Building Models - Part Three
Abstraction, Analogy, Description and Theory in Language Learning
In elaborating upon the various ways in which words can be learned, Quine contends that:
"In the case of words it is a contrast between learning a word in isolation - i.e., in effect, as a one-word sentence - and learning it contextually, or by abstraction, as a fragment of sentences learned as wholes. Prepositions, conjunctions, and many other words are bound to have been learned only contextually; we get on to using them by analogy with the ways in which they have been seen to turn up in past sentences. It is mostly just substantives, adjectives, and verbs that will occasionally have been learned in isolation. Which of them are learned thus, and which only contextually, will vary from person to person....
"The same would seem plausible for terms like "molecule" which, unlike "red", "square" and "tile", do not refer to things that can be distinctively pointed out. Such terms can, however, be inculcated also by yet a third method: description of the intended objects. This method could be grouped under the head of the contextual, but it deserves separate notice.
"What makes insensible things intelligibly describable is analogy, notably the special form of analogy known as extrapolation. Thus consider molecules, which are described as smaller than anything seen. This term "smaller" is initially meaningful to us through some observable contrasts as that of a bee to a bird, a gnat to a bee, or a mote of dust to a gnat. The extrapolation that leads to talk of wholly invisible particles, microbes for example, can be represented as an analogy of relation ..." (p. 14)
But after further indicating how, in addition to the size-relational analogy, a variety of other analogies can be brought to bear on the problem of providing an intelligible description of an insensible entity, such as a molecule, Quine stipulates:
"... the fact is that what one learns of molecules by analogy at all is meager. One must see the molecular doctrine at work in physical theory to get a proper notion of molecules, and this is not a matter of analogy, nor of description at all. It is a matter of learning the word contextually as a fragment of sentences which one learns to bring forth as wholes under appropriate circumstances." (p.15)
Although Quine uses different notions ( e.g., learning in isolation; learning contextually or by abstraction; learning by analogy or extrapolation; and learning through description.) to account for how words can be learned, all these allegedly different modes of learning words are, in one way or another, contextual in character. The context at issue in any given instance is always the phenomenology of the experiential field of the individual. This phenomenology has a shape and texture which always are changing as a result of the dynamic of focal/horizonal interplay over time.
The varying character of the experiential field, from one time to the next, provides a basis for individuation, particularization, or characterization to be made. These processes capture, in part or entirely, the structural or logical nature of the experiential features that differentiate one phenomenological context from another according to the focal/horizonal character which is used to represent, express, reflect or depict such contexts.
"Abstraction", "analogy", "extrapolation" and "description" are merely ways of referring, in general, to some of the cognitive processes which may be involved in the particularization or characterization of the experiential field into phenomenological co-ordinate points of reference. Taken collectively, these experiential co-ordinate points form the conceptual geometry which makes up one's pre-understandings and understandings at any given moment.
Indeed, "abstraction", "analogy", "extrapolation" and "description" are themselves examples of words which have come to be associated with, or are labels for, different phenomenological co-ordinate points of reference. These points of reference have been individuated or particularized on the basis of the focal/horizonal character of the experiential field occurring when such words have emerged as part of the phenomenological context experienced by a given individual.
The precise character of the conceptual co-ordinate points of reference to which these words ("abstraction', etc.) refer may vary, to some extent, from individual to individual. This variance is due to the differences (sometimes subtle, sometimes substantial) in the nature of the factors shaping the character of focus and horizon in such individuals with respect to the phenomenological/experiential circumstances through which these words were encountered originally and subsequently. As a result, each of the words in question refers to a generally determinate and small number of experiential particularizations which form the basic "structural core" from which meaning is generated and around which additional shadings and nuances of meaning are woven.
For example, the basic structural core of that to which "abstraction" refers concerns the following kind of phenomenological context. The nature of focal/horizonal interplay in this context is such that cognitive activity is geared toward creating a conceptual representation of that which focus is attending to.
This representation is to be based on a characterizing of certain features and aspects of the subject of focus. However, this characterization process emphasizes only some of these individuated features. Other features and aspects are de-emphasized or excluded entirely from the representation, even if they are relevant to the true representation.
In other words, in abstraction, one is removing oneself from the totality of the character of the subject of focus. In the process of removing oneself, one is narrowing the scope and character of that part of the focal process which is producing a representation.
Thus, the ensuing representation will be a function of the features of the given 'subject' which have been selected out, for whatever reasons, to serve as the basis for representing that subject. Such 'edited' themes will, then, be organized in a way that is thought to reflect accurately within the limits of the edited theme the character of the focal subject for which it is intended to act as a conceptual representation.
The description of the phenomenological aspects of the process - or, more precisely, those parts of the process which we could observe and focus upon in consciousness - is complex. Presumably, the underlying mechanism(s) which makes such a process possible is also complex.
Nonetheless, the actual process is something we do all the time as we individuate, particularize, thematize or characterize the phenomenology of the experiential field from instance to instance as the focal/horizonal interplay varies over time. When we come to understand that the term "abstraction" refers to this aspect of the experiential field, we in effect come to grasp the basic structural core of the abstraction concept in question.
The character of the phenomenology through which we come to grasp the nature of the experiential field to which "analogy" refers differs somewhat from the contextual circumstances surrounding the learning of "abstraction's" frame of reference. In fact, the structural core of the underlying conceptual reference points for "analogy" actually builds upon, not the concept of abstraction, but upon the processes to which the concept of abstraction refers. More specifically, "analogy" refers to those instances in the phenomenology of the experiential field in which focus is characterized, in part, as being concerned with, or attending to, the recognized similarity of likeness between two kinds of particulars.
On the one hand, there are particulars which, at some previous time, have been generated through abstraction during the process of being characterized as a focal subject of a certain kind in the context of a broader experiential field. On the other hand, there are particulars which now are being generated through the process of abstraction. The character of the analogy being drawn will depend on both the character of the abstractions to which the particulars being focused upon give expression, as well as on the specific features of such abstractions which the 'phenomenology of focus' experiences as being alike, for whatever reason(s).
When an individual comes to grasp what "analogy" is referring to, in effect, he or she comes to understand the following. The term "analogy" is labeling or directing attention to that aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field which encompasses the processes involved in likening one, or more, abstracted particulars to other abstracted particulars according to the character of the theme of likening which is occurring in a given experiential field.
The individual might not describe the phenomenology of grasping the reference of "analogy" in the foregoing terms. In addition, even his or her reflective, conscious understanding of this phenomenology may not necessarily be very clear.
Nevertheless, in order for the structural core of the analogy concept to be established, there must be some degree of the following kind of realization. The character of the aspect(s) of the experiential field to which "analogy" is giving labeling reference must be seen to concern the likening of the particulars (which are the subject of focus) along some thematic dimension(s) that is perceived, rightly or wrongly, to reflect some portion(s) of the abstracted character of each particular.
Quite conceivably, however, an individual could come to such a realization without having the term "abstraction" in his or her vocabulary. The structural core of the understanding to which a word gives reference concerns insight into the character of certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the word is linked. The nature of the link sets the parameters of reference (i.e., permissibility) that demarcate the given world's phenomenology. As such, these parameters must be recognized by the individual if the structural core of that to which the word refers is to be understood to some degree.
In likening two particulars according to some perceived overlapping theme(s) of their abstracted character, the individual may not realize consciously he or she is dealing with abstractions per se. Nonetheless, the character of the likening process which underlies that to which "analogy" refers makes use of the fact that abstractions of a certain character exist. The individual may come to realize at some later stage of language learning that the word "abstraction" has a reference which overlaps, in various ways, with those aspects of phenomenology of the experiential field to which "analogy" gives reference.
In the case of "description", a reference is being made to that kind of focal/horizonal interplay in which various aspects of the character of focus, horizon and the interaction of the two are being individuated, characterized or particularized for the purposes of being conveyed to someone else. Hopefully, if the process is successful, the latter (i.e., the hearer) has a means of making an identifying reference, in terms of those aspects of the phenomenology of his or her own experiential field, whose character answers to, or reflects, the character of the particularization being conveyed or described.
If the latter individual has difficulty establishing or finding something in his or her experiential field which matches the nature of the former's characterization of a certain aspect of the speaker's experiential field, then, normally, several things might happen. For example, the hearer could seek further elaboration of the character of the aspect of the experiential field being delineated by the speaker.
The hearer also might begin to inquire whether the aspect of the hearer's experiential field which had a character somewhat similar to that being conveyed was the sort of idea, entity, feature, etc. the speaker had in mind. Alternatively, the hearer simply could indicate that he or she didn't understand what the speaker was talking about. In any event, the structural core of the character of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which "description" gives reference concerns the delineating, elaborating upon or unraveling of various facets of the character of the focal/horizonal intersection within any phenomenology of the experiential field of a given individual.
Generally speaking, human beings are busy in the processes and activities of describing long before they have occasion to need to grasp the character of that to which "description" gives reference. If the individual does grasp the character of those aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which "description" gives reference, this is because there is a connecting insight into, or a realization of, the basic structural core of the phenomenology of some of the processes (of which we can be aware) that are involved in those aspects of phenomenology to which "description" gives reference.
When Quine speaks of words being learned "contextually, or by abstraction, as a fragment of sentences learned as wholes" one might question whether sentences really are learned as wholes (although some may be). Moreover, one might question whether the nature of contextual learning is really a matter of abstracting fragments of sentences which have been learned as wholes.
Of course, sentences and fragments of sentences form part of the input which is shaping the focal/horizonal interplay that characterizes the context(s) within which the learning of certain words is to take place. However, these sentences and fragments of sentences only have any shade of intelligibility in direct proportion to their being tied to the phenomenology of an experiential field which has been individuated and particularized sufficiently to allow one to set up a congruence relationship of some sort. This relationship would be between, on the one hand, sentences and fragments of sentences, and, on the other hand, various facets of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which such sentences and fragments of sentences are thought to make identifying reference.
Consequently, the context which serves as the basis on which abstraction is to operate is not really the sentence from which a sentence fragment is taken, as Quine maintains is the case. The context in question is the whole series of inputs (of which the sentence is but one such input) that shape, orient and lend qualitative texture to an individual having a framework of focal/horizonal interplay, over time, of a certain hermeneutical character.
Furthermore, the nature of the abstraction is such that the fragment of sentence which is being singled out from the given sentence in order to be learned must be capable of being understood by the individual. That is, the individual most be able to grasp that the abstraction is referring identifyingly to a certain aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field, and not other facets of that field.
In addition, the individual also must have insight into what the character of the aspect(s) is to which reference is being made. Reference not only establishes the general location within the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the individual's (i.e., the hearer's) attention is being drawn; reference attempts, as well, to particularize the character of the phenomenological location to which the hearer's attention is being directed. These attempts may or may not be accurate in the way they characterize such locations.
In effect, the basic difference between learning words in isolation and learning words contextually is, for the most part, a function of the increased complexity of the learning task of the latter in relation to the former. This is so since, essentially, both modes of learning are contextual, given that they each are embedded in the context of the phenomenology of the experiential field of the individual who is confronted with the learning task.
Nevertheless, in so-called instances of contextual learning, the individual is faced with several difficulties. To begin with, there is the problem of trying to grasp the specific character of the aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which reference is being made by a single word (as is the case in so-called 'word in isolation learning'). Moreover, the hearer also is faced with trying to discern the way in which an abstracted sentence fragment fits into the sentences from which the fragment was abstracted. This in turn must be placed in proper relation to the phenomenological location and location-character of the aspect(s) of the experiential field to which the sentence is making identifying reference.
As a result, so-called contextual learning usually requires more conceptual refinements and a greater awareness of, and insight into, the logical or structural character of a phenomenological context than does so-called 'word in isolation learning'. Obviously, however, some isolated words (e.g., "God", "justice", "love") may present learning problems as complex as those of contextual learning situations.
To say, as Quine does, that the learning of a word like "molecule" is a matter of learning the word contextually as a fragment of sentences which one learns to bring forth as wholes under appropriate circumstances" is to gloss over the character of the learning process. In other words, it glosses over the issue surrounding what it would mean to learn to bring forth sentences "as wholes under appropriate circumstances" (assuming this is what actually occurs).
In addition, it fails to deal with what is involved, to some extent, in the individual's determination of just what constitutes the nature of "appropriate circumstances" with respect to either certain sentences or sentence fragments. All of this (i.e., the learning, the identification of appropriate circumstances, etc.) is done through the phenomenological context in which such sentential considerations take place.
One cannot learn what the meaning of either whole sentences or abstracted sentence fragments are until one knows the following. One must know how the general character of the intentional framework which generated the sentence/sentence-fragment in question fits in with the character of the circumstances (whether phenomenological and/or metaphysical) deemed to be appropriate with respect to what is being identifyingly referred to in the sentence or sentence fragment.
Therefore, this learning cannot be accomplished merely in the context of sentences and sentence fragments. It must be done with some understanding, on the part of the hearer, of what the character of the relationship is between: a) the intentional framework underlying the saying of the sentence or sentence fragments; and, b) the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field on which the intentionality of the speaker is focusing.
The foregoing suggests one does not learn sentences as wholes, nor does one learn sentence fragments in the context of sentences which "one learns to bring forth as wholes under appropriate circumstances". Instead, the foregoing suggests that one learns words and word/sentence relationships through several processes.
First, the individual must undertake a hermeneutical analysis of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which such words and word/sentence relationships are thought to make identifying reference. Secondly, the individual must come to grasp, on the basis of the aforementioned hermeneutical analysis, the character of the phenomenology of the location in the experiential field to which reference is being made by a given word or word/sentence relationship.
Therefore, rather than assert, as Quine does, that "prepositions, conjunctions, and many other words are bound to have been learned only contextually; we get on to using them by analogy with the ways in which they have been seen to turn up in past sentences", one might argue in the following manner. The use of "prepositions, conjunctions, and many other words" presupposes a hermeneutical investigation into the problems surrounding the identification of the character of various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field of the speaker to which these words refer. To whatever extent analogy is involved in either the encoding (by the speaker) of the sentential message or its decoding (by the hearer), it will be a function of having connecting insight into the nature of the character of the relationship(s) between word/sentence(s) and the phenomenological context(s) of which such a word/sentence(s) is a part.
From the foregoing perspective, analogy will not be as a function of "the ways in which they [i.e., the words] have been seen to turn up in past sentences". This is the case because when sentences are removed from the phenomenological context of which they are a part, then, there is nothing upon which to reflect analytically in order to establish the character of an analogical relationship in the use of a word from one sentence to the next.
On Understanding a Speaker
According to Quine:
"One tends to imagine that when someone propounds a theory concerning some sort of objects, our understanding of what he is saying will have two phases: first, we must understand what the objects are, and second we must understand what the theory says about them.... In the case of the wavicles (i.e., light manifests properties of both waves and particles) there is virtually no significant separation; our coming to understand what the objects are is for the most part just our mastery of what the theory says about them. We do not learn first what to talk about and then, what to say about it.
"Picture two physicists discussing whether neutrinos have mass. Are they discussing the same objects? They agree that the physical theory which they initially share, the pre-neutrino theory, needs emendation in the light of an experimental result now confronting them. The one physicist is urging an emendation which involves positing a new category of particles, without mass. The other is arguing an alternative emendation which involves positing a new category of particles with mass. The fact that both physicists use the word "neutrino" is not significant. To discern two phrases here, the first an agreement as to what the objects are (viz. neutrinos) and the second a disagreement as to how they are (massless or massive), is absurd." (p. 16)
Quine uses a somewhat misleading manner of describing the two phases which some people (though Quine is not among them) believe characterize the hearer's understanding of what the speaker says of an object. For instance, Quine has designated the first step or phase of such an approach as one in which "we must understand what the objects are". Quine criticizes this kind of approach when, a short while later, he maintains: "We do not learn first what to talk about and then, what to say about it."
Yet, in point of fact, we often do first learn "what to talk about" before we go on to learn what others say about it and what we ourselves can say about it based on our own experience. However, in learning what to talk about in any given circumstance, this need not mean one has come to "understand what the objects are".
Rather, the nature of identifying reference is such that one has come to recognize the general character of, at least, the aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which attention is being drawn. Thus, the character of the object in question is a matter of establishing the parameters set down by intentional focus as it interacts, in terms of the hearer's own experiential field, with the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field being described by the speaker.
The first phase of the hearer's trying to understand what a speaker is saying concerns the task of identifying the nature of the general parameters of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the speaker is giving reference. The character of that reference - as understood by the speaker - becomes the "object" of focus toward which the hearer is directing his or her initial efforts of attempting to grasp what the character of the speaker's intentional object is.
Once the speaker's intentional object has been assigned certain co-ordinate points of reference within the hearer's conceptual/perceptual geometry (i.e., located, to some extent, within the phenomenology of the hearer's experiential field), the hearer can, then, explore the phenomenology of his or her own experiential field. In doing this, the individual can set about determining, as best he or she can, whether the object described, identified or characterized by the speaker has the structural nature which the speaker claims it has in terms of its perceived character in the context of the phenomenology of the speaker's experiential field.
As a result, a certain amount of comparing and contrasting of phenomenologies and experiential fields occurs at this stage or phase. But, as indicated previously, none of this means that either the speaker or hearer understands what the objects being referred to are. Rather, it only may mean that the character (or some portion thereof) of the aspect(s) of the phenomenologies of the experiential fields being attended to has been identified, to some extent, by the speaker and recognized (let us assume) by the hearer.
Quine is quite right to say that in order for a hearer to understand what a speaker is saying about given objects "we must understand what the theory says about them". In this case, "the theory" represents the net work which ties together the speaker's conceptual geometry with respect to the aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the speaker is making reference.
"The theory" also entails an account or explication of why that aspect or 'object' of phenomenology has the character it appears to have on the basis of the speaker's mode of particularizing (i.e., objectifying) it. This again, however, may not be a matter of understanding what the object being referred to is. It only may be an understanding of what the speaker believes that object is.
In coming to grasp the character of the speaker's theory of the 'object' which has been located in the phenomenology of the hearer's experiential field, the hearer has come to understand something about how the speaker's hermeneutic of experience operates. However, the hearer may not have learned anything about the actual, true nature of the subject matter upon which such a hermeneutic focuses.
Therefore, when Quine says "What the objects are is for the most part just our mastery of what the theory says about them", Quine tends to make reality (in this case, the "object" being studied) a function of theory, instead of making theory a function of reality. Consequently, Quine's characterization of the two phases of a hearer's understanding vis-a-vis the speaker's words of reference, etc., is quite misleading as far as the "reality" of what is going on in a hearer's attempt at understanding is concerned.
The subject matter, focus or theme upon which an individual is exploring and/or analytically reflecting, by means of, among other things, the interrogative imperative, is a phenomenological one. As such, it concerns the character of the experiential field, or some part thereof, through which the individual is ontologically linked with reality.
The hermeneutic of experience is an interpretive/descriptive metaphysical program which encompasses, potentially, every aspect of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field. Moreover, if the occasion, interest or need should arise, the aforementioned program may engage every aspect of the experiential field in an interplay of changing focal and horizonal components, as one seeks to piece together a conceptual geometry which accurately reflects the character of one's range of experience.
Through this interplay of focus and horizon, one also hopes to piece together a model of reality (or some aspect thereof) that is capable of providing an evidential basis out of which insight and understanding might arise. This evidential basis concerns not only the character of the phenomenology of the individual's own experiential field, but it also involves the character of the phenomenology of the experiential fields of others as mediated or processed through the phenomenology of one's own experiential field. This latter aspect is the case since the reported experiences of others form part of the fabric of the phenomenology of one's experiential field with which one is trying to come to grips hermeneutically.
The "objects" of an individual's experiential field are phenomenological in nature. The character of the individual's phenomenology with respect to these "objects" is a function of all the cognitive, emotional, sensory and/or spiritual forces that shape the structural nature of the focal/horizonal components that make up the phenomenological panorama through which we perceive, engage, interpret and interact with the experiential field that constitutes the substantive material with which consciousness is confronted at every turn and shift of attention or focus. These phenomenological objects - which are objects upon which our theoretical/hermeneutical efforts concentrate - may or may not constitute an accurate reflection or representation of those aspects of reality which help make such phenomenological objects of given character possible.
In time, we may explore, describe, analyze, question, hypothesize about, reflect upon, evaluate and, finally, assign such objects a set of conceptual co-ordinate points of reference. These points represent the character of that object in terms of the phenomenological location it has and role(s) it plays in our conceptual geometrization of the phenomenological space which marks the structuring of the individual's conscious orientation towards his or her experiential field.
Nonetheless, the act of identifyingly referring to, or singling out, an aspect or object of the phenomenology of the experiential field does not mean we know what the character of that phenomenological object is (although we may have certain first impressions of it, the character of which may vary from individual to individual). Furthermore, the act of identifying reference need not mean we know what the character of the relationship is, if any, between the character of the phenomenological object and the character of any metaphysical object or reality which may exist independently of the phenomenological object but which could play a fundamental role in the phenomenological object's having the character it does.
In view of the foregoing, our understanding of what someone else is proposing in the way of a theoretical account of the relationship between phenomenological object and metaphysical object does not require that, first, "we must understand what the objects are" which are referred to in the speaker's account, if by "object" Quine means metaphysical or ontological object. What is first required is the following. The phenomenological object which is referred to in the speaker's expounding of his or her theory must be located, to some extent, in the phenomenology of the hearer's experiential field according to the evidential clues which are provided by the speaker concerning the character of the given phenomenological object. If the hearer cannot locate such a phenomenological object (or one similar to it) in the context of his or her own experiential field, then, the individual attempts to locate the general parameters of the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field which the speaker contends the given phenomenological object is a part, or expression, of.
On the other hand, if, in his sentence "we must understand what the objects are", Quine means by "object", ‘phenomenological object’, one might agree, to some degree, with Quine when he says that "what the objects are is for the most part just our mastery of what the theory says about them". This is the case since, surely, as far as the speaker's understanding is concerned, the character of the phenomenological object is (partially or fully, depending on the individual) a function of the place which that object holds in the conceptual geometry of the theory as believed or understood by the speaker.
The aforementioned functional relationship is used to refer to, represent and/or account for the phenomenological object in question. Thus, if one is to understand what a speaker is propounding in the way of a theory about a given object, one must try to grasp the character of the theoretical network which the speaker uses with respect to the phenomenological object in question. In other words, one must try to merge horizons with the speaker's hermeneutic in which the phenomenological object is embedded.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, one still might inquire about whether, even in the case of phenomenological objects, the speaker's theory of the phenomenological object is a tenable one. Tenability could be considered in terms of either the character of the experiential data which the speaker might cite in justification of his or her theory.
Tenability also could be considered in terms of the character of the experiential data which the hearer might bring to bear on the issue of trying to establish the nature of the phenomenological object in question. In addition, there is the problem of trying to determine the nature of the relationship, if any, between: a) the phenomenological object which has been identified and located in the respective experiential fields of the speaker and hearer; and, b) any metaphysical ontological object which may stand behind and underwrite, to some extent, the character of the phenomenological object under consideration.
A theory of a given phenomenological object is a function of the theorizer's efforts to enter into a hermeneutic of experience. This hermeneutic concerns those aspects of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field which have been thematized, individuated, particularized or "objectified" into the form of a constructed representation with a given character. We refer to this representation as an 'object' of the focal/horizonal interplay of a certain facet of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
How one goes about generating such a constructed representation of determinate character will depend on what factors went into particularizing or characterizing the aspects of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field from which the 'object' is derived. Some of the factors shaping the structural character of the phenomenological object were a function of beliefs, values, assumptions, mis-perceptions, illusions or hallucinations which serve to distort the hermeneutical character of the way the individual interacted with the metaphysical/ontological object which serves as the experiential basis from which the individual derived his or her constructed phenomenological-object-representation.
As a result, in hermeneutically approaching such a representation, the hearer would have to try to establish a conceptual framework of demarcation which separated the notion of a "theoretical object" from that of a 'phenomenological object' (and surrounding experiential considerations). The phenomenological object(s) serves as the former's thematic subject from which the constructed representation embodied in the theory's character was, faithfully or unfaithfully, derived. Similarly, one must try to establish a conceptual framework of demarcation which separates the notion of a phenomenological object from the metaphysical/ontological object that serves as the phenomenological object's experiential subject of focus.
Given the foregoing, the constructed representation embodied in the character of the phenomenological object was, faithfully or unfaithfully, derived. In other words, a "theoretical object" is a representation of the phenomenological object to which it refers, just as a phenomenological object is a representation of the aspect(s) of reality (i.e., the metaphysical/ontological object) to which it refers.
In view of the above, one has to be very careful in determining just which kind of "object" is involved when one says, as Quine does, that "what the objects are is for the most part just our mastery of what the theory says about them". One might agree with Quine's position with respect to theoretical objects. However, one need not agree that "what the theory says about them" (i.e., objects) is accurately reflective of either phenomenological objects or metaphysical/ontological objects.
The whole purpose of inquiry, analysis, critical reflection and evaluation is to attempt to differentiate between the "myths" and "realities" surrounding each of these various kinds of "objects", and to determine what, if anything, one kind of object has to do with the other sorts of objects. The starting point for such a program of differentiation is to delineate the character of a given object(s) as one understands or believes it (them) to be.
One, then, conceptually, would begin to bounce this characterization off the phenomenology of the experiential field (mine and that of others) in order to determine if the characterization has staying power (i.e., tenability) or congruence in the face of additional data and hermeneutical investigation. The character of such 'conceptual bouncing' would be expressed through processes such as the interrogative imperative, establishing congruence relationships, model building and so on.
Subsequently, one notes where one's characterization requires repair, trimming, reconstruction and additional development in the light of this further data, inquiry, analysis and so on. If the hermeneutic of experience is pursued far enough and with sufficient rigor, the sought-after goal of this quest is to achieve a sort of congruency or merging of horizons (in understanding, that is) among the various kinds of objects. If successful, then, the character of one object (say, the theoretical object) will reflect, to varying degrees of congruency, the character of the object(s) to which it is being related (e.g.,either the phenomenological object or the metaphysical object or both).
This program of differentiation is complicated, considerably, in the case of metaphysical objects. This is so for the following reasons.
Whenever one is proposing or advancing a theory or a belief about some aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field, the latter aspect becomes the phenomenological object, and the former proposing or belief becomes the theoretical object. However, the theoretical object is itself a part of the phenomenology of the experiential field, but, a theoretical object does not become a phenomenological 'object', per se, until the former becomes the focus of reflection, analysis, exploration, etc. Prior to this (if it occurs at all), a theoretical object often makes its existence felt through horizonal influence in terms of the manner in which the character of the theoretical object sets conceptual parameters of pre-understanding through which phenomenological objects are viewed, approached, studied and treated.
Theoretical objects can be constructed or developed somewhat passively or actively, as well as informally or formally. Which will be the case will depend on whether one merely adopts a belief system developed by someone else, or on whether one undertakes to derive a belief system of one's own on the basis of entering into the hermeneutic of experience. Either of these alternatives can be pursued rather informally and un-rigorously or formally and rigorously. When a theoretical object is being developed or learned, it is encountered as a phenomenological object in the sense that at such times the orientation of focal consciousness is toward the aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field which gives expression to the particularization of experience that becomes the object of focus and, therefore, the phenomenological object.
As indicated above, within the context of one's own experiential field, one can compare, directly, the character of theoretical objects with the character of phenomenological objects, in order to see what congruencies, if any, exist between the two. However, making such comparisons in relation to metaphysical/ontological objects seems to be a much more elusive process.
Often times (if not invariably), we are forced to make inferences about the character of metaphysical/ontological objects on the basis of what we understand and can surmise about the character of theoretical and phenomenological objects. Inferences are necessary because we may not have direct access to, or perception of, the aspects of reality which appear to underlie, but make possible, the phenomena which we experience as theoretical and phenomenological objects.
As a result, our methodological position with respect to metaphysical/ontological objects is frequently as follows. Given that 'such and such' (this refers to some descriptive network) is the character of certain theoretical and/or phenomenological objects, what is capable of being inferred about the character of reality (or aspects thereof) which would make theoretical or phenomenological objects of such and such character possible?
Obviously, if there is some sort of error involved in the characterization of either theoretical or phenomenological objects, then, this error is likely to be passed on to the network one constructs as a model of reality. This error or distortion is passed on through the inferences one makes on the basis of erroneous or distorted premises. One potential area for error and distortion which tends to be quite pervasive (and one which potentially exists in the foregoing discussion) is to assume that because one talks in terms of theoretical objects and phenomenological objects, therefore, there must be corresponding metaphysical/ontological objects.
One should keep in mind that the "objects" of theory and the phenomenology of the experiential field are the end result of a process of objectification of experience. During this process, different aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field are characterized, particularized or individuated in various ways.
This objectification of experience will proceed as a function of the influences (e.g., emotions, cognition, sensory input, temperament, past experiences, etc.) which impinge upon and help structure focal/horizonal interaction. These structural influences collectively generate the character of the experiential themes, as well as weave such themes together into, for example, hermeneutical structures.
Out of this context arise both theoretical and phenomenological objects. But, the reality which makes these objects a possibility and to which theoretical and phenomenological objects attempt to refer identifyingly may not be itself a matter of objects. For example, maybe the ultimate nature of reality is not a matter of any sort of physical or material substance that can be objectified. Perhaps the ultimate nature of reality is a function of, or gives expression to, various principles, processes, conditions, etc. that are not themselves objects, but do make 'physical' or 'material' objects possible.
Consequently, perhaps the most that could be said in this respect is the following. The character of metaphysical/ontological reality is such that it allows for the possibility of there being theoretical and phenomenological objects of certain determinate characters which can be used as conceptual/perceptual representations of certain facets of the underlying reality.
Under these circumstances, the determination of the extent to which the character of a theoretical or phenomenological object is congruent with, or reflective of, the character of the reality to which the object refers becomes somewhat difficult. This is the case since there may be no object, per se, in reality which can be isolated or objectified in order to make the sort of comparisons which are needed to establish the degree of accuracy entailed by a theoretically or phenomenologically objectified representation of ultimate reality.
On the other hand, reality does have a character which is a function of all that it (i.e., reality) is. Therefore, congruency becomes a matter of trying to grasp reality's character as mediated by inferences about the character of theoretical and phenomenological objects as checked against the phenomenology of the experiential field (both the individual's and that of others). Through this mediation of the inferential process, one, in effect, is seeking a tenable account of what kind of character reality might have in order to make such theoretical and/or phenomenological objects possible.
If, in the light of the foregoing, one were to examine Quine's earlier stated example concerning "two physicists discussing whether neutrinos have mass", one need not arrive at the same conclusion as Quine does when he asserts: "To discern two phases here, the first an agreement as to what the objects are (viz. neutrinos) and the second a disagreement as to how they are (massless or massive) is absurd." Quine stipulates that the two physicists "agree that the physical theory which they initially share, the pre-neutrino theory, needs emendation in the light of an experimental result now confronting them." Yet, Quine's manner of describing the nature of this agreement is rather elliptical, since the two physicists do not just share a pre-neutrino theory. They also share a willingness in, or commitment to, using the theory as a way of referring to and/or describing and/or accounting for a certain range of the particulars which are considered to "inhabit" various aspects of the phenomenology of their respective experiential fields.
These particulars are ones which can be phenomenologically located, identified, characterized, described, and inter-subjectively agreed upon by the two physicists. The differences of perspective for the two physicists emerge in relation to the new data generated by a given experiment or series of experiments.
The problem for the two individuals becomes one either of: how to reconcile this new data with the pre-neutrino theory, or, how to reorganize the data (both new and old) according to the structure or character of some new theory. In Quine's example, one physicist attempts to deal with the challenge of the new experimental data by hypothesizing the existence of an, heretofore, unsuspected entity. The character of that new entity is said to be massless. The other physicist hypothesizes that although there is an, heretofore, unsuspected entity involved which is responsible, to some extent, for the experimental result having the character it does, nevertheless, the character of this newly discovered entity is said to have mass.
Regardless of how the differences in the proposed character of the hypothesized entity arose within the respective hermeneutics of the two physicists' exploration of the phenomenologies of their experiential fields, the following fact remains true. Prior to the experimental result, there had been an agreement about the character of the parameters of the aspects of the phenomenology of their experiential fields to which they were prepared to apply pre-neutrino theory.
The addition of the new experimental data does not alter, totally, the character of the given experiential parameters on which, and within which, pre-neutrino theory has focused. Instead, the new evidence is a manifestation of a phenomenon that expresses itself within the experiential parameters referred to by pre-neutrino theory.
However, the character of this manifestation is such, apparently that it cannot be reconciled with, or fit into, the character of pre-neutrino theory (i.e., the former is incongruent with the latter). As a result, the incongruencies have forced both physicists to acknowledge the inadequacies of pre-neutrino theory, as well as to acknowledge the need for some sort of re-working of this theory in order to be able to accommodate the new experimental data.
Thus, the two physicists still are agreed upon the character of the experiential parameters to which both pre-neutrino theory and the new experimental data refer or apply. That is, they are agreed upon the aspects of the phenomenology of their experiential fields to which their focal attention is oriented under the circumstances of considering the new experimental results against the backdrop of pre-neutrino theory. Nonetheless, the two physicists part company in relation to the manner in which they assign hermeneutic significance to the new experimental data in relation to both pre-neutrino theory and the data for which this theory allegedly accounted.
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