Building Models - Part Four
Quine is correct when he says: "The fact that both physicists use the word 'neutrino' is not significant,' for "neutrino" is just a means of encoding or addressing (as they say in the computer world) a certain facet(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field which is the "object" of focal attention. What is significant, on the other hand, is that the character of the aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field which each physicist associates with the label "neutrino" is different in at least one respect - namely, the feature of mass. Given this difference of character, how is one to answer Quine's question: "Are they discussing the same objects?"
Before tackling the above question directly, let us ask a slightly different question. However, the latter question is one which seems to be akin to the sort of question Quine is asking.
Let us suppose there are two individuals who are standing together in the same room. Let us further assume they both agree that they see a certain round object that is beneath the rectangular table in the middle of the room and which is near to the base of the table's leg. The table leg in question is to their right and farthest from them.
Suppose they also agree that the size of the round object is about four inches in diameter and has an exterior surface which is, as far as they can determine, solid in color (i.e., no stripes or dots). However, let us suppose they disagree as to what the nature of that color is. Do these individuals see different objects or the same object?
If one contends the two individuals see different objects, then, surely, one can inquire as to the precise nature of the basis for justifying the existence of more than one object. After all, in all other respects the evidence indicates the existence of only one object about which there is a dispute in relation to one facet of its character - i.e., its color.
Do they see different objects or do they see the same object differently? If one maintains the two individuals see the same object, then, one must provide an explanation of how they could come to characterize that same object in different ways.
A common means of approaching this issue is to differentiate between the perception of a thing and the thing being perceived. This corresponds, to a certain extent, to an earlier distinction made in this essay between phenomenological objects and metaphysical/ontological objects.
More specifically, in the context of the previously described circumstances, we are assuming that certain aspects of the character of the phenomenology of the experiential field of two individuals reflect one another in a congruent manner in every respect but one. The one difference concerns the color of the round object to which identifying reference is being given.
Under these circumstances, the usual tendency is to attribute the difference to perception (i.e., the phenomenological objects involved) and not to the character of the aspect of reality which is being perceptually characterized. One might come up with any number of explanations as to why there was a difference of phenomenological objects in relation to the aspects of reality to which such objects supposedly gave reference.
For instance, perhaps one (or both) of the individuals is color blind. Perhaps, although both individuals are standing together, the angle of sight for one individual places the object in more shadow than is the case for the other individual's angle of sight. For one of the two individuals, this causes a subsequent altering of the appearance of the color of the round object being focused upon. Another possible explanation is that, although in reality both individuals have the same kind of color experience, they learned different words to label those experiences.
Alternatively, perhaps one of the two has been given a post-hypnotic suggestion in relation to the color of the round object beneath the table. This possibility raises all kinds of interesting issues as to just what it is that the individual under the influence of a post-hypnotic suggestion actually does "see".
Does he or she see the actual object, but with a different color somehow superimposed on it? Or, does he or she see a phenomenological object of a certain color which occupies the place of the actual object? Or, does he or she see both 'objects', but only reports or attends to the one answering to the description of the post-hypnotic suggestion's character?
With a reasonable amount of further inquiry the individuals, probably, could arrive at a satisfactory means of determining the reason(s) for the reported differences in the character of the round object. More importantly, throughout this process of further investigation, both individuals seem to have a clear sense of the character of the horizonal or contextual parameters of the phenomenology of the experiential field about which they are inquiring. They also seem to have a clear sense of the nature of the specific focal character of the aspect of their respective phenomenologies which they find problematic - namely, the color of the round object in question. As a result, whatever the nature of the reason which underlies the differences in the phenomenology of the experiential fields of the two individuals, in most instances (with the possible exception of the post-hypnotic suggestion alternative) the two individuals, in all likelihood, would agree, eventually, they saw the same object differently, and would not conclude they saw different objects.
The case of the two physicists is, of course, not quite the same as the foregoing example. The "neutrino" doesn't refer to something which can be seen like a round object beneath a table.
"Neutrino" is a label for a theoretical object of a certain character which is hypothesized as a means of accounting for both the new experimental data as well as the earlier data in which the pre-neutrino theory was rooted. Consequently, when one asks: are the two physicists discussing different objects or the same object?, the question is complicated by the fact that the object(s) in question is theoretical in nature and may not correspond to any metaphysical/ontological "object(s)".
Moreover, the character of the phenomenology of the physicists' experiential fields is such that there is no phenomenological object, per se, answering to the description of the hypothesized neutrino. There is only the object of their focus or the aspect(s) of the phenomenologies of their experiential fields to which their attention is drawn (e.g., the new experimental results), from which, together with the horizonal data entailed by pre-neutrino theory and concomitant evidence, the inference concerning the possible existence of the neutrino particular emerges.
Nevertheless, here, too, just as in the case of the round object, the two physicists seem to have a clear understanding of the character of the horizonal or contextual parameters of the phenomenology of the experiential field about which they are inquiring. Moreover, they also seem to have a clear sense about the nature of the specific focal character of the aspect of their phenomenologies which they disagree on - in this case, whether or not the proposed neutrino has mass.
In each case, the proposed neutrinos are intended to account for precisely the same aspects of the phenomenology in the experiential field of both physicists. The only difference between the two physicists lies in the nature of the character of the proposed entity which each physicist believes to be an accurate characterization of the reality that underwrites the manner in which the phenomenologies of their experiential fields, vis-á-vis the new experimental results and the pre-neutrino theory/data, have the character they are observed to have and on which the two physicists agree. Only further inquiry will determine if either characterization constitutes an accurate representation of the character of the aspect(s) of reality being referred to on the basis of the physicists' respective inferences about why the phenomenology of their experiential fields have the character they do.
Simplicity and the Inter-animation of Sentences
Toward the end of Chapter One in Word and Object, Quine discusses how he believes the idea of "simplicity" plays a key role in establishing the 'center of gravity' for a given body of evidential data. For Quine, this ‘center of gravity’ is extremely important as one seeks to balance, delicately, the "varied forces transmitted across the fabric of sentences from remotely relevant stimuli" (p. 18). According to Quine:
"What we are doing when we amass and use circumstantial evidence is to let ourselves be activated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations as they reverberate through our theory, from present sensory stimulations, via the inter-animation of sentences." (p.18)
He goes on to ask, and, then, answer, a question concerning the criteria to be used in evaluating this "inter-animation of sentences":
"What conscious policy does one follow, then, when not simply passive toward this inter-animation of sentences? Consciously the quest seems to be for the simplest story. Yet this supposed quality of simplicity is more easily sensed than described." (p.19)
Quine further adds:
"... simplicity considerations in some sense may be said to determine even the least inquisitive observer's most casual acts of individual recognition. For he is continually having to decide, if only implicitly, whether to construe two particular encounters as repeated encounters with an identical physical object or as encounters with two distinct physical objects. And he decides in such a way as to minimize, to the best of his unconscious ability, such factors as multiplicity of objects, swiftness of interim change of quality and position, and, in general, irregularity of natural law.
"The deliberate scientist goes on in essentially the same way, if more adroitly.... It is part of the scientist's business to generalize or extrapolate from sample data, and so to arrive at laws covering more phenomena than have been checked, and simplicity, by his lights, is just what guides his extrapolation. Simplicity is of the essence of statistical inference....
"Simplicity is not a desideratum on a par with conformity of observation. Observation serves to test hypotheses after adoption for testing. Still, decisive observation is commonly long delayed or impossible; and insofar at least, simplicity is final arbiter." (pp. 19-20)
There are any number of issues which are problematic in the foregoing excerpts from Word and Object. For example, earlier in the present essay, Quine had been criticized for the inadequacies and vagueness that permeate his largely behavioristic position concerning the manner in which sentences supposedly are learned, somehow ( In Quine's words: "We just try to be as sensitively responsive as possible to the ensuing interplay of chain stimulations" - p. 19.), through contextual conditioning.
With respect to the lengthier quote noted above, one might wonder, as well, about the nature of the means by which "varied forces [are] transmitted across the fabric of sentences from remotely relevant stimuli" (p. 18). In other words, what is the character of this mechanism of transmission by means of which "varied forces" impinge upon the "fabric of sentences from remotely relevant stimuli"? What is the character of these mysterious "varied forces" which are being transmitted across the "fabric of sentences"? Moreover, on what basis does one determine the relevancy (remotely or otherwise) of stimuli that are linked to the "fabric of sentences" via the agency, on the one hand, of "varied forces", and, on the other hand, some, as-yet-unspecified, mechanism of transmission which transports such "varied forces" from "remotely relevant stimuli" to the "fabric of sentences"?
In addition, Quine has indicated "evidence is a question of center of gravity" (p. 18) in which the individual must undertake a task of "delicate balancing of varied forces transmitted across the fabric of sentences from remotely relevant stimuli" (p. 18). In view of Quine's above perspective, one wonders about the character of that which stands behind, directs, or regulates this process of "delicate balancing" to which Quine alludes. One also wonders about the principles or criteria according to which the balancing process is to be carried out.
Although Quine uses slightly different language, the following excerpt (previously cited) reflects the same basic idea (and concomitant problems) as does Quine's position outlined in the last paragraph:
"What we are doing when we amass and use circumstantial evidence is to let ourselves be activated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations as they reverberate through our theory, from present sensory stimulations, via the inter-animation of sentences." (p.18)
Just what does - "to let ourselves be activated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations ... via the inter-animation of sentences" - mean? Or, how does one go about being so actuated?
One also would like to know just what is entailed by the idea that chain stimulations "reverberate through our theory, from present sensory stimulations, via the inter-animation of sentences". In other words, what is the character of this reverberation phenomenon to which one is supposed to "be actuated as sensitively as possible"? Furthermore, what is the precise character of the manner in which the inter-animation of sentences is to mediate this reverberation phenomenon "as sensitively as possible"? Finally, what are the criteria by which the notion "as sensitively as possible" is to be discerned and measured?
Because Quine believes that what objects "are is, for the most part, just our mastery of what the theory says about them" (p. 16), one is not surprised to find he appears to believe that the idea embodied in the phrase "the inter-animation of sentences" has adequate explanatory power to account for how "chain stimulations ... reverberate through our theory". After all, Quine seems to maintain that chain stimulations (which are occasioned by one's encounter with objects) represent the context in which sentences are learned by the conditioning effect which exposure to such contexts supposedly has upon the individual.
If what Quine says is so, then, according to the logic of that position, one's understanding of objects will be a function of several factors. One factor will be the theory which inhabits, so to speak, the sentences which are learned through contextual conditioning. The other factor which, in Quine's view, would be related functionally to understanding is the "inter-animate" manner in which such sentences play off against one another while mediating "chain stimulations as they [i.e., the chain stimulations] reverberate through our theory, from present sensory stimulations". However, as previously indicated, one has considerable difficulty understanding how Quine proposes to explain the character of the transition from "present sensory stimulation" to the emergence of a theory of determinate (or partially determinate) character.
When Quine says "the pattern of conditioning is complex and inconstant from person to person" (p. 17), he is undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, one should permit neither the complexity nor inconstancy surrounding this issue to deter one from trying to explore and, if possible, come to understand both the "patterns of conditioning" as well as the character of all that is involved or encompassed by such a conditioning process.
Indeed, until one comes to grips with these issues and resolves the problems in which they are entangled, then, the whole idea of the "inter-animation of sentences learned through contextual conditioning" does not supply one with any real understanding of how objects, sensory stimulation, language and theory are interrelated. In addition, despite Quine's noting, with respect to these patterns of conditioning, that:
"there are points of general congruence: combinations of questions and non-verbal stimulations which are pretty sure to elicit an affirmative answer from anyone fit to be numbered within the relevant speech community," (p. 17)
The foregoing permits one, at best, to identify who can be "numbered within the relevant speech community". It suggests nothing about the process by which one becomes a member of the speech community in question, nor does it provide any hints as to what stands behind and makes possible the arriving at "points of general congruence" that alone makes a speech community feasible.
Similarly (and as noted previously), one is, to a large extent, left in the dark as to just what is meant and entailed by phrases like: "let ourselves be actuated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations"; "reverberate through our theory ... via the inter-animation of sentences"; and, the "delicate balancing of varied forces transmitted across the fabric of sentences".
One also is left in the dark with respect to finding answers concerning the following sort of questions. For example, how do these phrases come to have the character which Quine assumes them to have if one, allegedly, learns their meaning through contextual conditioning?
In addition, why, on occasion, do different people - even though members of the same speech community - inter-animate their sentences differently, and, thereby, allow chain stimulations to reverberate differently through their theory? Moreover, why are such people differently actuated by a similar series or sequence of chain stimulations? In all these cases, a great deal more work must be done before the idea of the 'inter-animation of sentences learned through contextual learning' - an idea which plays a fundamental role in Quine's model - can be of much help in establishing, with any degree of specificity and tenability, the relation between word and object.
Interestingly enough, much of the previous discussion is, for Quine, subsumed under what he takes to be a "passive" approach to the inter-animation of sentences. According to Quine, in the "passive" approach, "we just try to be as sensitively responsive as possible to the ensuing inter play of chain stimulations" (p. 19).
A more active participation in the inter-animation of sentences involves, according to Quine, "the quest ... for the simplest story" (And, remember, Quine is quick to acknowledge that "this supposed quality of simplicity is more easily sensed than described".). One, justifiably, might argue that such active participation in the inter-animation of sentences presupposes the so-called passive approach to the inter-animation of sentences.
This is so because before one can try to identify "the simplest story" with respect to any two sets of inter-animated sentences dealing with a given body of sensory data, one, first, must identify the character of the chain stimulations with which one is dealing in a given sensory data context. Furthermore, from Quine's point of view, this sort of identification of the character of a certain framework of chain stimulations is accomplished by one's trying "to be as sensitively responsive as possible to the ensuing interplay of chain stimulations".
This passive approach might even be considered to be at the very heart of the process of contextual conditioning through which Quine believes language (in the form of isolated words and whole sentences), allegedly, is picked up. For instance, let us suppose that the individual is "as sensitively responsive as possible to the ensuing interplay of chain stimulations" that occur in the context in which words (sentences, partial sentences or single words) are uttered by a speaker.
Given the foregoing, then, somehow, according to Quine, the individual (in the present case, a child trying to understand what, is said) will make a connection between context and linguistic utterances. Quine construes this connection in terms of conditioning in some, as yet undefined sense.
Through this connection, the child will be permitted to gain at least partial entry into the speech community of which the speaker is a member. If this is the case, then, once the rules of application for a more active criterion such as simplicity were specified and clarified, this criterion could be used to decide between alternative beliefs or theories. According to Quine, these beliefs or theories are those which arose in relation to the child's contextual conditioning within circumstances in which the verbal utterances remained constant.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations concerning constancy of verbal utterances, various non-linguistic aspects of the circumstances may have changed over time. In other words, the character of those con texts in which learning by conditioning is supposed to take place changes. Therefore, even when the linguistic stimulus remains constant across these contexts, one still might anticipate something such as the following.
In a series of encounters with a variety of contexts where the linguistic stimulus remained constant, the individual could juxtapose the linguistic stimulus with various aspects of these contexts and come up with alternative possibilities with respect to the connection between the constant linguistic stimulus and the varied contexts in which that stimulus appeared. For example, the sentence "There is a rabbit" could be related to a variety of different circumstances in a variety of different ways to generate a number of different meaning possibilities concerning the relationship between, on the one hand, the sentence which remains constant, and, on the other hand, the circumstances which do not remain constant but in which the same sentence occurs. Moreover, the foregoing assumes, of course, that the individual already had grasped or suspected there was some sort of representational link between linguistic stimulus and the various experiential contexts in which the linguistic stimulus is embedded.
In any event, according to Quine, one way to choose amongst the aforementioned alternatives would be to generate or adopt some criterion of selection. The purpose of this criterion would be to permit one to eliminate those possibilities concerning the connection in question which some-how did not 'fit' the available experiential data to that point with respect to the contexts of interest - namely, those in which a given linguistic stimulus was constant.
Quine's candidate for this criterion is 'simplicity'. Although he, actually, doesn't employ this term in his discussion of the process of contextual conditioning through which language theoretically is learned, nonetheless, such an application seems to suggest itself naturally in light of what Quine does say about the idea of simplicity.
At the same time, attempting to apply the term "simplicity" to the process of contextual conditioning by means of which, in Quine's view, language is learned, raises some important questions. For instance, Quine uses the idea of simplicity as an active approach to evaluating and shaping the inter-animation of sentences.
Yet, if no sentences exist, as would be the case with a child just starting to engage language, then, the character of those aspects of the process of contextual conditioning to which simplicity is to be applied would not appear to be essentially sentential in nature. In these circumstances, an understanding - which is pre-linguistic in nature - which embodies the idea of simplicity would be called upon to select between alternative theories, beliefs, ideas or understandings which differentially connected a constant linguistic stimulus to various features of the contexts in which such a stimulus manifested itself.
On the basis of the foregoing perspective, it is a pre-linguistic or non-linguistic selection process concerning the "simplest story" that is believed to link a constant linguistic stimulus to various contexts that will determine what is learned, be it right or wrong. That is, 'simplicity', in this case, involves the selection of one theory or idea (among, say, several) concerning the connection between constant linguistic stimulus and certain associated contexts which would underlie the process of contextual conditioning.
This selection mechanism is rooted in a non-sentential framework in the sense that the mechanism itself is not a function of sentences or the inter-animation of sentences. Instead, a non-linguistic mental or cognitive mechanism is responsible for the acquisition of such sentences. Furthermore, the aforementioned selection process would be responsible for the generating of the various possible theories of connection between constant linguistic stimulus and the varying surrounding experiential contexts in which such constant stimuli were embedded.
The sentence that is learned cannot, in and of itself, be the source of the theories which arise concerning the possible significance of that sentence (i.e., the character of its connection to the contexts in which it appears). Moreover, the sentence that is learned cannot be the source of the selecting process which settles upon one sort of connection between linguistic stimulus and associated contexts rather than some other sort.
A usable sentence (i.e., one which can be utilized effectively in a given speech community) is the end result of processes which seem to be somewhat independent of sentences qua sentences. These processes seem to operate in circumstances in which sentences are only one of the data inputs that are taken into consideration in the formation or generation of the character of the connecting link which stands between experiential contexts and linguistic stimulus.
The sentence, by itself, cannot stipulate what the nature of this link must be. The hearer must somehow grasp, or gain insight into, the referential nature of the intentionality that stands behind the sentence.
The hearer must do this on the basis of the data provided by the character of the experiential contexts in which the linguistic stimulus remains the same. This includes the data that comes through the individual's attempt to characterize such contexts. However, these experiential contexts also include data which arises through the individual's abstracting, reflecting, analyzing, and questioning (on however primitive a level) in relation to such contextual characterizations, once the latter have arisen.
As quoted earlier, Quine believes:
"... simplicity considerations in some sense may be said to determine even the least inquisitive observer's most casual acts of individual recognition. For he is continually having to decide, if only implicitly, whether to construe two particular encounters as repeated encounters with an identical physical object or as encounters with two distinct physical objects. And he decides in such a way as to minimize, to the best of his unconscious ability, such factors as multiplicity of objects, swiftness of interim change of quality and position, and, in general, irregularity of natural law." (p.19)
One wonders, however, if "simplicity considerations in some sense" really are what are at work in the problem of identification concerning a current encounter with an object which bears a perceived resemblance or similarity to a remembered instance of a previously encountered object.
Quine seems to be arguing, in the cited quote, that the decision of whether "to construe two particular encounters as repeated encounters with an identical physical object or as encounters with two distinct physical objects" is a function of "simplicity considerations in some sense". Yet, the aforementioned decision appears to be based on the degree of congruency between present and past encounters with the objects in question.
Determining the degree of congruency is not done for the sake of simplifying the situation per se. After some time, simplifying the situation "in some sense" might be one of the ramifications which results from this sort of re-identification determination by means of congruency. Moreover, determining the degree of congruency may not even be done for the purpose of becoming oriented toward the experiential context in an accurate epistemological manner. Here, too, however, such a result may ensue from the process of re-identification through congruency. In any event, the reason why congruency relationships come to the forefront in such instances of re-identification is because, phenomenologically, two experiential encounters are perceived or characterized by the individual as being the same, similar, or disparate in relation to one another.
Then, again, ‘simplifying the situation’ might not be one of the results if one should happen to decide that the present object is a different, though similar, object to one previously encountered. Under such circumstances, one appears to be stretching the notion of simplicity beyond the bounds of recognition to try to argue that the reason for deciding that a presently encountered object is distinct from a previously encountered object is due to "simplicity considerations" (whatever these are supposed to be). In any case, the reason for differentiating the current stimulus from past stimuli of similar character is done for other considerations.
Essentially, such differentiation occurs because the individual recognizes and acknowledges the presence of one, or more, themes, features, facets or characteristics in the presently encountered object which did not seem to manifest themselves in the previously encountered object, and vice versa. The line of demarcation, in other words, between deciding that the present object is a re-identified instance of a previously encountered object, or that the present object is a separate, different object from ones previously encountered, seems to be a function of two sorts of conditions.
First, there is the extent (if any) of the congruence relationship between present and past experiential encounters. Secondly, the line of demarcation is functionally dependent on the 'parameters of minimal acceptability' which the individual sets up for treating objects that are experientially encountered as either the same as previously encountered objects, or as different from them.
The character of these 'parameters of minimal acceptability' may change with interests, experience, understanding, goals, needs and so on. In any event, these parameters form as a result of the way the individual individuates, particularizes or characterizes his or her experiential encounters on any given instance.
In addition, they form as a result of the individual having decided that subsequent experiential encounters are identical to, similar to or disparate from the earlier encounters on the basis of how the particular aspect(s) of the current experiential encounter on which the individual is focusing 'strikes' one as being congruent or incongruent with some remembered past instance of experiential encounters which have been stored in memory in some fashion.
These memories manifest themes, characteristics or features that can be compared, to whatever degree, with the themes, characteristics and features of current aspects of experiential encounters.
This essay does not put forth any theory or answer which might account for why different people develop different senses of what strikes them as being congruent or incongruent. The present essay is only trying to draw attention to the fact this does seem to take place, as well as attempting to indicate the general character of the way in which it happens, along with the sort of factors that are involved in shaping and structuring the character of these congruency/incongruency orientations.
The rightness or wrongness of one’s perception or characterization will be tested subsequently in any number of experiential ways. Furthermore, the individual may devise any number of means (one of which might be, to some extent, a function of simplicity considerations) to measure or assess the accuracy of such a perception. However, the issue of the correctness of the phenomenological perception or characterization in question is irrelevant to, and a separate issue from, the process by which the individual decides whether or not a currently encountered object is a repeated encounter with a previously encountered object or is distinct from any previously encountered objects.
On the one hand, this latter process is entirely a matter of establishing the degree of congruence between, or among, different aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field at any given time. For example, this involves the determination of the degree of congruency between the memory component of the phenomenology of the experiential field and an ongoing visual input component of the phenomenology of the experiential field. On the other hand, the above mentioned process is also a matter of how the individual determines the character of the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field where the individual is prepared to set the lines of demarcation for the 'parameters of minimal acceptability' which differentiate identical, similar and disparate experiential objects that are encountered.
For a very young child, the lines of demarcation may be very ill-defined and easily subject to confusion or mistaken identity. For a very young child, the lines of demarcation may consist of very liberal parameters of minimal acceptability in which anything that manifests, say, merely one given theme, feature or character (be it color, shape, number of legs, presence of fur, taste, strangeness and so on) will be enough to establish a congruency between (or among) objects as being the same or similar. This will be the case even if, in reality, the objects being considered may be quite distinct and disparate (e.g., calling all four legged, furry animals "dogs" or "cats").
As we grow older, these initial lines of demarcation may be refined in accordance with the character of various subsequent experiential encounters and with the expanded understanding one develops as a result of such encounters. This has the effect of setting more stringent conditions for the parameters of minimal acceptability in determining whether (and how) two objects are the same, similar or disparate.
The refining of the lines of demarcation also has the effect of rendering those parameters more complex. This is done in order to take into account the possibilities that one and the same thing may express itself differently under varying conditions, or that one and the same object may, over the course of time, have its appearance altered without its basic nature or character undergoing any substantial change.
One of the factors that may shape the character of the parameters of minimal acceptability which begin to form around the phenomenology of congruency relationships could be that of "simplicity considerations in some sense". In any event, these considerations arise only after the fact of the emergence of an experiential situation in which something presently encountered is being compared with something previously encountered in order to determine the degree and nature of the congruency which is perceived to exist between or among the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field in question.
Therefore, eventually, one may develop a set of simplicity criteria or principles as a means of adjudicating between, or among, various ideas, beliefs, values, theories and so on. However, these sort of criteria and principles cannot be applied until the following has occurred.
One has to have characterized or individuated a certain aspect(s) of the current phenomenology of the experiential field. Once this process of characterization or individuation has taken place, the individual tries to fit this characterized particular into the conceptual geometry which has been developed or constructed along various thematic lines within the phenomenology of the experiential .
These thematic lines emerge due to earlier instances of characterizing and particularizing previous experiential encounters. Only during the fitting process would decisions be made in accordance with the simplicity criteria one had devised, as to which of the possible conceptual geometries that could arise when the current data is taken into consideration might be considered as "the simplest story" among the alternatives open to one from which one can select. In effect, this fitting process might be, in part at least, one kind of expression of what Quine referred to when he said we must "be actuated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations as they reverberate through our theory" or conceptual geometry.
One might be able to conceive of instances in which a decision is consciously or unconsciously made to individuate, particularize or characterize a given experiential encounter according to some principle of abstraction. When such a principle of abstraction is applied or used, only certain facets, features or dimensions of the phenomenology of the experiential field of which that encounter is a partial manifestation are singled out to represent the general character of the thing, object, event or phenomenon encountered.
Conceivably, this kind of abstraction might be undertaken to simplify the complexity of the ontological territory one was encountering in order to better understand some of the logical character of that territory. If so, the abstraction would need to be done in such a way so that the representation to be generated through the abstraction process would not be just the simplest, in some sense. The abstraction in question also would have to be the least distorting (which would have to be spelled out within the context of the process of developing a simplicity story or model) of the representational possibilities of what was being depicted within the individual's conceptual geometry.
Thus, a certain tension would emerge during the development of an abstracted representation. This tension is between the requirements of simplicity and the needs of accuracy. In fact, the criterion of simplicity is dependent, functionally, on considerations of accuracy in the following sense.
The ultimate arbiter for acceptable conditions of "simplicity considerations" necessarily will be the actual nature of the context to which such considerations are being applied. Essentially, the "simplest story" possible can be nothing other than the truth itself, for any deviation from the truth unnecessarily complicates the story line.
Consequently, the simplest story possible in any given set of circumstances will be that "story", among all those which are currently available, which is both most reflective of, and least distorting of, the actual character of the truth concerning those circumstances being considered. At the same time, the simplest story will be that one which achieves the foregoing while simultaneously conforming to, or falling within, the boundaries of the character of an abstracted representation of the circum-stances in question which is most economical in the way it (the representation) gives expression to this process of balancing 'maximum reflection/ minimum distortion' considerations.
An individual can decide "in such a way as to minimize, to the best of his or her unconscious ability, such factors as multiplicity of objects, swiftness of interim change of quality and position, and, in general, irregularity of natural law" (previously cited). However, before the individual can decide in this fashion, she or he, first, must be able to develop a framework of demarcated understanding concerning the individual's beliefs about, or insight into, or perception of, the character of some aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field and that which makes a field, with an aspect(s) of such character, possible.
Once one, or more, of these frameworks of demarcated understanding has been developed, an individual could undertake his or her program of minimization (i.e., simplicity considerations), but this program will have to be done while keeping in mind the aforementioned tension between the requirements of simplicity and accuracy. As a result, there will be a corresponding tension between the following aspects.
On the one hand, there is any given framework of demarcated understanding which arises in the context of the phenomenology of the experiential field. On the other hand, there are the horizonal aspects of that experiential field which do not easily, if at all, fit into one's theory of conceptual geometry. In addition, through this process of being "actuated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations", one attempts to particularize, characterize or individuate the phenomenology of such an encounter as it transpires within the experiential field.
Generally speaking, at the heart of this characterization phenomenon is a program of abstraction. In this program, the individual first generates (or learns), and then, applies, a framework of demarcated under standing that expresses some sort of tension between its dual features - namely, the simplifying action of its abstraction component and the exacting action of its accuracy requirement.
For whatever the nature of the themes, features, aspects or facets of the phenomenology of an ongoing experiential encounter that are being singled out or selected by an individual during the process of abstraction, and irrespective of the character of the factors (e.g., emotions, reasons, needs, desires, beliefs, etc.) which are shaping this selecting process, sooner or later the model or representation or conceptual geometry which is generated through abstraction is going to have to reconcile its character with the numerous horizonal features that phenomenologically impinge upon that representation.
These are features which, when analyzed closely during some shift in focal attention, are, themselves, characterized into various category particulars to be positioned coordinately in the individual's developing conceptual geometry. This positioning is done according to the manner in which they are perceived to be: conflicting with; confirming of; irrelevant to; an elaboration on; a refinement of; or consistent with the character of the abstraction/characterization of some aspect of the phenomenology of a previous experiential counter(s) undergone by the individual.
Out of this dynamic of the interaction between focal and horizonal elements emerges an understanding. This understanding concerns the nature of the conceptual geometry which is formed within the phenomenology of the experiential field through a whole succession of focal/horizonal interludes during the series of experiential encounters which help constitute the phenomenology of the individual's life history.
In the context of this focal/horizonal dynamic, the previously discussed tension between the requirements of simplicity and the requirements of accuracy manifests itself. Moreover, through this tension, the interrogative imperative aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field expresses itself as it attempts to explore the problems (if any) surrounding, and to seek for a clarification of, the character of the issue being focused upon.
Contrary to what Quine is maintaining in the previous quote, simplicity, per se, does not prompt one to adopt any given hypothesis for testing. What prompts one to adopt a hypothesis for testing or investigation is the individual's perception that the given hypothesis has a character which constitutes an 'acceptable' maxi/mini balance of the accurately reflective and distorting features, respectively, that give expression to the tension between simplicity requirements and accuracy, requirements in the focal/horizonal interaction.
What constitutes an acceptable maxi/mini balance will vary with the individual. However, this does not mean that hypothesis testing is, ultimately, relativistic.
The bottom line in hypothesis testing is the extent of the congruencies and incongruencies that are generated by that testing procedure. Consequently, regardless of what one initially considers to be an acceptable maxi/mini balance between simplicity and accuracy, that balance will have to survive the rigors of being tested, explored, analyzed and queries in the context of all subsequent experiences - not only those of the individual, but those experiences of others as well.
In this respect, Quine is quite right when he says: "Simplicity is not a desideratum on a par with conformity to observation." This is so since, on the one hand, "simplicity" is a function of observation. That is, simplicity depends on the presence of observational givens before it can be manifested in the phenomenological tension that follows upon the abstracted characterization of such givens.
The other reason why "simplicity is not a desideratum on a par with conformity to observation" is because simplicity involves something more than mere observation or being "actuated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations" (the so-called passive element in Quine's view). Indeed, "simplicity considerations" are one of the components which tend to structure the analytical, investigative, reflective and evaluative program that is, under the most ideal of circumstances, capable of helping to establish the "simplicity story" with regard to the character of a given body of observational evidence which has been experientially encountered and subsequently characterized by the individual.
However, as noted in the foregoing pages of discussion, part and parcel of this "simplest story" on which one is focusing is a horizonal dimension or requirement of accuracy. This component of the horizon frequently appears in the form of the interrogative imperative which probes the tenability of the story line (advanced through a given "author's" simplicity orientation). This probing attempts to determine if the story line being advanced is an accurate, abstracted representation of that which the individual is referring to, either in the phenomenology of his experiential field, or in terms of that (i.e., reality) which makes such a phenomenology possible, or both.
In light of the above considerations, one might not be inclined to go along with Quine in the previously cited quote when he asserts, in relation to scientists, that "simplicity, by his [i.e., the scientist's] lights, is just what guides his extrapolation". Arguing that "simplicity considerations" are just one of the factors which guide the scientist's extrapolations seems more appropriate.
Among other things, any specific set of "simplicity considerations" must itself be weighed against the requirements of accuracy which horizonally impinge upon these considerations through, for example, the agency of the interrogative imperative that emerges. The interrogative imperative arises as a function of an inability, or problems generated while trying, to attain and/or maintain the delicate balance of the maxi(reflective)/mini (distortive) components of the phenomenological tension which tends to characterize almost any epistemological focal/horizonal interplay. As indicated earlier, this sort of interplay occurs during the construction or development of a conceptual geometric representation of either the phenomenology of the experiential field or of the reality which is believed to underlie or give expression to such a phenomenology, or both.
Of course, in one sense, accuracy or correctness of truth is, as noted previously, the "simplest story" possible. Nonetheless, there is only one tenable way in which one could hope to argue that "simplicity considerations" played a role in the determination or identification or understanding of what the truth is in any given set of circumstances.
This way involves construing "simplicity considerations" as a matter of being "actuated as sensitively as possible by the chain stimulations as they reverberate through our theory" or conceptual geometry. Under these circumstances, and if successful, the character of the theory or conceptual geometry reflects (i.e., is congruent with) - within some minimal degree of acceptable accuracy - the character of the reality to which the chain stimulations in question were, in some way, functionally related.
In other words, the process of being "actuated as sensitively as possible by chain stimulations as they reverberate through our theory" or conceptual geometry would be a matter of getting the character of the story line of one's theory to be congruent with the character of that to which the theory refers. The congruency relationship involves either a given aspect of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field, or a facet of that which makes such an aspect of the phenomenology possible - thereby lending to this phenomenological aspect the character it does manifest.
The "simplest story" in this regard is the one where there is an exact congruence between: a) the character of the theory or conceptual geometry being studied or focused upon; b) the character of the chain stimulations which are the sensory mediators linking the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field with the underlying reality (of which the given field is but one expression); and c) the actual character of the dimension(s) of ontology or metaphysics to which a) and b) are making identifying reference. Furthermore, the foregoing congruency relationship - precisely because of its accuracy - is not disturbed or undermined by the character of the data generated by pursuing the interrogative imperative's exploration of the horizonal tensions that emerge in relation to a given theory's or conceptual geometry's attempt to represent: a) the character of a given set of chain stimulations; or, b) the character of the relationship between such chain stimulations and that aspect of reality which makes chain stimulations of that character possible.
Under the foregoing circumstances, "simplicity considerations" do not guide extrapolations. Rather, "simplicity considerations" and extrapolations are both answerable to the requirements of accuracy in seeking a minimally defensible congruency relationship between, stated in its simplest form, theory and reality.
As a result, that which, ideally, guides the formation and application of "simplicity considerations" and extrapolations in the development and adopting of hypotheses, will be the following. The scientist is guided in her or his selection process by that which is perceived by that individual to reduce any tensional imbalance which exists or emerges in the juxtaposition of the character of a given theory or conceptual geometry next to the character of the horizonal considerations that are believed to be, or actually are, in conflict with the given theory or conceptual geometry.
However, this reduction of tension is not to be construed as merely a matter of removing, or getting rid of, cognitive dissonance in any way one can. Instead, the cognitive dissonance must be resolved in the direction of satisfying the demands or requirements of accuracy, correctness and truth which the interrogative imperative places upon the epistemical/hermeneutical interaction of focal/horizonal components within the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field.
On the surface, the foregoing pages of discussion were a matter of attempting to trace the effects of "varied forces transmitted across the fabric of sentences" and to study the reverberative implications for theory of various chain stimulations "via the inter-animation of sentences". After all, nothing but sentences appeared on each of the pages, and their juxtaposed character constitutes, one might suppose, the "inter-animation of sentences". Yet, sentences do not inter-animate themselves.
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