Identifying Reference - Part Five
Structure of Our Thought About the World
The point of the foregoing analysis (or at least one of its has not been so much a matter of trying to eliminate either kind of consciousness as a legitimate possibility. The aim has been to demonstrate the character of the boundaries of various ideas which are central to the program of descriptive metaphysics Strawson is attempting to establish.
Strawson has argued, roughly speaking, that our way of describing or a function of a system of asymmetric identifiability-dependence relationships which is rooted in the idea of material body particulars that have been given category preference over other category particulars. Strawson also has argued that these material body particulars entail the notion of 'unobserved particulars', 'place', 'spatial system' and so on. Consequently, for Strawson, when these notions are juxtaposed properly in the context of non-solipsistic consciousness, all encountered particulars can be re-identified at a later time in terms of that context of non-solipsistic consciousness.
Arguments have been offered in the present essay which indicate that there is no compelling reason for one to give category preference to material body particulars. Moreover, there also appears to be no compelling reason for one to make other category particulars functionally dependent on material body particulars for their (i.e., the other categories of particulars) identification and placement in a system of descriptive meta-physics. In addition, there appears to be little evidence in Strawson's presentation to warrant binding: a) the notion of "particulars" to the idea of "spatial objects"; or, b) the concept of "unobserved particulars" to the notion of "place", construed as some kind of spatial system; or, c) the idea of "re-identifiable particulars" to a given theory of "non-solipsistic consciousness".
Certainly, one might consider Strawson's perspective as representing one possible way to pursue descriptive metaphysics in relation to such a program's preoccupation with the "actual structure of our thought about the world". However, the very fact of being able, in the present essay, to advance plausible counter-proposals to Strawson's various arguments would suggest that his position really may be only an exercise in the delineation of a belief system rather than an accurate description of the "actual structure" itself. As such, Strawson's position may be more reflective of the structure of Strawson's thought about the world, rather than reflective of the structure of human thought, in general, about the world.
One might even question whether or not there really is some unitary framework which does accurately describe the "actual structure of our thought about the world". In any event, in view of the numerous theoretical proposals that have been advanced over the last several thousand years, a distinction could be made which might help clarify exactly what a program in descriptive metaphysics is trying to get at.
The aforementioned distinction is this. There may be a difference between attempting to describe what the "actual structure of our thought about the world" is and attempting to describe what the "actual structure of our thought about the world" actually is.
If one wishes to know what the true nature of reality or Being or the world is, then, in order to entertain any hope of discovering what this nature is, he or she may have to acknowledge that the structure of thought should have certain characteristics which will enable one, or provide one, with the best opportunity to grasp accurately what the actual character of the world or reality or Being is. This is not to say, however, there is only one way to know the nature of reality or the world or Being, or even that one will necessarily be able to come to know the nature of reality in some definitive, exhaustive sense. Rather, to whatever extent human beings are capable of knowing the nature of reality or the world, man will have to discover and pursue those methods, techniques, systems, and so on which will permit the individual an opportunity to gain epistemological access to those aspects of reality which he or she is capable actually of engaging, through the potential inherent in, for example, the structure of human thought.
There may be, and likely are, elements in the structure of our thought about the world which are problematic or flawed or misleading or illusory or error prone. The mere fact that we may describe, accurately, the "actual structure of our thought about the world" does not guarantee we, thereby, will come to grips with the actual character of the world to which our thoughts refer. What is necessary is to identify, if possible, those aspects of the "actual structure of our thought" which will permit us to inferentially determine, to whatever extent we can, the specific character of the world on which our thoughts are focusing.
Up to this point, Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics may describe, quite accurately, the actual structure of the thought of some people about the world. However, if there are other people whose actual structure of thought about the world is different from that described by Strawson, as there most certainly are, then, how does one decide between, or among, the various programs of descriptive metaphysics?
Must descriptive metaphysics be reduced to so many exercises in relativism, where the "actual structure of our thought about the world" becomes functionally dependent on, and varies with, the philosophical outlook of the individual or group with whom one is speaking? Under these sorts of circumstance, one has no means of determining which, if any, of the views concerning the investigation of the structure of thought about the world are capable of withstanding an examination by a program of critical analysis.
Such a program would not be restricted to any one view. Instead, it would attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses of a given metaphysical program in terms of the considerations, questions, data, models, theories, and problems arising in the realms of human experience (taken collectively) and against which any metaphysical program must be able to defend itself.
Furthermore, a metaphysical program's ability to defend itself does not necessarily mean the program is correct in its depiction of reality. Such defensibility merely renders the program more or less plausible, depending on the strength, depth and breadth of that defensive capability.
Is there not a potential difference between looking at the structure of a given belief system about the world, qua belief system, and looking at the structure of a given thought system that actually tries to epistemologically engage the world qua world as something independent of the thought/belief system and to which the thought/belief system is descriptively referring? At the very least, there seems to be a potential difference in the character of the commitment in each case. Both investigations, in effect, involve beliefs, to one extent or another, but in the former case, all that matters is delineating the character of the belief system taken in and of itself, whereas in the latter case, there seems to be an interest in trying to determine the extent to which what one believes actually accurately reflects some aspect of reality beyond the horizons of the belief/thought system in question.
Strawson's stipulation that descriptive metaphysics concerns the "actual structure of our thought about the world" (emphasis mine) tends to suggest his program is attempting to get at something more essential than relative theories about the proposed character of the aforementioned "actual structure". The underlying intent seems to be a matter of identifying those aspects of the actual structure of human thought which will allow us to epistemologically engage the world in an accurate and revealing manner with respect to the actual character of that world.
If descriptive metaphysics is reduced to relativized theories about how different groups of people think about the world, then, Strawson's designation of the nature of descriptive metaphysics certainly is misleading. After all, the structure of our thought doesn't necessarily have any one kind of reflective structure concerning the nature of the world - not even that part of the world which concerns the structure of our thinking about the world.
There are a multiplicity of such structures which are possible. On the other hand, if descriptive metaphysics refers to all of these possible structures taken collectively, then, Strawson has not at all succeeded in describing what the "actual structure of our thought about the world" is, because he has, so far, restricted himself to but one kind of theoretical account - namely, his own version.
In order to avoid these problems, Strawson seems to be maintaining more than just that making the distinction between the structure of thought and the structure of the world is a useful one to make (i.e., adopting the stance of non-solipsistic consciousness as an heuristic device). He appears to be holding that the "actual structure of our thought about the world", when construed in terms of a proper program of metaphysics (i.e., as he conceives it should be) correctly reflects the character of the relationship of metaphysical/ontological realities which exist independently of our individual thought and beliefs about the world.
To make a distinction between, on the one hand, the character of the structure of thought, and, on the other hand, the character of the world, does not compel one, as Strawson apparently believes to be the case, to adopt a perspective of non-solipsistic consciousness and, thereby, to reject solipsistic consciousness. The aforementioned distinction only may mean that, at a minimum, the total experiential field of an individual can be differentiated, and frequently is, according to the character of those particularizations of experience (of which thought itself can be one) about which thought thinks. No presumptions need be made as to whether the "world" which is being particularized (according to the character of the experience in which the particularization arises) is an ontological entity that is metaphysically distinct from, and independent of, the metaphysical character of that which makes thinking and experiencing possible.
If the foregoing contention is correct, then, the problem with which one is faced is that of trying to determine what the nature of the relationship is between two dimensions of the experiential field which have been differentially particularized into entities that are respectively referred to as ‘thought’ and ‘the world’. Once having determined, as best one is able, what the characters are of ‘thought’ and ‘the world’, along with the relationship of these two, one can go on to ask whether: a) ‘the world’ and "thought" are metaphysically autonomous unto themselves (i.e., each distinct and separate from the other); or, b) ‘thought’ is but one special kind of manifestation of ‘the world’; or, c) ‘the world’ is just one special kind of ‘thought’; or, d) ‘thought’ and ‘the world’ are both expressions of ‘something’ more fundamental in metaphysical character?
Whatever the correct answer (or answers) may be, developing a program of descriptive metaphysics that attempts to provide an account of the "actual structure of our thought about the world" appears to be intended to lead beyond the level of just describing our thinking about the world. Such a program appears to lead into a philosophical journey where we must try, fully, to encounter and resolve the question: what makes the "actual structure of our thought about the world" possible at all. We also are confronted by the problem of trying to determine to what extent our thinking about the "structure of our thought about the world" provides a viable or defensible means of coming to understand the nature of that which makes this thinking possible to begin with.
Considered from this perspective, Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics seems to be plagued by a number of fundamental difficulties and unanswered questions as outlined earlier in this essay. The issues I have raised with respect to Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics seems to threaten, if not undermine, the tenability of his contentions about the character of the "actual structure of our thought about the world". And, this appears to be the case both in terms of the methodological approach which is reflected in his various contentions, as well as in terms of what those contentions seem to imply with respect to the substantive character of "the structure of our thought", "the world" and the relationship between the two of them.
Toward the beginning of the chapter entitled "Persons", Strawson says, in reference to the previous chapter "Sounds":
"We drew a picture of a purely auditory experience, and elaborated it to a point at which it seemed that the being whose experience it was - if any such being were possible at all - might recognize sound-universals and re-identify sound-particulars and in general form for himself an idea of his auditory world; but still, it seemed he would have no place for the idea of himself as the subject of this experience, would make no distinction between a special item in his world, namely himself, and the other items in it. Would it not seem utterly strange to suggest that he might distinguish himself as one item among others in his auditory world, that is, as a sound or sequence of sounds? For how could such a thing - a sound - be also what had all those experiences?" (p.88)
In actuality, Strawson neither has demonstrated, nor stipulated, that the No-Space world must be restricted only to sounds. Strawson merely said that the No-Space-world beings had no capacity for a sensible intuition of Space in the Kantian sense and that, therefore, apparently, all sources of sensation except audition effectively were denied to such a being.
Yet, unless one were to assume that consciousness, as a locus of experience, must necessarily be a function of something which requires a "place" in Strawson's sense of spatial system capable of housing objects (i.e., material body particulars), there is no reason to believe a No-Space-world being couldn't be capable of conscious reflection upon his or her auditory experiences.
Strawson seems to be assuming that consciousness (and whatever rational capabilities which are expressible in, or through, consciousness) is precluded from being a part of the No-Space-world being's epistemological repertoire because that being's capabilities supposedly are restricted (by Strawson himself) to sensible intuitions of Time alone. But, Strawson has done nothing to demonstrate that all aspects of consciousness, including the dimension of rational reflection, are necessarily a function of the sensible intuitions which have been ruled out, according to Strawson, from being part of the No-Space world model.
Moreover, in contradistinction to Strawson's point of view in the quote cited above, there is no need for a No-Space-world being to think of himself or herself (if he or she does have a notion of self - or, even of he or she) as being a "sound or sequence of sounds" (although the individual could if he, she, or it wished). As noted earlier, one must make a distinction between a being without a sensible intuition of Space and the character of the world in which such a being lives.
A No-Space world does not necessarily mean such a world consists only of sounds. A No-Space world means that at least one of the ways in which beings who inhabit that world are linked to their world is through their capacity to intuit Time sensibly by means of audition. This says nothing about whether the conceptual abilities of these beings would be capable of positing or grasping a multidimensional world which extended beyond the limitations of their sensible intuitive capacities.
Furthermore, this characterization of such a No-Space-world being does not say anything about what the actual metaphysical character of the world inhabited by those beings must be. Therefore, even though the sensible experience of a No-Space-world being may be limited entirely to sounds, one is uncertain as to what sort of a concept of self, if any, these beings will come up with and what sort of a concept of "the world" they will develop on the basis of their auditory experiences and their reflection upon those experiences, because, as of yet, one knows nothing about their capacities for thinking, knowing, understanding, reflecting, and awareness.
In addition, Strawson did not show or prove a No-Space-world being "would have no place for the idea of himself as the subject of [his] experience". In point of fact, and as previously discussed in this essay, Strawson attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to argue that No-Space-world beings would be unlikely to develop or possess a non-solipsistic con-sciousness. He tied his argument to his own individualized hermeneutic of such notions as "unobserved particulars", "re-identifiable particulars" or "place", together with what he believed these notions entailed or im-plied or presupposed with respect to the emergence or existence of non-solipsistic consciousness.
When his hermeneutic was shown to be faulty and indications were given of how the whole idea of non-solipsistic consciousness was not a necessary prerequisite for generating concepts like, for example, "re-identifiable particulars, "unobserved particulars" (and vice versa), then, whether, or not, a No-Space-world being actually would or would not have some means of developing an "idea of himself as the subject of experience" was left indeterminate. Conceptual room existed for both possibilities.
More specifically, a No-Space-world being might be capable of opting for either a solipsistic or non-solipsistic consciousness or even for some other form of philosophical solipsism (or rejection thereof). Whatever the No-Space-world being chose or was capable of choosing in this respect involved issues which could be considered independently of the problem of finding ways to generate a systematic means of identifying and re-identifying particulars during the course of experience.
This systematic means of identifying and re-identifying particulars might serve as a basis for proceeding further with a program of descriptive metaphysics. However, this system issue could be addressed prior to, and apart from, subsequent issues such as solipsistic versus non-solipsistic consciousness.
States of Consciousness, Corporeal Characteristics and Personhood
Strawson begins approaching the issue of personhood by describing how some of the characteristics we ascribe to ourselves as individuals we also ascribe to certain other kinds of particulars. For example, features such as color, location, shape, weight and size are attributed to those particulars which appear to be similar to ourselves as well as to other kinds of particulars.
Strawson also notes there are some characteristics which we ascribe to ourselves that many of us would not extend ascriptively to various sorts of particulars encountered in experience. For example, according to Strawson, we ascribe awareness, intentionality, motivation, rationality, understanding, perception and emotion to ourselves, but many of us do not tend to characterize other non-human particulars in the same way. Of, if we do characterize these other particulars in this way, then, we often are judged to be 'psychotic', 'retarded' or caught up in some sort of 'occult' or 'mystical' philosophy, all of which are further criterial ascriptions which generally are not extended to non-human particulars.
In the context of these considerations, Strawson maintains:
"... there seems nothing needing explanation in the fact that the particular height, coloring, physical position which we ascribe to ourselves should be ascribed to something or other: for that which one calls one's body ... can be picked out from others, identified by ordinary physical criteria and described in ordinary physical terms. But ... it can and must seem to need explanation that one's states of consciousness, one's thoughts and sensations, are ascribed to the very same thing to which these physical characteristics, this physical situation, is ascribed. That is, we have not only the question: why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? We have also the question: why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation ... ?" (pp. 89-90)
After running through a brief overview of a variety of facts which draw attention to the way in which the body seems to play a key role in determining, shaping and coloring the character of experience, Strawson attempts to point out, in relation to these facts, that:
"They explain ... why I feel peculiarly attached to what in fact I call my own body; they even might be said to explain why, granted that I am going to speak of one body as mine, I should speak of this body as mine. But they do not explain why I should have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my thoughts and experiences to anything. Moreover ... the facts in question still do not explain why we should, as we do, ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply to the body standing in this special relation to the thing to which we ascribe thoughts and feelings, &c., but to the thing itself to which we ascribe those thoughts and feelings ... the facts in question do not explain the use that we make of the word "I", or how any word has the use that word has. They do not explain the concept we have of a person." (pp. 93-94)
One could agree with Strawson when he points out that the notion or concept of person does not necessarily follow from the fact a body is said to exist which is described as the locus or focal point for a variety of perceptual experiences. However, one is less clear how use of the term "I", or the ascribing of physical states to "my" body, or the projecting of "my" thoughts and feelings into, or through, the body which seems to be "mine" necessarily indicates, suggests or presupposes the concept of a person, as Strawson appears to believe is the case.
Just as people seem to ascribe physical states to "themselves" or ascribe conscious states to "their" physical bodies, people can ascribe personhood to an ongoing demarcated field of experience. This is the case not because what is being ascribed really is a part of what it is being ascribed to, or because there really is an ontological, substantial counterpart to the linguistic label "person". Rather, this is the case because individuals have a tendency to develop beliefs about what the nature of reality is and proceed to ascribe various characteristics accordingly - even if this ascribing process involves improper inferential conclusions.
Sometimes individuals ascribe physical features to conscious states, not because conscious states are necessarily physical in nature, but because the character of beliefs of these individuals about the nature of reality holds that conscious states are, in part or in whole, physical phenomena. Similarly, sometimes people ascribe conscious states to a given physical locus (i.e., a body), not because conscious states are actually a function of bodies, but because the belief systems of these individuals stipulate that conscious states are a part, usually, of what is meant by having a physical body of a certain kind (namely, of a human kind).
Although there is clear-cut evidence which shows a correlated association of various sorts between conscious states and physical bodies, one cannot be sure the character of any given ascription constitutes a correct assessment of the nature of the reality at issue. This applies as much to the ascribing of the terms: "my", "mine" or "personhood" to the field of experience, as it does to the ascribing of mental and physical characteristics to physical and conscious states respectively. Therefore, conceivably, the whole notion of a person might be an illusory one which arises when certain inferential errors are made with respect to one's reflection upon that which transpires in various experiential circumstances.
Strawson believes the ascribing of mental and physical characteristics to physical and conscious states, respectively, does not at all explain why there should be the notion of "I", "my", "mine" or "self" in conjunction with these sorts of ascriptions. The implication here, perhaps, is that the concept of person, which Strawson, apparently, believes is implicitly or explicitly entailed or presupposed by these notions, must represent some different dimension of reality in order to make possessive ascriptions possible at all.
In other words, Strawson seems to be maintaining that neither the mere positing of corporeal and conscious states, nor the ascribing of physical and mental characteristics to such states, can explain the origin of the ideas underlying the use of "I", "my", "mine", "self" in relation to these states and ascriptions. As a result, "personhood", is seen as something apart from, although associated with, such states.
Whether Strawson's introduction of the concept of "person" is capable of really accounting for the emergence of "I", "my", "mine" and "self" in relation to experience remains to be seen. As noted several pages earlier, the concept of "person" may represent merely one more way of ascribing criterial features to experience such that this concept constitutes more of an ascriptive imposition upon the character of experience rather than an accurate reflection of what the actual structure of that experience is.
Human beings do all kinds of ascribing. The trick is to find a way, if one is available, of differentiating between the myths and realities of these ascriptive practices. That is, one needs to distinguish between which ascriptions are accurate with respect to that to which they refer, and which ascriptions are not reflectively accurate of that to which they make identifying reference.
The No-Ownership Thesis of Self
Strawson cites two different kinds of philosophical position which might be raised in objection to his concerns over the notion of "person". One position revolves around the ideas of Descartes' dualistic approach to a theory of mind. The other position is referred to by Strawson as the "no-ownership or no subject doctrine of the self" (p. 95).
Strawson clearly rejects both types of position and argues, instead, for the metaphysical priority of the notion of "person" over that of: "body", "consciousness" or both of these notions together. Let us briefly take a look at some of the arguments which Strawson puts forth in this regard.
At one point in his discussion, Strawson argues in the following way:
"... if we think, once more, of the requirements of identifying reference in speech to particular states of consciousness, or private experiences, we see that such particulars cannot be thus identifyingly referred to except as the states of experiences of some identified person. States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are. From this it follows immediately that if they can be identified as particular states or experiences at all, they must be possessed or ascribable in just that way which the no-ownership theorist ridicules; in such a way that it is logically impossible that a particular state or experience in fact possessed by someone should have been possessed by anyone else. The requirements of identity rule out logical transferability of ownership. So the [no-owner-ship] theorist could maintain his position only be denying that we could even refer to particular states or experiences at all; and this position is ridiculous." (pp. 47-48)
To begin with, there seems to be no readily apparent reason why one must believe that the identification of "particular states of consciousness, or private experiences" can only be accomplished by means of ascriptively linking these states and experiences to "some identified person". For instance, consider the following two positions.
1) A locus of consciousness, answering to identifying description "xyz", gives expression to an experience or state of consciousness of character "abc". 2) Only persons can "have" experiences or states of consciousness, and because the being answering to identifying description "xyz" reports an experience or state of consciousness, therefore, the being is a person since only persons can have experiences or states of consciousness.
This latter position, 2), presupposes the truth of its conclusions by including the conclusions as part of its starting point and treating this starting point as a matter of conventional truth (i.e., truth by convention) rather than arguing for, and demonstrating, its truth. On the other hand, the former position, 1), suggests a quite different possibility.
1) indicates that while one needs to identify the character of a locus of experience or state of consciousness in order for one, or more, individuals to identifyingly be able to refer to such a locus in any speaker/hearer interchange, there is no need to presuppose that the being or entity which is said to have undergone an experience or state of consciousness must be a person. Certainly, one can raise this issue of personhood in relation to the being which is referred to identifyingly in terms of experiences or states of consciousness and ask whether such a being is a person (whatever that is) or a computerized automaton or a No-Space-world being, or non-human humanoid, or whatever. Nonetheless, there seems to be no inherent difficulty in making identifying references to a being who reports, or is reported to have, experiences or states of consciousness, while keeping this issue of identification entirely separate from the question of personhood in relation to these beings.
Strawson contends that experiences and states of consciousness "owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are". He concludes from this contention that in order for these experiences and states of consciousness to be identifiable at all, they must be seen as being ascribable to persons.
He also believes "it is logically impossible that a particular state or experience in fact possessed by someone should have been possessed by anyone else". Unfortunately, Strawson does not elaborate on what it means to "possess" an experience or state of consciousness, except by implication - namely, if person x possesses experience y, then, the very idea of "possession" would seem to denote, according to Strawson, that no one can lay a legitimate claim to possessing what x does (i.e., experience y).
Strawson appears to believe that "the requirements of identity rule out logical transferability of ownership" in the sense that part and parcel of the identity of a given person is the idea that what such a person possesses or owns in the way of states of consciousness or experiences constitutes an important facet of establishing the identity of this person and differentiating him or her from other persons. In this respect, Strawson's argument seems to be that if the character of the requirements of metaphysical identity did not rule out the "logical transferability of ownershi", then, there would be considerable confusion with respect to whom or what one was attempting to identifyingly refer to in any given case.
Thus, Strawson's position seems to be the following. Unless a speaker and hearer can positively ascertain that the experiences or states of consciousness they are discussing are precisely those which have been undergone (i.e., possessed) by a specific individual, then, this individual's phenomenological identity vis-á-vis the experiences and states of consciousness in question has not been established determinately as required by the logical character of identity (according to Strawson). As a result, one cannot be sure the experiences or states of consciousness in question are exactly those ones which are required to establish the identity of a person as the one and only being to have undergone the specified experiences or states of consciousness.
However, there is no obvious (or even not-so-obvious) reason why one couldn't differentiate between two beings according to some temporal, relational, logical conceptual, emotional, or spiritual criterial distinction. One, then, could proceed to enquire about whether or not the two beings could be said to be capable of undergoing the same state of consciousness or experience at the same time or at separate times.
Of course, the character of reality may be such that no two beings, simultaneously, can undergo the same state of consciousness or experience. If this is the case, then, the requirements of identity would preclude the "transferability of ownership' of these states and experiences.
Nevertheless, none of these possible concessions does anything to demonstrate that experiences and states of consciousness must be differentiated with sufficient precision so as to permit any speaker/hearer dyad to be able to make identifying reference to a given person on the basis of knowing the exact nature of this individual's internal experience. One needs to make a distinction between: a) what might be termed the "absolute ontological fact" that a given being has undergone a specific state of consciousness of character "mno", and b) the requirements of identifying reference.
The requirements of identifying reference only have to be pursued far enough to allow speaker and hearer to set up a framework of sufficiently numerous criterial attributes for them to know, or plausibly believe, that they are referring identifyingly to one and the same thing at any given time. Under these circumstances, there is no need to determine that person A, and only person A, had experience Q. There also is no need to demonstrate that the very phenomenological character of person A's Q-experience rules out the possibility of anyone else having this same experience with the same phenomenological qualities.
What is necessary is for the speaker and hearer to know that one of the identifying features of the 'object' being referred to is that this 'object' either reported having, or is reported as having, a given experience or state of consciousness. If this feature is not sufficient to identify whom or what is being referred to, then, one adds as many features as are necessary, or as one can, in order to establish a common framework of identifying references.
One might be willing to acknowledge that specific experiences or states of consciousness "owe their identities as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are" functions of, or generated through, or whose existence makes them possible at all. Nevertheless, none of these considerations needs to be known by a given speaker and hearer in order for this dyad to be in a position to be able to refer identifyingly to a being who is supposed to have undergone such experiences or states of consciousness.
The two issues are separate matters. One concerns metaphysical identity in an absolute sense. The other is a purely methodological issue concerning the problems surrounding the issue of how two individuals (a speaker and a hearer) go about ensuring their identifying references coincide so that they can continue on in their discussions of, arguments about, or explorations into the nature of descriptive metaphysics.
Although, under certain circumstances, the precise determination of absolute metaphysical identity may become a crucial issue in questions of identifying reference (e.g., determining the identity of an heir to a fortune, or providing someone with top level security clearance, or ascertaining that a given experience was an authentic mystical opening, etc.), this need not always be the case, and one must be careful not to conflate or confuse the two matters. Whether or not such a precise determination is to play a crucial role depends on the purposes for which something is being referred to identifyingly.
For instance, a speaker merely may be trying to draw the hearer's attention to certain features of the experiential field as concrete examples around which to have a discussion. Thus, in identifyingly referring to Mr. P's reported dream about "falling off a cliff", in order to relate one's own experiences of a similar nature, one does not have to establish that Mr. P's dream had any specific phenomenological character which identified it, in absolute metaphysical terms, as Mr. P's dream, and only his dream, or that such a dream is part of the identity of who Mr. P is. One need not even have to believe that Mr. P is a person - assuming one knew for sure what this term meant.The speaker may be referring to Mr. P merely because there is a feature - namely, dreaming about falling off a cliff - associated with Mr. P which is important to the character of the sort of conceptual framework the speaker is trying to describe, and, for better or worse, Mr. P may represent only a convenient focus of reference to help the speaker to identifyingly refer to the thrust of his or her (i.e., the speaker's) intention, meaning or hermeneutic so that the hearer is provided with enough criterial features to enable the hearer to be able to fix a context of identifiable/logical character which will help the hearer grasp the nature of what the speaker is getting at within this sort of context.
There can be many reasons for identifyingly referring to a human being, none of which necessarily forces one to get caught up in the kind of issues that Strawson seems to be implicitly, if not explicitly, insisting on in the last quote from him that was given in this essay. Among other things, this means one is not compelled to accept the previously cited conclusion which Strawson arrives at, namely: "only by denying that we could ever refer to particular states or experiences at all" could no-ownership theorists maintain their position.
The absence of compulsion concerning acceptance of this conclusion is not because the no-ownership thesis is viable (at least not in the very restricted form in which Strawson characterizes it). Instead, this is so due to the fairly elementary point that there is no methodological need for identifyingly referring to particular experiences or states of consciousness to give immediate rise to, or presuppose, the issue of personhood. One can proceed with beginning to explore the characteristics of identifying reference quite independently of such an issue.
Methodologically speaking, one does not proceed from the assumption of person in Strawson's sense (as that which has unique ownership of certain specified experiences and states of consciousness) and, then, subsequently, treat identifying references to any experiences and states one encounters as functions of the underlying personhood which makes these experiences and states possible to begin with. One starts with identifying references to variously described experiences and states of consciousness in relation to certain beings. Then, one proceeds from reflection upon the character of those identifying references to a theory or hypotheses or ideas about whether there is such a thing as 'personhood' in the beings in question - and, if so, what the character of said personhood is.
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