character they do and what it is that makes features of this character possible to begin with.
The infant who is hungry or thirsty does not fabricate the hunger or thirst to which he or she is conceding existence in the phenomenology of hunger and thirst. The infant who is suffering from diaper rash does not posit, ex nihilo, the pain to which he or she is conceding existence in the phenomenology of such pain. The infant who is too hot or too cold does not fabricate the uncomfortableness to which he or she is conceding existence in the phenomenology of felt discomfort. The infant who is attracted by a nearby mobile does not invent the attraction to which he or she is conceding existence in the phenomenology of attraction. The infant who is hugged or kissed or cuddled or rocked or fed or changed or played with does not posit, ex nihilo, the activity or its pleasurable aspects to which he or she is conceding existence in the phenomenology of these kinds of interactions. The infant who dreams or fantasizes or conceptualizes does not posit, ex nihilo, the imagery or ideas to which he or she is conceding existence in the phenomenology of these sorts of experiences, and so on.
In fact, even if one were to claim that people do create or generate everything which they experience from nothing - as some solipsist might, such a person still has a problem. What is the nature of the ontology of the positing process through which such experiences are given expression? One cannot assume one’s conclusions by saying that the posting process is, itself, a mysterious function which posited itself into existence.
All of the previously noted aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field of an infant, and many others, are expressions and manifestations of some dimension of an unknown reality. The existence of this reality is conceded by the very act of acknowledging, or attending to, aspects within the phenomenology of the experiential field whenever those aspects emerge or appear or erupt into the fabric of consciousness.
The character of this consciousness sets the focal/horizonal parameters within which the phenomenology of an individual's experiential field unfolds, and through which that phenomenology begins to individuate or particularize itself according to the differential manner in which the character of various experiences display themselves from one focal/horizonal interlude to the next.
Once having transpired or occurred, these experiential features become the particulars of the phenomenology of the experiential field with which we busy ourselves in trying to figure out and discover their character, significance and relationship, if any, to one another. These features might consist of colors, sounds, textures, tastes, pains, thoughts, interests, judgements, pleasures, needs, inferences, emotions, intuitions and all other sundry qualitative and quantitative features which are supported and made possible by one's existential en-counter with different facets and levels of the ocean of reality in which we are immersed and of which such encounters are but an expression.
At this experiential juncture, "the standpoint of a description of the theory building process" may begin to assume some relevance in the phenomenological life of the individual. However, this emergence of relevance for the theory building process is not because the theory building process has posited the existence of these differentiated phenomenological aspects of the experiential field. Instead, the theory building process assumes relevance and importance at this juncture because we do not know what to make of, or what the significance is of, that which has mysteriously appeared and transpired in the phenomenology of the experiential field, and whose existence we either cannot deny or which we have difficulty in trying to deny.
The fact that at many subsequent experiential junctures the individual may come to confuse or conflate myth and reality or theory and truth or positing and ontology does not alter the legitimacy of conceding existence to aspects of experience which methodologically are prior to whatever might be posited by an individual's theory building processes. The phenomenology of the experiential field is the thread from which theory building processes spin their epistemological tapestry. Furthermore, this phenomenology is a thread, the existence of which these processes presuppose, not whose existence they posit.
If the existence of this thread has to be posited by the theory building process, then, almost be definition, one loses access to the "simplest story" line because one has been forced to invent the existence of something which does not actually exist (except in the context of the theories which the theory building processes weave by means of it). This kind of invention only can complicate the search for the simplest story line concerning the actual character of various aspects of reality. It accomplishes this by throwing in one's way unfathomable infinite regresses which preclude the discovery of a solution(s) to the puzzles of what makes, say, such a theory building process possible and from whence it derives its character.
Irrespective of whether we can ever get to the bottom of the mysteries encompassed by reality, no purpose is served, heuristic or otherwise, by arbitrarily pulling out the ontological rug from beneath our feet before we even begin the hermeneutical quest. Yet, in effect, Quine's idea that "everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory building process" has the potential to accomplish precisely such a rug pulling. Thus, one must be very careful in how one approaches the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field with respect to which Quine is attempting to establish a case to justify the character which his current positing on theory building is manifesting.
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