Identifying Reference - Part Four
At one point in his discussion (see pages 74-86 of Individuals), Strawson appears to be trying to argue against precisely what has been alluded to in the last paragraph. More precisely, he seems to be attempting to show that beings who inhabit a No-Space world could not generate, successfully, any procedural means for constructing a basis for identifying and re-identifying category particulars encountered by such beings during the course of experience.
Believing there is no direct way in which one could use purely auditory sensible intuitions in a No-Space world to generate spatial concepts, Strawson begins to hunt around for some dimension of auditory experience within the No-Space world that might provide something of an analogy with the idea of Space. According to Strawson:
"We want an analogy of distance - or nearer to and further away from - for only, at least, under this condition would we have anything like the idea of a dimension other than the temporal in which unperceived particulars could be thought of as simultaneously existing in some kind of systematic relation to each other, and to perceived particulars." (p. 75)
Unfortunately, this way of stating the issue is misleading.
The immediate task is not to show how "unperceived particulars could be thought of as simultaneously existing in some kind of systematic relation" to other particulars, both perceived and unperceived. One is not, yet, in a metaphysical position, as far as the current stage of 'progress' of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is concerned, to begin asking about the logical character of unperceived particulars or about whether or not these particulars exist "in some kind of systematic relation" to one another as well as to perceived particulars.
If anything, the postulation of, or hypothesizing about, the character of unperceived particulars must be based upon, and presuppose, the identification of perceived particulars. One is getting ahead of the game to go looking for dimensions "other than the temporal in which unperceived particulars could be thought of as simultaneously existing in some kind of systematic" relationship to one another and to perceived particulars.
In a No-Space world in which sensible intuitions were restricted to purely auditory particulars and in which, given Strawson's orientation, one were left with only the temporal dimension with which to work in establishing a basis for identification of particulars, there is not any need, initially, to even bring up the idea of unperceived particulars. Of course, one could do this if one wished to, once one's program of identification of perceived particulars were completed.
Nonetheless, the immediate (or first) task is to see if, by working within the described parameters of the logical character of the No-Space world, one can find a means of identifying auditory particulars. In any event, the whole idea of looking for a dimension of the No-Space world which is analogous to that of Space in our world is misconceived.
Apparently, Strawson believes this kind of an analogy is necessary in order to leave open metaphysical room for the notion of unperceived particulars in the conceptual framework of the No-Space-world beings. However, since Strawson holds that the only sense which he can make of the idea of "unperceived particulars" is through the notion of "place", construed as a spatial system within which objects (i.e., material body particulars) can be housed, one would seem to hope in vain for a suitable analogy within the No-Space world which could correspond to the Space of human experience.
In other words, by trying to keep alive the idea of material-body particulars as presupposing "place" and, therefore, requiring either the sensible intuition of Space or of an adequate analogous category, one gets trapped into investing unperceived particulars with the ontology characteristic of Strawson's metaphysical program at this point in his presentation. Yet, beings of the No-Space world have no initial reason to assume anything at all about the character of "material body particulars" or about the character of "place" or about the character of "unperceived particulars". This is so because, initially, the No-Space-world beings are only trying to develop a procedure for identification of particulars from which they can launch a metaphysical investigation into accounting for the existence of those particulars within experience.
Consequently, Strawson's attempt to seek spatial analysis in the No-Space world is methodologically irrelevant at this juncture in the program of descriptive metaphysics. Nevertheless, although Strawson continues to pursue his discussion in this portion of Individuals along the lines of seeking some sort of spatial analogy in the No-Space world, let us proceed to look at the examples Strawson puts forth, not with the purpose of seeking spatial analogies, but solely with the aim of trying to determine whether beings in a No- Space world could generate a basis for identification of particulars within the context of the examples Strawson advances. For, as previously pointed out, if this aim could be given some viability, then, Strawson's argument at this point would become suspect.
At one point, Strawson asks us to imagine:
"... that the purely auditory experience we are considering has the following characteristics. A sound of a certain distinctive timbre is heard continuously, at a constant loudness, though with varying pitch. This sound is unique in its continuity. We may call it the master-sound.... In addition to the master-sound, other sounds or sequences of sound of various degrees of complexity are heard. Some of these sequences may be supposed to have the kind of unity which pieces of music have. They recur and are recognized. They are highly complex universals with particular instances.... One may imagine, finally, that variations in the pitch of the master-sound are correlated with variations in the other sounds that are heard, in a way very similar to that in which variations in the position of the turning-knob of a wireless set are correlated with variations in the sounds that one hears in the wireless.... A gradual change in the pitch of the master-sound is accompanied by a gradual decrease, or a gradual increase followed by a gradual decrease, in the loudness of the unitary sound-sequence in question until it is no longer heard. If the gradual change in pitch of the master-sound continues in the same direction, a different unitary sound-sequence is heard with gradually increasing loudness." (pp. 75-76)
Strawson contends the foregoing framework provides an insight into the sort of example someone might come up with to illustrate how one could construct a means of not only identifying and re-identifying particulars, but also of conceptualizing the notion of unperceived particulars within the setting of a No-Space world.
Apparently, the portions of the master-sound to which one was not currently attuned would constitute the basis for the possibility of subsequent unitary sound experiences. Also, because by definition (i.e., the manner in which Strawson has arbitrarily determined the character of the example) the master-sound is continuous, then, one must suppose there are unheard sound particulars simultaneously existing with the sound particulars which are being heard by a given being at a given time.
Therefore, according to Strawson, unperceived particulars exist such that while they do not seem to require the notion of a "spatial system" in Strawson's sense (i.e., a means of housing material-body particulars) as an underpinning to their existence, they do seem to convey the idea of an auditory particular which is "audible at other positions than the one occupied at that moment". Although Strawson considers such a possible argument to be both attractive and persuasive, he does not think it is compelling.
Before examining why Strawson holds this to be the case, one might do well to look at the logical character of the example a little more closely. The first thing to note is that the example outlined by Strawson presupposes what needs to be investigated.
He speaks of there being an array of sounds which are heard and which are related functionally to the master sound in some way. They are said to be related functionally since the changing of the pitch of the master-sound is correlated with an ensuing change in the quality of "unitary sound-sequence" heard by the appropriately positioned No-Space-world being.
Strawson stipulates these sounds "recur and are recognized". In other words, the No-Space-world being is conceded the capability of being able to identify the various sounds he or she encounters as ones that have been heard before (when this is, in fact, the case). Presumably, different sounds or sound-sequences would be differentially recognized as being distinct in some way from one another by such a being.
Unfortunately, Strawson gives no account of how this differential recognition and identification operates. Furthermore, he does not provide any account of: a) what makes the master-sound possible; or, b) whether the character of the particularzied unitary sound-sequences heard by the No-Space-world beings are a function, to some extent, of the character of the sensible intuition and conceptual capabilities of these beings; or, c) if they are entirely a function of the nature of the master-sound, with the perceptual equipment of the No-Space-world beings serving as passive receptors which in no way distort the character of the master-sound in any given instance. Yet, all of these issues have a bearing on the shape of the descriptive metaphysics one will come up with in relation to the character of the 'actual structure of thought' of these beings about their No-Space world.
The reason, of course, why Strawson presupposed all of these identi-fication and reidentification aspects of the example is because he is pre-occupied with the question of unperceived particulars and whether or not the notion of "place" (which he believes is entailed by the idea of "un-perceived particulars") requires one to posit a spatial system capable of housing material-body particulars of the kind he holds to be at the foundation of any asymmetric identifiability-dependence relationship within the context of a program of descriptive metaphysics. Nevertheless, given the nature of the example outlined by Strawson, a being of the No-Space world could proceed in the following way without having to pre-suppose the kinds of things which Strawson seems to feel are necessary.
Starting with his or her immediate experience of a sound with a given character, the No-Space-world being begins to experiment with and explore those experiences over a period of time, keeping careful mental records of what is observed under different experiential conditions at different times. The No-Space-world being observes that the character of sound experiences does change with time.
After some time, the being hypothesizes (let us assume) that part of the reason why the character of the sound experience changes with time has to do with the qualitative differences in one's concentration across time. On this view, differences in perception of sound experiences would not necessarily be a function of "place", but of the quality of the character of one's attunement to the ongoing master-sound. The notion of "place" would, then, become tied to the qualitative intensity of the being's efforts of concentration such that those beings who concentrated with the same degree of intensity would occupy the same auditory 'place' (although the term "place" may be somewhat misleading in this context).
As a result, the being might maintain there was a spatially dimensionless "place" consisting of: the master-sound and all the beings of the No-Space world, and the relationship of the beings to this 'place' would be defined not in terms of spatial reference points, but in terms of auditory reference points which were judged as being perceptually "closer" or "farther away" from the actual character of the master-sound. Those beings whose consciousness exhibited greater concentration would be, say, closer to the true value of the master-sound; those beings exhibiting less concentration would be further away from the true value of the mastersound.
Perhaps No-Space-world beings even could differentiate among themselves in terms of who were the "slackers" and who were the 'virtuosos' in concentrating upon the master-sound. If this were so, then, presumably, there would have to be some independent means of checking the actual structure of thought or understanding or awareness in such beings with respect to their experience of the master-sound in order to ensure that a being claiming to be a master-sound virtuoso was 'authentic'.
In none of the foregoing suppositions has one needed to construe "place" as involving some sort of spatial system, nor has one needed to consider "unperceived particulars" as entailing the notion of material body particulars which are, supposedly, the natural heirs of the would-be spatial system. Identification and re-identification of sounds would be a function of the quality of the intensity of concentration exhibited in relation to the master-sound.
Two perceived sounds in the No-Space world that are marked by equivalent efforts of concentration are identified by the perceived during such an effort. Moreover, the quality of sound perceived would be compared to some kind of innate understanding, or mental chart, or complex equation, or series of tests, or council of experts, in order to determine its logical, structural, perceptual, or spiritual distance from the true character of the master-sound.
While the foregoing kinds of identifiability relationships show evidence of dependence features, they do not appear to be asymmetric - at least not in Strawson's sense. Rather, there seems to be a mutual interdependence between the perceptual experience of the No-Space-world being and the continuous character of the master-sound posited by Strawson.
To be identified and recognized, the master-sound must be experienced would be congruent. In addition, the clarity with which the master-sound is perceived is dependent on the quality of the effort of concentration put forth by any given No-Space-world being.
At the same time, without the existence of the master-sound of given audible character, then, there is nothing of a sensible nature to be identified or recognized by the No-Space-world beings. Without the determinate nature of the master-sound's continuous presence, there is nothing against which to measure the degree of clarity of auditory experience.
Naturally, No-Space-world beings will be confronted with the problem of trying to discover the extent and character of the contributions which are made, respectively, by the master-sound and the No-Space-world being's perceptual/conceptual equipment in any given auditory experience. However, even if determination of the relative contributions of these two inputs to auditory experience reveals a certain amount of asymmetry under various conditions, the asymmetry is not necessarily a function of identifiability-dependence relationships rooted in material body particulars. This is because the previously noted possibility concerning the issue of identifiability is that it might be dependent on both the character of consciousness of auditory experience as well as on the character of the reality of the master-sound's existence.
The question of asymmetry here, if any asymmetry is present at all, is a matter of inquiring about which, if either, of the two inputs has a greater effect upon shaping the character of the perceived experience in any given instance. The more perceptually distant a No-Space-world being is from the true character of the master-sound, the more the asymmetrical character of the identifiability-dependence relationship would be a function of the being's perceptual/conceptual contribution of shaping the character of the perceived auditory experience. On the other hand, the more perceptually proximate a No-Space-world being is to the true character of the master-sound, then, the more the character of the identifiability relationship would be a function either: a) of the symmetrical contributions of the two inputs; or, b) of an asymmetrical relationship dominated by the actual character of the master-sound being allowed, by the perceptual/conceptual capabilities of the being, to come through in as undistorted a manner as the being's perceptual/conceptual capabilities will permit.
Apparently, the reason why Strawson feels the conceptual scheme he has outlined for the re-identification of particulars in the No-Space world is, ultimately, not very satisfying is because:
"We could adopt a different scheme of description which allowed for re-identifiable universals but not for re-identifiable particulars." (p.77)
But, given that the No-Space world example, as outlined by Strawson himself, seems to revolve around the possibility of re-identifiable particulars, yet, does not necessarily allow for re-identifiable universals, there appears to be some question as to just what exactly is being re-identified within the No-Space framework specified by Strawson.
Therefore, there is a potential for confusion concerning the identity of sound particulars and their actual relation to the world. Thus, Strawson's treatment seems to leave one with these questions: is that which the No-Space-world being is re-identifying an instance of a universal manifestation of the sound-world independent of, though not unrelated to, his/her/its experience; or, is that which such a being is re-identifying an instance of a sound particular which is a function of that being's specific experience, and not necessarily a reflection of a universal expression of some aspect of the actual, real character of the world?
I say these "seem" to be the questions we are left with and this "apparently" is the reason behind Strawson's not finding the No-Space world example he developed very "compelling" (although he did find the example somewhat "attractive") because, quite frankly, Strawson's presentation at this point in his program leaves a lot to be desired as far as its clarity is concerned, and it does not readily permit one to grasp precisely, if at all, what he finds problematic and not compelling about the stated example. Indeed, one might contend that if the example in question is not compelling, then, perhaps this is because Strawson did not develop it and construct it as rigorously as he might have.
In other words, had he taken more care in formulating the master-sound example, he might have been able to raise issues that would have constituted far more of a richly textured conceptual challenge for him to deal with in trying to defend the material-body particular based system of asymmetric identifiability-dependent relationships than is presently the case. By and large, the possibility that, with respect to the No-Space world example, someone "could adopt a different scheme of description which allowed for re-identifiable universals but not for re-identifiable particulars" seems to be neither here nor there.
In other words, this seems to be an irrelevant issue as far as the critical problem of the differential identification and re-identification of various aspects of experience is concerned. Whether a given feature being referred to, and which one is attempting to descriptively identify, is considered to be a universal or a particular makes little difference to one's capacity to identifyingly refer to the feature in question.
The question of universals is a separate metaphysical issue altogether which involves a lengthy process of hermeneutical investigation in relation to the "text" of experience. Ultimately, the text of experience may, or may not, be a function of universals of some sort, expressing themselves in particularized instances, but one perfectly well could go about a differential identification of various facets of the text of experience without ever raising this sort of question.
On the level of identification and re-identification, the particularization of experience is not a matter of presupposing any kind of ontological relationship between universals and particulars. It is a matter of pointing out the different facets of the character of a specified focus of a given experiential context and attempting to determine if some subsequent or previous experience has a requisite degree of congruency to quality as an example or instance of the specific category particular being referred to in a speaker/hearer interchange.
As intimated previously, there may be times when determining whether a given particular, currently being referred to, is identical to a particular previously encountered may be of crucial importance (e.g., as in the case of determining whether something is a forgery). At other times, if the two experiential particulars share certain values or qualities in common within the specifiable parameters of acceptability, this may be enough to satisfy the conditions of re-identification. Thus, in identifying a given object as a car, one may be satisfied that the object has a character which conforms to, or is congruent with, a certain minimal number of features which were manifested in prior, encountered instances of cars, without supposing the present object has to agree in every detail with all previously experienced cars.
Still, one should keep in mind that even in cases where identity of a precise kind is important [i.e., where what is now referred to must be the same (in some sense) as what had been previously experienced or referred to], one need not feel compelled to argue that the idea of universals is the only way one could link the particulars across time within the experiential context of identifiability relationships. At the same time, the aforementioned sense of identity may not be that easy to pin down.
Even if one were to assume that a given object existed continuously from time 't' to time 't+10', there may be changes of wear and tear, so to speak, in which the object's appearance is altered from one temporal point to another. Or, there may be changes of a chemical or atomic nature which may subtlely alter certain aspects of the character of the object. How one determines identity amidst these changes and transitions, and how one determines whether one has a totally new object or an altered old object, are not always easy questions to answer.
Re-identification of particulars is an epistemological issue requiring the establishment of congruencies between experiential frameworks, irrespective of how, or whether, continuous existence of such particulars is possible. The notion of universals, on the other hand, is an attempt to metaphysically account for how particulars come by their specific character and/or how particulars could exist continuously across time and maintain identity despite undergoing numerous changes.
Persons, Non-Solipsistic Consciousness and Reidentifiable Particulars
Toward the end of his chapter "Sounds" in Individuals, Strawson states:
"The question, whether we could find room in the purely auditory world for the concept of a re-identifiable particular, was not, however, the only question we set ourselves. There was also the question, whether the conditions of a non-solipsistic consciousness could be satisfied in such a world. An affirmative answer to the first question appeared as at least a necessary condition of an affirmative answer to the second. Whether it was also a sufficient condition, was a point I left undecided. It might appear obvious that it was a sufficient condition. For the concept of a re-identifiable particular was held to entail that of a particular's existing while unobserved and hence, in general, the distinction between being observed and being unobserved, or at least some closely analogous distinction. But how can this distinction exist without the idea of an observer? How, therefore, can the being with the auditory experience make use of any such distinction without the idea of himself as an observer? Moreover, when we were preparing to construct our auditory analogue of space, we spoke of ordinary observers as thinking of themselves as being at different places at different times. Must not the being with the purely auditory experience similarly think of himself as "at" different places in auditory space? ... The question essentially is whether a distinction parallel in other respects to the ordinary "observed-unobserved" distinction can be drawn without the need for any idea such as we ordinarily express by the first person singular pronoun and associated forms." (pp. 81-82)
Believing he has satisfactorily answered "whether we could find room in the purely auditory world for the concept of a re-identifiable particular" (which he has answered in the negative), Strawson begins to address some questions he feels will help set the stage for an investigation of the idea of "personhood" which he intends to develop in the chapter of Individuals entitled "Persons". The question which he now wishes to raise is whether or not a being of the No-Space world needs to have some sense of the notion of selfhood in order to sustain the idea of a re-identifiable particular.
According to Strawson, the idea of a re-identifiable particular entails a spatial system which can act as a place holder for the objects which exist continuously. This system permits particulars to be re-identified as something encountered previously at some ontological juncture other than the "place" with which one currently is engaged. Strawson also believes the notion of a re-identifiable particular implies the following.
The being who is the conscious locus for the re-identification is making, or is capable of making, a distinction between "observed" and "unobserved" which will coincide with the metaphysics of re-identifiable particulars. This is so because Strawson is presuming that a being who re-identifies a particular will conceive of such a particular as having been continuously existent but unobserved (at least by the being in question) in the interim between initial identification and subsequent re-identification.
Strawson, then, concludes that any being who makes the observed/unobserved distinction in relation to re-identifiable particulars also must acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, that such a distinction entails the idea of an "observer". In other words, Strawson is maintaining there exists some locus of consciousness capable of appreciating the metaphysics of re-identifiable particulars in both their observed and unobserved states. In this regard, Strawson asks: could a No-Space-world being make the observed/unobserved distinction which seems to be a part of the process of re-identifying particulars, without, at the same time, being compelled to make use of the notion of personhood which appears to underlie the notion of "observer" that Strawson claims is inherent in the observed/unobserved distinction associated with re-identifiable particulars?
To use the terminology employed by Strawson, he wishes to argue for the idea that beings with non-solipsistic consciousness are the kind of beings humans are - that is, beings who thereby generate a descriptive metaphysics of a sort which is rooted in asymmetric identifiability-dependence relation-ships that are functions of the notion of material body particulars. As a result, according to Strawson, the form of descriptive metaphysics which these beings with non-solipsistic consciousness develop, accurately construes "the actual structure of our thought about the world".
By examining what he takes to be the problems in the model of the beings of a No-Space world, he apparently feels he can show that descriptive metaphysics demands the sort of delineation which he is giving to it in Individuals.
If one is not forced to believe the re-identification of particulars entails their continuous existence while not being observed, then, beings of the No-Space world need not have to conclude that unobserved particulars must exist in some "place" where they are not now at. However, without the requirement of this notion of "place" (with its concomitant implications of a spatial system capable of housing unobserved objects), the beings of the No-Space world are free, to some extent, to construe the notion of re-identifiable particulars in ways which do not have to entail the kind of ontological baggage Strawson wants to place on board during the metaphysical journey he is advocating.
Of course, after considerable investigation, the beings of the No-Space world may come to the conclusion there are things such as spatial objects - although the existence of these objects might have to be inferred and not sensibly intuited by No-Space beings. They also may conclude that there are objects which exist continuously while not being observed.
Nevertheless, neither of these acknowledgments need to be tied to, and dependent upon, a Strawsonian conception of re-identifiable particulars. As pointed out earlier, the beings of the No-Space world may make a clear distinction between the epistemological demands surrounding the problem of re-identifying particulars and the quite separate metaphysical issue of whether or not those particulars exist continuously in the interim prior to re-identification but subsequent to the initial identification of the particular in question.
Strawson believes an affirmative answer to "whether we could find room in the purely auditory world for the concept of a re-identfiable particular" (p. 81) is a necessary prerequisite for affirmatively answering "whether the conditions of a non-solipsistic consciousness could be satisfied" (p. 81) in a No-Space world. The reasoning here seems quite straightforward.
First, Strawson holds that a being with non-solipsistic consciousness is defined as a being who has a use for the distinction between self and other-than-self. In addition, Strawson believes re-identifiable particulars entail the ideas of, respectively,: "unobserved particulars", "place", "spatial system", and "material body particulars".
Given the foregoing, the conditions for non-solipsistic consciousness would seem to be satisfied in a world where re-identifiable particulars in Strawson's sense were possible, because these particulars would provide a basis for the self/other-than-self differentiation in terms of the observed/unobserved distinction concerning particulars. In other words, if a particular is thought to be capable of existing continuously while unobserved, then, this appears to imply there is something other than self responsible for the ontological maintenance of such a particular while it remains unobserved. Furthermore, if one could find room in one's "world" for "the concept of re-identifiable particulars", then, according to Strawson, one would have supplied a necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition which logically allows for beings of non-solipsistic consciousness to exist in that "world".
The foregoing line of argument, however, involves a number of problems. First of all, the reasoning which appears implicit in Strawson's attempt to make the conditions for non-solipsistic consciousness at least necessarily (if not sufficiently) dependent on the idea of re-identifiable particulars is suspect. For instance, just because a particular may be considered to exist continuously while unobserved does not mean, in and of itself, that something other than self is responsible for the ontological sustenance of the unobserved particular. Thus, a memory not presently in consciousness is a particular of sorts which is presumed to exist continuously (let us assume, for now, this is so) while unobserved.
Yet, one cannot conclude, as a result, that something other than self is responsible for the ontological sustenance of this particular. The complexities of the self's structure may be such that memories are maintained by the self through unconscious mechanisms.
Obviously, where one places the boundaries designating the outer limits, so to speak , of the character of "self" will affect the different kinds of theories one might come up with concerning what the precise nature of non-solipsistic consciousness is in any given case. For example, there may be some point to the discussion of whether the unconscious realm constitutes an aspect of self given that it often seems to lie beyond one's capacity to control and understand. Some people only might want to consider as "self" that which pertains to consciousness or to the rational faculties or to the soul or to the Divine spark within us - depending on one's point of view on these matters.
Even in the case of "material body particulars", one just cannot assume the postulated continued existence of unobserved particulars of this sort necessarily means that something other than self is responsible for the ontological maintenance of a particular while that particular continues to exist unobserved. Something other than self may be so responsible, but this has to be determined. It cannot merely be presupposed.
Among other things, one would have to contend with the challenge of mysticism. More specifically, many mystics approach "selfhood" in terms of its being but one expression of an underlying Self which is believed by them to be the true Self and the Source of all reality. Mystics also often contend that the notion of 'other than Self' (including continuously existing, unobserved material body particulars) is purely an illusion.
Whether mystics are right or wrong is not the point. The point is that one cannot presuppose one's conclusions. The link, if any, between "other than self" and the continuous existence of unobserved particulars does not appear to be an a priori truth. Consequently, the tenability of any proposed link would have to be considered on a case by case basis before any conclusions could be drawn.
According to Strawson's view of the matter, a being with non-solipsistic consciousness is not stipulating that philosophical solipsism is a false doctrine (although it may be). Rather, Strawson maintains that this kind of being is saying something quite different.
For Strawson, a being with non-solipsistic consciousness is saying that, regardless of the ultimate character of reality, there is heuristic value in believing there are particulars which are not functions of, and are independent from, the self and the states which the self encompasses. Therefore, the only condition which needs to be satisfied in order for non-solipsistic consciousness to be realizable is for there to be a consciousness which, rightly or wrongly, believes, for whatever reason, that making a distinction among particulars, in terms of whether they are considered to be expressions of self or not-self, is a worthwhile distinction to make. Thus, the issue of non-solipsistic consciousness can be considered quite independently of the issue of "re-identifiable particulars" construed in Strawson's sense of the term.
Having said the foregoing, a question still remains. Could the No-Space-world beings develop a method of re-identification of particulars "without the need for any idea such as we ordinarily express by the first person singular pronoun and associated forms" (Individuals, p. 82, quoted earlier)?
In a way, the foregoing question is like asking if one must maintain that a computer is conscious of itself simply because it has a means of determining (i.e., the logic of its micro-circuitry) that the particular which is called for now is the same or similar to the particular existing at address XY in its storage banks. Correspondingly, one might wonder if one must be cognizant of the fact that what is now being re-identified in consciousness as a previously encountered or stored particular is an act of re-identification which one - a self - is doing?
Must one be consciously aware that it is oneself who is making a re-identification? If one were not aware that one were making the re-identification, would this lack of awareness somehow invalidate the re-identification if this re-identification were rooted in a correct analysis of the congruency or identity of two particulars?
Imagine a No-Space-world being who learned, as a "child", that any particular of experience manifesting seven specified auditory features 'a’ through ‘g' represents an instance of a "grock". Should there, subsequently, arise within this being's consciousness an awareness of a particular exhibiting auditory features 'a’ through ‘g', such that a being might think: "grock", without necessarily having to think grock is something other than self? Must the No-Space being suppose there is a self now thinking grock and identifying the latter particular as something other than the self which is doing the identifying or re-identifying, as the case may be?
There seems little reason to assume that a No-Space-world being need believe that the particular now encountered in experience must be thought of as "something I've experienced before". Such a being conceivably might consider such an experience to be merely the recognition that the present particular being encountered in phenomenology is the same as, or similar to, a given memory of determinate character which is now recalled and compared with current experience for the purposes of determining the extent of the congruency between the two with respect to the criterial features 'a’ through ‘g'.
Strawson appears to want to say that understanding necessarily requires an awareness that "I" am the one who is doing the understanding. The foregoing paragraph, however, is suggesting that what is crucial to correct understanding is its accuracy and not necessarily an awareness of who or what is responsible for its accuracy.
The idea of understanding does imply there is a consciousness in which, or through which, this understanding is present or manifested. Nonetheless, such understanding doesn't seem to imply there must be some element of self-awareness presently associated with the given consciousness in order for this kind of understanding to exist. In short, there appears to be nothing inherently contradictory in simultaneously maintaining that: 1) a being of the No-Space world could re-identify particulars without: 2) having to believe a non-solipsistic consciousness must be present in order to accomplish a re-identification.
One could raise questions about the correctness of the No-Space-world being's re-identification of particulars and whether a currently experienced particular was really identical with a previously encountered particular. One could also raise the same questions in relation to the re-identification of particulars of a being with non-solipsistic consciousness.
Regardless of whether or not a being has a use for making a distinction between self and not-self, answering the issue of solipsistic versus non-solipsistic consciousness will not settle the extent of truth or error in a given instance of supposed re-identification. The issue of correctness is entirely independent of the kind of consciousness (i.e., solipsistic or non-solipsistic) one believes to be present.
Moreover, as indicated a short while ago in the above discussion, an accurate re-identification of a particular could, conceivably, be made within the context of a solipsistic consciousness. Thus, there seems to be little reason or evidence contained in the arguments that Strawson has put forth which would force one to reject the possibility that a being of the No-Space world might come up with a scheme of re-identifying particulars that neither presupposed nor entailed the notion of non-solipsistic consciousness. Alternatively, there appears to be little, if anything, so far in the discussion of Strawson's arguments in the first several chapters of Individuals which would prevent a being of the No-Space world from opting for a non-solipsistic consciousness.
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