Identifying Reference - Part Seven
Pure Consciousness and Identifying Reference
Early on in the chapter entitled "Monads", Strawson states:
"I have maintained, roughly, that no principle of individuation can be framed for consciousness as such, and hence that nothing can be a subject of predicates implying consciousness, unless it is, in that sense of the word which implies also the possession of corporeal attributes, a person, or at least a former person." (p. 121)
This statement comes in the midst of Strawson's attempts to show how his conceptual scheme for descriptive metaphysics contrasts with his version of Leibnizian-like theory of monads. The term "Leibnizian-like" is used because, as Strawson himself acknowledges, he is not fundamentally concerned with whether the historical Leibniz would have accepted the monadic model which Strawson is constructing as a flawed counterpoint against which to bounce his own conceptual scheme in order to demonstrate the resiliency of the latter compared to the former. Essentially, Strawson uses the name "Leibniz" as a convenient code name for an imaginary philosopher with whom he is contesting various philosophical points and whose philosophy has a character which bears a certain similarity to some facets of the historical Leibniz' position.
In Strawson's presentation, there is a subset of monadic individuals in the Leibniz-like metaphysical perspective which are construed, by Strawson, as being constituted of consciousness that is characterized by features of apperception and perception. Although Strawson acknowledges that for Leibniz this kind of monadic consciousness was not necessarily the same thing as a mind, Strawson considers the notion of mind to be the closest approximation to the idea of a monad which is accessible to us. Therefore, he draws a sort of rough equivalency between "mind" and "monad", and he tends to use the two interchangeably during the course of his discussion.
In fact, this idea of a pure consciousness is what Strawson wishes to contrast his own position with. In doing this, Strawson wants to try to establish what the characteristics of a system of individuation would be through which one could make identifying and re-identifying references to the particulars which are experientially encountered.
According to Strawson:
"... it seems to me necessarily true ... that no system which does not allow for spatial or temporal entities can be a system which allows for particulars at all, or at least can be understood by us as such. This point is the same as that made by Kant in saying that space and time are our only forms of intuition. If we take these two points together, it follows that, in general, identifying reference to particulars rests ultimately on the use of expressions which, directly or indirectly, embody a demonstrative force; or, to put it in terms of thought rather than of language, that identifying thought about particulars necessarily incorporates a demonstrative element." (p.119)
For Strawson, the central role played by the demonstrative process is a function of its capacity to uniquely establish the identity of a reference to a particular of experience by placing that particular in a conceptual grid with spatial and temporal axes. By plotting the spatial/temporal character of the particular in relation to oneself, together with adding some brief, qualitative, secondary descriptions, one, according to Strawson, is able to fix the identity of the given particular of reference.
The term "secondary" is used in the foregoing paragraph because Strawson believes all descriptions are identifyingly tied, either directly or indirectly, to material body particulars that entail a spatial/temporal framework in which they are 'housed'. If these material body particulars are considered as primary, all other description becomes secondary and dependent on these particulars.
The sort of identifying reference with which Strawson is most concerned occurs in the context of speaker/hearer interchanges. That is, the demonstrative features he is emphasizing become crucial in linguistic use age.
However, whereas Strawson advocates a notion of demonstrative reference which is rooted in material category particulars and the concept of person, one can conceive of other approaches to the issue of demonstrative reference which are quite different from Strawson's position, and, perhaps, less problematic. For example, being demonstrative is inherent in the very character of identifying thought, awareness, consciousness, understanding, etc.
In fact, to be demonstrative, is in the very character of consciously "attending to" or "focusing on" (i.e., intentionality) various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field, irrespective of whether one recognizes, or one can place or fix, the identity of that which is being intentionally referred to or that which is doing the identifying. Even in the context of being passively aware, one is being demonstrative. In all these cases (attention, thought, ideation, conceptualization, awareness, reflection and so on), there is a particularization going on which, at a minimum, has the feature of a focused (whether broad or tight) awareness of some aspect of the experiential or phenomenological field.
This sort of phenomenon seems to represent an instance of particularization at its most primitive level. After all, from the perspective of consciousness, what is a particular, but a facet of experience which has taken on, or given expression to, a character of sorts according to the nature of the experience? At this level, the issue is not a matter of assigning causes in order to try to explain the emergence of such an experience or why it has the character it does. There is merely someone’s or something’s conscious acknowledgment that an experience is being undergone and that the experience seems to have certain characteristics - all of which, taken together, constitutes the particularization of experience.
As previously cited (see the last quote), Strawson believes: "no system which does not allow for spatial or temporal entities can be a system which allows for particulars at all, or at least can be understood by us as such". Stated in another way, Strawson is claiming that individuation of experience is only possible within the context of a conceptual framework of scheme which allows for the existence of spatial/temporal entities that can be demonstratively identified by means of fixing their spatial/ temporal co-ordinates according to the particular way in which such entities express their co-ordinates as a function of their being the spatial/ temporal entities they are and not some other entity.
On the other hand, in terms of the alternative perspective of the previous paragraph: "individuation of experience" is a matter of being aware of the differential character of various aspects of the experiential field to which awareness, for whatever reason, becomes drawn. Whether the differential character is imposed on the given aspect of the field by some feature of consciousness, or whether the differential character arises as an interactive function of a variety of influences, the differential character constitutes a particularization of experience and, therefore, an individuation of experience.
In view of the foregoing, what seems necessary, minimally speaking, for the individuation of experience is a (a) framework of consciousness capable of (b) attending to various aspects of that framework and (c) noticing whether or not the character of these various instances of attending are different from, or similar to, one another [One might also want to add (d) - a dimension of memory that is capable of bringing (a), (b), and (c) together over time]. Where differences are noted, then, regardless of the accuracy of the noting activity, the experience of the attending process constitutes an individuation of experience into particulars of some specified character according to the nature of the similarities and differences which are noted. As such, the character of the attending experience is, from the phenomenological side of things (and not necessarily in a causal sense) one of the main sources of the particularization or individuation of experience.
Experience may be particularized because there exist metaphysical objects independent of experience which are waiting to be experienced as particulars of a certain sort. Experience also may be particularized because of the way the nature of consciousness particularizes itself. Experience may be particularized by some sort of interaction between independent metaphysical objects and one’s phenomenology of experience.
Whatever the reality behind, or expressed through, the 'facticity' of the particularization, from the immediate point of view of the consciousness undergoing the experiences, experience is individuated because of the conscious awareness of differences among various instances of intentionality. Whether or not there is a 'real world out there', whether or not one is solipsistically responsible for all that one experiences (irrespective of questions concerning the identity and origin of consciousness), individuation of experience is tied to the possibility of being aware of differences in character among the shifts in focus or attention of the intentional quality of consciousness.
There may be many considerations, factors, principles, influences, forces or entities which lie behind the differences in character of various experiences and which make possible the individuation of experience into particularizations of identifiable and re-identifiable natures. Most assuredly, "spatial and temporal entities" constitute one set of possibilities through which one could develop a descriptive metaphysics to account for why experience can have the individuated character it does.
Nonetheless, ‘allowing for particulars’ need not be restricted to such spatial/ temporal frameworks. Particularizations can be as varied as the character of one's intentional dimension and the ideas and understandings which arise in conjunction with this dimension.
What is necessary is to have a way of placing (but not in the spatial sense) experience in some kind of conceptual grid. The problem of identifying reference among speakers and hearers then, becomes a matter of being able to single out the facet of the co-ordinate system being used by, say, speakers that will permit hearers to locate the experience, or feature thereof, which is being referred to. Against the backdrop of the logic of this sort of co-ordinate system, epistemological beings (of whatever sensible or non-sensible intuitive capabilities) will proceed to make inferences, generate theories, posit hypotheses, establish programs of investigation and so on, concerning the nature of the reality which would make this sort of a co-ordinate scheme possible as a result of their intentional episodes having the character they do.
In any event, the processes of positing the hypothesis and confirming it are separate questions from the issue of the individuation of experience. In fact, methodologically, the former pre-suppose the latter, and the basic character of the former will be heavily influence by the actual character of the individuation process.
What has been said in the foregoing about the character of the individuation process out of which particulars arise may or may not be compatible with a Leibnizian view. Which is the case doesn't matter, since I'm not really trying to defend Leibniz or his theory of monads.
Strawson, on the other hand, is attempting to zero in on, and attack, features of a view which bears a passing resemblance to at least some of the facets of a Leibnizian-like position. The question with which Strawson originally started is whether a framework of consciousness that makes no provisions for spatial/temporal entities can allow for particulars and can be understood by us as doing so. Strawson, then, proceeded to introduce his Leibniz-like philosophy as being a paradigmatic example of the sort of system someone might devise who wished to advocate that particulars could be allowed for, without, simultaneously, committing oneself to allowing for, or presupposing, spatial/ temporal entities.
While the Strawson/"Leibniz" debate is an interesting one, I have no wish to get swept up into it. In fact, there is no need to do so in order to be able to respond to Strawson's concerns about the capabilities of so-called pure consciousness (whatever this might be).
In other words, the main issue is whether or not one can conceive of a means to demonstratively refer, without having to resort to a conceptual framework which is dependent, directly or indirectly, on the idea of spatial and/or temporal intuitions. This issue may be addressed without having to be tied to the boundaries of a Leibnizian-like position.
Strawson seems to assume that if one takes away the dimensions of space and time, then, one will be left with something called "pure consciousness". Whether or not such consciousness would be "pure" (and what that would mean) is irrelevant to the point being made in the analysis of the last several pages. The point is that, phenomenologically or experientially, space and time represent but two ways of laying out a conceptual grid which permits an individuation of experience.
One could come up with any number of alternative or parallel conceptual grid systems dealing with, for example, emotions, mathematical abstract spaces, motivations, languages, logical frameworks of different character, spiritual dimensions, and so on. Any one of these systems could be used to generate a co-ordinate system for 'placing' or individuating or particularizing experience for the purpose of, among other things, identifying reference. Moreover, not one of these grid systems would need to be rooted in a system that presupposed or en-tailed spatial/temporal intuitions as indispensable parts of such a grid system.
Uniqueness of Reference
Contrary to Strawson's views, the main issue of the problem of identifying reference is not necessarily a matter of "securing uniqueness of reference to a particular" (p. 117). The problem is one of trying to determine a means of fixing a point of reference which has enough particulars of identifiable character associated with it that permit two or more beings to lock in on those co-ordinates and focus upon the aspects of the field of consciousness to which attention is being drawn for purposes of further comment, investigation, description, analysis, and so on.
In fixing this point of reference, one is not necessarily maintaining there is no other particular in existence which could satisfy the description given and on which the identifying reference in question is based. Therefore, the particular to which attention is being drawn may not be unique when considered in the context of how individuals go about, or are capable of, individuating the particulars that appear in the phenomenology of the experiential fields of the individuals engaged in discussion.
This is so because phenomenologically speaking, there might be many particulars answering to a basic description or identifying reference made on any given occasion. This would be so even if, in terms of absolute metaphysics, all particulars which are capable of being referred to identifiably are actually unique, despite phenomenological judgements to the contrary.
Dropping the uniqueness condition as a ubiquitous feature of identifying reference does not automatically mean one is unavoidably and incessantly going to become entangled in mass speaker/hearer confusions. Rather, dropping the uniqueness condition merely leaves the door open to misunderstanding under certain circumstances.
Conceivably, one could have any number of separate speaker/hearer interchanges in contexts which are descriptively identical and in which identifying references are made to a particular aspect of the experiential framework in each instance that is characterized in the same way by the respective speakers. For example, numerous speakers named Mr. Escher might say, simultaneously, to numerous hearers named Mr. Godel, when in rooms of identical description, "Do you see that red ball over there by the television?"
And, all of the various Mr. Godels involved might collectively say, "You mean that one with the hole in it that's laying on the brown coffee table and which is about to be picked up by the young girl with blond hair, blue eyes and a pink dress?"
To which all of the Mr. Eschers might reply, "Yes, the one that the young girl with the blond hair, blue eyes and pink dress has just picked up and thrown on a trajectory which should place it somewhere through the picture tube of the television in about .1265 seconds."
To which all of the Mr. Godels might inquire, "Well, what about it?"
To which all of the Mr. Eschers might remark, "Well, the present situation reminded me that yesterday I was reading in the National Enquirer - you know, the news magazine for inquiring minds - about how scientists recently have discovered conclusive mathematical evidence for the existence of parallel worlds which are exact replicas of one another in all respects, even down to occupying the same space and time continuum. The article went on to point out that: a) the consciousnesses of the inhabitants of these parallel worlds were not aware of the other parallel worlds or their counterparts in those worlds; and, b) the objects existing in the various parallel worlds, although they all occupied the same time/space continuum, were a function of quantum states which ranged across, and filled out, the probability distribution which was used to describe any given quantum condition of an atom(s) which made up a given parallel world. Thus, each world filled out part of the probability distribution used, say, to represent the location or momentum of a given electron in a given state in a given atom in a given parallel world.
"The article also indicated how sometimes the consciousness of one of the inhabitants of a given parallel world or one of the objects of one of the parallel worlds inexplicably would cross over into one of the other parallel worlds. When this happened, a chain reaction automatically was set off.
"As a result, whatever particular underwent the crossover phenomenon would displace the corresponding particular in the given parallel world into which it crossed over. Moreover, the displaced particular of that parallel world would, subsequently, be forced to cross over into another parallel world, and so on. Apparently, this would all continue until the original crossover particular got back to its own world, and all of this took place, supposedly, within only a few seconds.
"The article ended by saying that none of these transformations or crossovers seemed to have any discernible effect on the various parallel universes as far as conserving different physical principles is concerned. The article did say, however, that entropy was considered to increase negligibly with each crossover.
"The article ended by stating that scientists were now trying to discover how a particular which underwent the crossover phenomenon was able to recognize its original world amidst all the other "identical" worlds into which they crossed over. In any case, I've been thinking about the idea a lot," the various Mr. Eschers might continue," and when I saw that red ball and began identifying it to you, I suddenly realized there was no guarantee that, metaphysically speaking, the ball I saw was the same one you saw, or that I am the one you actually heard identify it, or that you are the one who heard me speak.
"After all, there was no way for one to tell for sure which consciousness or particular, if any, was or was not undergoing the crossover phenomenon at any given moment. Yet, despite all of this, even though we might not be talking at all about precisely the same metaphysical particulars from one second to the next, or that even though you and I might not even now represent the same precise consciousness as when this conversation began, nonetheless, one would still be able to identifyingly refer to aspects of experience and have someone else be able to locate such a reference in the context of their own experience, just on the basis of the way the character of the experience was individuated or particularized during the course of the identifying reference."
The various Mr. Eschers might also add the following: "I began to think the whole idea of parallel worlds is sort of like an old philosophical problem concerning a ship that had all of its planks replaced during a voyage across the ocean. The problem arises when someone asked the question of whether or not the ship which arrived at the port of destination was the same ship which had embarked on the voyage.
"Perhaps one even could ask whether either the port of destination or the port of disembarkation would be the same ports after the ship in question had, respectively, arrived and departed. Whatever the answer may be, people would seem to have no trouble making or understanding identifying references to various particulars sufficiently well to at least talk intelligibly about, or raise problems in relation to, those aspects of their experiential frameworks which are being referred to or seem to be referred to."
The foregoing example suggests there may be something which has methodological priority in instances of identifying reference over that of Strawson's concerns with resolving the problem of "securing uniqueness of reference". More specifically, irrespective of whether the speaker and hearer are certain that the identifying reference establishes a unique reference to a given particular, what is crucial is the following.
The two individuals involved must be satisfied, in the context of the description in which the identifying reference is made, that enough features of the particular being referred to have been mentioned to permit the hearer to eliminate from consideration everything in his or her experiential framework except the aspect, if any, which bears the sort of character that answers to, or reflects, the character of the features which have been included in the identifying reference of the speaker. Of course, the hearer may be mistaken in what he or she believes the speaker is referring to, due to either a poorly executed (e.g., ambiguous) identifying reference, or to a misinterpretation on the hearer's part of the character of the identifying reference which the speaker actually gives.
However, for many everyday speaker/hearer interchanges and under most day-to-day circumstances, a framework of identifying references can be established without ever having to determine if the reference to the particular is a unique one. For instance, in talking about freedom, consciousness, justice, democracy, love, life's purpose, truth, morality, religion, mysticism, duty, law and so many other possibilities, enough can be included in a speaker's identifying reference to permit the hearer to understand which aspects of his or her own experiential field might be involved, without necessarily supposing the hearer is fixing the identity of the particular being referred to in a way which uniquely matches the character of the particular that the speaker has in mind.
Instead, enough features of similar character are singled out and enough considerations are eliminated in the respective experiential frameworks to permit a minimally adequate identifying reference to be established between speaker and hearer concerning the nature of the particular being referred to. Thus, if a speaker mentioned the term "legal theory", a hearer might know that something of a legal nature, loosely construed, was to be discussed.
Yet, he or she might not know the specific logical character of the theory of law which shaped the perspective of the speaker who was going to speak on such a legal theme. Uniqueness of reference for the hearer and speaker would only exist in these circumstances if the hearer and speaker both agreed, in all (or most nearly all) respects, as to the full character of the particular being discussed - in this case, legal theory, or some aspect thereof.
While one and the same "objective" particular (i.e., one which is supposedly independent of the experiential framework of the speaker and the hearer) may be identifyingly referred to, and recognized by, a speaker and hearer respectively, there is no guarantee the actual character of the two contexts of individuated or particularized experience will necessarily coincide, even though they both may be intentionally tuned to the same "objective" particular. Consequently, from a standpoint of absolute reality, there may be a unique real object or particular which is the subject of an exercise in identifying reference.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the speaker/hearer experiential frameworks attempting to establish an identifying reference, the character of the respective intentional focus may be sufficiently different that the nature of the referential process as described by the speaker and as understood by the hearer may not be secured uniquely. This may be so even though there tends to be enough of an overlap of the actual character of the two experiential perspectives for the speaker and hearer to understand the phenomenological direction toward which intentional focus is turned in their respective experiential frameworks. One will have to wait to see which, if either, of the two experiential frameworks has constructed a more accurate and insightful descriptive representation or characterization of the "objective" particular within the conceptual grid or logical co-ordinate system which the respective experiential frameworks use for representing the character of, and relations among, individuated experience with respect to existential encounters with, or engagements of, these "objective" particulars.
As multiple, cross-indexed sets of co-ordinates are assigned to certain features of the experiential field, a conceptual map or understanding begins to develop concerning the perceived character of that facet of the experiential field and its relation, if any, with other facets of the experiential field which also have epistemological constructs of various character built up around them. In this way, one goes about trying to understand, or building up belief systems concerning, the nature of the world which makes experiences of such character possible. Presumably, this process is part of what is meant when one speaks of the "actual structure of our thought about the world" which Strawson takes to be the central focus of any program of descriptive metaphysics.
Conclusion
A number of general points emerge from the previous critical discussion of Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics as he has outlined it in Part One of Individuals. To begin with, and in contrast to Strawson's perspective, the process of identifying reference is, first and foremost, a matter of establishing how the particulars of experience manifest themselves through, or within, the phenomenology of the experiential field. This field constitutes one's primary, if not only, means of becoming aware of the possibility of particulars as 'objects'.
Important to note in this regard is that use of the term "objects" might signify, under some circumstances, just those particulars within consciousness to which attention might be drawn at any given time. Such particulars often are treated independently of any epistemic considerations about what makes particulars of this phenomenological character ontologically possible.
Under other circumstances, "objects" also might signify those particulars whose origins lie outside of an individual's consciousness. These particulars, to whatever extent and in whatever way they exist, would help generate, or make possible, experiences whose phenomenological characters manifest themselves as being particulars of consciousness of one sort rather than another.
Normally, we tend to use the former 'phenomenological' kind of "object" as our medium through which to methodologically approach (i.e., to inquire about, reflect on, make inferences about the actuality or possibility of) the latter "ontological" kind of objects. In any event, the process of identifying reference is rooted methodologically in asymmetric identifiability dependence relationships that are a function, in part, of the character of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
Given that, depending on circumstances, "objects" may have either phenomenological and/or 'ontological' overtones, one of the main problems that constantly plagues the process of identifying reference is the way in which there is a potential for confusion between, or conflation of, two realms. These realms, although they may be related, interact or overlap at certain points, nevertheless, they are somewhat different from one another. These two realms are, on the one hand, the phenomenology of the experiential field, and, on the other hand, the ontological/metaphysical principles, forces, factors, etc. which make such a phenomenology a reality.
This distinction between "phenomenological" and "ontological" objects is somewhat arbitrary since phenomenological objects are, by virtue of their existence, also ontological ones. However, the distinction is drawn to make allowances for the possibility that ontological objects may not be reducible to phenomenological objects in all, or many, instances.
In terms of the present essay, the suggestion has been made that one of the ways to try to overcome the aforementioned problem is to chart how the process of identifying reference operates within the phenomenology of the experiential field. In line with this charting procedure, the present essay has attempted to point out some of the methodological or procedural steps that are important to pursue or establish in order not to unduly prejudice inquiries concerning "the actual structure of our thought about the world".
For example, among other things, I have argued in the present essay that the issue of re-identifiable particulars does not require one to pre-suppose the continuous existence of an independent world rooted in the spatial/temporal framework of material body particulars. Instead, I have maintained that the notion of re-identifiable particulars can be treated methodologically as a function of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
The particulars which give this phenomenology its current character may stand in need of ontological explanation, but before one can undertake such an explanation (or the underlying search), one needs, first, to deal with the criteria which are to serve as a basis for establishing whether, say, a presently experienced particular is the same as a previously experienced particular - and, if so, to what extent they are the same (e.g., similar, identical). Until one has accomplished this, one really is not in any methodological position to ask, or to try to deter-mine, whether, for example, the ontological particulars underlying, or giving expression to, such phenomenological particulars had to exist continuously in a spatial/temporal framework in order to make such re-identifications possible.
In fact, as has been argued in the present essay, issues of re-identification can be handled, to some extent, quite independently of ontological issues that are concerned with what makes particulars of a given character possible or behave in a given way(s) over time. In this essay, the method of handling problems of re-identification was indicated to be a function of congruence relationships.
I also have argued in the present essay that, methodologically, one can handle both the identifying or re-identifying of particulars independently of deciding whether or not identifying reference presupposes or requires the concept of a person in order for such references to be made. Similarly, I have contended that the distinction between self and other than self, or between solipsistic and non-solipsistic consciousness, does not have to be made as a prerequisite to tackling the problem of trying to make identifying reference with respect to the "actual structure of our thought about the world".
In addition to the foregoing methodological points, I have maintained that the process of identifying reference does not always demand or require that uniqueness of reference be established in order for the phenomenologies of two or more experiential fields (e.g., hearer/ speaker) to be able to lock in on the experiential co-ordinates that are signified by any given instance of, or attempt at, identifying reference. What is required, however, among other things, in order for there to be communication concerning a given instance of identifying reference is the following. There must be enough points or facets of congruence established between two (or more) phenomenological frameworks to be able to isolate those phenomenological particulars from among the available phenomenological particulars which reflect characteristics that are being given expression through that to which identifying reference is being made.
Finally, I have argued during the course of the present essay that, in minimal methodological terms, the individuation of experience requires a framework of consciousness (such as is manifested in and/or through the phenomenology of the experiential field) that is capable of several things: a) this framework must be capable of attending to various aspects and dimensions of that framework (i.e., it must have a reflexive quality about it); b) the framework must be capable noting, and keeping track of, the similarities and differences from one experiential context to the next; and, c) the given framework must be capable of juxtaposing and combining a) and b) in various ways in order to be able to generate different sets of conceptual grids axial dimensions represent hermeneutical and/or epistemic structures that are a function of the above mentioned processes of juxtaposing and combining a) and b).
'Demonstrative reference', 'material body particulars', 're-identifiable particulars', 'persons', 'solipsistic versus non-solipsistic consciousness', 'uniqueness of reference', etc. are all structures that have been generated by Strawson's uses of the structuring process of identifying reference. The above concepts identify structures inasmuch as they organize, orient and determine relationships among various experiences and thoughts.
Moreover, the foregoing notions represent structures inasmuch as the represent demarcated (i.e., individuated or particularized) frame works with specific properties and characteristics. Such frameworks tend to persist over time and, as a result, persistently interact with reality in terms of the parameters which are given expression by such properties, etc.
Problems arise in Strawson's position, however, concerning the character of, and relationships among, the aforementioned structures because Strawson has not paid adequate attention (if any at all) to the character of the structuring processes out of which the above mentioned structures arose. If Strawson had paid adequate attention to the underlying structuring process, he might have seen that the very act of identifying reference which he uses to help produce, and draw attention to, such structures has a methodological character that is quite distinct from the structures which Strawson has generated while using it. At bottom, identifying reference refers to a dimension of the character of the structuring process of understanding that establishes the phenomenological co-ordinates within which the search for a given kind of experiential particular is to take place.
Thus, identifying reference is both a phenomenological issue as well as a methodological issue. Indeed, the first task of methodology is to recognize its own rootedness in the phenomenology of the experiential field.
In this respect, many of Strawson's problems in the first part of Individuals are traceable, I believe (and as I have argued) to the fact that Strawson appears to want to ontologically/metaphysically run before he has learned even how to methodologically crawl. In any event, one of the purposes of the present essay has been to point out a few of the aspects of this methodology which pertain to the issue of identifying reference.
As I have endeavored to point out at various junctures in this essay, Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics structures his conception of "the actual structure of our thought about the world" in accordance with the manner in which he has characterized the idea of identifying reference. By making the process of identifying reference asymmetrically dependent on the category of material body particulars, and by restricting this process of identifying reference to beings that exhibit non-solipsistic consciousness, Strawson has established the framework of understanding or pre-understandings that will horizonally structure, organize or orient the rest of his thought about the world.
In effect, the aforementioned methodological considerations, and whether or not they are heeded, have substantial impact upon how we view both the "actual structure of our thought" as well as the "actual structure of our thought about the world". In this sense, issues of identifying reference give expression to a fundamental dimension of the structures and structuring of understanding qua understanding. And, while the methodological points made in this essay do not begin to exhaust the points that could be made with respect to the issue of identifying reference, the various points which have been developed during the course of the discussion give something of the methodological flavor of the ways in which identifying reference represents an important dimension of the structures and structuring of understanding.
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