The Hermeneutics of Meaning - Part Seven
Putnam has offered no account, as far as the theory of meaning is concerned, of what the beings of Earth/Twin Earth in the pre-1800s are doing when they call liquids "water" whose atomic/molecular structure (although the beings do not know this) are H2O and XYZ on, respectively, Earth and Twin Earth. Furthermore, he does not have any satisfactory explanation for what the people of Archimedes' time are doing when they use the Greek linguistic marker equivalent of "gold" to identifyingly refer to certain aspects of the phenomenologies of their experiential fields and/or to that which helps make aspects of such specific character possible.
Putnam's theory breaks down when, among other places, one is considering the meaning, in Putnam's sense, of the natural kind word "meaning". "Meaning", as employed in the pre-1800s (and this is presumably true also of the equivalent Greek term in Archimedes' time), identifyingly refers to just the sort of activities which are expressed in the manner in which Earth/Twin Earth beings (or the people of Archimedes' time) hermeneutically engaged various facets of the phenomenology of their experiential fields and by which these beings are able to identifyingly refer to different aspects of those fields. In other words, what these people of Earth/Twin Earth and Archimedes' time are doing linguistically and conceptually constitutes the heart of the character of the hermeneutical enterprise to which "meaning" (and its Greek equivalent) is giving identifying reference.
Putnam must reject the manner in which the people of Archimedes' time are hermeneutically approaching the linguistic term "khronos" as he must reject the manner in which the beings of Earth/Twin Earth in the pre-1800s are hermeneutically approaching the linguistic marker "water". He must reject their hermeneutical approaches because, as far as Putnam is concerned, "water" must be a rigid designator or indexical for H20, while "gold" ("khronos") must be a rigid designator or indexical for a certain metal of specific atomic/molecular structure.
Yet, the beings of Earth/Twin Earth in the pre-1800s are liable to identifyingly refer to liquids whose atomic/molecular structure is XYZ by using the linguistic marker "water", just as the people of Archimede's time are inclined to identifyingly refer to metal X by using the linguistic marker "khronos". Having rejected such hermeneutic approaches, Putnam effectively has cut the conceptual ground from beneath his own feet as far as the meaning of "meaning" is concerned, since he wishes to eliminate from the extensional matrix of "meaning" the very sorts of hermeneutical activities of which this term is true.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, one were to accept Putnam's assumption that, metaphysically (i.e., in terms of the nature of ultimate reality), H2O was the essential nature of certain liquids on Earth. As such, these liquids would have phenomenological counterparts on Twin Earth, but not metaphysical counterparts with congruent atomic/molecular structure. Furthermore, let us suppose that Au79 was the ultimate nature of certain metals on Earth. As a result, these metals were metaphysically distinct from metal X in relation to atomic structure, despite the phenomenological similarities of the latter to the former. Moreover, let us suppose that we were to agree that "water" was to be a rigid designator for H20, but not for XYZ, and that "gold" was to be indexical for Au79 but not for metal X.
None of the foregoing suppositions, even if granted, would alter the following fact. Using Putnam's criterion for the meaning of meaning, the hermeneutical activities which the beings of Earth/Twin Earth display in relation to the usage of "water" or which the people of Archimedes' time manifest in relation to the usage of "gold" (that is, its Attic equivalent) constitute instances of the extensional character of the nature of "meaning". Therefore, such hermeneutical activities are an integral part of the conceptual geometry for which "meaning" would be indexical or a rigid designator.
Unless Putnam wishes to make the atomic/molecular structure of natural kind entities such as water and gold a matter of innate, a priori understanding - which, presumably, he does not wish to do - then, whether Putnam likes it or not, he is going to have to make allowances for the fact that the only way one can discover the nature of a given natural kind entity is to establish a hermeneutical/phenomenological starting point. Once established, the character of this starting point can conceptually be bounced off a wide variety of experiential co-ordinate points of reference which ensue from ontological encounters of different kinds.
The ‘bouncing off’ process is another way of referring to the hermeneutical search for, or acknowledgment of, experiential co-ordinate points of reference. Focal/horizonal characters of the experiential co-ordinate points are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being congruent or incongruent with the character of one's hermeneutical/phenomenological starting point concerning that aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field for which a given linguistic marker serves as a means of making identifying reference.
The aforementioned incongruencies can arise in a number of ways. For example, differences may arise between the character of one's understanding of a term's usage and the character of a given linguistic community's usage of the linguistic marker in question. In addition, incongruencies might emerge between the character of one's understanding concerning that to which a given term is making identifying reference and the actual character of that (whether phenomenological or metaphysical) to which reference is being made.
Moreover, incongruencies could emerge between, on the one hand, the character of one's previous manner of particularizing or characterizing a given experiential co-ordinate point of reference arising out of an ontological encounter, and, on the other hand, the character of a subsequent, but similar, ontological encounter with an aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field or the aspect(s) of reality which helps make such a field possible. Finally, incongruencies might arise among: a) the character of an individual's hermeneutical treatment of certain aspects of phenomenology or concomitant underlying reality; b) the character of a linguistic community's (or subsection thereof) inter-subjective hermeneutical treatment of the same certain aspects of phenomenology or concomitant underlying reality; and, c) the actual character of that (whether phenomenological or metaphysical in character) to which the individual and linguistic community are attempting to make identifying reference in their respective ways. Whatever the character of the context out of which incongruencies emerge, only by discovering the character of the source or sources which are generating the incongruencies can one hope to make progress toward developing a hermeneutical framework (individual or inter-subjective) whose character is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of that (whether phenomenological or metaphysical in character) to which a hermeneutical framework or conceptual geometry is attempting to make identifying reference.
If one starts with a series of introducing events concerning the character of that to which the linguistic marker "gold" (or its Greek equivalent) makes identifying reference, and if among these introducing events are instances of both 'actual' gold (i.e., Au79) and metal X, then, in time, there will arise experiential co-ordinate points of reference whose character will manifest, or give expression to, differential features with respect to certain sub-populations of the set of entities which, heretofore, had been identifyingly referred to collectively as "gold". After an accumulation of some amount of experiential data related to this issue, one may decide to treat the aforementioned sub-populations as variations on one underlying theme or as instances of two distinct themes.
In either case, differences have been noted which affect the interaction (and perhaps tenability) of the character of the inferential mapping relationships of one's hermeneutical framework/conceptual geometry in relation to various experiential co-ordinate points of reference from which the framework/geometry is constructed. As a result, noticing of these differences also will affect the character of one's understanding of that to which identifying reference is being made on those occasions.
In the case of metal X and Au79 - which in Archimedes' time were both considered to be extensional instances to which "khronos" makes correct identifying reference - evidence will accumulate which, eventually, would culminate in a discovery that there are two natural kind entities (i.e., metals) involved. These metals display a certain surface similarity of character, but have atomic structures that are quite different. Moreover, these entities also manifest other properties (e.g., boiling points, density, malleability, tensile strength, etc.) which differ, one from the other, and which may or may not be shown to be direct functions of differences in the atomic/molecular structures of the two metals.
Nevertheless, the fact one started out including instances of both metals in the extensional matrix to which the linguistic marker "gold" ("khronos") made identifying reference did not prevent human beings from, eventually, generating an epistemic context in which one (or a linguistic/epistemic community) hermeneutically could distinguish between metal X and Au79. Consequently, the differential characters of the respective aspects of the hermeneutical framework served as a basis for establishing congruency relations between the character of these hermeneutical aspects and the character of certain aspects (i.e., co-ordinate points of experiential reference) of the phenomenology of the experiential field for which the linguistic markers "gold" ("khronos") and "metal X" (or its Greek equivalent) would come to serve as the means for making differential identifying references.
In some ways, the presumed confusion in Archimedes' time which involved treating both metal X and Au79 as instances to which "gold" ("khronos"), allegedly, would make identifying reference could, in time, actually prove to be advantageous. This is the case since it was through lumping the two natural kind entities together and attending to them on that basis that various people would have ontological encounters with those natural kind entities which, in time, generated incongruous co-ordinate points of experiential reference which, in turn, help led, over a period of time, to the sort of metaphysical determination in which Putnam is interested.
Therefore, the sort of metaphysical meaning which lies at the heart of Putnam's theory of meaning can only be discovered through, and in the context of, a whole series of other kinds of hermeneutical activity. These activities establish an initial framework or conceptual geometry out of which various connecting insights arise that, in time, are used to bridge any inferential gaps which currently may exist in the character of one's understanding (as represented by the focal/horizonal character of different facets of the hermeneutical framework) concerning the character of that (whether phenomenological or metaphysical) for which a given linguistic marker is presently used to make identifying reference. Due to these hermeneutical activities, then, in time, more than one linguistic marker may be used (e.g., "gold" and "metal X"; "H20" and "XYZ") in order to draw attention to the differentials in character which are involved phenomenologically and/or metaphysically in that to which one is attending.
The foregoing hermeneutical/phenomenological approach to meaning is not, strictly speaking, a form of operationalism (the only other kind of meaning theory which Putnam appears to allude to in the last quote cited previously in the present essay. This is because the character of the hermeneutics of identifying reference (which form the focal/horizonal core of the phenomenology of a linguistic marker's meaning) imposes certain parameters on the process of meaning generation.
Consequently, one is not free to adopt, and then, drop, any framework of meaning one chooses. Moreover, one is not free to revise arbitrarily and continuously one's meaning framework with respect to a given linguistic marker.
Identifying references are directed toward aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field and/or toward those aspects of reality which make such aspects (and the surrounding field) possible. These phenomenological aspects have a character. Similarly, the reality underlying, or expressed through, the phenomenological aspects also have a determinate character.
In using a given linguistic marker to serve as a means of signifying that an identifying reference is being made to some aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field or to some facet of the underlying reality, one is rooting both the linguistic marker and its usage(s) in a phenomenological/hermeneutical and/or metaphysical context which has a determinate character. If either an individual or a linguistic community is to maintain any sense of clarity about what the character is of the context to which a given linguistic marker makes identifying reference, then, irrespective of the alterations that subsequently might be made in the phenomenological, hermeneutical or metaphysical character of the identifying reference context in question, these changes will have to be done in relation to, and in acknowledgment of, the character of the existing context.
Initially one could employ any one of a wide variety of linguistic markers to use as a means of identifyingly referring to, say, certain kinds of liquids or metals. However, once a marker has been selected, then, that marker becomes rooted in the character of the identifying reference for which it is used as an indicator or signal.
For example, instead of "water", one initially might have used some other term for purposes of establishing a means of identifyingly referring to certain kinds of liquid. Yet, once the term "water" is selected, that marker becomes immersed in the hermeneutical characterization of the natural kind entity to which it identifyingly refers.
In the beginning, the characterization of such an entity concerns themes of taste, smell, feel, appearance, behavioral properties, uses and so on. When, later on, the liquid in question is discovered to have an atomic/molecular structure of H20, this discovery doesn't negate any of the features which previously made up the liquid's character. Rather, a further dimension of the character of the given liquid has been revealed.
One hasn't suddenly generated a new set of operational parameters by which to identifyingly refer to the character of the aspects of the phenomenological/metaphysical context through which the given liquid manifests or expresses itself. One merely has refined and expanded the character of those aspects of the existing hermeneutical context to which the linguistic marker "water" makes identifying reference.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, if the water of Twin Earth and the water of Earth are alike in all respects except that of atomic/molecular structure, then, it becomes very debatable whether or not an Earthling, for instance, could no longer identifyingly refer to Twin Earth liquids with atomic/molecular structure of XYZ as "water", or whether or not a Twin Earthling could no longer identifyingly refer to Earth liquids with atomic/molecular structure H2O as "water".
If the decision were made to differentiate between the character of that to which "water" made identifying reference on Earth from that to which "water" made identifying reference on Twin Earth (i.e., to treat them as different natural kind entities), the decision would not be an operational one per se. Instead, it would be a function of acknowledging recognizable differences in the character of the hermeneutical/metaphysical contexts to which the linguistic marker "water" made identifying reference in the respective worlds.
Similarly, whatever subsequent discoveries might be made about the character of Earth-water and/or Twin Earth-water would not result in arbitrary operational adjustments to the hermeneutical/metaphysical context being identifyingly referred to. These discoveries would serve only to make the character of one's existing hermeneutical framework concerning the focus of the identifying reference signified by a given linguistic marker more congruent with the character of the metaphysical nature of the natural kind entities in question. In the present case, these are liquids whose atomic/molecular structure is H2O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth and which manifest a variety of other properties: a, b, c, d ... , that are held in common by the two natural kind entities.
Conclusion
As indicated at numerous points in the preceding pages, and in contradistinction to the perspective advocated by Putnam in his article, meaning need not be indexical or a rigid designator for the ultimate nature of a natural kind entity. Meaning can, and often does, involve hermeneutical activity through which one works toward the assigning of significance to, or the discovery of significance in, various aspects of the experiential field or that (i.e., reality) which makes a phenomenology of such character possible.
Moreover, this dimension of significance may or may not be reflective of, or even concerned with, the actual nature (in Putnam's sense) of that to which one is making identifying reference. Therefore, by construing meaning as being an indexical process, Putnam has introduced elements of arbitrariness and restrictiveness into the discussion of meaning that do little but establish a potential basis for, in any given instance, the distortion of the character of meaning as either a structure or a structuring process. Furthermore, even if one were to concede Putnam's point and make the meaning of a term indexical for the actual nature of that aspect of reality for which the term was to serve as a natural kind rigid designator, nonetheless, what we believe or understand to be the actual nature of a natural kind entity in any given case may reflect only a very limited portion of the 'actual, ultimate reality of the natural kind entity at issue.
In line with the foregoing, I have argued during the course of this essay in the following way. One cannot assume, automatically, that any given meaning that is a function of 'indexical' treatments of a natural kind word will represent, exhaustively, the character of that for which the word is used, among other things, to make identifying reference. Enough flexibility must be extended to the process of meaning-making such that potential room is left open for those dimensions of natural kind entities which, conceivably, may be found, in time, to extend beyond the horizons of the parameters of permissibility that currently characterize our indexical treatment of such entities.
In conjunction with the above point, I have argued that the meaning of ‘epistemic necessity’ (in the context of indexical relationships between a natural kind word and that aspect of reality for which it is to serve as a rigid designator) derives its sense of necessity from the extent to which such an indexical relationship is capable of manifesting congruency between the different rules of that relationship. Consequently, epistemic necessity is not a matter of how one arrives at an understanding (e.g., synthetically, analytically, a priorily, etc.). Rather, epistemic necessity is a function of whether or not a given understanding accurately reflects the character of that to which it is making identifying reference in a specific instance.
Unlike Putnam, however, I have not arrived at the foregoing hermeneutical position concerning the meaning of epistemic necessity by relying on the format of a 'logically-possible-worlds' analysis'. Instead, emphasis has been given to indicating the importance of the conceptual structuring process through which one attempts to establish that epistemic necessity is a function of the relationship between the character of a given understanding and the character of that to which such understanding makes identifying reference. As such, I have treated the problem of the meaning of 'epistemic necessity' as an exercise through which to explore two approaches (namely Putnam's and mine) concerning the character of the structuring process of meaning as that process relates to understanding the character of the structure of epistemic necessity to which "epistemic necessity" makes identifying reference.
In addition to the foregoing, this essay also suggests that there can be more than one "introducing event" through which an individual comes to be acquainted with the character of the basis of a SameL relationship. These relationships serve as the means by which an individual recognizes or identifies whether, or not, a given instance of a natural kind entity actually displayed or expressed the sort of features that would allow one to claim the following - namely, if a given exemplar was sufficiently like the prototype that had been part of the introducing event one might consider the exemplar to be the same as, or the same kind of thing as, the original prototype of the introducing event. However, if the learning of a natural kind word is rooted in a set of introducing events, not all of which are the same, then, the problem of determining SameL relationships becomes much more complex.
As a result, even if one were to adopt Putnam's indexical model of meaning, one encounters considerable difficulty trying to establish clearly what the actual nature of a given natural kind entity is. Moreover, one needs to entertain the possibility that using, say, atomic structure (as Putnam seems to) as the main criterion of what constituted a SameL relationship for natural kind entities, is somewhat arbitrary.
After all, one might use any number of dimensions of the introducing event(s) as a criterial basis for determining SameL relationships in the future. In this sense, one need not show any inherent preference toward using the atomic structure of a natural kind entity as the basis for determining SameL relationships, rather than toward using, for example, various 'surface' features such as size, taste, feel, appearance, color and/or behavior as bases for determining SameL relationships. Consequently, meaning of natural kind words need not be tied to Putnam's indexical mode of treatment.
Ironically, by structuring the character of natural kind words in accordance with his indexical theory of meaning, Putnam has created conditions that are capable of illustrating a fatal weakness in his own position. In essence, although Putnam has inquired about the meaning of "meaning" in relation to such natural kind words us "water" and "gold", he has not provided the meaning of "meaning" as a process or state or event or condition in and of itself.
In other words, he does not seem to have reflected very much on the phenomenology of the hermeneutical process through which the structure of natural kind words emerged. As a result, he has distorted the character of his understanding of the meaning process by failure to take note of, or sufficiently appreciate, the crucial role played by the individual's hermeneutical interaction with the phenomenology of one’s own experiential field.
In this essay I have mentioned that the starting point for seeking significance for, or in, various experiential co-ordinate points of an individual's conceptual geometry is in the phenomenology of the experiential field. That is, the central locus for initiating processes of meaning-making in human beings resides in the individual's hermeneutical exploration of his/her own phenomenology of the experiential field.
This exploration can be directed toward assigning significance for, or discovering significance in, various aspects of that field. Such exploration also can be oriented toward assigning significance for, or discovering significance in, those underlying aspects of reality which make that kind of field possible.
In the latter case, the hermeneutical exploration still is mediated through the phenomenology of the experiential field of the individual. However, in either case, Putnam's indexical account of meaning is missing the fundamental phenomenological dimension which bears upon how the structuring process of meaning operates, as well as how structures of meaning are generated through that process.
By illustrating the importance of how the individual's hermeneutic of the phenomenology of the experiential field gives expression to a central theme in the structuring process of meaning, I believe the present essay has been able to suggest a more flexible, fruitful, adequate, and tenable way of approaching the problems of meaning than has been provided by Putnam approach to this same issue.
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