The Hermeneutics of Meaning - Part Three
Natural Kind Terms in the Context of Logically Possible Worlds
Putnam maintains:
"There are two obvious ways of telling someone what one means by a natural-kind term such as "water" or "tiger" or "lemon". One can give a so-called ostensive definition - "this (liquid) is water"; "this (animal) is a tiger"; "this (fruit) is a lemon"; where the parentheses are meant to indicate that the markers "liquid", "animal", "fruit" may be either explicit or implicit. Or one can give a description. In the latter case the description one gives typically consists of one or more markers together with a stereotype - a standardized description of features of the kind that are typical, or "normal", or at any rate stereotypical. The central features of the stereotype generally are criteria - features which in normal situations constitute ways of recognizing if a thing belongs to the kind or, at least, necessary conditions (or probabilistic necessary conditions) for membership in the kind." (pp. 229-230)
A page later, Putnam states:
"When I say "this (liquid) is water", the "this" is, so to speak, a de re "this" - i.e.,the force of my explanation is that "water" is whatever bears a certain equivalence relation (the relation we called "sameL above) to the piece of liquid referred to as "this" in the actual world." (p.231)
The phrase "the actual world" is used in the above quote because Putnam is approaching his analysis of meaning from the perspective of a possible worlds framework. Thus, shortly before the above quote, Putnam stipulates the following:
"Let W1 and W2 be two possible worlds in which I exist and in which this glass exists and in which I am giving a meaning explanation by pointing to this glass and saying "this is water" (we do not assume that the liquid in the glass is the same in both worlds). Let us suppose that in W1 the glass is full of H2O and in W2 the glass is full of XYZ. We shall also suppose that W1 is the actual world and the XYZ is the stuff typically called "water" in the world W2." (p. 230)
Putnam further notes how Saul Kripke uses the term "rigid" to refer to those linguistic markers (Kripke calls them "designators") which refer "to the same individual in every possible world in which the designator designates" (p. 231). Putnam goes on to suggest that "water" (in Putnam's sense of H20) is an instance of what Kripke has in mind when the latter speaks of rigid designators or rigid designation.
Putnam believes this is correct since, apparently, the meaning of "water" is to be determined by the character of the liquid in the glass on World1 - given that World1 is the actual world and given, presumably, that meaning is a function of what the character of the actual world entails with respect to that aspect of the actual world to which attention is being directed at a specified time and place. Furthermore, in the example described by Putnam, this aspect toward which attention is directed consists of the glass of liquid which is before one now and which, by stipulation, is said to contain H20.
The foregoing really does not account for why either Putnam or Kripke feels one needs to invoke the notion of logically possible worlds in relation to the analysis of the notion of meaning. In fact, the reasons for the introduction of logically possible worlds into the discussion of meaning don't begin to become apparent until one studies the theory of meaning that is rooted in the character of the perspective which is expressed through the term "rigid designator".
Especially important in this context are the ramifications of that theory of meaning for the idea of necessity. More specifically, Kripke distinguishes between "epistemically necessary" and "metaphysically necessary" truths.
The former kind of truth refers to those statements or terms whose meanings reflect the actual nature of things (e.g., that water is H20) such that no world can be considered a possible world unless that world includes linguistic markers whose meanings are accurately reflective of the actual nature of those ontological/metaphysical 'things' which make up such a world. "Metaphysically necessary" truths, on the other hand, refer to "statements which are true in all possible world" (p. 233).
In Putnam's words the alleged upshot of this distinction is:
"Since Kant there has been a big split between philosophers who thought that all necessary truths were analytic and philosophers who thought that some necessary truths were synthetic a priori. But none of these philosophers thought that a (metaphysically) necessary truth could fail to be a priori; the Kantian tradition was as guilty as the empiricist tradition of equating metaphysical and epistemic necessity." (p. 233)
Apparently, through means of the possible worlds mode of analysis, one is able to gain connecting insight into, or true understanding of, the character of the supposed differences between metaphysical and epistemic necessity in the context of human understanding.
However, there appear to be a number of fundamental problems. For instance, problems arise in relation to the presumed heuristic value or pay-off of the possible worlds mode of analysis. Moreover, problems also arise with respect to the notion of "rigid designation" and whether or not that notion really clarifies the logical character of the meanings in the way Putnam (and Kripke) seems to believe is the case.
Putnam has claimed that when one ostensively refers to a glass which contains a liquid and says, either explicitly: "The liquid in this glass is water", or implicitly: "This [meaning that substance which is in the glass] is water", the effect of the reference is de re in nature. As a result, whatever bears a certain equivalence relation (the relation we called 'sameL' above) to the piece of liquid referred to as 'this' in relation to the given glass, then, that substance will be the very same sort of thing to which we, presently, are making identifying reference by using the linguistic marker "water".
Given that Putnam has specified (see the quote taken from page 230 of Putnam) we are to suppose the glass of liquid in Worldl is to be composed of H20, and given that Worldl is to be considered as the actual world, then, as far as Putnam is concerned, the precise nature of the de re identifying reference which is being made (by saying, for example: "This [the liquid] is water") is a matter of the atomic/molecular structure of the liquid in question. In other words, for Putnam, there is an equivalency relation ('sameL') between two things. On the one hand, there is the ostensively designated liquid in the glass. On the other hand, there is that to which the designator "water" makes identifying reference. The character of this equivalency relation is, according to Putnam, a function of the atomic/molecular structure of both the liquid in the glass and that to which the linguistic marker "water" is used to designate.
Putnam, seemingly, is being very arbitrary by contending that the character of the equivalency relation which he claims ties together the liquid in a given glass (to which ostensive identifying reference is being made) and the linguistic marker "water" must be a function of atomic/molecular structure. He is being arbitrary in that he seems to want to require everyone to restrict their sense of meaning with respect to that to which "water" makes identifying reference, to the dimension of atomic/molecular structure.
If the context in which the sentence: "This (liquid) is water" is uttered were a science laboratory, then, there might be some legitimacy to one's surmising that in pointing to the liquid and identifying it as "water" the speaker was not referring to just the phenomenological character of an individual's sensory interaction with such a liquid. In these sorts of circumstance, the speaker may have been referring primarily to the atomic/molecular structure of the liquid.
On the other hand, if the speaker simply wanted the others in the lab to know where the liquid was which could help wash away certain caustic substances from the skin or eyes should there be an accident with such substances, or if the speaker merely wanted to identify the container which contained the liquid that could be used to make tea or coffee, or if the speaker wanted to alert students about the locality of the container which contained a liquid that could put out certain kinds of fires, then, even in the context of a laboratory, one could not assume the focus of a speaker's ostensive designation (concerning the liquid in a given glass or container) was intended to refer to the atomic/molecular structure of that liquid.
Under these circumstances, the character of the equivalency relation between the liquid and "water" may be along various functional lines which do not require that, say, a unique atomic/molecular structure be identified as the link between designated particular and the linguistic designator. Instead, the link may be rooted in certain functional properties which are held in common by any of the members of a set of particulars (in the present case, containers of H2O and XYZ) that are collectively referred to by the linguistic marker 'water".
In addition, as discussed previously, the character of the basis for the equivalency relation between ostensively identified liquid and linguistic designator "water" may be a product of purely phenomenological considerations. These considerations would concern matters such as: how the liquid tastes, smells, feels, looks; its effect upon one when consumed; whether it could be used for cooking, working, generating power, growing plants, and so on, as determined by one's understanding of the character of the various aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field which one learned to link (on one's own or through the ostensive designations of others) with that to which the term "water" made identifying reference during the course of one's conceptual/ linguistic development.
The "actual world" can be approached hermeneutically from many different directions. Because this is the case, the character of a speaker's focus with respect to that to which ostensive identifying references are being made, on any given occasion, could be as varied as the nature of the hermeneutical framework out of which such identifying references arise. The atomic/molecular structure of particulars constitutes only one hermeneutical possibility.
Consequently, there seems to be no good reason why one should feel compelled to be confined to the character of the parameters defined by the restricted scope of such a hermeneutic. The foregoing is the case irrespective of whether one is attempting to grasp the character of either a) what someone means by a linguistic marker, or b) what, in ultimate metaphysical or ontological terms, is entailed by that to which someone is making an identifying reference by employing a given linguistic marker.
With regard to this latter metaphysical aspect [i.e., b) above], Putnam appears to be assuming that the atomic/molecular structure of, say, water (i.e., H20) constitutes the most essential and definitive dimension of such a substance. However, if one were concerned with the religious dimension of that substance and its use in, for example, baptismal rites or ritual ablutions for the performance of prayer or in the performance of an exorcism, then, the aspect of atomic/molecular structure may only be an incidental consideration when juxtaposed next to the canonical rules that govern which liquids of all those that consist of H2O will be permitted to be used for spiritual purposes.
A liquid which was determined to consist of H2O might not qualify as an instance of "water" in the religious/spiritual sense, as a result of some feature of contamination that did not alter the atomic/molecular character of the liquid but which did, or was believed to, affect the spiritual character of that for which the term "water" was used as an identifying reference or designation. Similarly, a container of liquid might consist of just H2O and, yet, be useless - in fact dangerous - for the purpose of human consumption.
For example, that for which "water" is used to make identifying reference in most everyday sorts of circumstances is not distilled water but potable water. Potable water contains, among other things, trace amounts of various metals which provide a specific electrolytic character to the liquid, thereby making it usable or non-injurious, and so on.
To the extent one is trying to understand what others mean by their use of a linguistic marker, then, one should note how the character of a speaker's identifying reference to the "actual world" is a function of the speaker's focal/horizonal orientation with respect to certain aspects of the phenomenology of the speaker's experiential field. In order to grasp someone else's meaning, the character of one's understanding must be accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the character of the speaker's focal/horizonal orientation. The greater the degree of this reflection or congruency, the more closely does one's understanding come to merging horizons with certain facets of the speaker's conceptual geometry or demarcated framework of meaning.
On the other hand, to the extent one is trying to understand the character of certain aspects of the ultimate metaphysical properties and/or principles that make various demarcated phenomenologies of the experiential field possible and for which purposes certain linguistic markers or designators are used to make identifying references, then, one should keep the following in mind. The character of the "actual world" is a function of metaphysical properties and principles. These properties and principles are responsible for differentially demarcated phenomenological frameworks having the character they do. Consequently, in order to grasp the intensional/extensional character of such metaphysical properties and principles, the character of one's understanding must be accurately reflective of, or be congruent with, the character of the intensional/extensional parameters expressed through, or manifested by, such metaphysical properties and principles.
Furthermore, the character of one's understanding with respect to the latter metaphysical dimension will be mediated by the inferences and connecting insights one makes in relation to, and by means of, the conceptual geometry one has constructed. The geometry has been structured through organizing the various experiential co-ordinate points of reference which have been made possible by the underlying metaphysical dimension.
In both of the above senses of "actual world" introducing the idea of 'logically possible worlds' seems entirely unnecessary as a way of clarifying what a term, designator or linguistic marker is making, or attempting to make, identifying references to in any given set of phenomenological and/or metaphysical circumstances. In fact, one has considerable difficulty understanding just why Putnam believes the idea of a logically possible world helps clarify the problem of meaning in a way which is not encompassed already by one's attempted hermeneutic of the "actual world" as expressed in terms of: either a) the character of a certain aspect(s) of the phenomenology of a given individual's (e.g., a speaker's) experiential field to which one is attending; or, b) the character of that which makes a certain demarcated aspect(s) of the phenomenology of the experiential field (whether mine or one which is described or reported by someone else) possible.
To be sure, in one sense, one's hermeneutical inferences concerning the character of a given phenomenological and/or metaphysical context constitute a kind of logically possible world which is rooted in, and a function of, the way one individuates, particularizes or characterizes the focal/horizonal interfacing that is generated through one's intentional encountering of some aspect of the phenomenology of one's experiential field. One's manner or mode of individuating experience produces experiential co-ordinate points of reference that manifest a certain character according to the nature of the individuation process one employs.
This process may involve conscious structures (e.g., in line with some belief system), or the individuation process may transpire as a function of the structuring properties of those facets of one's hermeneutical capabilities (e.g., connecting insight, interrogative imperative, congruence relationships, etc.) that are not currently being mediated or oriented by some specific belief or belief system. By means of these experiential co-ordinate points of reference, together with some inferential ordering and linking of such points, one constructs a conceptual geometry or demarcated intentional framework which expresses something like a logically possible world as viewed through the current epistemic shape of one's hermeneutic of experience.
Thus, one can reflect upon that hermeneutic, as well as analyze it, pursue the interrogative imperative in relation to it. One also can experiment with it and check the results against subsequent experiential co-ordinate points of reference, or one can check the results against past experiential co-ordinate points of reference (mine or those of others) which have not been investigated previously or have not been integrated with the current conceptual geometry.
In doing these sorts of activities, one has a phenomenological basis which one can use to explore the extent or degree of congruency which may exist: a) between the character of various aspects of one's conceptual geometry and the character of those aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field to which one is attending; or, b) between the character of various aspects of one's conceptual geometry and the character of those metaphysical principles and properties which would seem necessary (given the character of one's current range of experiences) to make such a demarcated phenomenology possible.
In terms of the foregoing perspective, one might say that one is comparing the character of the 'possible world' of one's hermeneutical framework with the character of the "actual world" of either the phenomenology of the experiential field or the metaphysics of that which makes such a phenomenology possible. However, in this latter metaphysical sense of "actual world", reality is mediated through phenomenology, whereas in the former phenomenological sense of "actual world", reality is (in one's own case, at least) directly experienced.
This is so because in those circumstances, the phenomenology qua phenomenology constitutes the real nature of the "actual world" of phenomenology. Nonetheless, even where the 'actual world" is a matter of the character of the underlying metaphysical principles and properties which make a given demarcated phenomenology possible, if such an "actual world" is to be understood or known, it needs to be mediated through the logical character of the hermeneutical framework which orients or structures the focal/horizonal nature of the phenomenology of one's experiential field with respect to those principles and properties.
In either case, one can explore the issue of congruency between the possible world character of one's conceptual geometry and the character of the "actual world" metaphysics. One can do this by noting the sort of problems and questions which are left as a result of having pursued the interrogative imperative when playing off the character of one's conceptual geometry against, for example, the character of subsequent experiences (mine or others) which can be characterized and then, juxtaposed next to the geometry for purposes of determining congruency.
In time, one builds up, or attempts to, an experientially cross-referenced (through inferential linkages) conceptual geometry. This geometry is capable, to a greater or lesser extent, of providing a basis for resolving previously encountered problems of congruency that have been generated by the unanswered questions and difficulties which arose due to the congruency lacunae entailed by the character of the earlier conceptual geometry when pitted against the data of the phenomenology of the experiential field (both mine and that of others).
The above senses of "logically possible world" and "actual world" do not fit, in any readily evident way, with Putnam's consideration of a (supposedly) logically possible world Twin Earth where "water" serves as a linguistic marker for XYZ and not H20. In the Twin Earth context in which "water" refers to the liquid with an atomic/molecular structure of XYZ (not H2O, as is the case on Earth), the character of that to which "logical possibility" makes identifying reference becomes a function of the conceptual parameters which one builds into one's suppositional/hypothetical 'world parameters'. Such parameters are limited only by one's creative imagination and by the restrictions which the requirements of, say, non-contradiction impose on what is to be considered to be "logically possible".
Thus, 'sounds that smell' or 'water (i.e., H20)-like liquids which are made of XYZ' might make up a logically possible world since there appears to be nothing contradictory in supposing that, on some possible world, sounds smell, or that, on some other possible world, water (i.e., H20)-like liquids have XYZ for their atomic/molecular structure and not H20. On the other hand, a world in which there were 'round squares' or 'seven-sided triangles' or 'bachelors who were married' or 'red circles that were colorless and shapeless' or 'A's which were not A's' would not, one might surmise, be considered as instances of logically possible worlds.
The foregoing is so because, if the various words in the foregoing expression were to have the same meaning on such worlds as those words have on Earth, then, there would seem to be logical contradictions involved in those worlds. Yet, if this is the case, then, apparently Twin Earth should not be considered to be a logically possible world.
After all, according to Putnam, on Earth "water" is a linguistic marker for liquids whose nature is expressed through the atomic/molecular structure of H20. If the character of an "actual world" designation, (i.e., 'something' to which a linguistic marker on Earth makes identifying reference) is to establish the criteria by which one judges whether or not something is logically possible (as in the cases of 'round squares', 'seven-sided triangles', 'married bachelors' and so on), then, obviously, Twin Earth cannot be a logically possible world.
On Twin-Earth, "water" designates liquids whose atomic/molecular structure is XYZ. However, according to Putnam, "water" only can refer identifyingly to liquids whose atomic /molecular structure is H2O as is the case on Earth which is an "actual world" (at least, Earth is an "actual world" as far as the way Putnam has set up the situation is concerned).
Putnam himself seems to say as much when he argues:
"Once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water doesn't have that nature. Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is H20, nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn't H20. In particular, if a "logically possible" statement is one that holds in some "logically possible world" it isn't logically possible that water isn't H2O ." (p. 233)
Since Putnam has stipulated that the nature of water resides in its atomic/molecular structure of H20, then, ipso facto, Twin Earth cannot count as a possible world because in it water isn't H2O. It is XYZ.
Evidently, to say that the nature of water is XYZ is like saying 'bachelors are married', or 'circles are squares', and so on. This is seemingly a contradiction in terms.
If Twin Earth, as described by Putnam, is not a logically possible world, then, one wonders how it can be accepted as part of an alleged demonstration of the untenable nature of various implications which reportedly ensue when the assumptions underlying so-called traditional theories of meaning are linked together in certain ways. Seemingly, Putnam's attempted demonstration that psychological states do not determine extension rests on one's having to accept a world (i.e., Twin Earth) which, by Putnam's own criteria, is not a logically possible one.
In reflecting upon Putnam's position, "logically possible worlds" appear to be a function of what is the case in the "actual world". As Putnam says (quoted earlier): "Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is H20, nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn't H20" (p. 233). Yet, if logically possible worlds are really only a function of, and restricted by, the character of various aspects of "actual worlds", then, one wonders what purpose is served by speaking of the idea of "logically possible worlds" or by introducing this idea into the discussion of meaning.
Putnam does specify that: "Once [emphasis mine] we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water doesn't have that nature" (p. 233). This leaves room open for entertaining the following.
Until the actual nature of something is discovered, then, logically possible worlds could be constructed, imagined or hypothesized. This construction process would permit the positing of various structures as the proposed nature of that 'something' to which one is attending in the "actual world".
Presumably, this would mean that in the mid-1700s, before the discovery of the atomic/molecular structure of the liquid substances for which "water" is used to making identifying references on both Earth and Twin Earth, Twin Earth would be a logically possible world. On the other hand, after the discovery that the liquid substances on Earth, for which "water" serves as linguistic marker, had an atomic/molecular structure of H20, then, apparently, Twin Earth could no longer be considered a logically possible world since the nature of water on that planet is not H2O but XYZ. This conclusion seems a rather relativistic one.
Let us imagine that Twin Earth did exist. Let us further suppose the discovery was made on Twin Earth that the atomic/molecular structure of the liquid substance in question was XYZ prior to the time when scientists on Earth discovered that the atomic/molecular structure of the respective liquid substance on Earth was H20.
Does this mean Earth would not be a logically possible world as far as the people of Twin Earth were concerned? After all, using Putnam's criteria, nothing would count as a logically possible world in which water was not XYZ. Surely such an argument places Putnam and all other inhabitants of Earth in a rather strange position of having to sup-pose there might be some circumstances in which the actual world, from our point of view, is not a logically possible one.
The character of reality, or of the "actual world", is independent of the way one assigns linguistic markers as a means of making identifying references, either to certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field or to certain aspects of the underlying metaphysics which makes such a field possible. Therefore, when Putnam says: "Once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world in which water doesn't hold that nature", the issue of meaning in these circumstances isn't a matter of linguistic markers or rigid designators. Instead, Putnam is concerned with the actual character of that to which one makes identifying reference through the use of terms or linguistic markers.
If a given liquid substance has an atomic/molecular structure of H20, then, any world in which H2O is not H2O is not a logically possible world. This is the case, just as worlds in which 'squares are round' or 'A is not A' or 'triangles are seven-sided' are not to be construed as logically possible worlds because squares (i.e., that to which the linguistic marker "squares" makes identifying reference) have a character of being four-sided, closed, plane figures which are incongruent with entities that are, among other things, 'round in character. Moreover, A (i.e., that to which the linguistic marker "A" makes identifying reference) is what it is by virtue of its character, and anything which does not have that character cannot be A, and A cannot be that thing which does not have the character which A has. Similarly, triangles (i.e., that to which the linguistic marker "triangle" makes identifying reference) are three-sided, closed, plane figures, and, consequently give expression to a character that is incongruent with entities which have seven sides as part of their character.
Nevertheless, all of this appears to have relatively little, if anything, to do with the 'fact' that on Twin Earth the linguistic marker "water" is used to identifyingly refer to a liquid substance whose atomic/molecular structure is XYZ. If on Earth part of the character of a given liquid substance is that it has an atomic/molecular structure of H20, and if on Twin Earth part of the character of a given liquid substance is that it has an atomic/ molecular structure of XYZ, then, from Putnam's perspective, one would not be describing a logically possible world if one tried to maintain that H2O was XYZ or that XYZ was H20.
Yet, the foregoing is not what is happening in the hypothetical circumstances which Putnam has outlined in his article. The inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth, circa 1750, both use the linguistic marker "water" to make identifying references to liquid substances which, from a purely surface-phenomenological point of view, are identical in all respects (i.e., in terms of taste, smell, feel, appearance, and functional properties - such as whether one can cook in it, swim in it, grow fruits in it, and so on).
Oscar1 is not saying that H2O is XYZ, and Oscar2 is not saying that XYZ is H20. They each are saying that the character of the hermeneutical means by which they identify whether or not any liquid substance they experientially encounter will be the sort of thing for which they will use the term "water" to make identifying reference is a function of the extent of the congruency which can be established. This proposed congruency is between the character of their understanding of that for which "water" is used as a linguistic marker and the character of the liquid substance which they are now encountering.
Neither the Oscar1 nor the Oscar2 of the mid-1700s includes considerations of atomic/molecular structure as part of the character of the hermeneutical framework through which they are epistemically linked to those aspects of the phenomenology of their respective experiential fields to which the linguistic marker "water" makes identifying reference. Consequently, for Oscar1 and Oscar2 of the mid-1700s, the atomic/molecular structure of a given liquid does not form part of what they mean by "water" (in the sense of the character of the hermeneutical framework for which the given linguistic marker makes identifying reference).
Moreover, this atomic/molecular structure does not form part of what they would identify as being required by exemplars in order for "water" to be used as an appropriate linguistic marker in relation to such exemplars ("Identify" here is to be construed in the sense that a collection of experiential instances manifesting enough of the features of the character of an intensional framework would be accepted as extensional expressions of that to which the intensional framework was making identifying reference.). Thus, even though, in terms of the character of the intensional/extensional nature of certain aspects of metaphysical reality, some liquid substances on Earth have an atomic/molecular structure of H20, and even though some liquid substances on Twin Earth have an atomic/molecular structure of XYZ, as far as Oscar1 and Oscar2 of the mid-1700s are concerned, the intensional/extensional nature of the hermeneutical framework underlying and governing the use of the linguistic marker "water" is not making identifying references to atomic/molecular structure when that term (i.e., water) is being employed. As scientists later will discover, it so happens that, in point of fact, the liquid substances to which Oscar1 is making identifying reference in the mid-1700s has an atomic/molecular structure of H20, while the liquid substances to which Oscar2 is making identifying reference has an atomic/molecular structure of XYZ.
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