The Hermeneutics of Meaning - Part Six
Realism, Operationalism and SameL Relationships
In differentiating between, on the one hand, his perspective of realism concerning the theory of meaning, and, on the other hand, an operationalistic framework which he seems to consider as the only alternative approach to his theory of meaning, Putnam states:
"... we maintain: "gold" has not changed its extension or not changed it significantly in two thousand years. Our methods of identifying gold have grown incredibly sophisticated. But the extension of ‘khronos’ in Archimedes' dialect of Greek is the same as the extension of gold in my dialect of English.
"It is possible (and let us suppose it to be the case) ... there were or are pieces of metal which could not have been determined not to be gold in Archimedes' day, but which we can distinguish from gold quite easily with modern techniques. Let X be such a piece of metal. Clearly X does not lie in the extension of "gold" in standard English; my view is that it did not lie in the extension of ‘khronos’ in Attic Greek, either, although any ancient Greek would have mistaken X for gold (or, rather, ‘khronos’).
"The alternative view is that "gold" means whatever satisfies the contemporary "operational definition" of gold. "Gold" a hundred years ago meant whatever satisfied the "operational definition" of gold in use a hundred years ago; "gold" now means whatever satisfies the operational definition of gold in use in 1973; and ‘khronos’ meant whatever satisfied the operational definition of ‘khronos’ in use then.
"In the view I am advocating, when Archimedes asserted that something was gold (‘khronos’) he was not just saying that it had the superficial characteristics of gold ...; he was saying that it had the same general hidden structure (the same "essence", so to speak) as any normal piece of local gold. Archimedes would have said that our hypothetical piece of metal X was gold, but he would have been wrong ." (pp. 235-236)
When considered from the modern perspective, one could agree that Archimedes would have been wrong if he called something "gold" which was actually metal X and not what would be identified as gold today. Nonetheless, even if one were to accept Putnam's contention that when Archimedes said something was "gold" Archimedes meant the given substance's hidden essence or structure was that of gold ( which leaves aside the issue of what, if anything, Archimedes felt about the relationship between essential and accidental properties, universals and particulars), one cannot dismiss the fact that the intensional/extensional character of Archimedes' hermeneutical framework concerning gold substances was also making identifying references concerning certain aspects of the phenomenology of his experiential field. This is the field which Archimedes (if he thought about it at all), presumably, would consider to be perceptually related to substances (namely, allegedly gold things) that help give the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which he was attending at least some of their characteristic features.
Let us suppose that Archimedes had an assistant helping him in his various experiments. Let us further suppose that, while engaged in setting up some such experiment, Archimedes would nod (i.e., point with his head) to a table with three objects on it: a piece of wood, a ceramic dish and a sample of metal X, instructing his assistant at the same time to bring the piece of "gold".
If one were to further suppose that the assistant picked up the indicated object from the table and dutifully delivered the sample of what we now know to be metal X to Archimedes, one would not expect to hear Archimedes say (I'm translating from Attic Greek): "You dunce!! What are you doing handing me this object whose hidden essence obviously is not that of gold?" Nor would one expect to hear Archimedes' assistant claiming, when asked to bring the 'gold': "Sire, I heartily regret that I cannot comply with thy most judicious request. With much distress, I must confess that I do not know which object on the table thou art referring to since their essences are all hidden from me, and I fear mightily that I may hand thou that which is not truly gold in its most inward reaches." Instead, given the character of the understanding vis-a-vis so-called "gold" things in Archimedes' times, we would anticipate that the assistant would simply pick up the sample of metal X in order to give it to Archimedes, and that Archimedes, when he received metal X, would proceed to do whatever it was he planned to do with the 'gold' he had requested.
While the 'reality' of gold may not-have changed from the beginning of its formation on Earth, the character of the intensional/extensional nature of the way the linguistic marker "gold" (or its Greek equivalent) has been applied, from Archimedes' time down to the present, has changed. To say, as Putnam does, that "our methods of identifying gold have grown incredibly sophisticated" implies there has been a corresponding sophistication in the manner in which we conceptualize that to which "gold" makes identifying reference. If this were not so, then, there would be no reason for Archimedes to include metal X among the extensional instances he would identify as gold. Moreover, there would be no reason for Archimedes' modern-day counterparts to exclude metal X from the extensional instances that they would identify as substances to which the linguistic marker "gold" could be applied legitimately.
There is a constant dialectic between, on the one hand, our individual and collective projections onto reality by means of hermeneutical frameworks of varying intensional/extensional character, and, on the other hand, the manner in which those projections are rebuffed by (or found to be congruent with) the intensional/extensional character of various aspects of reality. As a result of this dialectic, human beings (both individually and inter-subjectively) are able to travel toward establishing more and more accurately reflective congruency relationships between the characters of various hermeneutical perspectives and the characters of that to which these perspectives attempt to make identifying reference. As the character of this congruency relationship changes over time, so, too, does the usage of the linguistic markers which are used to communicate identifying reference in such contexts.
Let us imagine that the people of Archimedes' time had means (however primitive and limited) of determining that metal X (which they called "khronos") manifested a structural character which could be shown to be different [in some way(s)] from the structuralcharacter of another sample of metal. This other sample of metal was also called "khronos" by them, and was, in fact, gold, if by "gold" one means those metals which exhibit physical/chemical characteristics that today would be discussed in terms of a atomic/molecular structure of a particular kind, occupying a specific place in the Periodic Table of Elements.
Under these circumstances, the people of Archimedes' time would be confronted with the problem of whether to treat the two substances as being: a) essentially different; b) basically the same but, occasionally, manifesting marginally different properties internal or external factors; or, c) closely related, but showing significant variation in manifested properties. Where one draws for purposes of establishing the criteria for 'correct' a given linguistic marker (in this case, "gold") will depend individuals involved decide, for whatever reason, to treat two substances as falling into categories a), b) or c).
If they decide in favor of a), then, one of the two substances will be called "khronos". The other substance will be called something else, and each term will be understood to be identifyingly referring to substances of manifestly different character, despite a certain overlap or similarity of some aspects of their respective characters.
If, on the other hand, they opt for possibility b), then, they are likely to use the same linguistic marker (i.e., "khronos") to identifyingly refer to both samples, as well as to all other samples, subsequently encountered, whose observed structural characters are congruent with the character of either (or both) samples which serve as the standards for determining whether, in any given case, a SameL relationship exists. Option b) allows for the possibility that not all instances of those substances which one would identifyingly refer to as extensional expressions of the character of a SameL relationship must necessarily manifest exact congruence, one with another. If this were the case, however, one would then, be faced with the problem of accounting for how substances of natural kind entities which were supposedly the same could give expression to features of differential character.
Finally, if the given group of individuals chose to follow the orientation of category c), mentioned above, one might be undecided as to whether the two substances were: 1) basically the same with differences; or, 2) similar but basically different. Consequently, one might hold in abeyance any decision to identifyingly refer to them both with the same linguistic marker.
Instead, one might establish a convention in which one, arbitrarily, would refer to one or the other as, say, "khronos" and await further evidential developments before deciding to include (or exclude) the other substance among the extensional instances that are believed to give expression to the character entailed by the "introducing event" sample which has been selected to be called "khronos". At the same time, while one might suspend judgement concerning a given substance with respect to whether or not that substance actually does bear the SameL relationship to the substances that presently are being identifyingly referred to as "khronos", one probably would entertain those substances as 'possible-khronos' candidates and might investigate or interact with them in a manner somewhat parallel (with certain reservations) to the way one investigated or interacted with those substances called "khronos". Over time, data would arise in relation to their interactional experience with both substances, and this data would provide a further evidential basis on which to decide whether, a), b) or c) was the most tenable approach to pursue under the existing epistemological convention.
Unfortunately, matters might be complicated for the new learner of the language in Archimedes' time. This is because there is not likely to be just one "introducing event" through which the individual is to become acquainted with the actual character of the basis of the SameL relationship. This factor is quite crucial since introducing events serve as the means through which an individual is to recognize or identify subsequent instances of various encountered substances as expressing or not expressing the appropriate SameL relationship that would permit one to identifyingly refer to the newly encountered substance as an extensional instance of "khronos".
For example, let us suppose that, on one occasion, an individual of Archimedes' time is introduced to a substance as an instance of "khronos" (and let us assume that on this occasion the substance is an instance of "gold" as we understand the term today). Let us also suppose that on a second occasion the individual is introduced to a substance of certain manifest properties and told the substance is an instance of "khronos". However, let us assume that on this occasion the substance is an instance of what Putnam calls metal X, and not of gold.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the individual's understanding of the character of those sorts of things for which "khronos" is used as a means of identifying reference by the people in his or her community will be shaped by both of the "introducing event" experiences. As a result, what the learner will consider to constitute the nature of a SameL relationship will be a function of some sort of epistemological combination of the two experiences.
As the young learner participates in further experiences which involve substances called "khronos", the individual's understanding of "khronos" character will come to be an expression of the sort of conceptual geometry which the individual draws up on the basis of his collective experiences concerning "khronos". If the character of the young learner's connecting insights in relation to that which he or she understands or believes is the character of "khronos" is congruent with the character of the manner in which the surrounding community actually does employ "khronos", then, the individual has grasped the concept which stands behind a given word usage. In this respect, there has been a partial or full merging (depending on the degree of the congruence of the connecting insight with current usage) of the hermeneutical horizons of the learner with his or her linguistic community.
Putnam believes the only alternative to his theory of meaning/realism is, as the previous quote demonstrates, some sort of operational perspective. Yet, the foregoing considerations do not so much constitute an operational approach to the theory of meaning as much as they reflect the character of certain aspects of the way in which language is learned and the manner in which the individual hermeneutically engages experience in general.
More specifically, a basic distinction needs to be drawn between two things. On the one hand, there are instances in which when one asks, "What do you mean by 'gold'?", the thrust of the question is to seek an understanding of the character of the identifying reference which a given speaker has in mind when he or she uses a specific linguistic marker. On the other hand, there are times in which when one asks, "What do you mean by 'gold'?"the question is directed, not just at seeking to establish what the speaker has in mind by way of identifying reference, but also at discovering the actual character of the 'thing', 'object', 'entity', 'process', 'event', 'phenomena' and so on, to which identifying reference is being made.
The first case encompasses a sense of "meaning" which concerns the character of certain aspects of some individual's (or group's) mode of hermeneutically engaging experience in terms of how that individual (or group) understands the character of those aspects, and what significance, meaning or value those aspects have for him or her (or them). In the second case mentioned above, the focus of the question is not primarily oriented toward understanding the character of various aspects of the individual's hermeneutical framework as an end in itself. The focus is on determining the character of certain identifyingly referential aspects of the individual's hermeneutical framework as a means of establishing a point of reference from which to launch a further investigation into the character of that object (or whatever) to which identifying reference is being made by the speaker(s).
On those occasions when the character of the identifying referential aspect of an individual's hermeneutical framework is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of the object (etc.) to which identifying reference is being made by the speaker, then, regardless of which of the aforementioned senses governs the asking of the question (which, in the present case, is: What do you mean by "gold"?), the character of the speaker's answer will provide a basis from which insight might emerge concerning both senses of dimensions of the issue of "meaning". This, of course, assumes that the speaker is able to articulate the character of those facets of his or her hermeneutical framework that constitute the individual's understanding of the character of the identifying reference for which the linguistic market in question is used as a communicational designation or index.
In criticizing what he refers to as an anti-realist perspective concerning theory of meaning, Putnam says:
"... for a strong anti-realist, truth makes no sense except as an intra-theoretic notion ... the anti-realist can use truth intra-theoretically in the sense of a redundancy theory, but he does not have the notion of truth and reference available extra-theoretically. But, extension is tied to the notion of truth. The extension of a term is just what the term is true of. Rather than try to retain the notion of extension via an awkward operationalism, the anti-realist should reject the notion of extension as he does the notion of truth (in any extra-theoretic sense)." (p. 236)
One of Putnam's mistakes in the above quote is to suppose the meaning of "extension" can only be made sense of in a realist setting of the sort which he seems to be advocating. In that sort of setting, natural kind terms make identifying reference to allegedly real 'objects' that have determinate characters according to the nature of the given natural kind entity at issue. Thus, from that perspective, the extension of "water" involves those liquid substances which have an atomic/molecular structure of H20, and the extension of "gold" involves those substances which have the atomic/molecular structure characteristic of a certain kind of metal, and so on.
What is to stop a so-called anti-realist, however, from saying the following? The extension of "gold" concerns all those 'objects' which manifest themselves in the phenomenology of the experiential field and which display a character that is congruent with the character of those facets of one's hermeneutical framework which constitute one's understanding of, or beliefs about, what the linguistic marker "gold" was making identifying reference to in the context of the "introducing event".
After all, the character of the understanding of the 'antirealist' gives expression to a congruency relationship concerning the nature of a SameL relationship between, on the one hand, a certain aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field currently being attended to, and, on the other hand, the character of that which was the focus of a given introducing event (or series of such events) for which the linguistic marker "gold" served as a means of making identifying reference. If this is so, then, does not the recognition that - the character of the currently experientially encountered aspect of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field, to which one is attending, accurately reflects the character of the focus of the introducing event for which "gold" served as a means of making identifying reference - constitute an extensional exemplar as far as the hermeneutical framework of the individual is concerned (Inasmuch as it represents an instance of "just what the term [in this case, 'gold'] is true of".)?
Putnam charges the 'anti-realist' with advancing a redundancy theory of meaning in which the meaning of terms such as "extension", "truth", "natural kind entities" and "meaning" are tied to the character of the theoretical context in which they are developed. As a result, such a position, according to Putnam, "does not have the notion of truth and reference available extra-theoretically" in relation to any of the terms which are being, or are to be, considered.
From the perspective of the so-called anti-realist, however, Putnam's criticism is irrelevant as far as a theory of meaning is concerned. An 'anti-realist' knows what he or she means by use of a linguistic marker.
In other words, this individual can recognize those experiential instances (i.e., instances appearing in the phenomenology of the experiential field) which manifest a character that is congruent with (in Putnam's terms, exhibits a SameL relationship with) the character of the introducing-event-experience(s) that, at some point in time, appeared in the phenomenology of the experiential field of the individual. Through these introducing events, the individual came to grasp the character of that to which a given linguistic marker was making identifying reference.
Therefore, an 'anti-realist' understands the extension of such a linguistic marker, and, consequently, understands what the term or linguistic marker is true of. The fact that truth for the anti-realist does not extend into, or encompass, a reality of autonomous character which is independent of, for example, the individual's mental states, or which may not entail a reality in which objects are substantial, materialistic and made out of various sorts of natural kind "stuff" (i.e., molecules, atoms, electrons, quarks, gluons, etc.) is beside the point as far as a theory of meaning is concerned. Such cases also are incidental as far as being able to understand what the character of that theory is and how terms such as "extension", "truth" and "meaning" fit into it.
If the 'anti-realist' is wrong, his or her error is not a function of the general properties of that individual's theory of meaning. The problem resides in the fact that the linguistic marker "reality", which the so-called anti-realist uses as a means of identifyingly referring to the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field taken as a whole, forms part of a hermeneutical framework whose character will, in certain respects, be incongruent with various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field or will be incongruent with that (i.e., metaphysical reality) which makes a field of such determinate character possible (including the aspects of incongruency).
Stated in another way, if the 'anti-realist' is wrong, that individual will understand which aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which he or she is making identifying reference when the linguistic markers "truth", "extension" and "meaning" are used in relation to certain natural kind terms. However, the character of his or her understanding may not be accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of reality to which reference is made.
Putnam may, or may not, be correct in his assumption of realism concerning the ontological character of natural kind entities. Nevertheless, as far as his theory of meaning is concerned, his position is vulnerable due to its dependency on having to determine the nature of a natural kind entity to which natural kind terms are supposed to make identifying reference.
As argued earlier, Putnam, arbitrarily, has selected the atomic/molecular structure of, for example, the substances to which "water" and "gold" make identifying reference as constituting the nature of those substances. Consequently, he has not entertained the possibility that the nature of those substances may be rooted in some more subtle dimension of reality.
However, even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that the nature of, say, water is H2O, such a concession in no way compels one to commit oneself to the view that a theory of meaning in relation to the liquid substances to which the linguistic marker "water" is used to make identifying reference must concern itself with atomic/molecular structure. Given the foregoing concession, the meaning of "water" still might concern itself with investigating any aspect of the process of making identifying reference in those aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field which the atomic/molecular structure of the substance in question (i.e., H20) helps give expression to - including its appearance, taste, feel, smell, uses and behavioral properties.
On the basis of the above assumption - namely, that the nature of a given liquid substance is H2O (this represents the metaphysical intensional character of that substance according to the assumption), the reality of the extension of such a substance involves all ontological instances of liquid substances whose atomic/molecular structure is H20. Consequently, any linguistic marker which is used to make identifying reference to the intensional/extensional metaphysical character of such a substance will have an extension associated with that term or linguistic marker, and this extension will express "just what the term is true of". Nonetheless, what a term means in this sense still might not constitute what is being identifyingly referred to when an individual uses the same linguistic marker (as was the case in the two-Oscars example) to draw attention to certain aspects of the hermeneutical framework through which the individual orients him, or her, within the phenomenology of his or her experiential field.
In addition, the intensional/extensional character of a hermeneutical framework concerning the usage of a given term or linguistic marker might not coincide with the intensional/extensional character of those aspects of reality which involve substances whose atomic/molecular structure is H20. For example, one could concede that the hermeneutical character of the individual's intensional/extensional meaning framework may, at certain junctures (e.g., Twin Earth prior to the early 1800s) be incongruent with the metaphysical character of a natural kind entity's intensional/extensional meaning framework.
However, the epistemic pathway by means of which one, eventually, is able to determine the metaphysical nature of, say, a liquid substance - in this case water or H2O - is accomplished by means of the establishing a hermeneutical framework of meaning. Through the establishing of such a framework, one, gradually, becomes able to understand the character of the process of making identifying references when linguistic markers or terms are used to designate or index the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which one is attending and to which one wants to draw the attention of others.
Moreover, by seeking to understand (i.e., through setting up a hermeneutical framework) what sort of reality could make an experiential field of such character possible, one attempts to discover one, or more, connecting insights. These insights allow one to determine if a congruency relationship exists between the structural or logical character of one's hermeneutical framework (or parts thereof) and the structural character of those aspects of reality which help make certain aspects (e.g., those to which one is attending) of the phenomenology of the experiential field possible.
From Putnam's perspective, Oscar2 of Twin Earth is wrong in identifyingly referring to Twin Earth liquid substances of a certain phenomenological description as "water". At the same time, no serious difficulties ensue from the fact that Oscar2 of Twin Earth refers to certain liquid substances, whose atomic/molecular structure is later found to be XYZ, as "water".
In time, the differences between the liquid substances in question on Twin Earth and Earth will sort themselves out on the basis of, among other things, atomic/molecular structure. In the meantime, most people on Earth and Twin Earth who have language competency will have little or no difficulty in understanding the sort of thing which is being identifyingly referred to when the linguistic marker "water" is used.
If this difference in atomic/molecular structure turned out to be the only characteristic feature which distinguished the two liquid substances, and if in all other respects they were the same, then, one might begin to wonder if the atomic/molecular differences in structure (H20 versus XYZ) really represented all that much of a difference. In fact, under all but a very limited and technical set of circumstances (i.e., those dealing with the form of atomic/molecular structure of the two substances), Earth-water and Twin Earth-water would be able to pass every test one cared to administer as far as determining whether a SameL relationship existed between Earth-water and Twin Earth-water.
Moreover, the one difference which did exist (i.e., atomic/molecular structure) might not be a sufficient basis (at least not in the science fiction format developed by Putnam) on which to establish two separate metaphysical categories concerning Earth-water and Twin Earth-water. As suggested earlier, the foregoing difference has important similarities to maintaining that the existence of hot water and cold water would not be enough of a differential foundation to contend that, due to their differential characters, hot and cold water cannot both be water. In other words, one need not have to choose one or the other of the two substances as the basis for determining whether a SameL relationship exists with respect to liquid substances subsequently encountered.
In both of the above cases, SameL relationships are a function of establishing congruency relationships between (or among) the characters of two (or more) entities (events, processes, principles, etc.). The nature of these relationships are such that whatever differences do exist between (or among) the entities (or whatever) being compared, one is willing to treat differences as variations on a theme (or set of themes) rather than as constituting separate and distinct categories.
The focal/horizonal character of these "themes" will be a function of the character of an individual's conceptual geometry or hermeneutical framework which has built up over time in relation to the way certain aspects of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field have been introduced, characterized, particularized, or individuated by the individual on the basis of a limited number, or wide variety, of experiential encounters manifesting certain features. In time, these features may come to be considered, rightly or wrongly, as expressions of one fundamental phenomenological and/or metaphysical theme.
For instance, phenomenologically, "water" can - within certain parameters of permissibility - be used to identifyingly refer to various liquid substances despite variations in appearance, taste, feel, smell and the behavioral properties of such liquids. This will be the case as long as the character of those liquids is capable of reflecting sufficient congruency with the character of the conceptual geometry which has arisen in relation to a set of experiences involving liquid substances of certain properties.
The aforementioned experiences are ones that have been characterized in specific ways according to various features and properties of those experiences. Such characterized or individuated experiences collectively come to constitute the conceptual standard against which subsequent experiences with liquid substances are measured in order to determine whether a SameL relationship is thought to exist.
The ability of a group of people to mutually grasp the character of the phenomenology of SameL relationships with respect to the use of various linguistic markers plays a fundamental role in the defining and acquiring of the linguistic competency (both individually and collectively) which is necessary to the formation of a linguistic community and which is necessary to enable an individual to participate in, and be a member of, that community. The beings of Earth/Twin Earth in the mid-1700s, as well as the people of Archimedes' time, are linguistically/conceptually doing what they have to do (and really only what they can do) in order to generate the requisite experiential data out of which an understanding of some kind concerning meaning will emerge.
This data acts as a starting point through which, from day to day, they can go on to make mutually understandable, identifying references. Such data also serves as a starting point that (given time, interest and ability) will provide an opportunity for someone, eventually, to epistemologically arrive at the metaphysical points concerning extensional truths - such as, "water" is an index for H2O (in contrast to phenomenological points concerning extensional truths) - which is what Putnam feels ought to be the proper basis of extensional/intensional meaning.
Whether Putnam would consider someone who works from the assumption of methodological solipsism as being anti-realist is not clear. If Putnam does hold this to be the case, his contention might be untenable.
The experience of the solipsist is quite real inasmuch as it occurs as a phenomenon in the phenomenology of the experiential field. Hallucinations have reality, as do illusions, dreams, beliefs and fantasies.
The problem is not in determining whether or not they are real. The problem is in determining the character of their kind of reality in terms of how they differ from one another and in terms of how they differ from those sorts of objects which seem to have a more 'substantial' character (in some 'materialistic' sense).
If a solipsist were to maintain that nothing existed independently of his or her mental states, and if this individual were to further maintain that the reality of whatever did exist as a function of the individual's mental states was of a non-substantial or non-materialistic nature, then, such a solipsist is saying reality has a character which is non-substantial or non-materialistic. The solipsist is not casting doubt upon reality per se. Instead, such an individual is attempting to draw attention to what he or she believes the character of such reality is.
On the other hand, there is nothing inconsistent about a solipsist who believes the 'objects' which appear in the phenomenology of his or her experiential field have substantial, concrete, materialistic characters. What makes someone a solipsist is that individual's contention that such 'objects' exist compliments of his or her mental states, irrespective of whether the individual understands how this is possible.
Consequently, neither sort of solipsist is anti-realist. Their positions are statements about the character of the ontological source from which 'objects' (whether conceived of as being substantial or insubstantial) are derived - namely, the individual and his or her mental states under these circumstances.
The solipsistic perspective is not a matter of saying there is no reality. That perspective is a matter of saying reality does not have the character which Putnam claims it does - e.g., that 'objects' have a reality independent of an individual's mental states.
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