The Hermeneutics of Meaning - Part Four
Metaphysical and Epistemic Necessity
When Putnam differentiates between "metaphysical necessity" and "epistemic necessity" (previously quoted), just what is the character of the hermeneutical foundations upon which the distinction rests? On the basis of the foregoing 10-12 pages of analysis, the idea of a "logically possible world" seems to be horizonally bounded by at least two features:
1) whatever else it may be, this sort of world cannot entail anything which would contradict the determined character of a given thing's (object's, phenomenon's or event's) nature in the actual world; and, 2) such a "possible world" can entail, and give expression to, whatever considerations of character are not incongruent with the character of the determinate restrictions encompassed by 1).
Given these two features, how is one to differentially conceive of the notions of epistemic and metaphysical necessity in relation to the idea of logically possible world which is bounded by the conditions set out in 1) and 2) above? Once the nature of something (e.g., a given liquid substance) has been determined, does this determination establish epistemic necessity or metaphysical necessity?
Presumably, the source of a hermeneutical frame work's epistemic necessity lies in the manner in which the character of that framework's demarcated understanding reflects, or is congruent with, the character of that to which the framework is making identifying reference in the context of the focal/horizonal nature of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field at a given experiential juncture. In addition, when that to which one is attending concerns the character of the metaphysical principles and properties which actually make certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field possible, then, epistemic necessity is a function of the way the character of one's hermeneutical framework accurately reflects, is congruent with, or merges horizons with certain aspects or dimensions of actual character of such reality.
Furthermore, in any given instance in which an actual determination of nature has been established (e.g., a liquid substance whose atomic/molecular structure os H20), the character of the nature of that 'something' which has been so determined is an expression of what constitutes metaphysical necessity in the given case (i.e., the 'thing's' being what it is). Consequently, under these circumstances, epistemic necessity is not equivalent to metaphysical necessity.
The former (i.e., epistemic necessity) has a character which accurately reflects, or is congruent with, the character of the latter (i.e., metaphysical necessity). However, because the latter (i.e., metaphysical necessity) is an expression, we are assuming, of the way a certain aspect or dimension of reality is, then, the necessity of the epistemic framework is derived from the relationship of understanding's accurate reflectivity with respect to the manner in which reality manifests itself in the experiential circumstances being attended to.
To ask whether reality could have expressed itself differently, and thereby not have constituted an instance of metaphysical necessity, is like supposing one could imagine a logically possible world in which, say, H2O was not H20. Reality is, by virtue of what it is, and what being includes, as well as by what it is not, and what the nature of reality precludes.
The necessity of reality’s being what it is on any given occasion rests with the ontological facticity of its having expressed or manifested itself in a given manner on such an occasion. Irrespective of whatever may transpire on some other occasion of reality manifesting itself, necessity is tied to what did happen in the way of the expression of certain facets of the character of reality on a given occasion - and not to what could have happened on such an occasion.
Even if it could have been the case for a given aspect of manifested reality to, in some sense, have been other than what the character of its transpired ontological expression encompassed or entailed, the necessity which hermeneutically one must keep in mind in order for one's understanding to be described or characterized as expressing epistemic necessity is the following. In relation to the experiential juncture in question, reality expressed itself in the way it did and not in some other way.
Even if the way a given aspect of reality manifested itself was not metaphysically necessary (in the sense that, somehow, it could have manifested itself in other than the way it did, and, as a result, its given manifestation was not necessitated, rendering it as a sort of non-necessary expression of reality), nevertheless, this does not at all affect the following principle. In order for an understanding to be epistemically necessary, the character of the understanding in question must accurately reflect the character of that which it purports to epistemically represent.
One also might want to distinguish different senses of metaphysical necessity. For example, what transpired ontologically is a function of metaphysical principles or properties. This is so, regardless of whether one wishes to maintain: a) there is nothing operative beyond the manifested plane of Being, and, therefore, metaphysics consists in nothing more than an account of the principles (e.g., physical, material, ideational) which comprise the ontological domain of manifest reality; or, b) there are principles (e.g., mystical, religious, spiritual, occult) which are operative beyond the manifest ontological realm, and, therefore, metaphysics consists in an explanation of that which stands outside of, or beyond, physics, temporality, materiality and physicality.
Now, assuming that what transpires ontologically is, according to both a) and b) above, a function of metaphysical principles, the question arises as to whether one could develop a sense of necessity which may not be operable at all levels of reality and, yet, which still would represent an expression of metaphysical necessity in some still-to-be-determined sense of the word. Conceivably, under option b), one has room to maintain that what ontologically takes place constitutes a necessary expression of metaphysical principles and is, thus, an instance of metaphysical necessity. Nevertheless, one could still suppose that, on a deeper metaphysical plane (i.e., that which is beyond the ontology of physical/material events, objects, etc.), 'principles' could have been expressed which were other than what led to the specific ontological manifestation which has occurred.
From the foregoing perspective, there may be a dimension of metaphysical non-necessity standing behind a given ontological manifestation - that is, a manifestation which is necessary in as much as it has been manifested at a given ontological juncture and in as much as the given juncture could not be what it is if it were not manifested in the way that it was manifested. Yet, such a manifestation is a function of higher metaphysical principles that might have expressed themselves in ways other than what happened in the given case.
The event which actually occurs is what is necessary, not necessarily the underlying metaphysical principle’s manner of expression which in a given set of circumstances manifested itself as one kind of event rather than another. Of course, problems arise when one tries to determine exactly what might be entailed by the idea of a level of metaphysics which is free to express itself in different ways and, in so expressing itself, generates, say, physical/material processes or objects such that, once the latter have been ontologically expressed, they are necessary and, therefore, cannot be denied without entangling oneself in contradiction.
With respect to the possibilities inherent in condition 2) outlined on page 41, the issue of differentiating epistemic and metaphysical necessity becomes more elusive. If one is entertaining, as logically possible, a given world of determinate character, then, from the perspective of its logical possibility, there are only two contexts in which one can raise the issues of epistemic and metaphysical necessity in relation to the world that is being entertained.
The first context merely is a rehashing of conceptual ground already covered in the last several pages. In other words, once the nature of something has been determined, then, that nature must be accurately reflected in the character of one's understanding if there is to be any epistemic necessity entailed by one's understanding.
As previously argued, the above context doesn't really concern logically possible worlds. It concerns the metaphysical character which the 'world' manifests through its ontological actuality.
In one sense, an actual world does entail certain possibilities: a) because it has the metaphysical character it does, and b) because not every facet of that metaphysical character may be actively being expressed or manifested at any given experiential juncture. Still, these possibilities really only represent different dimensions of that which is being identifyingly referred to when one uses the linguistic marker "character" in relation to some given aspect of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field or to some aspect of the reality which makes this kind of phenomenology possible. In effect, these possibilities are metaphysical actualities that will be manifested when circumstances occur which are conducive to, or receptive toward, the expression or manifestation of the underlying metaphysical possibilities/actualities.
If one is going to restrict the character of "logically possible worlds" to what, in fact, is a matter of the metaphysical character of actual worlds, then, there is no reason for distinguishing between "actual worlds" and "logically possible worlds", as Putnam does. This is the case since, from the foregoing perspective, "logically possible worlds" would just be an alternative linguistic marker which could be used to make identifying reference to the character of the metaphysics of the actual world. In this context, epistemic necessity becomes, as previously argued, a function of metaphysical necessity.
The only other context in which one can raise the issue of epistemic and metaphysical necessity in relation to a world that is being entertained from the perspective of logical possibility is one that is both interesting and problematic. More specifically, let us imagine, for the moment, there were some things, objects, events, phenomena and so on, of the actual world, whose natures have been determined. Let us also assume there were many other things, objects, events, phenomena and so on of the actual world whose natures had not been determined.
Although, by Putnam's criteria, those aspects of the actual world whose natures have been determined would establish some determinate horizonal boundaries in relation to the character of the metaphysics of the actual world, one would still be free to speculate, hypothesize or theorize about the character of those aspects of the actual world that had not yet been determined. The one restriction on this process would be that the character of this speculating, hypothesizing and theorizing did not contain elements which were incongruent with the character of what had been determined with respect to the metaphysical nature of certain aspects of the actual world.
The foregoing state of affairs would be congruent with Putnam's dictum that: "Once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water doesn't have that nature" (p. 233). Nevertheless, having accepted this provision, one still is left with considerable conceptual latitude or maneuvering room within which one could theorize about how the nature of water might express itself under various experiential conditions.
These would be conditions that had not been explored yet, and, as a result, had not yielded any determinate results that would further restrict what one could entertain in the way of a logically possible world. In this context, the idea of a logically possible world is rooted in, and bounded by, the already determined features of the actual world. At the same time, it would be somewhat open-ended in the sense that one has various degrees of freedom within which to theorize or speculate. These degrees of freedom would represent the epistemic lacunae in one's current hermeneutical framework concerning the metaphysical character of reality or the actual world. The foregoing idea of a logically possible world is an interesting one because it alludes to, and gives intuitive intimation of, many facets of the creative side of epistemological pursuits in which one searches for ways to gain connecting insight into the nature of more and more features of the actual world in order to expand the horizons of one's understanding.
However, the above idea of a logically possible world also represents something of a problem. For instance, in such a logically possible world, one wonders how one is to differentiate between epistemic and metaphysical necessity.
By its very nature, the interesting side of the previous approach to logically possible worlds is immersed in the unknown. As a result, one has no pre-established grounds for identifying the character of those aspects of the metaphysical nature of the actual world which have not been determined yet. Indeed, one is searching for precisely the kind of conceptual ground on which one can establish a tenable, if not accurate, epistemic position concerning some aspect(s) of reality.
All one has are a few guidelines embodied in the way the character of what has so far been determined places boundary restrictions on, or parameters of permissibility in relation to, the character of the logically possible worlds one is epistemically permitted to play around with, or in, during one's theoretical investigations. As far as the unknown dimensions of these logically possible worlds are concerned, one has difficulty trying to establish just what it is, in specific terms, that the notions of "epistemic necessity" and "metaphysical necessity" would be making identifying references to in that context of ignorance.
In outlining Kripke's position on this point, Putnam states:
"Kripke refers to statements which are rationally un-revisable (assuming there are such) as epistemically necessary. Statements which are true in all possible worlds he refers to simply as necessary (or sometimes as "metaphysically necessary"). In this terminology, the point just made can be restated as: a statement can be (metaphysically) necessary and epistemically contingent. Human intuition has no privileged access to metaphysical necessity." (p. 233)
To the extent that understanding requires experience in order to be able to grasp the character of the phenomenology of these experiences or in order to be able to grasp the character of those aspects of reality which make possible, and give expression to, experiences of such determinate character, then, understanding is contingent, irrespective of whether one arrives at that epistemic state in a 'synthetic' or in an 'a pirori' manner. Understanding's contingency is, to a certain extent, rooted in its functional dependency on having experiences of one sort rather than another as the focus for one's understanding. However, what is meant by the idea of "having experiences of one sort rather than another" requires some explanation.
In order to grasp the character of the sort of experiences one is undergoing at a given juncture, one must attend to the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field through which the experience in question expresses or manifests itself. By attending to these aspects, the individual has a focal/horizonal basis from which to begin trying to grasp, or gain connecting insight into: a) the character of the experience being attended to, and/or b) the character of that dimension of reality which makes such an experience possible.
Consequently, understanding requires (that is, is contingent upon) a focus. This focus is something to which the individual can attend, be aware of, explore, be conscious of, investigate, analyze, question, push against, work with, or concentrate on.
Having said the foregoing, one must go on to note that having something to attend to does not guarantee, in and of itself, one will understand what one is attending to. Understanding is also contingent upon one's being able to generate, arrive at, or recognize a hermeneutical framework whose character is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of that which is to be understood and which is being attended to.
This concession concerning the contingent facets of an epistemic state notwithstanding, one still can maintain that an epistemic framework entails necessity to the extent this framework accurately reflects, or is congruent with, the character of that to which the framework is attempting to make identifying reference. As indicated earlier, an epistemic framework derives its necessity from the ontological 'fact' that: 1) what is being hermeneutically represented is what it is and has the character it does, and 2) the character of one's epistemic framework is capable of accurately reflecting, or being congruent with, the character of the given aspect of ontological facticity being identifyingly referred to through the aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which one is attending.
In other words, even though the means by which one arrives at a given understanding may be contingent in a number of different respects, this feature of contingency cannot preclude the possibility that one's understanding may be expressing what is epistemically necessary. Epistemic necessity exists to the extent one's understanding is an accurately reflective hermeneutical representation of some given facet of phenomenological or metaphysical reality.
One might even maintain the following. A contingent statement whose epistemic character does not reflect, accurately, some aspect of the phenomenological/metaphysical necessity (in terms of the former's being congruent with the character of some facet of phenomenological or metaphysical facticity's ontological expression) is not likely to be a very informative or heuristically valuable epistemic statement.
The foregoing would be the case unless one knows of, or realizes, such inaccuracy, and through this realization, one is able to eliminate various possibilities which create, or could create, epistemic/hermeneutical problems for the development and accuracy of one's conceptual geometry.
If the character of a contingent statement does not reflect some facet of the necessity of reality having expressed itself (i.e., reality) in a given ontological fashion on a specified occasion, then, the contingent statement hardly can be said to qualify as being epistemic to any significant degree since it does not entail any knowledge. In other words, that statement does not entail an understanding whose character accurately reflects, or is congruent with, the character of that to which the understanding is attending in a given case.
Putnam seems to be trying to suggest something like the following. Because epistemic statements are contingent, then, one cannot possibly hold, with any tenability, that, epistemically, one could have access to metaphysical necessity through such statements. Or, as he phrases it, "human intuition has no privileged access to metaphysical necessity" (p. 233).
Nevertheless, whether or not human intuition could be said to have a means of "privileged access to metaphysical necessity" is an entirely separate problem from the issues surrounding the possibility of linking epistemic contingency with metaphysical necessity. This is so because, as outlined above, the element of contingency in one's epistemic framework need not constitute an absolute hindrance to gaining, or having, connecting insight into meta-physical necessity. That is, contingency cannot, in and of itself, preclude the possibility of having privileged access to metaphysical necessity - certainly, Putnam's arguments, thus far, have not shown one is forced to accept such a position.
Before one can determine if human intuition does, or does not, have privileged access to metaphysical necessity, one would have to acquire some understanding concerning the well-springs from which human intuition arises. Moreover, given an understanding of the nature of such an epistemological wellspring, one would have to determine if the character of human intuition (or its source) could be said to constitute a means of privileged access to metaphysical necessity. This, of course, assumes one understood what was meant by the notion of "privileged access", and assumes, as well, one actually had determined what was metaphysically necessary in any given case.
To the extent human beings are capable of understanding anything at all about various aspects of metaphysical necessity, then, at some point, this capability appears likely to be rooted in, or shaped by, intuitions which provide what might be termed "connecting insight". These connecting insights allow one to tie together one's particularization or individuation of different aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field into a demarcated hermeneutical framework of specified character.
Hopefully, such a framework would be congruent with, or accurately reflective of, the character of the aspects of reality which makes possible the facets of the phenomenology of one's experiential field to which one is attending at a given experiential juncture (or during a series of given experiential junctures). Without this connecting dimension of intuition or intelligence, one becomes hard pressed to account for even the possibility of the emergence of those insights that are to permit one to bridge epistemically the gap between what transpires within the boundaries of the phenomenology of the experiential field and what, if anything, metaphysically transpires at, beyond and/or beneath the horizons of that field, thereby making a field of such demarcated character possible.
If there is no way to bridge the epistemic gap which stands between our phenomenology and that (i.e., reality) which makes this sort of phenomenology possible, then, the character of reality remains unknowable. Reality would remain unknowable under such circumstances because there would be no connecting insight of the sort required to establish an epistemic link between the two sides of the hermeneutical equation (one side being phenomenological, the other side being metaphysical) that we could be aware was justified or true.
On the other hand, if there were an intuitive means of bridging the aforementioned epistemic gap, then, in some sense of the term, a "privileged access" would be enjoyed by human understanding concerning insight into at least a certain aspect of the character of reality. This aspect would involve that dimension of reality which is expressed in the way reality ontologically has manifested itself at the experiential/epistemological juncture in question.
Because Putnam has not demonstrated, yet, that such an access route does not, or cannot, exist, his contention that "human intuition has no privileged access to metaphysical necessity" is slightly premature. If "statements which are true in all possible worlds" (p. 233) are to be referred to "simply as necessary (or sometimes as ‘metaphysically necessary')" (p. 233), then, seemingly, there can be no epistemically necessary statement which does not reflect what is metaphysically necessary.
After all, surely the reason why some statement would be "rationally un-revisable" (and, therefore, epistemically necessary) is because "in all possible worlds" the statement is true. This would eliminate any need for subsequent revision, rational or otherwise. By being rationally un-revisable or true in all possible worlds, what is epistemically necessary gives expression to what, supposedly, is required, according to Kripke, in order for the statement to be considered metaphysically necessary.
In all of the above, however, there is nothing to indicate why one should suppose the following. If a given epistemic statement is arrived at through contingent means (as opposed to privileged access), this statement could not be accurately reflective of, and congruent with, some aspect of reality. In other words, there appears to be no reason to rule out the possibility that a contingent statement could be, under the right circumstances (i.e., when it is true or correct or accurate), an epistemically necessary representation of the ontological necessity which is manifested in the given instance of reality that is being entailed by the contingent statements. And, this contention is quite apart from the issue of having a "privileged access route" to metaphysical necessity discussed earlier.
From Putnam’s perspective, all "possible worlds" seem to reduce down to being functions of actual worlds. This seems to be the case because, according to him, that which is to count as a possible world must reflect the character of whatever has been determined with respect to the nature of some aspect of the actual world.
Under these circumstances, an epistemic statement must accurately reflect some aspect of the character of reality that is being ontologically manifested in the form of the actual world if this statement is to be considered necessary. However, in the context discussed previously - in which possibility was considered in terms of a theorizing about those aspects of reality which were still unknown (while, simultaneously, taking into account what, so far, has been determined epistemically about the character of such reality) - one cannot speak with any degree of specific hermeneutical authority concerning the relationship, if any, between epistemic and metaphysical necessity. This is so because one doesn’t know what might be rationally un-revisable in these cases (i.e., epistemically necessary).
Furthermore, one doesn’t know what would be true in all possible worlds (i.e., metaphysically necessary) with respect to any given theoretical possibility one might wish to maintain within the context of the character of the horizonal degrees of freedom permitted by what is known or by what has been determined about the nature of the actual world.
On the other hand, as far as the hermeneutical process is concerned, one has no reason to reject the following.
A theoretical statement which one is entertaining as being 'possible’ [epistemically necessary]' does not acquire its necessity in any way except by displaying a character which is understood to be accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of those aspects of reality which currently are being expressed. In addition, such aspects are being expressed in a manner that makes possible the facets of the phenomenology of one's experiential field to which identifying references are being made through the theoretical statement being entertained.
In the light of the discussion during the last 25 pages of this essay, if one returns to the quote cited on page 28, there are several points to note. First of all, irrespective of whether the "Kantian tradition was as guilty as the empiricist tradition of equating metaphysical and epistemic necessity", the foregoing pages of analysis suggest an alternative position.
While metaphysical and epistemic necessity are closely tied together, the character of that connection is not in terms of equating the two. Instead, the character of the connection is in terms of whether or not the character of one's epistemic framework is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of those aspects of the ontologically necessary (inasmuch as they happened) manifestations of reality to which one is making identifying reference by means of one's epistemic framework. If the reflection is accurate, then, it represents epistemic necessity insofar as it is accurate.
Secondly, metaphysically necessary truths are not a function of epistemology. Epistemic necessity is a function of what is metaphysically true according to how this truth is manifested through its ontologically necessary expression.
The character of this expression must be accurately reflected by the character of one's hermeneutical framework in order to tenably contend that the framework has a dimension of epistemic necessity. Therefore, epistemic necessity is not a matter of how one arrives at an understanding (e.g., whether synthetically, analytically or a priorily). Rather, it is a matter only of whether, or not, a given understanding accurately reflects the character of that to which it is making identifying reference in a specific instance. On this view, anything is epistemically necessary if it is rooted in a hermeneutic framework whose character constitutes a true (i.e., is accurately reflective of, or congruent with) understanding of the character of an actual instance of some manifestation of reality.
If, as Putnam contends is the case, both the Kantian tradition and the empiricist tradition maintained that necessary truths were necessarily a priori, then, the tenability of the so-called 'Kantian/empiricist' position does not rest on one's have equated metaphysical and epistemic necessity. Instead, the aforementioned traditions rest on being able to show that: a) the relationship between epistemology and metaphysical principles which will be required to produce a necessary truth is achieved when the character of the former accurately reflects, or is congruent with, the character of the latter; and, b) the route by which a) is established is a priori in character.
Given the foregoing, the Kantian and empiricist traditions are guilty, if they are guilty of anything, of supposing that necessary truth is a function of how one knows and not a matter of the character of what one knows. Epistemic necessity is rooted in 'things' (i.e., reality as ontologically expressed on some given occasion) being the way they are. Therefore, such necessity is not a function of how one comes to recognize, grasp or gain insight into the way things are in any given instance of reality. Rather, whatever our mode of understanding, if it is to entail epistemic necessity, then, it must accurately reflect, or be congruent with, the truth or what is the case in relation to some aspect of reality.
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