The Hermeneutics of Meaning - Part Two
Extension, Psychological States and Twin Earth
According to Putnam, traditional theories of meaning are committed to maintaining that:
"... two speakers cannot be in the same psychological state in all respects and understand the term A differently; the psychological state of the speaker determines the intension (and hence, by assumption 2), the extension) of A." (p. 222)
Putnam goes on to assert, with respect to the above:
"It is this last consequence of the joint assumptions 1), 2) that we claim to be false. We claim that it is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the same psychological state (in the narrow sense), even though the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other. Extension is not determined by psychological state." (p. 222)
In order to demonstrate the correctness of his claim concerning the short-comings of the assumption on which traditional theories of meaning supposedly rest, Putnam makes use of a possible world setting called "Twin Earth". In this setting, one is to imagine that, with a few exceptions, everything about Twin Earth is, as its name would suggest, exactly like its counterpart Earth.
One of the differences which is said to distinguish Twin Earth from Earth is that on the former planet:
... the liquid called "water" is not H2O but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated." (p. 223)
Putnam provides an abbreviated symbol, "XYZ", to represent the complex chemical formula which expresses, presumably, the atomic/molecular structure of the substance called 'water" on Twin Earth. Putnam also goes on to note that despite the difference in chemical formulae between Earth's "water" (H20) and Twin Earth's "water" (XYZ), nonetheless, we are to suppose that, under normal conditions of pressure and temperature, both Earth's H2O and Twin Earth's XYZ are indistinguishable from one another as far as the way they each look, taste, and quench thirst.
The indistinguishable character of their respective appearances and properties notwithstanding, Putnam contends that "water" has a different meaning and extension on Twin Earth than it has on Earth. What is called "water" on Twin Earth is XYZ and not H20. Yet, what is called "water" on Earth is H2O and not XYZ.
Stated in an alternative way, on Twin Earth the term "water" serves as a linguistic marker which can be used to make an identifying reference to a substance-particular whose chemical formula is XYZ. On Earth, however, the term "water" serves as a linguistic marker which can be used to make an identifying reference to a substance-particular whose chemical formula is H20. Furthermore, according to Putman, although there might be some initial confusion concerning the meaning and use of the term "water" if someone from Twin Earth were to visit Earth, or if someone from Earth were to visit Twin Earth, nevertheless, eventually, the intensional/extensional character of that to which "water" referred would come be seen to be different for the inhabitants of each planet.
Having argued in the foregoing manner, Putnam alters the character of the previous story line somewhat and asks his readers to suppose that the time-frame in Earth and Twin Earth is no longer the modern era, but has been changed to the mid-1700s. This is prior to the time when Earthlings and Twin Earthlings had discovered that "water" referred, respectively, to substances whose chemical formulae are H2O and XYZ. Putnam's argument proceeds in the following manner:
"Let Oscar1 be such a typical Earthian English speaker, and let Oscar2 be his counterpart on Twin Earth. You may suppose that there is no belief that Oscar1 had about water that Oscar2 did not have about "water". If you like, you may even suppose that Oscar1 and Oscar2 were exact duplicates in appearance, feelings, thoughts, interior monologue, etc. Yet, the extension of the term "water" was just as much H20 on Earth in 1750 as in 1950; and the extension of the term "water" was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in 1950. Oscar1and Oscar2 understand the term "water" differently in 1750 although they were in the same psychological state, and although given the state of science at the time, it would have taken their scientific communities about fifty years to discover that they understood the term "water" differently. Thus, the extension of the term "water" (and, in fact, its "meaning" in the intuitive pre-analytical usage of that term) is not a function of psychological state of the speaker by itself." (p.224)
Putnam's belief that the extension of the term "water" would be different for the two Oscars, despite the alleged sameness of psychological states, seems to rest on the scientific evidence that, eventually, is uncovered. Putnam seems to be arguing, implicitly, that although the discoveries concerning such structures are not made until around 1800 on both Earth and Twin Earth, the time of discovery has no bearing on what the actual character of a substance's atomic/molecular structure is.
That which "water" referred to on Twin Earth in 1750 was still XYZ, whether the beings on Twin Earth knew this or not. Similarly, that to which "water" made identifying reference on Earth in 1750 was still H20, whether Earthlings knew this to be the case or not.
Consequently, considered from the perspective of what Putnam sees as the absolute characters of water on Earth and Twin Earth, the proper extension of "water" on Twin Earth would entail only instances of XYZ. As a result, any samples of H2O which were encountered by a Twin Earth being would not be treated as part of "water's" extension.
At the same time, the proper extension of "water" for an Earthling would include only exemplars whose atomic/molecular structure was H20. Therefore, if an Earthling were to run across water-like substances whose structure was XYZ, that substance would not be identified as part of the extension of "water" on Earth.
As far as Putnam is concerned, even if one were to assume that the psychological states of Oscar1 and Oscar2 were precisely the same in all respects, the character of the extensional sets entailed by their respective uses of the linguistic marker "water" would be mutually exclusive or disjoint. Therefore, Putnam feels one is compelled to conclude that psychological states do not determine extension in the way he claims traditional theories of meaning would be required to maintain.
The essential features of Putnam's foregoing position is untenable, although there is an element of his argument which, when placed in proper perspective, is capable of being defended. Among other things, Putnam appears to confuse and conflate a number of issues.
For example, he appears to ignore, entirely, the following, fundamental distinction. On the one hand, there is the character of the intensional/extensional dimension of the phenomenology of the individual's experiential field which constitutes the individual's own hermeneutical understanding of either various aspects of that phenomenology or of that which makes a phenomenology of such demarcated character possible. On the other hand, there is the character of the intensional/extensional dimension of the aspect of experience or reality to which the individual is attempting to make identifying reference through his or her hermeneutic.
Even if one were to acknowledge Putnam's point that, say, "water" on Twin Earth is still XYZ before the discovery of its atomic/molecular structure, this acknowledgment is irrelevant to what the being of Twin Earth (circa 1750) would identify as exemplars of "water", whether on Twin Earth or Earth. As far as the 1750 Twin Earth being's sense of understanding is concerned, with respect to the linguistic marker "water", the extension of "water" (as well as its intension) is a function of the character of all of the features, peculiarities, properties, uses, dangers, appearances, and so on, which, experientially, have been encountered by the Twin Earth being.
Let us imagine that some bright young scientist from the Twin Earth of 2002 (let us call him Oscar Chronos) were to invent a time-travel device. Let us further imagine that Dr. Chronos is an anthropologist and historian whose specialty is the life and times of Twin Earth in the mid-1700s.
Given the foregoing, then, in the event Dr. Chronos traveled back to the year 1750, there are certain distinctions which he would be capable of making that non-time-traveling inhabitants of Twin Earth in 1750 would not be capable of making. For instance, imagine that Dr. Chronos undertook his time journey in order to perform various experiments.
Therefore, among the experimental paraphenalia which he stuffed into his deluxe model time-travel kit we might find some sensitized strips of specially processed fabric designed to indicate whether a substance contained H2O (let us assume the fabric turned orange on exposure to H20) or XYZ (let us assume the fabric turned purple when exposed to XYZ). By using the specially processed fabric, the scientist would be able to determine whether any given instance of water-like substance he encountered in the Twin Earth of 1750 should be assigned to the extension of "water" as beings on Twin Earth of 2002 understood the term, or whether those substances should be included in the extensional set encompassing what beings on Earth of 2002 would refer to as "water".
For Dr. Chronos, anything which turned his fabric indicator purple would be an instance of Twin Earth "water". Alternatively, anything which induced the fabric indicator to turn orange would be considered to be an instance of Earth "water".
Being an expert anthropologist and historian of the Twin Earth of the mid-1700s, Dr. Chronos would understand, presumably, that the inhabitants of Twin Earth in 1750 would not differentiate between two substances which he knew, after testing, to be XYZ and H20, respectively. As far as the inhabitants of Twin Earth, 1750, are concerned, all substances, regardless of whether their atomic/molecular structure is H2O or XYZ, are identifyingly referred to by the linguistic marker "water", as long as those substances manifest properties which conform to the range of possibilities that fall within the character of what the inhabitants have come to understand about those substances on the basis of a wide variety of previous experiential encounters with them.
Dr. Chronos, of course, would restrict the scope of the linguistic marker "water" to only substances having an atomic/molecular structure of XYZ. However, as an anthropological and historical expert on life in the mid-1700s, he also would understand that the dwellers of the mid-1700s would not place such a restriction on the scope of their use of the linguistic market "water".
Consequently, there would be differences between Dr. Chronos and the dwellers of the mid-1700s in relation to the character of their respective extensional treatment of the term "water". These differences also would correspond to, and be a function of, differences in the character of hermeneutical approaches which they employed as a means of ordering or structuring various experiential co-ordinate points of reference that arose in the phenomenology of their respective experiential fields (i.e., experiences involving 'water').
Putnam would be correct to say that the extension of "water", as Chronos understood the term (i.e., the substance which has atomic/molecular structure XYZ and which is native to Twin Earth), would exclude any instances of substances whose atomic/molecular structure was H20. Furthermore, Putnam also would be correct to maintain that whenever a Twin Earth being of 2002 encountered a substance whose atomic/molecular structure was XYZ, then, this being would refer identifyingly to that substance as "water".
Nonetheless, Putnam would be wrong to argue that what a Twin Earth being of the mid-1700s would identify as an extensional instance of "water" would exclude all substances whose atomic/molecular structure turned out to be H20. Putnam also would be wrong to maintain that whenever a Twin Earth being of the mid-1700s encountered a substance whose atomic/molecular structure turned out to be H20, then, this being would not refer identifyingly to that substance by the linguistic marker "water".
Putnam has failed to take cognizance of the fact that for the dwellers of Twin Earth in the mid-1700s, the character of their basis for demarcating those aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field which are identifyingly referred to as "water" involves a variety of experiential encounters which are independent of atomic/molecular considerations. Stated in a slightly different way, what the dwellers of Twin Earth are really referring to is that substance whose character is such that it is capable of interacting with the character of the phenomenology of the experiential field in a way that would result in aspect(s) of that field having a character which could be identified as indicating the presence of "water" - and, in the mid-1700s, there are two substances capable of doing this: H2O and ‘XYZ’.
These experiential encounters are particularized and characterized according to how the relevant particulars look, behave, smell, feel, and taste, as well as in terms of what can be done with, or to, such particulars. In other words, the hermeneutical basis for the use of "water" by Twin Earth dwellers of the mid-1700s is characterized along different lines than the hermeneutical basis for the use of "water" by Twin Earth dwellers of 2002.
The latter is rooted in what is believed or understood to be the character of the atomic/molecular structures of that which is being referred to. On the other hand, the hermeneutical basis for the use of "water" by mid-1700s Twin Earth dwellers is rooted in what is believed or understood to be the character of the phenomenology of everyday experiences involving liquids of a determinate description or characterization.
Unfortunately, Putnam, apparently, fails to see there are two entirely different ways of individuating the phenomenology of the experiential field for Twin Earth beings of the different time periods. These differences do not necessarily mean the character of that which is being differentially individuated or particularized in the two time frames is unrelated.
Nevertheless, the differences in character between the individuation of the respective hermeneutical frameworks do mean that if one is not careful, as Putnam appears not to have been is his argument quoted earlier in this essay, then, one easily can confuse or conflate two separate dimensions. On the one hand, there is the intensional/ extensional nature of one's understanding of the character of that to which a term is making identifying references in the phenomenology of one's experiential field (or that which makes such a field possible). On the other hand, there is the intensional/extensionsl nature of: either someone else's understanding of the character of that to which a term is making identifying reference, or what turns out to be the actual character of that to which identifying references are being made. And, if such conflation does occur, one comes to impose one's meaning framework onto others or onto reality, irrespective of the actual character of either of the latter contexts.
The Character of Meaning
Somehow, Putnam seems to feel the atomic/molecular structure of a substance (in the present case, either H2O or XYZ) is a more reliable and fundamental indicator of what must be meant by a term than is the character of the focal/horizonal orientation of the phenomenology of an individual's experiential field. To be sure, an individual's intention might be to try to provide an explication of why certain aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field had the character they did.
As a result, one might begin to search, rigorously and methodically, for the underlying metaphysical or ontological nature of that which made those characteristic aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field possible. Moreover, conceivably, one might discover that the most readily experiential properties of the character of that to which the term "water" made identifying reference (e.g., its liquidity, taste, smell, appearance under different conditions, feel and so on) were, in fact, a function of the way the atomic/molecular structure of "water" expressed itself when shaped and played off against the character of the contextual circumstances in which that to which "water" referred was phenomenologically and metaphysically immersed.
Nonetheless, one could acknowledge this sort of possibility without, in any way, being compelled to reject the following position. What one intensionally/extensionally meant to identifyingly refer to when one employed the linguistic marker "water" were those aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field whose character manifested some minimum number of features (e.g., characteristic taste, feel, smell, liquidity and clear appearance).
An individual even could say something like the following: "The scientists on my planet use the term 'water' to refer only to those substances whose atomic/molecular structure is XYZ (or H20). Regardless of how similar the character of some other substance may be to XYZ (or H20), as long as this other substance does not have the requisite XYZ (or H20) atomic/molecular structure, then, the scientists will not label it 'water'.
Yet, although I understand the nature of the scientists' convention in this regard and appreciate the capacity of that convention to specify subtle differences in substances which, in most cases, appear to be identical, still, when I or my friends use the term 'water', we are making identifying references to any substance that has a certain taste, feel, appearance and which can be used for cooking, washing, swimming, growing fruits and so on. Now, since substances with the atomic/molecular structures of XYZ and H2O both express, over time, all the requisite features of physical characteristics and uses which the character of that to which we use 'water' to refer entails, then, XYZ-substances as well as H20-substances constitute extension instances of 'water'."
The fact that a substance's atomic/molecular structure may be XYZ or H2O need not make this facet of the character of that substance the basis for determining the intensional/extensional scope of a term or linguistic marker. This is the case even when the intensional/extensional scope of a term may be used to make identifying references to aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field whose character may, at some point, touch upon, but need not be restricted to, the given features of atomic/ molecular structure.
In other words, the intensional/extensional scope of a term is not necessarily a function of the ultimate nature of that to which the term, in reality, makes identifying references. One must also take into consideration the character of the focal/horizonal context out of which an identifying reference arises in relation to certain aspects of the phenomenology of a given individual's (or group of individuals') experiential field(s).
What an individual refers to may have, from the perspective of a physical expression of actual reality, a given atomic/molecular structure. Nevertheless, from the intentional focal/horizonal perspective of the individual who is making the identifying reference, the dimension of the character of reality involving atomic/molecular structure may be irrelevant to the facet(s) of the character of phenomenological reality (which is also a dimension of the character of reality) to which the individual is attempting to draw one's attention by using a given linguistic marker.
One cannot assume that identifying references need to be considered only in terms of essential or ultimate metaphysical properties, principles or characteristics which extend beyond the individual's (or individuals') phenomenological horizons. Instead, one should remember that all identifying references emerge in the context of the phenomenology of a given experiential field. Consequently, the nature of many identifying references (and this is especially true in day-to-day, run-of-the-mill situations) is geared toward the character of the phenomenology of the aspect of that field being attended to and not necessarily toward the metaphysics or ontology of that which makes such a demarcated phenomenology possible.
Having said the foregoing, however, one still must concede that even if an individual is not interested in the metaphysics or ultimate ontology of what makes everyday experience possible, nonetheless, there is an ultimate reality of which the everyday experiences are an expression. This is so in the sense that the former makes the latter possible by virtue of what the former permits (i.e., parameters of permissibility) in the way of these experiences.
When some term or linguistic marker "x" (in the present case, "water") is linked to a predicate qualifier(s) by the copula "is",' then, one who wishes to grasp the character of the focal/horizonal perspective which is attempting to link "x" to a qualifying or delineating framework through the linguistic marker "is" will have to discern whether the character of the speaker's employment of "is" is primarily phenomenologically oriented or whether it is primarily extra-phenomenologically oriented, or a combination of the two. For instance, in saying: "The water is cool, clear and inviting", the speaker is making identifying references to certain aspects of the character of the phenomenology of the speaker's experiential field concerning various experiential co-ordinate points of reference (i.e., clarity, coolness and invitingness). These points of reference have been particularized or characterized in relation to the aspects (i.e., water) to which one is attending and for which the term "water" has been learned as an appropriate means of making identifying references to those aspect-particulars.
The speaker is not necessarily saying the ultimate, metaphysical, defining properties of that to which he or she refers to as "water" is that it is "cool, clear and inviting". Rather, the individual is specifying those facets of the character of the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which he or she wishes, for whatever reason, to make identifying reference.
On the other hand, if the speaker were to say: "Water is H2O (or XYZ)", then, the speaker is making identifying references to what is believed or understood to be an underlying metaphysical dimension of the character of certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field. Moreover, these aspects are related to a dimension which the speaker believes or understands is responsible, in part, for the phenomenology of water having the character it does in the context of the individual's experiential field.
When the Twin Earth beings of the mid-1700s use the linguistic marker "water" to make identifying references to certain aspects of the phenomenology of their experiential fields, they need not be attempting to draw attention to the underlying metaphysical character of that to which "water" refers. In fact, if they were trying to direct attention to an underlying metaphysical dimension, one might suppose they would have had in mind a quite different framework whose character reflected, perhaps, alchemical, magical or spiritual dimensions of that to which the term "water" was used to make identifying reference, instead of a framework which reflected atomic/molecular properties of that to which they were attending. In any event, one suspects the character of the scope of the identifying reference to be covered in the use of "water" by the Twin Earthlings of the mid-1700s was more a conjunction of surface, phenomenological considerations, than underlying metaphysical ones.
Consequently, whatever the character of the atomic/molecular structure is of that to which the Twin Earthlings of the mid-1700s identifyingly refer to as "water" is largely a function of phenomenological properties and not metaphysical or ultimate ontological properties. However, having said this, one should note that there need not be any contradiction involved if one were to juxtapose, and be committed to, the following assertions: 1) The character of that which gives the phenomenology of the experiential field concerning water its demarcated features is a function of metaphysical properties (principles) of some kind; 2) The character of the phenomenology of the experiential field is an expression or manifestation of such metaphysical properties (principles) in action as they are experienced and understood through the phenomenologies of various individuals.
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