The Concept of Horizon - Part Three
Transductions and transformations
The foregoing comments bear on a variety of statements which Van Peursen makes in his article. For example, at one point, Van Peursen says: "All the characteristics of the surrounding world are characteristics of our own body". To be sure, the sensory modalities which are inherent in our bodies do contribute to one's conception of the structural character of the world as a result of the way these modalities transduce incoming stimuli. However, the body does not solipsistically generate these sensory structures.
The transductions that take place are transforms of the waveforms impinging on the body's sensory cells. As such, transforms are operations that are applied to a given object, form, structure, or process.
Although these transforms do shape and alter the character of what is being operated on, there is a continuity which links the structural character of that which is operated on by the transform and the structural character of that which is generated by applying the transform to a given object, form, and so on. Therefore, just as the transform does alter and structural character of what is operated on, the structural character of what is operated on also is capable of affecting and shaping the kinds of structures which can be generated by applying a given transform under certain circumstances.
An object, form, structure, or process which is going to be operated on by a given transform encompasses a spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom. This means that when a transform is applied to this object, form, or process, the transform must dialectically interact with this spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom.
The manner in which the transform vectors or tensors or alters a given object or form will occur within the parameters of what that object's or form's spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom permits. In other words, the object's or form's structural character places inherent limitations on what a transform operation can do.
Consequently, when the various sensory modalities perform different sorts of transform operations - by way of the transduction process - with respect to the waveforms of incoming stimuli, one cannot necessarily argue that the structural character of the post-transformation, transduced form is purely a function of what the transduction transforms bring to the situation. The post-transformation, transduced forms are also a function of the spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which the incoming waveform stimuli bring to the transduction process.
In short, transduced structures are a collaborative effort of both the transduction transforms of the body's sensory modalities, as well as of the waveform properties of the in-coming stimuli. Consequently, one cannot entirely agree with Van Peursen when he claims that "all the characteristics of the surrounding world are characteristics of our own body".
The body does, indeed, color and shade and highlight various aspects of one's perception of the surrounding world. Moreover, the body does introduce a variety of characteristics into the way in which one construes the surrounding world.
However, the vectoral, shaping influences flow the other way as well - that is, the structural character of the surrounding world colors, shades and highlights various aspects of the way the body experiences the world. Furthermore, the structural character of the surrounding world introduces a variety of vectoral and tensoral themes that help form the seeds of the ways in which one hermeneutically construes the surrounding world.
At certain points, Van Peursen's position is something like Saussure's position. For example, Van Peursen says that: "All science is conditioned by a coherence wherein each symbol refers to another". Like Saussure3, Van Peursen seems to make the mistake of failing to take into account that symbols and their relationships arise out of a more fundamental, non-linguistic hermeneutical context of dialectical activity, and this dialectical activity does make contact, to a certain extent, with various aspects of the noumena.
Understanding need not be restricted, as Van Peursen is arguing, merely to the realm of interacting symbols divorced from the underlying hermeneutic which generated them or divorced from contact with the aspects of the noumena which helped lend shape to the structural character of those symbols. Understanding may not be absolute, but neither is it entirely a matter of relative or arbitrary choices. Reality places constraints and limits on the kinds of coherency which will work or be successful or be able to resolve problems or answer questions in an acceptable way.
Temporality, dimensionality, and the expansion of horizons
Van Peursen maintains one of the most fundamental and crucial features of the horizon is this: it is the means by which time is linked with space. Although space provides perspective and gives expression to a range of possibilities which can be explored, according to Van Peursen, space is itself "oriented by means of the future".
Because time is irreversible, it points in only one direction - the future. Therefore, the only way in which one can proceed to explore the range of possibilities to which space gives expression, is in the context of time that draws one inexorably toward the future.
Van Peursen goes on to say that a space-time field is formed by the presence of the horizon. As a result, he believes the horizon not only "encircles space-time" but that truth is revealed to the individual through the horizonally generated field of space time. In addition, he contends that, for human beings, "truth ... does not exist outside the framework of the horizon".
The horizon is part of a dialectic which engages, among other things, space-time. At best, the horizon represents the individual's hermeneutical mode of partitioning space-time. However, what actually is partitioned in such cases is not time or space themselves. What is partitioned is one's orientation toward, or way of relating to, space and time.
One cannot claim, as Van Peursen does, that the horizon encircles space-time. Although the horizon does not always give expression to the spatial - at least when this is interpreted to mean physical space, the fact is, the horizon always gives expression to the temporal. The horizon is one of the indices of the presence of time since it is only in the presence of time that the horizon unfolds. Indeed, rather than say the horizon encircles time, the interests of accuracy might be better served if one were to say that not only does the temporal encircle the horizon, the temporal also permeates the horizon's every nuance.
In addition, there is a sense in which the horizon does not so much encircle time, as much as the horizon arbitrarily and distortedly delimits the structural character of time by abstracting only a very small segment of time. One even could argue that through its delimiting aspects, the horizon partitions time into hermeneutically manageable units - that is, units capable of being made sense of in the context of measurements, planning, day-to-day living, and so on.
Moreover, while our contact with certain aspects of the truth does come through our horizonal contact with space-time, the fact is, physical space is not the only kind of 'space' which exists. Somewhat paradoxically, there are a whole variety of non-spatial (in the physical sense) spaces through which one makes contact with, and interacts with, different aspects of truth.
Non-space spaces (i.e., manifolds, dimensions) refer to those aspects of ontology which occupy no physical space, yet, which permit relationships to form among the constituent structures, neighborhoods and latticeworks that are manifested in such dimensional ‘space'.
For instance, time does not occupy space, but it does permit a variety of linkages to be given expression in the form of temporal phase relationships which unfold over the course of time. There are other dimensions, as well, that, like time, do not occupy space (although they may be associated with, and interact with, space, as time does). Truth can come through one's horizonal contact with the ‘spaces’ of all these dimensional modes.
As far as Van Peursen's contention is concerned - namely, that "truth ... does not exist outside the framework of the horizon" - while one understands what he is getting at here, his position may not be defensible. In fact, only because truth exists outside the framework of the horizon can truth exist inside the framework of the horizon. Only by virtue of what we can grasp of the structural character of that which is impinging on, engaging, shaping, organizing, orienting and structuring the focal/horizonal dialectic, do we come to understand that the structural character of what exists inside the horizon has an intimate, if not functionally dependent, relationship with what exists outside of, or beyond, the horizons which limit us as human beings.
Any understanding that is restricted to the confines of the parameters of the horizon and which does not reflect something of that which is extra-horizonal and which help makes possible a horizon of such structural character is, at the very best, extremely limited in the amount of truth to which it gives expression. In fact, only by gaining access to the truth that lies beyond the limits of present horizons, can one be said to be expanding one's horizons in any non-arbitrary and legitimate sense.
Any other kind of horizonal expansion is merely illusory. In other words, while these other kind of horizonal expansion may open one up to a variety of possibilities, one will never have a means of determining if any of these possibilities are capable of accurately reflecting, or giving expression to, any aspect of the truth.
Therefore, the generating of possibilities, in and of itself, is not enough. One needs a means of separating the wheat from the chaff. The means of doing this is to show how the structural character of a given possibility reflects something of the truth which lies beyond the present horizons and which makes a horizon of such structural character possible.
To some extent, what has been said above sounds paradoxical. After all, it seems to say that in order to expand horizons one must transcend present horizons. Yet, the very idea of a horizon suggests that which delimits the individual and which determines the individual's understanding. So, the obvious question is this: how does the individual transcend that which determines him or her?
The means of working toward a resolution of this apparent paradox has several aspects. To begin with, the individual's capacity to alter perspectives as a result of the hermeneutical activity of the focal/horizonal dialectic plays a fundamental role in being able to look at the structural character of the horizon in different lights and from different vantage points.
Sometimes one's perspective veils one from, or closes one off to, certain possibilities concerning the structural character of that which could be responsible, in part, for helping to generate a horizon of such structural character. Under these sort of circumstances, what one needs to do is to re-examine the relationship between the structural character of one's present perspective and the structural character of certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field (e.g., a given region of the horizon). One undertakes this reexamination in order to determine if there might not be some other perspective capable of providing a better congruence function with respect to accounting for why such aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field have the structural character they do.
This process of reexamination has the potential to lead to a discovery that brings one closer to grasping the nature of the truth which is being manifested in a horizon of such structural character. As such, although, in a sense, the horizon doesn't change, one's perspective concerning it does change, and with a shift in perspective comes an expansion of horizons.
One's perspective moves in the direction of greater congruence with, and understanding of, the structural character of that (namely, extra-horizonal ontology) which helps make horizons of such structural character possible. Consequently, by transforming the structural character of a given perspective's hermeneutical account of why a certain aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field has the structural character it does, one can transcend the horizons of the previous perspective. This permits one to work toward developing a better congruence function with respect to those aspects of the horizon which are given expression in the region of that part of the phenomenology of the experiential field to which identifying reference is being made.
One needs to understand there are a whole set of perspectives which can arise in relation to various aspects of the horizon. However, not every perspective which arises necessarily concerns every aspect of the horizon. Moreover, there may be aspects of the horizon for which one has not developed any sort of perspective except, perhaps, an attitude or orientation of neglect or disinterest. On the other hand, one can have more than one perspective relating to the same aspect of the horizon.
In the latter case, sometimes these multiple perspectives concerning one-and-the-same aspect of the horizon are complementary, dealing with different facets or themes of that horizonal aspect. For example, emotional facets, motivational facets, heuristic facets, problematic facets, and so on could all deal with one given aspect of the horizon.
Sometimes the multiple perspectives are antagonistic to one another, offering different accounts of the same phenomenon. Sometimes these multiple perspectives are the result of having learned, through intersubjective communications, about a variety of philosophical, scientific, religious or political approaches to the issues which tend to arise in relation to the aspect of the horizon to which identifying reference is being made.
Not all of these perspectives are necessarily equally reflective of the horizonal character of a given aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field. By hermeneutically sorting through these various perspectives, and altering or transforming or supplementing or eliminating where necessary, one alters the structural character of the horizon with respect to individual perspectives. On the other hand, ipso facto, the horizon, in Van Peursen's terminology, summarizes all of these perspectives.
In the context of such alterations, one is looking for a perspective (or perspectives) which is (are) capable of merging horizons with the summary-horizon. This merging process must be done in such a way that it allows one access, within certain limits, to the extra-horizonal truth which is being given expression through the structural character of certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field that also form part of the summary-horizon.
The summary-horizon consists of all the perspectives which exist within the various facets of a person's understanding. The summary-horizon also consists of all the aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field which have given, and/or are giving, expression to experiential point-structures, neighborhoods or latticeworks, but toward which one doesn't have, or hasn"t yet generated, a hermeneutical perspective.
Consequently, one can expand one's hermeneutical-horizons within the context of, and against the background of, the summary-horizon. Given that certain aspects of the summary-horizon have had, or are having, contact with the noumena, by merging horizons with such aspects of the summary-horizon, the hermeneutical-horizon can gain access, to varying degrees, with the aspects of truth which are being manifested through the summary-horizon. Thus, by transcending the horizons of certain hermeneutical perspectives, one becomes opened to the possibilities of the summary-horizon which previously had fallen beyond the horizons of a given hermeneutical perspective.
Even if the summary-horizon stays the same, the hermeneutical-horizon can be altered - sometimes expanding; sometimes contracting; sometimes neither expanding nor contracting, but merely changing the character of the ratio of constraints and degrees of freedom to which a given hermeneutical-horizon gives expression. However, in point of fact, the summary-horizon does not say static or quiescent.
New experiences are being added to the summary-horizon all the time. Therefore, there are new possibilities emerging on a fairly regular basis which provide the hermeneutical-horizon with the opportunity for engagement and possible expansion toward seeking greater congruence with the ever-changing summary-horizon.
The relation between the horizon and reality
According to Van Peursen, something becomes real only by virtue of its having a relation to man. In fact, he goes beyond this and contends that nothing has value except as it relates to human beings.
The hold man has on the world through the horizon is the means through which the world is provided with its reality. The horizon renders the world real because the horizon makes the world accessible to human beings. Moreover, Van Peursen characterizes time as reality's way of making the world come within the reach of man.
Van Peursen believes there is no need to posit the existence of a reality which underlies the world of phenomenal manifestation. At the same time, he holds that the horizon gives expression to the idea of a realm which lies beyond the horizon.
However, he contends this realm of the beyond - to which the horizon alludes - is not a hidden reality that is operating beneath or behind the world of phenomenal manifestations. He argues, instead, that the realm of the beyond is only provisionally hidden since it becomes manifest as the horizons of various perspectives are expanded to encompass such realms.
Even if Van Peursen wishes to argue that reality is a solipsistic expression of the human condition, he will have considerable difficulty avoiding the fact that there are innumerable aspects of experience which cannot be accounted for in terms of what value or meaning or reality are assigned to them by a human being. Indeed, the meanings and values which have been assigned to various aspects of experience over the years by different cultures, philosophers, scientists, and so on, have, repeatedly, been questioned and re-questioned, modified, qualified, probed, expanded, critically analyzed, and, where necessary, thrown out. All of this has occurred as a result of the way the proffered meanings and values have proven to be incongruent with a variety of persistent qualitative and quantitative features, themes, and characteristics of the phenomenology of the experiential field.
If reality is purely a function of its relationship to man, if the world becomes real only when it is within the reach of the horizon, and if reality is only actualized by being manifested through the temporal which is encircled by the horizon, then, one is faced with a number of problems. How does one account for the presence of man as a being capable of experience of such diverse structural character?
What is it that makes man, as the generator of experiences of different structural character, possible? How does man generate time when the very existence of man seems to presuppose the presence of time as the means by which the process of generation can unfold?
If the world does not become real unless it relates to man, then, man must necessarily have sprung into existence instantaneously, spontaneously, autonomously, and independently of all realities, since reality is a function of man, and, therefore, there cannot be any reality prior to the existence of man. If this is the case, then, the existence of man becomes problematic since it is inexplicable.
How is it possible to suppose that a being of such capabilities arose ex nihilo? Yet, this seems to be the implication of Van Peursen's position.
In order for meanings and values to be assigned, one must presuppose there is something which is capable of doing this. This suggests there is a reality which makes possible the generation of human meanings and values, together with their assignments.
This reality cannot itself be dependent on such a process of generation-otherwise, it would be a matter of that process presupposing itself, resulting in a circular argument that has very little plausibility. The upshot of such a circular argument is that one would never be able to answer the following questions: (a) how did such a meaning/value generating process come into being? (b) what it is that makes it possible? (c) why is it that the meaning/value generating process has the structural character it does, rather than some other structural character?
FOOTNOTES
3.) Pettit, Philip. The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 1 - 10; Sturrock, John. Structuralism. (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1986), pp. 1 - 30. Return to Essay
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