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Exploring Life's Horizons
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Philosophy - A Discursive Search For Truth and Wisdom
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Meaning - Part One
Introduction
Understanding is a way of organizing, arranging, ordering, and connecting experiences. And, in order to accomplish this processing of experience, one needs to establish a conceptual geometry within which, and with respect to which, experiences of various kinds can be plotted as so many co-ordinate points of identifiable character. By drawing up this kind of conceptual grid or network, one is in a potential position to proceed further and attempt to grasp some of the levels of significance of these experiential co-ordinate points.
From the perspective of the present essay, the theory of meaning is, essentially, an investigation into the aforementioned issue of significance. The search for significance concerns the hermeneutical probing of various aspects of: a) the phenomenology of the experiential field, or b) that (i.e., reality) which makes possible a phenomenology of given character.
Such probing is, like identifying reference, a structuring process that generates organization, order, relationships, and so on. However, the structuring process of identifying reference primarily is concerned with establishing, or locating, points of reference for identification prior to other hermeneutical activities.
In the case of meaning, the hermeneutical probing is a function of the character of the process through which one assigns significance to, and/or discovers significance in, a) and b) above. The structures generated by this assigning/discovery process give expression to the character of the significance or meaning of various aspects of a) and b).
In other words, through language competency (which involves the use of linguistic markers), the individual and/or the surrounding linguistic community is able to try to make more than just an unelaborated identifying reference to experiential co-ordinate points within the phenomenology of the experiential field. The individual and/or surrounding linguistic community also can try to refer to the significance or meaning of the points partially characterized by the sort of broad process of identifying reference which often goes on when two, or more, people seek to establish a frame of discourse about which, and through which, to talk or write.
Although there have been a number of different theories of meaning which have emerged over the years within both philosophy and linguistics, I don't propose to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the various offerings which have been made in these areas. Consequently, the current essay should not be construed as an analysis of the philosophy of meaning as conceived from a variety of perspectives. Rather, this essay involves a hermeneutical exploration of the character of the structuring process through which meaning is generated and by means of which it plays a role as one of the dimensions in the structure and structuring of understanding.
In order to provide a concrete background against which to conduct my exploration into the character of meaning as a structural dimension of understanding, I have selected an article by Hilary Putnam entitled: "The Meaning of 'Meaning"'. One of the main reasons for settling upon Putnam rather than upon so many others that could have been chosen is because Putnam is an advocate of what might be termed, generally speaking, a realist theory of meaning.
As such, Putnam's position is representative of an approach that offers a somewhat different perspective from that of, say, Strawson in the first part of Individuals. In the latter case, Strawson believed it is possible to 'say' how we conceive of "the actual structure of our thought concerning the world", even if this 'saying' didn't mean, necessarily, that one could know how the world really is, or even if determining the actual nature of the real world was not the task of descriptive metaphysics.
Putnam, on the other hand, tends to believe that not only can one 'say' how the world is, but one also can ‘know’, in some sense, how the world is. Furthermore, he believes that the meaning of terms can, and should, reflect the character of that reality.
One of the main themes of Putnam's article is that he wishes to argue in opposition to what he takes to be the position of many traditional theories of meaning. More specifically, he wants to try to demonstrate that extension is not determined by psychological states.
In other words, Putnam believes that two speakers could be in exactly the same psychological state, even though the extension of a term 'x' that is related somehow to that state in the idiolect of one speaker is different from the extension for the same term 'x' in the idiolect of the other speaker. Although Putnam employs a number of arguments and examples in his article in order to support his position, the present essay will concentrate on only some of those issues which seem to be most central to his perspective.
Furthermore, the purpose behind pursuing such issues will not be in order to decide the tenability of Putnam's arguments concerning whether the extension of a term is, or is not, determined by psychological states. Rather, the underlying intention is to provide an opportunity for reflecting on the character of the role which meaning plays within the structures and structuring of understanding.
There are a number of concepts which play prominent roles in Putnam's theory of meaning. For instance, notions such as: 'sameL relationships', 'indexical relationships' (or Kripke's comparable notion of 'rigid designator'), 'introducing events', as well as the distinction between 'epistemic' and 'metaphysical necessity' are all crucial and interrelated ideas in Putnam's article. Moreover, Putnam utilizes a number of contexts such as the Twin-Earth example and possible worlds arguments in order to illustrate the character of, among other things, the concepts listed toward the beginning of this paragraph.
Essentially, the realism of Putnam's position is reflected in his contention that a natural kind term such as, say, "water" is indexical for, or acts as a rigid designator of, the actual or real nature of water in all possible worlds. For Putnam, the real nature of water concerns its atomic structure which is H20, just as the real nature of, say, gold concerns its atomic structure. In emphasizing the actual or 'real' nature of a natural kind entity as it is in all possible worlds, Putnam feels he is providing a means of escaping from the problems of mentalism which he considers to have plagued many traditional theories of meaning.
In opposition to Putnam, the main thrust of this essay will be to argue that, for the individual, the activity of meaning-making is tied fundamentally (although this need not mean exclusively so) to hermeneutic activity within the phenomenology of the experiential field. In maintaining this, however, I do not intend to suggest that I am aligning myself with the traditional theories of meaning against which Putnam argues.
Whether, or not, I am aligning myself with any of those theories would depend on the specific character of the philosophy of meaning one wished to consider. In any event, by fundamentally tying the activity of meaning-making to hermeneutical activity within the phenomenology of the experiential field, I intend to draw attention to two things: 1) whatever else may be the case with respect to meaning, the activity of meaning is, first and foremost, a way of demarcating (i.e., particularizing, individuating) various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field. This demarcation is accomplished by assigning significance to, or discovering significance in, such aspects through a hermeneutical process. 2) By failing to give proper acknowledgment to 1), Putnam's theory of meaning cannot give an adequate indexical account of "meaning" qua meaning.
The Assumption of Methodological Solipsism
After some brief comments at the beginning of his article "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" on the inadequacy of the extension/intension distinction in so-called traditional approaches to the notion of meaning, Putnam goes on to outline what he believes are "two unchallenged assumptions" underlying the theories of meaning of many, if not most, traditional philosophers:
"1) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (in the sense of ‘psychological state’, in which states of memory and psychological dispositions are ‘psychological states’; no one thought that knowing the meaning of a word was a continuous state of consciousness, of course).
2) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of ‘intension’) determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension)." (p. 219)
Putnam, then, stipulates he intends to argue that "the traditional concept of meaning is a concept which rests on a false theory" (p. 215). Apparently he intends to demonstrate that this is the case by, among other things, challenging both of the foregoing "unchallenged assumptions".
Putnam begins his program with an attempt to lend some sort of specificity to the idea of "psychological state". At one point, Putnam claims:
"In one sense, a psychological state is simply a state which is studied or described by psychology. In this sense it may be trivially true that, say knowing the meaning of the word "water" is a ‘psychological state’ (viewed from the standpoint of cognitive psychology). But this is not the sense of psychological state that is at issue in the above assumption 1).
"When traditional philosophers talked about psychological states (or "mental states"), they made an assumption of methodological solipsism. This assumption is the assumption that no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. (In fact, the assumption was that no psychological state presupposed the existence of the subject's body even: if P is a psychological state, properly so called, then it must be logically possible for a "disembodied mind" to be in P) ... Making this assumption is, of course, adopting a restrictive program ... " (p. 220)
Whether, or not, Putnam is correct concerning his allegations in the above quote is an issue with which I don't intend to deal. One might note in passing, however, that a distinction can, and perhaps should, be drawn between, on the one hand, what Putnam is referring to as methodological solipsism, and, on the other hand, a methodological issue involving questions about the justifiability of the character of one's starting points.
More specifically, if one takes mental states as one's hermeneutical point of entry into the mysteries of the metaphysics of experience, then, as a matter of methodological propriety, one cannot presuppose either the existence of other individuals or the existence of a body as substrate for the mental states which mark the phenomenological doorway through which the journey of exploration begins. If one were to make such presuppositions, one, potentially, could contaminate or prejudice the character of the hermeneutical investigation before it even gets started. The main issue here is not, first and foremost, a solipsistic one.
The primary given of the initial hermeneutical starting point is a function of awareness, attending to, intentionality or consciousness. This is so because part and parcel of the character of that to which the label "mental" makes identifying reference is what, heretofore, has been called the ‘phenomenology of the experiential field’.
In beginning, as one sets about trying to describe such phenomenology, one may not be in any position to ascertain just what the significance of that phenomenology is. In other words, one may not be able to determine: a) whether the particulars which are individuated within the phenomenology of the experiential field are capable of being accounted for entirely in terms of the self-contained properties of that field (as a solipsist might advocate); or b) whether one is required to seek for some sort of answer to a) in that which is independent of (but not necessarily unrelated to) such a field (as some so-called "realists" might argue). Furthermore, one might not be in any position at the beginning of one's hermeneutical pursuits to establish whether the phenomenology of the experiential field is sustainable only through the agency of, say, material bodies.
Thus, from a methodological standpoint, one who begins with mental states as the basic experiential data (as seems to be unavoidable, directly or indirectly, for human beings to do) is neither denying nor affirming the existence of other individuals or of an underlying substrate body to house mental states. Rather, the task is to take the experiential givens of the phenomenology of the experiential field and attempt to work out answers, hypotheses, theories, beliefs or understandings concerning these features as they arise during the course of experience.
Whether one decides in favor of a solipsistic or non-solipsistic position is a problem to be subsequently resolved, as best one can, on the basis of one's hermeneutical analysis of ensuing experiences. However, both the phenomenology of the experiential field and one's hermeneutical investigation of that field's logical character are issues and problems which, in general, are encountered and reflected upon without recourse to the matter of solipsism - presumptively or otherwise.
The assumption on which should be working is not necessarily that of methodological solipsism, but that of methodological objectivity. One is attempting to refrain from committing oneself to a particular conceptual position until one, at the very minimum, has had the opportunity to explore the phenomenology of the experiential field and tried to particularize or characterize various facets of that phenomenology in a way which is accurately reflective of, or congruent with, the actual character of that which makes such a phenomenology possible.
Prior to the point at which an individual makes an inference in the direction of, or away from, methodological solipsism, one might uncertain possibility that a "disembodied mind" could be in some psychological state P. This would be the case not because of the assumption of methodological solipsism but because one's inquiries had not proceeded sufficiently far for one to be able to feel justified in either rejecting or accepting the character of such a possibility as being congruent or incongruent with the experiential data which one had compiled and analyzed to that point. In other words, in the beginning, "disembodied minds" might be a logical possibility because there is nothing within the context of one's current or past hermeneutic of the phenomenology of the experiential field which precludes such a possibility as being a legitimate manifestation of the character of one's experience.
If one were to come across evidence which seemed to indicate that the available evidence did not lend credence to the possibility of a disembodied mind, then, the character of this kind of possibility would be in conflict with the character of one's hermeneutic of experience. As a result, the logical possibility of disembodied minds would be brought into question and subject to further critical examination.
In all of this supposition about the possibility of disembodied minds, one is, at no point, required to presuppose something like methodological solipsism in order to be able to entertain this sort of a possibility as being a logical candidate within one's present understanding. There is a difference between: a) methodologically keeping one's options open in accordance with what one’s current understanding of various aspects of the phenomenology of one's experiential field permits as possible avenues of fruitful hermeneutical investigation; and, b) the assumption of methodological solipsism which Putnam is attributing to traditional philosophical conceptions of mental states. The former theme of methodologically keeping one's options open as long as it is tenable to do so seems nothing more than sound and appropriate epistemological practice.
One should not suppose the argument in the foregoing several paragraphs has been designed to show that Putnam's contention concerning traditional philosophers and their assumption of methodological solipsism is wrong. Rather, the emphasis has been on clarifying a methodological point about the character of one's starting point, together with the considerable ramifications which, for example, assumptions can have in shaping the hermeneutical process that disembarks from one starting point rather than another.
In fact, if Putnam is right, then, the adopting of the assumption of methodological solipsism by traditional philosophers would show how they had unnecessarily restricted their methodological options by allowing their assumptions to distort the hermeneutical process, inasmuch as subsequent inquiry might be skewered in directions that were biased in favor of their initial assumption(s). However, be this as it may, traditional philosophers still could have opted for the methodologically more flexible option had they recognized the effect which their assumptions have on the ramifications that ensue from starting points shaped by such assumptions.
According to Putnam, if one were to retain, or work on the assumption of, methodological solipsism, then, one would have to rework the logical character of a wide variety of common psychological states. Putnam illustrates his point by examining the psychological state of "being jealous". He notes:
"... in its ordinary sense, x is jealous of y entails that y exists, and x is jealous of y's regard for z entails that both y and z exist (as well as x, of course). Thus being jealous and being jealous of someone's regard for someone else are not psychological states permitted by the assumption of methodological solipsism. (We shall call them "psychological states in the wide sense" and refer to the states which are permitted by methodological solipsism as "psychological states in the narrow sense".) The reconstruction required by methodological solipsism would be to re-construe jealousy so that I can be jealous of my own hallucinations, or of figments of my imagination, etc. Only if we assume that psycho-logical states in the narrow sense have a significant degree of causal closure (so that restricting our-selves to psychological states in the narrow sense will facilitate the statement of psychological laws) is there any point in engaging or in making the assumption of methodological solipsism. But the three centuries of failure of mentalistic psychology is tremendous evidence against this procedure ..." (pp. 220-221)
Putnam's reference to "ordinary sense" with respect to the condition of jealousy in x with respect to y can be misleading. This is so since it tends to shift emphasis away from the psychological state of jealousy and, instead, focuses on the ontological entailment which the condition of being jealous supposedly holds with respect to the object (i.e., other person) toward whom the emotion is directed.
While in numerous, everyday, ordinary circumstances, the emergence of jealousy in an individual may be an indicator that someone, independent of the individual, is assumed to be the target for this emotion, jealousy, per se, need not entail the separate ontological character of the object toward whom jealousy is directed. Instead, the character of jealousy takes on concrete form in the context of the phenomenology of the experiential field through which the emotion manifests itself. This form of emotional expression is characterized by the individual in a way that generates a certain flavor of relative deprivation in certain aspects of the individual with respect to certain other aspects of the experiential field (or that which helps make such aspects possible - e.g., some portion of reality).
The character of the flavor of this felt sense of relative deprivation can vary in any number of ways. It may range from acuteness, to a more chronic condition; from a fleeting twinge, to an intense obsession; from being ego-shattering, to being a source of hostility and antagonism that is directed at the aspect(s) of phenomenology to which one is attending.
In concert with the foregoing, one could conceive of a whole array of possibilities in which the phenomenological aspect(s) in question toward which jealousy may be directed does not necessarily entail the separate, ontological existence of that aspect of the phenomenology to which the individual is making identifying reference in any given experiential situation. Thus, an individual "x" dreams that "y" is loved by "z" - whom "x" loves or desires - and "x" feels jealousy toward "y". Or, "x" reads a fictional work and feels jealous toward one or more of the principal characters of the story being read. Or,"x" is hypnotized and given a post-hypnotic suggestion to feel jealous toward the man sitting in the chair to the left of "x", and there is no one (in the actual, material, concrete sense) who is there. Or, x" is deceived by "b" (a pen pal whom "x" has never met) into believing that the circumstances of "b's" life are far better than what really is the case, and, as a result, "x" feels jealous of "b", although the "b" of whom "x" is jealous doesn't really exist.
With the possible exception of the hypnosis example, all of the above situations are, potentially, commonplace. In addition, it does not appear to be out of order to maintain that the usage of the term "jealousy" in these circumstances might well fall within the framework of "ordinary usage" with respect to that term.
Of course, in all these uses, there certainly is an existential or ontological dimension to the aspect(s) of the phenomenology of experiential field toward which jealousy is felt or directed. Nonetheless, Putnam's belief that the philosopher who retains the assumption of methodological solipsism would have to reconstruct his or her position vis-á-vis jealousy is distortive of the actual character of the phenomenology of the experiential field of someone who was experiencing jealousy, but for whom there was no corresponding ontological object beyond the horizons of the aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which the individual experiencing jealousy was attending. More specifically, while a philosopher who consciously retained the assumption of methodological solipsism might concede that the object of one's jealousy was an hallucination or figment of one's imagination, this concession does not undermine the reality of the jealousy experience, nor does it alter the basic character of that experience.
Although an important theme of the character of that experience is relational, there is nothing in the character of jealousy as an experience which demands that the object-particular toward which jealousy is directed must be a real object whose ontological character is underwritten by something other than the phenomenology of the experiential field in which it arises. Therefore, contrary to what Putnam seems to allege, there is no inherent narrowing of the character of such psychological states as jealousy when considered from the point of view of someone who wishes to retain the assumption of methodological solipsism.
What is narrowed is the character of the ontological framework to which the individual is willing to commit himself. This is so because the one who wishes to retain the assumption of methodological solipsism obviously would be unwilling to extend ontological character to anything which is not a function of the phenomenology of the experiential field that constitutes the 'world' within which the individual metaphysically operates.
However, as previously indicated, given that the character of the experience of jealousy is, first and foremost, phenomenologically relational [because the experience represents the interfacing of, on the one hand, awareness (i.e., the subject-locus of the focus of the phenomenology of an experiential field), and, on the other hand, a particular within the framework of that field (i.e., the object-locus toward which focal awareness is directed), and not necessarily ontologically relational (i.e., entities which are ontologically independent of, and distinct from, one another)], then, the psychological state is not what is being narrowed in the context of methodological solipsism. What is narrowed is the scope of the ontological inferences one makes on the basis of having hermeneutically considered various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
Consequently, as far as an examination of the character of psychological states is concerned, one who adopts a perspective of methodological solipsism need not be locked into the kind of restrictive program which Putnam seems to envision is the case, nor is one necessarily required to reconstruct the nature of psychological states like jealousy. Furthermore, as pointed out in the foregoing discussion, the relational theme which is an essential facet of jealousy is as logically and experientially permissible in a framework that retains an assumption of methodological solipsism as it would be in the non-solipsistic framework which Putnam appears to believe underlies the so-called "wider sense" of the notion of psychological state.
Finally, leaving aside the vagueness of precisely what Putnam has in mind when he alludes to "the three centuries of failure of mentalistic psychology", and without wishing in any way to imply I would want to defend the 'accomplishments' (whatever they might be) of mentalistic psychology during the last three centuries, the last few pages of discussion in the present essay would appear to lay a solid foundation for inferring the following. One neither has to assume, as Putnam contends, "that psychological states in the narrow sense have a significant degree of causal closure", nor must one feel compelled to engage in any sort of reconstruction of the kind envisioned by Putnam if one starts from the assumption of methodological solipsism.
One does not have to assume the former - and indeed should not - since the notion of "causal closure" through which one establishes the character of the "laws" that govern psychological states is a goal to be sought and not something to be presumed from the outset. In other words, there is nothing in the arguments presented by Putnam in his article which tenably would indicate that a hermeneutical investigation into the phenomenology of the experiential field is any more doomed in the case of a methodological solipsist than it would be for a non-methodological solipsist.
Putnam believes he has shown, through his jealousy example, how the assumption of methodological solipsism forces one to restrict the scope of one's investigation into the nature of psychological states. According to Putnam, this remains so unless one reconstructs the character of states such as jealousy that, ordinarily, according to him, do not fit into the conceptual framework in which methodological solipsism permits one to work. In addition, as noted previously, in view of the supposedly restrictive nature of the conceptual framework which the assumption of methodological solipsism allegedly permits, Putnam considers the psychological states which can be studied within this restricted framework to represent what he terms "psychological states in the narrow sense".
One might concede that the character of methodological solipsism has a different ontological sense about it from, say, the character of a ‘non-methodological solipsistic position. Nonetheless, Putnam has not - at least, to this point in his article - demonstrated that in terms of the character of a psychological state qua state (i.e., this is independent of any inferential conclusions one might wish to draw about what makes a state of given character possible, and, whether that which makes it possible, ontologically, extends beyond the horizons of the phenomenology of the experiential field in which the psychological state manifests itself) that the assumption of methodological solipsism naturally leads one to consider only "psychological states in the narrow sense".
Indeed, as far as psychological states qua states are concerned, the phenomenology of the experiential field of someone who is working from the assumption of methodological solipsism seems no more, or less, narrow than the phenomenology of the experiential field of someone who is working from outside the perspective of the assumption of methodological solipsism. This is the case since both perspectives require one to begin with the givens of the ontological context - that is, the phenomenology of the experiential field through which psychological states make their entrances and exits.
Thus, one looks in vain for some clue in the jealousy example which would show one how an individual who has adopted the assumption of methodological solipsism would experience the psychological state of jealousy any differently than would someone who had not adopted the foregoing assumption. Their respective interpretations of that experience might entail quite different ontological ramifications, but the phenomenology of the psychological state, itself, would remain the same in both cases.
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