Identifying Reference - Part One
Introduction
Of the many things that Strawson attempts to explore and accomplish in his book Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, one might list three features which tend to encompass the very heart of the philosophical perspective which is delineated in the first part of his book. First, Strawson wants to demonstrate that the process of identifying reference is thoroughly rooted in the category of material body particulars. Through this, Strawson intends to show that other categories of particulars such as 'events', 'states', 'conditions', etc. form asymmetric, identifiability, dependence relationships with the category of material body particulars.
As a result, for Strawson, all identifying involving various categories of particulars (material body and otherwise) are a function, directly or indirectly, of the category: material body particulars. Therefore, they are tied, ultimately, to some context of demonstrative identification involving material body particulars.
Secondly, Strawson is determined to establish that the ascriptive processes which accompany instances of identifying reference are generated by persons. For Strawson, 'persons' refers to an unanalyzable, primitive concept. As such, states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are both analyzable in terms of personhood, and personhood is not analyzable in terms of states of consciousness or bodily characteristics or some combination of the two.
Moreover, Strawson's concept of person is one that tends to exhibit what is called non-solipsistic consciousness. This means that a person is one who finds value in, or has use for, malting a distinction between self and other-than-self. Further more, as it turns out, such a being is one who, according to Strawson, would show category preference for material body particulars.
Consequently, Strawson's concept of a person is one that would construe identifying reference as involving the generation of patterns of asymmetric identifiability dependence relationships which are rooted in material body particulars. Strawson believes that his manner of handling the concept of person allows him to escape some traditional problems of philosophy which have plagued, among other Cartesian dualists.
Finally, Strawson wants to show that his rendering of descriptive metaphysics as "the actual structure of our thought about the world" is, in fact, reflective of precisely those characteristics that have been outlined in the first and second features noted above. In other words, by joining (a) the issues surrounding the giving of category preference to material body particulars, together with (b) the Strawsonian concept of person, Strawson believes he has provided a basis for understanding what the character is of "the actual structure of our thought about the world" which he sees to be the task of descriptive metaphysics.
Much of the discussion throughout the first part of Individuals is directed toward either: (1) clearing conceptual ground for, or (2) delineating and clarifying various aspects of, the three features which have been summarized in the foregoing. Furthermore, whatever discussion is not geared toward (1) or (2) usually is devoted to arguing against some alternative conceptual schemes as a means of exploring various dimensions of his position, and, thereby, illustrating the strengths and tenability of his own perspective.
In the present essay, I will take issue with each of the aforementioned features that represent the philosophical core of Strawson's position as set forth in Part One of Individuals. Thus, to begin with, I intend to challenge Strawson's contention that identifying reference is tied functionally to asymmetric, identifiability, dependence relationships which are rooted in material body particulars.
I also intend to argue, not only against Strawson's belief that his concept of person is a tenable position, but also against his belief that a person is likely to exhibit non-solipsistic consciousness. Consequent ly, I will be attacking the idea that the concept of a person forces one to use asymmetric, identifiability, dependence relationships that are, supposedly, a function of giving category preference to material body particulars.
Finally, I intend to challenge Strawson's contention that "the actual structure of our thought about the world" requires one to adopt, or be reliant on, Strawson's concepts of material body particulars, persons and related issues. In fact, I intend to argue in this essay that Strawson consistently makes a number of fundamental errors in his program of descriptive metaphysics.
Essentially, I will argue that he fails to establish and appreciate the role of various considerations that have methodological priority over the sorts of points and issues with which Strawson is preoccupied. In this respect, I intend to argue that identifying reference is a function, first and foremost, of the phenomenology of the experiential field from which an individual begins his or her investigation into trying to determine "the actual structure of our thought about the world".
Equally important, and related to the foregoing emphasis, is the following point. Namely, in making the phenomenology of the experiential field the philosophical or methodological starting point for subsequent exploration, one cannot forget, as I believe Strawson has done, that methodological considerations are extremely important in determining how one proceeds in that exploratory process.
As such, they have an essential bearing upon the problem of determining what the character is of "the actual structure of our thought about the world". Because Strawson has lost sight of these considerations, his theoretical model for descriptive metaphysics contains some substantial problems.
The foregoing points notwithstanding, the present essay should not be construed merely as an exercise that is to be restricted to examining the question of the tenability of Strawson's position in the first part of Individuals. Indeed, the discussion which follows is pointed, ultimately, towards providing some concrete material against which to push conceptually in order to gain some familiarity with the methodological roles which the issue of identifying reference plays in contributing to the structures and structuring of human understanding.
Through the various issues and problems that emerge during the course of a critical analysis of Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics, the present essay attempts to provide a means of directing attention toward various methodological characteristics of identifying reference and how these characteristics contribute to the structure of, and structuring of, understanding. In effect, the critical discussion of Strawson's program of descriptive metaphysics becomes a reflexive study of the way in which my hermeneutical structures and structuring processes engage the way Strawson's hermeneutical structures and structuring processes respectively establish a position with respect to one another, as well as, potentially, "the actual structure of our thought about the world".
Descriptive Metaphysics and Identifying Reference
Early on in his book Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, P.F. Strawson makes a distinction between what he terms "descriptive metaphysics" and "revisionary metaphysics". The former focuses on describing "the actual structure of our about the world" (p. 9), whereas the latter attempts to improve upon the quality of the structure or framework generated through the enterprise of descriptive metaphysics.
Historically, Strawson lists Kant and Aristotle among those who were preoccupied with descriptive metaphysics, and he considers Leibniz, Berkeley and Descartes to be among the practitioners of revisionary metaphysics. As the title of his book would clearly seem to indicate, Strawson either wishes to place himself in the same descriptive tradition as that of Kant and Aristotle, or he wishes, at least temporarily, to pursue that tradition during the course of his book. In any event, he has very little to say about revisionary metaphysics beyond his introductory remarks, and he leaves, largely unaddressed, the question of what constructing a "better" descriptive structure would mean.
In Part One of Individuals, Strawson begins his program of descriptive metaphysics by exploring the issue of identifying particulars. Strawson stipulates:
"Among the kinds of expression which we, as speakers, use to make references to particulars ... include some proper names, some pronouns, some descriptive phrases beginning with the definite article, and expressions compounded of these. When a speaker uses such an expression to refer to a particular, I shall say that he makes an identifying reference to a particular.... When a speaker makes an identifying reference to a particular, and his hearer does, on the strength of it, identify the particular referred to, then, I shall say, the speaker not only makes an identifying reference to, but also identifies, that particular. So we have a hearer's sense, and a speaker's sense of 'identity'." (p.16)
After distinguishing the notions of "identifying reference" and "identifies" from one another, Strawson proceeds to offer a critical basis by which one will be able to determine, according to Strawson, when a hearer can be said to have correctly identified the given particular which has been identifyingly or descriptively referred to by a speaker. In this respect, Strawson clearly indicates he is interested in something more than mere "story-relative" identifications, as Strawson calls them.
In this sort of identifications, a hearer can identify the general thrust of what is said by being able to consider various particulars which are mentioned in terms of the conceptual context painted by the speaker. However, in these "story-relative" identifications, the hearer could not identify the pa
rticulars being referred to outside or beyond the immediate frame of reference represented by the speaker's "story".
For example, if a speaker says that "The boy hit the woman," the hearer can identify which particulars are being talked about in terms of the speaker's storyline (which may or may not be true), but the hearer cannot necessarily be said to be able to identify precisely which boy hit which woman in the so-called real world. Moreover, the hearer of a story-relative identification could not even determine whether the described event actually occurred.
Consequently, since Strawson wishes to deal with the issue of specific identification of particulars above and beyond story-relative identification, he introduces the idea of "demonstrative identification". In this mode of identification, Strawson maintains that "the hearer is able directly to locate the particular referred to" (p. 19).
Strawson follows up his account of demonstrative identification with a consideration of situations in which the speaker refers to particulars not sensibly present either to him or her (i.e., the speaker) or the hearer or to both. One means of identification used in these sorts of circumstance involves the use of names, but Strawson points out that names are useless unless they are supported by some sort of descriptive network which can fix the name's referential context.
In addition to emphasizing the importance of rooting the use of identifying names firmly in a descriptive context, Strawson also attempts to show the role of 'uniqueness' in being able to identify particulars that cannot be identified demonstratively. According to Strawson:
"... even though the particular in question cannot itself be demonstratively identified, it may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified. The question, what sector of the universe it occupies, may be answered by relating that sector uniquely to the sector which speaker and hearer themselves currently occupy." (p. 21)
Strawson believes this stratagem of, sooner or later, being able to relate an issue of non-demonstrative identification to a descriptive context that has at least one component which has been identified demonstra tively, is a means of overcoming all theoretical difficulties that someone might care to cast in the way of solving problems of non-demonstrative identification.
Developing an Asymmetric Referential Framework
With respect to this stratagem of tying non-demonstrative identification to demonstratively identified particulars, Strawson asks, and, then, answers, the following question:
"Can we plausibly claim that there is a single system of relations in which each has a place, and which includes whatever particulars are directly locatable? ... For all particulars in space and time, it is not only plausible to claim, it is necessary to admit, that there is just such a system: the system of spatial and temporal relations, in which every particular is uniquely related to every other ... For by demonstrative identification we can determine a common reference point and common axes of spatial direction; and with these at our disposal we have also the theoretical possibility of a description of every other particular in space and time as uniquely related to our reference point." (p.22)
If one is not careful here, there is a real danger of confusing, if not conflating, two separate issues. When Strawson speaks of "all particulars in space and time" or of "the system of spatial and temporal relations, in which every particular is uniquely related to every other", one gets the distinct impression Strawson believes he is referring to objective reality independent of human cognition.
Yet, the issues of demonstrative and non-demonstrative identification concern the manner in which speaker and hearer attempt to enter into a common understanding with respect to the identity of particulars being referred to in a given discussion. Quite conceivably, speaker and hearer could establish a means of uniquely identifying (both demonstratively and non-demonstratively) particulars. However, the unique means of referential identification they have achieved may not have anything true to say about the character of reality (or the world) which underlies and makes possible the speaker/hearer interchange.
Thus, two chemists of the 1700s might have discussed the characteristics of phlogiston at some length in a way that allowed them to make unique referential identification to various aspects of their experience. Nonetheless, despite the descriptive context of mutually understood identifications, there was no phlogiston in the real world to which the identifications corresponded. Instead, the identifications were of a conceptual nature in which certain facets of experience were linked together in an incorrect manner.
Today, this conceptual framework might be referred to as an hypothetical construct. In any event, there is a potential difference between the 'world' of reality and the 'world' of our identifying descriptions.
Unfortunately, Strawson's original characterization of descriptive metaphysics (i.e., "to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world") is somewhat ambiguous in establishing a clear-cut distinction between the aforementioned potential difference. In other words, by characterizing descriptive metaphysics as being concerned with "the actual structure of our thought about the world", is Strawson describing merely the structure of our (i.e., human) thought as thought? Or, is he describing the structure of our thought in terms of the manner in which it goes about establishing, to some extent, the nature of the world as the latter really is?
Quite clearly, the scope and character of each of these metaphysical programs of description could be very different from one another. As a result, one will have to pay close attention to what Strawson says in Individuals in order to determine which of these positions is the one he is actually proposing. Furthermore, such scrutiny will be warranted because if Strawson's metaphysical program is preoccupied primarily with describing the structure of human thought qua thought, then, we will want to make sure he does not illicitly slide over into the other sort of descriptive metaphysical program, and, thereby, confuse or conflate issues of description with matters of reality that stand apart from such descriptions.
Alternatively, if Strawson's metaphysical program is an attempt to demonstrate how the structure of thought is capable of gaining access, in part or in whole, to the structure of reality or the world, then, we will have to check for the presence of something entirely different. That is, we will have to determine if the character of the system of relations among particulars which is advanced by Strawson and which, he believes, is able theoretically to be identified demonstratively or non-demonstratively by two or more participants in a discussion, can, in fact, uniquely and accurately, capture the character of the system of relations among particulars in the real world on which the identifying references are said to focus.
Following his discussion of some of the conditions surrounding the identification of particulars, Strawson inquires whether there is:
"any one distinguishable class or category of particulars which must be basic from the point of view of particular-identification? ... [Is there] a class or category of particulars such that, as things are, it would not be possible to make all the identifying references which we do make to particulars of other classes, unless we made identifying references to particulars of that class, whereas it would be possible to make all the identifying references we do make to particulars of that class with-out making identifying reference to particulars of other classes?" (pp.38-39)
Strawson answers these questions in the affirmative, and claims material bodies constitute fully satisfactory candidates for meeting the requirements of a basic particular alluded to in the foregoing quote.
Strawson, then, proceeds to distinguish between two broad categories of particulars. On the one hand, there are material bodies which, for him, are basic and on which, he believes, all other particulars are to be identifyingly dependent. These are described as three-dimensional - enduring, relatively stable over time, capable of giving rise to a rich context of sensory experience through smell, touch, taste, sound, appearance and so on - that is, they are publicly observable objects. On the other hand, there are states, processes, conditions and events which, according to Strawson, descriptively presuppose, and are dependent upon, material bodies for their identification.
In order to lend direction and support to his contentions at this point, Strawson sets out to construct an argument that, if successful, will demonstrate the tenability of his claim that material bodies are basic particulars. If successful, Strawson believes his argument also will demonstrate how all other categories of particulars (such as events, processes, etc.) are to be identified in terms of those basic particulars.
After entertaining, and, then, discarding, a variety of possibilities for the kind of argument he is seeking, Strawson eventually settles on one he feels is defensible. What Strawson has in mind is a perspective which, if correct, establishes an asymmetrical basis for determining the direction of identifiability-dependence with respect to, on the one hand, material bodies, and, on the other hand, such particular-categories as processes, conditions, events, and so on. The example he uses to explicate his position concerns the relationship between "animals" and "births".
Animals are to be considered as subsumable under the category of particulars known as material bodies, whereas births are to be considered as representative of one of the non- material body categories of particulars. However, Strawson never is very clear whether one is to consider births as events, processes, conditions or whatever. Moreover, he is not very clear (which he acknowledges on page 46 of Individuals) about what the distinctions are among these various categories of non-material body particulars. Apparently, Strawson is content to believe these latter categories of particulars are somehow non-material in character and that material bodies have a character which falls outside the nature of these other categories of particulars.
Given the considerable discussion in modern physics concerning:1) the event and process nature of quantum phenomena; or 2) how macro phenomena are dependent on the states of the micro-physical world which are thought to underpin these phenomena; or 3) the mysterious relationship which is alleged to exist between states of consciousness and quantum states and events, one might seriously wonder if the broad distinction Strawson is making between material body and non- material body categories of particulars is as well conceived as Strawson seems to believe.
Do quantum events and processes give definitional/ontological character to material bodies? Or, do material bodies constitute the ontological framework which makes quantum events, processes, states and/or conditions possible?
Even once we leave the subatomic world and journey up the scale in relative size from molecular processes to, say, cellular interaction, and from tissue differentiation to organ functioning, and from the inter-dependent, systematic harmony of integrated systems of organs to that of ecological balance among such systems, all along this journey, material bodies seem to be as much a function of events, processes, conditions and states as do the latter seem to be, as Strawson would maintain, a function of material bodies.
Strawson contends the relationship between animals and births is quite asymmetric. Thus, he argues:
"... there is no corresponding paraphrase of the entail-ment from 'this is a birth' to 'there is an animal of which this is the birth'. We can paraphrase one entail-ment so as to eliminate what logicians might call quantification over animals. In other words, the admission into our discourse of the range of particulars, births, conceived of as we conceive of them, does require the admission into our discourse of the range of particulars, animals; but the admission into our discourse of the range of particulars, animals, conceived of as we conceive of them, does not require the admission into our discourse of the range of particulars, births." (p.52)
While Strawson does believe the argument is a sound one and is fully generalizable to the asymmetric relationship holding between any given material body particular and any relevant non-material body particular(s), he also acknowledges the following caveat with respect to the foregoing argument:
"The argument does not explain the existence of the general identifiability-dependence it establishes. It remains a question why particulars which figure in our conceptual scheme should exhibit the relation on which the argument draws, why we should conceive of the relevant particulars in these ways." (p.52)
One might venture to hypothesize that the reason why the stated argument is not able to account for the identifiability-dependence which Strawson claims the argument successfully establishes is because the argument is misleading and flawed in its presentation. Moreover, if this ventured hypothesis should turn out to be correct, then, Strawson's argument constitutes an inadequate foundation for making accurate inferences concerning the actual character of identifiability-dependence relationships. The following remarks represent an attempt to indicate that the above mentioned hypothesis is warranted and that, as a result, Strawson's would-be foundations for identifying reference are, at the very least, premature.
To begin with, Strawson is quite vague and somewhat arbitrary at the present juncture in his elaboration of descriptive metaphysics with regard to what he means by the admitting "into our discourse of the range of particulars, births, conceived of as we conceive of them" (previously cited on page 81). In fact, both the facet of the process of "admitting into discourse" a given particular, as well as the issue of given particulars being "conceived of as we conceive of them" raise a variety of questions.
As a category of particulars, "births" are not tied just to animals. One can speak of the birth of a nation or the birth of an idea or the birth of a galaxy, or even the birth of a universe. All of these contexts share a common theme of referring to a 'coming into existence', but that which comes into existence is not necessarily a material body. For example, although an idea can be given a variety of material forms or expressions, one cannot necessarily be sure the idea itself is a material body or that it presupposes, and is dependent on, a material body for its existence.
Those who subscribe to some sort of mind/brain identity theory undoubtedly will hold that ideas are material bodies because ideas correspond, or so these theorists might maintain, to neurophysiological circuitry of a certain nature and complexity. Nevertheless, the definitive determination of the ultimate character and source of ideas or whether ideas can be generated through disembodied particulars, has, yet, to be established. Consequently, on the basis of the available scientific evidence, one cannot be certain (or even fairly certain) that the coming into existence of an idea is, ultimately, either a material body of some sort or a function of an underlying material body.
One could pursue a similar kind of reasoning with respect to the birth of a nation. To be sure, the birth of a nation may entail the designation of specific geographic co-ordinates. Moreover, it also may involve the existence of written documents (e.g., a constitution) together with the establishing of sundry social, political and legal institutions which may be housed in material buildings or structures. Nonetheless, the moving force behind the birth of a nation may be a function of ideas, values, beliefs, desires and so on that, as suggested above, may not be reducible to being functions of material bodies.
There is also considerable debate, controversy and mystery surrounding the origins of the universe. Whether the universe was born ex nihilo or came into existence through identifiable, determinate physical/material processes are questions which are no closer to being resolved to everyone's satisfaction, today, than they were several thousand years ago among the Greek philosophers who are often credited (rightly or wrongly) with having started Western man on the road to thinking about these possibilities.
When a child grows up in a given culture, that individual tends to encounter a variety of theories, beliefs, ideas, conventions and so on concerning how different aspects of reality - from ideas, to animals to the universe - come into being. How this notion of 'birth' or coming into existence is admitted into a culture's discourse and how the people in that culture conceive of birth depends on a complex set of interacting factors which are at work within the culture in question.
The nature of language is such that there is often no one way in which given concepts, ideas, notions, etc., are admitted into discourse, even if there may have been a specific historical instance or set of circumstances (for the culture or the individual or both) to which the origin of, or first encounter with, a certain word of phrase could be traced. As is the case with "births", there are a number of different contexts (often unrelated to one another in any direct fashion) in which a certain idea or concept holds descriptive value because of its capacity to identifyingly characterize a certain aspect or aspects of experience in a way that can be recognized, to a greater or lesser extent, by the people of that culture.
The circumstances within which a concept arises and through which an individual comes to grasp the concept may constitute the occasion for picking up a concept, but this does not necessarily mean one is required to make, say, births identifiably-dependent on material body particulars - animal-particulars or otherwise. Once a concept is grasped, one is relatively free to apply it to any aspect of one's experiential field with respect to which the concept is capable of helping one to identifyingly characterize or describe such an aspect to other individuals. This freedom reflects an important dimension of the flexibility of any living language: namely, the capacity to restructure the old mode of use and application of a given word(s) and, through the restructuring process, introduce alternative senses of the world.
Furthermore, although the birth of an animal presupposes a material body particular (namely, an animal) as locus for the process or event of birth to occur, Strawson is being somewhat misleading when he makes certain additional claims. For instance, Strawson attempts to maintain that because one can conceive of animals without knowing anything about, or admitting into discourse, the non- material body particular of birth, therefore, according to Strawson, this demonstrates the asymmetric identifiability-dependence of the latter upon the former. However, in maintaining the foregoing, Strawson, quite arbitrarily, I believe, is restricting the scope and range of the manner in which particulars are both admitted into discourse as well as how they are conceived of by those into whose discourse such particulars have been admitted.
True, some people can refer identifyingly to animals without ever needing recourse to the process or event of birth. Usually, those people are very young children.
For the most part, the people into whose discourse the range of the given particulars, animals, has been admitted are those people who conceive of births as part of what the very concept of animals entails. If an adult were to give a detailed description of animals, without invoking the particular of births at any point in the description, this individual would be generating a concept of animals which is substantially different from the animal-particular as understood by most adult human beings.
In view of the foregoing considerations, even assuming (which is questionable) one could come up with a determinate, identifiable and defensible distinction between material body and non-material body particulars, the range of the particulars admitted into any given discourse, or the manner of conceptualization of any particulars so admitted, may not (although it may be, on certain occasions and under specified conditions) a function of the linear, somewhat static model put forth by Strawson. In that model, there are clear-cut, invariable and universal asymmetric identifiability-dependence relationships between material body and non-material body particulars. Nevertheless, on the basis of the previous discussion of the use of 'births', there seems, instead, considerable room to develop a more dynamic, multi-faceted, complex and non-linear conceptualization of how particulars are admitted into discourse and, once admitted, how they are conceived of by those into whose discourse the particulars have been admitted.
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