The Hermeneutics of Meaning - Part Five
Exploring the Horizons of Natural Kind Words
Putnam has been concentrating on "natural kind" words such as "water", "tree", "gold", etc. Underlying this focus has been the assumption (sometimes explicitly stated, sometimes implicitly present) that natural kind words refer to 'things', 'objects' or 'material/concrete entities' of one sort or another in the so-called "natural world" (i.e., they aren't man-made artifacts) which have a definite nature. When one determines this nature, then, according to Putnam, the relevant linguistic markers (which are used to make identifying reference to the collective phenomenon encompassed by the character of the given object's nature) mean or designate or index the character to which such markers make identifying reference. Consequently, for Putnam, meaning is determined by the character of the natural kind entity in question, and not by the concepts and mental entities of intentionality.
However, what about the linguistic marker "meaning"? Is this a natural kind word? If so, what is the character of that to which it makes identifying reference? What is it that "meaning" stands as a rigid designator for, or what is it that "meaning" is indexical for?
One might be willing to accept the position that part of what "meaning" is indexical for concerns the actual nature of character of that to which natural kind words make identifying reference. However, one cannot assume this is all that ‘meaning’ is indexical for, without running the risk of totally distorting the phenomenological context out of which problems of meaning arise in the first place.
For example, seemingly, "brain" is a natural kind word, as are, when viewed from the perspective of a mind/brain identity theory, "thought", "consciousness", "insight" and "understanding". All of these terms would be, we shall assume for the moment, functional expressions of brain activity.
Thus, let us suppose the thought were to arise in consciousness. Let us further suppose that this thought should constitute an insight concerning the determination of the nature of something (say, water as H20). Under these circumstances, the meaning context in which "water" is immersed would involve the 'fact' that the nature of the liquid (to which we identifyingly refer when we use the linguistic marker "water") is H20. The meaning context surrounding "water" also would involve the 'fact' that such a liquid is being attended to, characterized, understood and so on by a conscious brain.
Meaning, in the sense of the actual nature of some natural kind entity (in this case, water), is spoken about through the use of certain linguistic markers which, according to Putnam, are indexical for the character of that natural kind entity being identifyingly referred to when the requisite marker is applied.
A word cannot be indexical for, or a rigid designator of, some aspect of reality (e.g., the liquid whose atomic/molecular structure is H20) unless that symbol is understood by someone as expressing a character which entails the quality of a rigid designation relationship for which the marker serves as a rigid or indexical means of making identifying reference. Therefore, the meaning (in Putnam's sense) of a word as a rigid designator or as indexical cannot be restricted only to the natural kind entity in question. Such meaning also must encompass the phenomenological dimension which provides the hermeneutical medium in which, and/or through which, the connecting insight exists that understands the indexical character of the relationship between a given linguistic marker and the natural kind entity being designated by the marker.
If one considers "meaning" as a natural kind word, then, the actual nature of the natural kind entity for which "meaning" is indexical, or for which it serves as a rigid designator, has something to do with brain functioning (at least, for the time being, such an assumption is being made) and all that, allegedly, is entailed by such functioning (e.g., phenomenology, understanding, thought, consciousness, and language). In somewhat more precise terms, the nature of this 'brain-functioning-something' with which "meaning" is connected concerns both of the following.
On the one hand, the ‘brain-functioning-something’ concerns the character of the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the individual is making identifying reference when employing certain linguistic markers. On the other hand, the 'brain-functioning-something' concerns reality (in this case, say, bio-chemistry and physiology, together with certain natural kind entities like material/physical objects) that make such a demarcated phenomenology possible.
The individual is trying to make identifying reference to these latter aspects by means of the focal/horizonal orientation of his or her hermeneutical framework through which the individual is attending to some given aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field. Consequently, part of the character of that to which "meaning" makes identifying reference is irrevocably tied up with the sorts of natural kind 'things' for which Putnam, presumably, would use the linguistic marker "mental entities" to make a collective identifying reference. This remains true even in instances where one is referring to natural kind words of the sort Putnam has in mind, such as "water", "gold", "tree" and so on.
When one speaks of the "meaning of water", to say that the atomic/ molecular structure of the liquid being identifyingly referred to is H2O is not enough - even if accurate, to some extent. One also must place that atomic/molecular structure within the phenomenological/hermeneutical context that makes possible an identifying reference of given focal/horizonal character for which a specific linguistic marker can be indexical or can serve as a rigid designator. In fact, without such a phenomenological/hermeneutical context, the "meaning of 'water'" is empty, even if it should be the case that a liquid whose atomic/molecular structure is H2O does exist.
This phenomenological/hermeneutical context plays such an essential role in the meaning of "meaning" one must leave room for the following possibility. What is being identifyingly referred to when a given linguistic framework is being employed by an individual who is working out of a hermeneutical framework of a given focal/horizonal character may not concern the atomic/molecular structure of the liquid being attended to by means of what shows up in the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field.
Rather, the term "water" might be used as a means of identifyingly referring to any number of the facets of the character of particular liquids (whether Twin Earth or Earth water) which are encountered, experientially, by the individual during the course of linguistic, biological, conceptual, and spiritual development. In this respect, liquidity, smell, feel, taste, appearance, behavior under different conditions (say, freezing versus heating), functional uses, etc. are all as much an expression of what "water" can identifyingly refer to as is the dimension of atomic/molecular structure.
Furthermore, if the character of what* someone is identifyingly referring to when employing "water" does not entail a specific atomic/molecular structure (e.g., H2O rather than XYZ), then, "water" need not identifyingly refer to only those liquids which have an atomic/molecular structure of H20. Indeed, this is the case for Oscar1and Oscar2 of Earth and Twin Earth, respectively, during the mid-1700s.
There is another aspect of Putnam's preoccupation with a certain limited range of words - namely, natural kind words - which poses considerable difficulties for the sort of theory of meaning which Putnam appears to be proposing. For example, what if one begins to use words like "justice", "morality", "religion", "God", "soul", "love", "intellect", "creativity", "mysticism", "beauty", "evil", "good", "virtue", "miracle" and so on?
How, if at all, do these linguistic markers fit into Putnam's theory of meaning? Are they natural kind words? Or, are they man-made concepts?
Even if one were to suppose they were natural kind words, what happens if there are disagreements (which there are) over what the nature is of the aspect(s) of reality to which such linguistic markers supposedly make identifying reference? How does one know when one is dealing with the actual (in Putnam's sense) meaning of a linguistic marker and when one is dealing with some pseudo-meaning (i.e., a linguistic marker that makes identifying reference to something other than the actual nature of a given aspect of the actual world)?
In fact, one can ask this same question in relation to clear-cut natural kind words like "water". More specifically, Putnam may feel he has a straightforward position in cases like "water" in which the meaning of "water" concerns a liquid whose atomic/molecular structure is H20. Nonetheless, one might consider the atomic/molecular structure of H2O as a rather arbitrary point at which to commit oneself as to the nature of water.
What if, for instance, someone were to argue that the nature of water is not H2O since the atomic/molecular structure of the liquid in question constitutes but a corruptible and imperfect copy of the Idea or Form of water? Stated in another way, let us suppose for the moment that the character of 'corrupted' water (i.e., its atomic/molecular structure) were a function of a Transcendental/Universal Form of Water.
Under this supposition, we are assuming that while the character of water's corruptible nature is expressed in terms of atomic/molecular structure, the character of the Idea of Water is not a function of atomic/molecular structure. Instead, this latter character is assumed to be a matter of a metaphysical property or principle for which atomic/molecular structure acted as an imperfect, corruptible copy.
Under these circumstances, one, conceivably, might argue that the nature of water is not really H20. Rather, one might argue that the nature of water resides in the metaphysical principles, properties or whatever which make possible the ontological, though imperfect and corrupted, liquid whose atomic/molecular structure is H20.
If one feels uneasy with the idea of Ideas, let us alter our suppositions somewhat. Let us assume that someone were to argue that the nature of water was not H20, but was a function of some sort of complex quantum field. This quantum field is characterized by a certain statistical distribution of gluons, quarks (of the 'proper' colors and flavors - that is, with the 'right' distribution of strangeness, charm, etc.) and other denizens of the quantum deep.
From this perspective, the atomic/molecular structure is to such a field as the taste, smell, appearance and feel of a given liquid is to its atomic/molecular structure. In other words, what is to prevent someone from considering atomic/molecular structure as merely an expression of the 'surface' properties of more fundamental principles, just as, from Putnam's perspective, the conception of water on Earth and Twin Earth in the mid-1700s would constitute merely the expression of the 'surface' properties of more fundamental principles concerning atomic/molecular structure?
How could one ever be sure one had, at any given point, finally arrived at the ultimate determination of the nature of some particular natural kind entity? And, if one could not be positive one had arrived at the determination of an entity's nature, what ramifications would this have for Putnam's theory concerning the "meaning of meaning"?
Putnam still might claim the general form of meaning remained the same inasmuch as meaning still referred to the nature of the given natural kind term in question (in the present case, "water"). In this event, the only thing which would have changed, or so it might be argued, concerns the identity of the character of that nature. In other words, the nature of the 'thing' in question would have been pushed back from that of atomic/ molecular structure to either Transcendental/Universal Forms or to quantum fields (or further, if some other discovery were forthcoming).
Nonetheless, in either case, this single alteration is enough to place one, potentially, in the position of the beings of Earth and Twin Earth during the mid-1700s, prior to the discovery of the atomic/molecular structure of water. After all, the change in question opens up the possibility that what we now take to be the nature of water (which, according to Putnam, is H20) may no more be the nature of water than was the case with the beings of Earth and Twin Earth in the mid-1700s who considered water to be a clear liquid of certain taste, feel, smell and behavioral properties. Some new discovery could be forthcoming which might reveal there is something more fundamental underlying the character of water than atomic/ molecular structure, just as the discovery of water's atomic/molecular properties revealed to the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth in the mid-1700s that there was something more fundamental than the character of water's appearance and behavior on the gross/macro level of sensory encounters.
Under these circumstances, one has two options: 1) one can leave open the possibility that "water" may not, ultimately, mean (in Putnam's sense) the atomic/molecular structure of H2O; or; 2) one can acknowledge that the meaning of "water" (again, in Putnam's determinate sense of the actual nature of water) can be considered from a variety of perspectives of identifying reference, as long as the character of a given perspective is congruent with, or accurately reflective of (within the limits of that perspective's capability of being so), the character of what the nature of water turns out to be.
With respect to the first option, one is constantly confronted with the possibility that "water" doesn't mean what we claim it does (i.e., that which has an atomic/molecular structure of H20). Therefore, from Putnam's perspective, we may no more know what "water" really (in terms of the nature of water) means than the two Oscars did in the mid-1700s.
However, if the foregoing situation is so, then, the following question surfaces. If one's employment of the linguistic marker "water" does not constitute, in Putnam's sense, a proper meaning usage of the term because we actually may not have finally determined the nature of water, just what is it one is engaged in doing by employing the given linguistic marker in the way one does?
One possibility is as follows. What the individual is engaged in doing is making identifying references which, at a minimum, concern certain aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field and, at a maximum, concern an epistemic, theoretical or ideational (e.g., an understanding, insight, or belief) link between certain aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field and certain aspects of the reality that makes, or is believed to make, a phenomenological field of such character possible.
If the above is what the individual is doing, then, the second option outlined earlier - four paragraphs ago - follows from, or is congruent with, the character of such an activity. In other words, the meaning of a natural kind term can be considered from a variety of perspectives of identifying reference, as long as the characters of these perspectives are, to some extent, accurately reflective of the character of that to which identifying reference is being made.
If the clear liquid of characteristic smell, feel, taste, and behavioral properties turns out to have an atomic/molecular structure of H2O and also turns out to have a certain quantum field structure and/or a Transcendent/Universal Form, then, the linguistic marker "water" could be considered appropriate to use as a means of identifyingly referring to a number of 'contexts'.
For example, the linguistic marker "water" might refer to certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field (e.g., the character of one's sensory/perceptual experiential encounter with the given liquid). The linguistic marker "water" also might refer to certain aspects of the reality which makes such a field possible (e.g., the atomic/molecular structure H2O or a quantum field of certain quark/gluon properties or a given Transcendental/Universal Form or Idea). In addition, although we may not presently know what the ultimate nature is of the liquid to which identifying references are being made through use of the linguistic marker "water", certainly part of the meaning entailed by such an ultimate nature involves the way this nature expresses itself in a manner which metaphysically underwrites the character of that to which identifying references are now being made, either with respect to its phenomenological properties or with respect to certain levels of its ontological properties.
Pursuing the second option on pages 61-62 would have the potential effect of preserving epistemic necessity. Thus, should it turn out that the character of one's present understanding concerning the nature of that to which identifying references are being made (through use of a given linguistic marker) is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the ultimate character of the nature of that to which identifying reference currently is being made, then, one would have satisfied the conditions of epistemic necessity outlined earlier in this essay.
Yet, the issue of metaphysical necessity need not be circumscribed determinately by the foregoing condition of epistemic necessity (assuming this condition actually did exist). This is the case because what we understand - accurate though it may be as far as it goes - might reflect only a very limited portion of the total character of the ultimate reality to which identifying reference is being made through the character of the focal/horizonal orientation of one's hermeneutical framework and for which the given linguistic marker is being used as a symbol of identifying reference.
The understanding of beings on both Earth and Twin Earth in the mid-1700s concerning the nature of water would be epistemically necessary in as much as the character of their understanding, as far as it went, was accurately reflective of at least part of the character of that to which they were making identifying references by means of the focal/horizonal orientation of that understanding and by use of the linguistic marker "water". Nevertheless, the character of metaphysical necessity in relation to the nature of that to which identifying references were being made through these beings' understanding need not be completely reflected in the character of what had been established to be epistemically necessary in terms of the accuracy of such understanding.
In short, as discussed earlier, if one holds (as I do) that epistemic necessity derives its necessity from a hermeneutical framework’s capacity to accurately reflecting part or all of the character of some aspect of reality, then, one cannot assume, automatically, that any given instance of epistemic necessity exhaustively represents, in part or wholly, the character of reality. As a result, potential room is left open for a reality whose character extends beyond the hermeneutical horizons which set the parameters on a given instance of epistemic necessity.
Therefore, beings in the mid-1700s on both Earth and Twin Earth might maintain that the linguistic marker "water" makes epistemically necessary identifying reference to a liquid substance which has a characteristic taste, smell, feel, appearance and behavior. Alternatively, beings in the 1800s (or later) on both Earth and Twin Earth might maintain that the linguistic marker "water" makes epistemically necessary identifying reference to a liquid substance which has a characteristic taste, smell, feel, appearance, behavior and atomic/molecular structure.
In neither of the foregoing cases, however, must the beings involved be compelled to maintain that the ultimate nature of water is a function of what they claim is epistemically necessary concerning the use of the linguistic marker "water". This is so because in both instances the liquids being referred to may be a function of metaphysical principles or properties which extend beyond the considerations of, respectively, surface features (such as taste, feel, appearance, etc.) and atomic/molecular structure.
In addition, the necessity involved here does not mean one must choose the term "water" to make identifying reference to the given liquid substance. One can choose any term or linguistic marker one likes for this purpose. The necessity involved is a function of the epistemic relationship which must exist between the character of one's understanding and the character of that to which identifying reference is being made by use of whatever linguistic marker is selected to signify or represent that epistemic relationship.
In both cases, the only facet of metaphysical necessity which has been fixed will be a matter of the extent or degree to which the character of one's understanding accurately reflects, or is congruent with, the character of the aspect(s) of reality to which identifying reference is being made. However, this facet is not fixed, established or determined by epistemic necessity. Epistemic necessity is determined by the given metaphysical facet.
In other words, one must discover the latter (or parts thereof) to establish the former since the character of reality imposes horizonal limits on what can be said to be epistemically necessary. This is because the given aspect of reality has the character it does, and, thereby, gives expression to the 'standard' to which one's understanding must conform in order for that understanding to acquire a dimension of necessity. The feature of necessity is acquired through the extent to which one's understanding is accurately reflective of the aspect of reality to which identifying reference is being made.
Reality does give expression to the ultimate nature of natural kind entities, and, in this respect, establishes the parameters of structure or character concerning the nature of those entities which constitute their meaning in Putnam's sense. Nevertheless, there also is an epistemic dimension to such meaning that involves the manner in which, and extent to which, the character of one's hermeneutical framework is capable of grasping or gaining insight into the character of various aspects of the reality underlying, and giving expression to, different natural kind entities to which identifying reference is being made.
Consequently, even if one were to accept a qualified version of Putnam's position and assume that, under some circumstances, phenomenological intensions do not determine metaphysical extensions (i.e., ontological realizations), the meaning of ‘meaning’ still need not become simply a function of ultimate reality. Meaning must be considered in the context of the character of an individual's (or society's) hermeneutical engagement of the aspect of reality at issue. Without this context of the degree of epistemic engagement, one would be left with a position of questionable tenability and heuristic value. This would be the case since one would have to assume that unless one had determined the nature of a given natural kind entity, one had not established a proper basis for speaking of meaning in relation to such an entity.
If one allows the feature of hermeneutical engagement into the discussion of meaning, one provides a basis for speaking of meaning in a way that does not require, or presuppose, meaning is always a matter of determining what the ultimate nature of a natural kind entity is. Instead, one has a means of working toward such a determination. This means does not preclude the possibility of having established a certain amount of meaning which is epistemically necessary in that (and to the extent that) it accurately reflects, or is congruent with, some aspect of reality.
As suggested earlier, even the foregoing way of attempting to salvage something from Putnam's position on meaning appears to have very limited value. This is due to the manner in which it tends to operate on the assumption that one's understanding actually does accurately reflect something of the character of some metaphysical level of that to which identifying reference is being made when a given linguistic marker is being employed. Yet, when dealing with words like "morality", "religion", "God", "concept", "idea", "love", "justice" and even "meaning", one may not be able to determine, in any given case, if these are natural kind words which make accurate identifying reference to: a) certain aspects of reality, or b) man-made myths/beliefs/ideas/theories which refer to nothing more than the character of a given individual's understanding for which the various linguistic markers, listed previously, serve as a means of making identifying reference.
If these words are natural kind words, how will one determine whether, and to what extent, the character of one's hermeneutical framework is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of the aspect of reality to which one is supposedly making identifying reference? Without such a determination, what meaning can "meaning" (in Putnam's sense) have in such contexts?
An interesting expansion of Putnam's science fiction thought experiment would be the following. Let us suppose that in the year Star Date: 2357.6, some scientist (a Vulcan, perhaps) were to discover that although the atomic/molecular structures of water on Earth and Twin Earth were quite different (being H2O and XYZ respectively), nevertheless, the underlying quantum fields which give expression to the two atomic/molecular structures consisted of the same distribution of gluons and quarks.
Let us further suppose that these gluon/quark distributions yielded a difference in atomic/molecular structure depending on whether or not the field had been passed through certain kinds of cosmic radiation fields (known as Z-fields) which were often generated within one light-year of quasars of a given magnitude. This possible extension of Putnam's science fiction idea raises some interesting questions with respect to, for example, whether the water on Earth is really, essentially, different from the water on Twin Earth, despite the noted differences in atomic/molecular structure of the two liquids.
Whether water is hot or cold does not interfere with one's willingness to identify the liquids in question as instances of water. Similarly, whether water is fresh or salty does not prevent one from identifying both as instances of water.
Moreover, even if a clear liquid does not freeze at 0°C or boil at 100°C, these 'failures' do not cause one, automatically, to rule out the possibility that the liquid in question is water. This is so because conditions such as pressure and solute concentration can affect freezing and boiling points.
Therefore, conceivably, two liquids (such as 'water' on Earth and Twin Earth) which are precisely alike in all other respects except for atomic/molecular structure, could both be identified as instances of the same natural kind entity (considered, say, from the perspective of quantum field distribution of characteristics) that had been subjected to different metaphysical shaping pressures (e.g., a Z-field within a certain distance of a particular class of quasars). This resulted in liquid substances whose only difference was that of atomic/molecular structure.
Would the foregoing case be akin to instances in which the given liquids were subjected to different metaphysical shaping pressures which resulted in liquid substances whose only difference was that of being: hot rather than cold; salty rather than fresh; freezing at-7°C rather than 0°C; distilled rather than potable; pH 7.3 rather than pH 7.1?
Putnam appears to be working on the assumption that atomic/molecular differences constitute a fundamental criterion in distinguishing between natural kind entities of supposedly different types. Ultimately, however, atomic/molecular differences in cases like that of water on Earth and Twin Earth might be more akin to the differences between, say, hot and cold water than between, say, apples and potatoes - that is, the atomic/molecular structure of XYZ really might just be what one gets when H20 is passed through z-fields within a certain distance from a particular class of quasars.
Human beings can manifest a wide variety of differences in height, weight, physiognomy, facial characteristics, hair coloring, presence or absence of speech, behavior patterns, personality, intellectual capabilities, moral characteristics, strengths, weaknesses, talents and so on. Yet, none of these differences prevents one from identifying each individual as a human being. Similarly, perhaps in some instances - for example, that of water on Earth and Twin Earth - the differences may not be sufficient to prevent one from identifyingly referring to the liquids in question as both instances of water.
If U235 and U238 both can be identified as instances of Uranium, and if levo- and dextro-isomeric forms of an organic compound both can be referred to, collectively, as, say, a given kind of protein or lipid or nucleic acid, are there not some grounds for arguing that the liquids in question (Earth water and Twin Earth water) are both exemplars of water despite their specified differences of atomic/molecular structure, and that the reason for these differences is a function of whether H20 has passed through the appropriate kind of z-field under the right conditions (distance from a particular class of quasars)? If nothing else, all of these possibilities raise questions about the process of how one goes about demarcating differences in various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field or in various aspects of the reality which makes possible the sort of demarcated field through which one can establish hermeneutical frameworks of varying focal/horizonal character as a means of making identifying references.
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