Identifying Reference - Part Two
Category Preference and Ontological Priority
At the very beginning of the second chapter in Individuals entitled "Sounds", Strawson acknowledges he is showing what he terms "category preference" to those particulars referred to as "material bodies" by considering them to be basic to any scheme of identification and subsequent program of metaphysical description. He further contends that although he considers material body particulars to be "ontologically prior" within the context of the descriptive metaphysical program he is mapping out, one should not read into the character of such preference or priority any implications concerning whether or not only material bodies exist or whether all other categories of particulars are reducible to being functions of material body particulars. Strawson maintains that the features of category preference and ontological priority associated with his use of material body particulars hold only within the framework of the issue of, and problems surrounding, particular identification and its concomitant topic identifiability-dependence relationships.
Having stated the foregoing cautionary note, Strawson adds the following:
"On the other hand, I believe that the facts I have tried to indicate may underlie and explain, if not justify, some of the more striking formulations, which I disavow, of the category-preference which I acknowledge." (p. 59)
Once again, Strawson seems to balance ambiguously along a line between two possibilities that must be kept distinct. On the one hand, he claims to disavow making any allusions to material bodies being, in reality, basic. Yet, on the other hand, he appears to be saying that the arguments and data he has presented "may explain, if not justify" such a position in relation to the category of material body particulars.
Similarly, at times he appears to be speaking of a purely descriptive, self-contained conceptual system, with no reference point beyond itself as a conceptual system. At other times he seems to be speaking of the character of the interplay between reality and the structure of our thinking, which helps generate the experiences out of which a given descriptive metaphysical program arises. Thus, when Strawson says:
"... it is the things themselves, and not the processes they undergo, which are the primary occupiers of space, the possessors not only of spatial position, but of spatial dimensions" (p.57)
one gets the impression he is referring to the ontological character of Reality.
Many modern philosophers of special and general relativity, as well as of quantum physics, might wish to quibble with the way Strawson describes things as occupying space - as if space were an inert nothingness to be filled, as opposed to being an expression of a dynamic, space/time continuum event or process with far-reaching ramifications for the way in which 'things' could and could not express themselves. In fact, these events may even determine what 'thingness' is.
In any event, given the aforementioned dimension of ambiguity in Strawson’s position, there seems to be a problematic shadow which is cast across Strawson's position at this point. In other words, there appears to be legitimate reason to question Strawson's use of the term "ontologically prior" in relation to his giving material body particulars category preference over other categories of particulars - despite the fact Strawson believes this usage is unobjectionable.
The whole notion of ontology concerns being existence or reality. There is, of course, a very real sense in which a descriptive system has a sort of being of its own simply by virtue of its existing as a descriptive system. In this sense, one could explore the system in question strictly in terms of the character of the being of such a system qua system.
However, while material body particulars very well may have logical priority within a given conceptual system, this, in no way, necessitates that these sort of particulars will have priority in any broader, more fundamental sense of ontology dealing with the very nature of Being itself. That is, there is no guarantee that the particulars of a given conceptual system will accurately reflect any sort of ontological priority (i.e., the nature of Being) which makes possible the being of such a limited conceptual system of specified character.
Whether Strawson likes it or not, there is at least one very crucial sense in which one must take Strawson's metaphysical project to be about the real world and not just a matter of a description of a conceptual scheme for identifying particulars and establishing a basis for setting up identifiability-dependence relations. More specifically, if one takes Strawson at his word in his introductory section of Individuals and accepts, for the sake of argument, his construal of descriptive metaphysics as a matter of describing "the actual structure of our thought about the world" (p. 9), then, this view assumes human thought has an "actual structure" which can be described.
Presumably, this "actual structure" is an expression of, minimally, one facet of the character of fundamental ontology. In other words, this "actual structure" of thought is a part of the world about which thought thinks, and, in thinking about itself, thought is thinking about the world or reality or Being. Or, at least, thought is thinking about that aspect of the world of reality or Being which involves thinking and the structure of this thinking. If Strawson's proposed metaphysical program is to be a realizable possibility, one must be able to have sufficient access to reality in order to be able to ascertain and describe the "actual structure of our thought about the world".
One still could be faced, of course, with the possibility that what our thought is "about" may not be so much the actual nature of the structure of our thoughts about the world, as it is an expression of our beliefs about the structure of such thought. If so, then, one still might not be in any epistemic position to discover or gain access to the "actual structure" of the world 'out there' in order to determine whether there were such things as material body particulars or whether they had ontological priority over other kinds of particular categories.
In view of the foregoing, one might wonder if category preference should be extended to material body particulars. One also might wonder whether these particulars should be awarded logical priority even within the limited framework of developing a conceptual scheme to identify particulars in order to proceed with a program of descriptive metaphysics in Strawson's sense of the term.
Even if Strawson's strategy to establish material body particulars as the basis for a system of identifying reference should fail, all is not lost. Although Strawson, undoubtedly, would reject the following perspective, nonetheless there seems to be a kind of particular, of sorts, that is even more basic than material bodies and which also establishes the basis for setting up the kind of framework of asymmetric identifiability-dependence relationships in which Strawson is interested.
For example, without a dimension of reflexive consciousness that generates, or gives expression to, an experiential field in which, or through which, we can: be aware; discriminate within; recognize similarities among the field's various aspects, and gain insight into the nature of the particulars that appear in (through) it, then, how could one propose anything at all, descriptive or otherwise, concerning material body particulars? One may suppose material body particulars are pure constructs of the aforementioned sort of reflexive consciousness.
Alternatively, one might contend that reality writes its message upon the conceptual slate provided by consciousness, or one might believe some kind of interactionist relationship holds between reflexive consciousness and the reality underlying material body particulars. In all of these cases, the most fundamental aspect of any process of identifying particulars of whatever category would seem to involve placing those particulars in the context of the experiential field of reflexive consciousness which is mediating and underwriting, to some extent, the existence of such particulars within the realms of conscious experience.
The phrase "to some extent" is used above in order to leave open the possibility that the particulars to which one attends in the experiential field may or may not have an existence independent of the field through which the individual becomes aware of such particulars. Even if these particulars do have an autonomous, independent existence, nevertheless, the reflexive qualities of the experiential field still help mediate and underwrite the perception of particulars according to the nature of that field and how, or to what extent, that field accurately transmits the character of the given particular being attended to.
One could subscribe to any number of different theories of mind and acknowledge the fact that the identification of particulars, real or imagined, is possible because such particulars are capable of gaining entry to, or being reflected in, the medium of consciousness. Through exploring the phenomenology of this medium, one seeks whatever clues one can that might indicate or suggest the character of the "actual structure" of the character of that medium as it encounters the "world" (whether conceived as self-generated or as other than self and somewhat independent of self).
Our ideas about, or descriptions of, material body particulars begins, first and foremost, with an examination of the contents of consciousness. Even if reflexive consciousness should turn out to be a function of some underlying material body (i.e., the brain), there is nothing to prevent one from using reflexive consciousness as the basic methodological starting point to which category preference should be assigned in seeking to establish a framework for identifying particulars through which one can proceed to other stages of a program of descriptive metaphysics.
Reference and the No-Space World
After outlining his ideas as to how to go about constructing what he considers to be defensible means of establishing a basis for identifying particulars, Strawson proposed to address the following question:
"Could there exist a conceptual scheme which was like ours in that it provided for a system of objective and identifiable particulars, but was unlike ours in that material bodies were not the basic particulars of the system?" (p. 60)
Strawson, of course, believes the answer is no. As the previous few pages of discussion suggest, I believe an affirmative answer can, and should, be given to the foregoing question. The following pages will attempt to demonstrate why I believe Strawson's negative response is untenable and why an affirmative response to his question is defensible.
Toward the beginning of his attempt to put forth an argument in support of his rejection of any affirmative response to the above question, Strawson decides he must place a constraint on the scope of the question's generality and states his intention to restrict the question to being one:
"... about the conditions of the possibility of identifying thought about particulars distinguished by the thinker from himself and from his own experiences or states of mind, and regarded as actual or possible objects of those experiences. I shall henceforth use the phrase "objective particulars" as an abbreviation of the entire phrase, "particulars distinguished by the thinker." (p. 61)
In many ways, the limitation which Strawson is here imposing on the basic question he wants to investigate is somewhat illegitimate. This is because the foregoing limitation tends to allow conceptual baggage to be carried as ontological contraband since such baggage will not be subject to proper processing through the appropriate methodological check points.
Consequently, the imposed limitation helps Strawson evade a number of fundamental questions which could be asked. For example, while distinctions and differentiations need to be possible in order for identifications of particulars to be made, nevertheless, from a methodological perspective, the particulars which are identified during the process of differentiation need not be perceived or considered, initially at least, to be distinct from one's experiences or states of mind.
To assert such a distinction is to make an ontological presumption about the existential status of these particulars as being independent of the experiential field or state of mind which is focusing upon them. Methodologically, this sort of presumption really falls beyond the realms of the question concerning the identification of particulars which first must be addressed.
In fact, this kind of presumption is entirely beside the point since the issue of the identification of particulars is primarily a matter of whether or not the experiential field lends itself to identifiable distinctions. Whatever else the distinctions may, or may not, encompass or entail, first and foremost, these distinctions are rooted, at least in part, in the phenomenologies of the experiential fields that are being attended to in any speaker/hearer interchange.
The reason why the experiential field does lend itself to the identifiable distinctions which become the particularized reference points of speaker/hearer discussions could be, of course, because they are autonomous, 'real-world' particulars that are somehow 'picked up' by the perceptual/conceptual capacities of human beings and identifyingly experienced as distinct particulars. Nonetheless, the ontological leap from the particulars of the experiential field to particulars of an "objective" world is a separate issue.
One certainly can raise the question how could there be such a speaker/hearer interchange? That is, what would the character of reality have to be in order to make such an interchange possible? Still, this question is distinct from the problem of establishing a basis for the identification of particulars.
The latter issue is a methodological one which requires no ontological presuppositions concerning the existence or non-existence of certain particulars within an "objective" world. The former question, on the other hand, is asking for some sort of commitment or explanation relating to the basic nature of at least one part of reality - namely, the part which makes possible an inter-subjective identification of a particular of given description.
The term "makes possible" in the last paragraph is to be construed in the following sense: inasmuch as there exists "an inter-subjective identification of a particular of given description", then, some aspect of metaphysical reality must have a nature such that it can give expression to, or be manifested in, the form of the inter-subjective identification in question. In short, anything which can be described and identified has ‘somehow’ become an experience to which identifying references can be made. In the present case, the commitment or explanation being sought would be, respectively, either to, or for, the specific character of this ‘somehow".
Epistemologically, the issue of identification has methodological priority to the problem of determining the ontological character of some aspect of reality. This is the case because, before one can try to explain something, one has to be able to determine or recognize the character of what one is trying to explain.
Conceivably, a hearer and speaker could reach complete agreement as to which particular within their respective experiential fields was being referred to by the speaker, but be in complete disagreement as to the nature of the underlying ontology that would make possible the identifying reference to such a particular. In failing to separate the methodological issue from the ontological one, Strawson prematurely has introduced ontological issues prior to the settling of methodological questions such that the smuggling of the former improperly prejudices or taints one's investigation of the latter.
In posing his question about whether one can come up with a conceptual scheme which is not rooted in a system of material body particulars as the asymmetric basis for identification of other particulars, Strawson recasts the question in a Kantian mold. He notes how Kant believed there was a very strong basis for contending there were only two forms of sensible intuition: Time and Space.
Strawson further stipulates that whereas Kant held that Time encompassed the kind of sensible intuition through which all representations expressed themselves, Space constituted the form of intuition which only entailed the outer senses. Thus, although sensible intuitions of Time were always present in any and all experiential encounters, sensible intuitions of Space would only be present when dealing with experiential encounters involving the outer senses.
In view of the foregoing, Strawson wants to rephrase his basic question (concerning the identification of particulars) as follows:
"I suggest that we inquire whether there could be a scheme which provided for objective particulars, while dispensing with outer sense and all its representations. I suggest we explore the No-Space world. It will at least be a world without bodies." (p. 63)
In rephrasing the question in this manner, Strawson believes, among other things, he will be able (see page 63 of Individuals) to introduce questions which are essentially unanswerable or indeterminate. He believes this to be the case since, in examining the notion of a No-Space world, one is, effectively, talking of a world populated by beings whose experience is, in numerous ways, quite different from human experience.
After all, by hypothesis, No-Space-world beings, unlike humans, have no form of sensible intuition concerning Space. In actuality, Strawson considers the questions raised about such beings to be merely a heuristically convenient exercise for raising questions about how human beings conceptually deal with experience in general and whether or not one would be able to reinterpret various aspects of the broad context of experience in terms of the characteristics of some restricted portion of that experience. However, I believe that Strawson's excursion into the world of No-Space beings is a misleading way of setting up the problem concerning the basis for establishing a framework for identifying particulars.
To be sure, the character of how other beings experience existence may provide valuable data to cross-reference with the character of how human beings seem to experience existence. Furthermore, this data could provide important clues (when cross-indexed to human experience) with respect to the nature of the ontological reality which made such different experiential frames of reference possible.
Nonetheless, the introduction of these beings into a discussion, together with the concomitant problems of trying to accurately translate their experiential framework into one we can understand, would appear to represent an unnecessary muddying of waters which are already murky with difficulties. Moreover, this sort of interjection also would appear to be beside the point as far as the issue of identifying particulars within the structure of human thinking about the world is concerned.
This would be so unless Strawson was attempting to claim that the category of material body particulars necessarily constituted the asymmetric basis for identifiability-dependence relationships in all beings capable of hearer/speaker interchanges. Yet, this does not seem to be the case, since, as already noted in the previous quote, Strawson has referred to No-Space world as "a world without bodies".
In addition, even if he were trying to establish a more general basis for identifiability relationships, then, he would have to restructure not only his characterization of descriptive metaphysics as the "actual structure of our thinking about the world." His re-formulated version of descriptive metaphysics also would have make allowances for the "actual structure of our thinking about the world" with respect to both human beings and No-Space-world beings. Under such circumstances, descriptive metaphysics no longer could be restricted to merely "the actual structure of our thinking about the world".
In any event, I see absolutely no reason for having to entertain such potentially complex translation equivalencies between beings of the No-Space world and human beings of a world of sensible intuitions rooted in Space and Time. One only has to ask the original question: could one conceive of a conceptual framework in which material body particulars did not constitute the basis for determining asymmetric identifiability-dependence relationships among particulars in general?
Whether one is talking about a No-Space world or a world of Time and Space or some other kind of world, the same question is relevant. More importantly, while one might not be able to speak with any conviction about what is, and is not, possible for the beings of other worlds to conceive of, one can ask whether or not Strawson, in any of his hypothesized worlds (e.g., No-Space), has managed, successfully, to establish that material body particulars must play ‘the’ fundamental role in determining identifiability-dependence relationships among various categories of particulars.
In order to help one imagine what the character of a No-Space world might be like, Strawson delimits the number of senses one can have to work with in that kind of world. Rather than using the input of taste, smell, touch, sight and hearing as a means of developing an epistemic relationship with the world (or what we take to be the world), Strawson singles out only hearing as a sense which could apply to a No-Space world and which is, therefore, to serve as the primary sensory means of gaining access to or generating a system of identifying particulars within the No-Space world.
In this regard, Strawson further specifies:
"The only objects of sense-experience would be sounds. Sounds of course have temporal relations to each other, and may vary in character in certain ways: in loudness, pitch and timbre. However, if they have no intrinsic spatial characteristics: such expressions as ‘to the left of’, ‘spatially above’, ‘nearer’, ‘farther’ have no intrinsically auditory significance." (p. 65)
Although Strawson makes no mention of it, one presumes that the ‘physics’ of sound or the cognition process which makes audition possible are totally different in a No-Space world from our so-called Time/Space world. If this were the case, then, one would have to place the locus of sensory potential within the perceptual mechanism of the being - whatever that mechanism might be and however it might operate - and leave reality in an n-dimensional format, where the value of 'n' is uncertain.
If this is the case, then, the idea of a No-Space world becomes a function, not necessarily of reality taken as a whole, but of a certain, restricted, perceptual/conceptual framework of the being’s engagement of such reality. The only way in which this sort of No-Space world could be co-extensive with the whole of reality would be, on the basis of what Strawson has said, if reality were, in fact, a No-Space world.
In any event, one has difficulty knowing whether Strawson intends that, in his hypothetical example, we should construe ultimate reality as being synonymous with No-Space, or whether he only intends that the sensible intuitions of the beings in question are limited to that of Time. If the latter were the case, then, the character of reality, if any, beyond the beings in question, presumably would be left indeterminate as to the number of dimensions it may entail which extend beyond the restricted capacity of the No-Space being's sensible intuitions.
Uncertainty surrounding Strawson's intentions in these areas is not just an incidental matter. Depending on which route one pursues, one comes up with quite different experiential parameter characteristics with-in which one is trying to construct a metaphysical program. The differences in question can have considerable ramifications for how one construes the world and how one perceives the individual's epistemic hookup with the world.
For instance, consider the following. Let us assume, for the moment, that the notion of a no-Space world is to be restricted to the perceptual/conceptual character of the being's epistemological equipment. Let us further suppose that this restriction places no intrinsic limitations on the ontological character of the world which the being is thinking about on the basis of his or her limited mode of No-Space experience.
Given these assumptions, one is free to ask the following question: could a being with a No-Space-restricted sensible intuition capacity logically infer the possibility of a spatial dimension in the 'real world' on the basis of experience which lacks a spatial element? However, if the No-Space feature is not restricted to just the being's perceptual/conceptual equipment and is considered to be an integral feature of the character of the real world, independent of the being's epistemological relation to the world, then, any inferences about the spatial character of reality as a result of the experiences of a being with No-Space capacity would, given the foregoing, constitute an untenable inference.
Obviously, what one supposes the No-Space component applies to (i.e., just the being's sensory/conceptual equipment or the world as a whole) will have a substantial effect on the sort of metaphysical program one is envisioning. While Strawson does not clearly spell out exactly where he stands in relation to such choices, his previously quoted disavowal of any sort of implicit ontological reductionism with respect to his giving category-preference to material body particulars (although he does leave the metaphysical door open to such a possibility) would seem to indicate that the more prudently flexible course to pursue is as follows.
We should leave unaddressed, for the present, the issue of the actual character of reality in the No-Space hypothesis and assume the No-Space world notion refers to the restricted sensible, intuitional capacity of a given kind of being. In other words, we should assume the No-Space world hypothesized by Strawson refers to the world of experience and not necessarily to the world of reality which may exist independently of such experience. This presumptive provision allows one to make a distinction between two separate issues.
On the one hand, there is the problem of how a No-Space-world being goes about attempting to assign a metaphysical value to the actual character of reality. On the other hand, there is the problem of whether such a being could come up with a conceptual means of establishing a basis for determining asymmetric identifiability-dependence relationships among various categories of particulars which does not include or require fundamental reference to material-body particulars.
Eventually, Strawson may or may not want to provide some sort of answer to the former problem, but the problem of identification of particulars does not require one to have to resolve the former question immediately as a prerequisite to being able to address the latter issue involving the development of a basis for the identification of particulars. In fact, the reverse is likely to be the case.
That is, this latter project concerning identification undoubtedly will affect how one proceeds to approach the more difficult problem of assigning metaphysical character to the world. For it is through being able to identify particulars within experience that one has something on which one can reflect and through which one attempts to grasp the character of reality or the world.
There is a further advantage, for present purposes, to construing the No-Space world as a function of individual sensible intuition limitations rather than as a reflection of an aspect of reality taken as a whole. At one point in his discussion, Strawson states:
"I shall take it as not needing further argument that in supposing experience to be purely auditory, we are sup-posing a No-Space world. I am not, of course, contending that the idea of a purely auditory world is the only possible model for a No-Space world. There are other and more complex possibilities."(p. 66)
Strawson does not specify or even hint at what the nature of these models might be. In any event, by retaining audition as the only one of the traditional five senses to function, to some degree, in a No-Space world, Strawson provides an experiential reference point that bears some degree of resemblance to an aspect of the character of human experience (i.e., audition).
Consequently, whatever conclusions one might come to concerning the issue of identifiability-dependence relationships for being in a no-Space world, there should be a certain amount of conceptual spillover with respect to consideration of the character of the "actual structure of our thought about the world". Since Strawson's stated goal of descriptive metaphysics is in relation to determining the structure of human thought (as opposed to generalized - or specific - statements about the structure of thinking across the spectrum of beings capable of something called 'thinking' - whatever that might be), then, the retention of an experiential theme to which human beings can relate with some degree of insight and familiarity (despite the obvious differences) is a consideration of not inconsequential importance.
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