The Concept of Horizon - Part Two
Secondly, contrary to Van Peursen's contention, the notion of horizon does not appear to cut through dualisms such as the distinction between the physical and the mental, and so on. The notion of a horizon seems neutral, in the sense that it can fit in with a variety of metaphysical positions.
The primary aspect of horizon is that it, together with focus, generates a complex membrane-manifold which dialectically interacts with different aspects of ontology on various levels of scale. Whether the focal/horizonal dialectic is generated through physical processes, mental processes, spiritual processes, or some other set of processes, as far as the hermeneutics of experience is concerned, the structural character of the interaction is what matters, not the process which produced it. In a sense the focal/horizonal dialectic cuts through dualisms because it isn't really intended to address that issue and, as a result, avoids the issue altogether.
According to Van Peursen, the horizon circumscribes man in such a way that one is unable to flee it. By circumscribing man, the horizon determines who and what man is, by the manner in which it delimits man.
In this way, man is confronted with his finitude In this way, man's finitude is reflected in the delimiting quality of the horizon.
Van Peursen believes the horizon "takes shape around sight". Moreover, he maintains that all the various activities which are given expression in human life owe their existence to the presence of horizon. Thus, all manner of: creativity, institutional practices, cultural manifestations, rational activity, and so on, are defined by the structural character of the horizons which accompanies and delimits each of these spheres of activities.
One might take exception with the way in which Van Peursen expresses the delimiting properties of the horizon. In point of fact, the horizon does not delimit human kind.
The structural character of the horizon is an expression of how an individual has delimited himself or herself. As such, the horizon doesn't so much delimit the individual, as it is a reflective index of the presence of limitation as a function of the character of the experience and understanding of a given individual. The presence of such limitation is given expression through a spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which lends shape and form to the structural character of the horizon.
Van Peursen's way of putting things seems to give horizon an aura of mysterious substantiality that is capable of affecting human understanding, cultural process, and so on. However, this way of stating things, tends to gloss over the fact that the horizon cannot be considered in isolation, or divorced, from its dialectical relationship with focal activity. The structural character of the horizon is as much a function of focal activity, as focal activity is a function of horizonal influence.
Secondly, to say that "horizon takes shape around sight" may be somewhat misleading. To begin with, horizon doesn't take shape around sight.
Horizon is the outermost parameter of sight. Horizon is not something in addition to sight, it is part of that sight.
If horizon were something beyond sight, we wouldn't be able to see it. In point of fact, the outermost parameter of sight constitutes, as well, the nearest parameter of that which, for the most part (although not entirely) lies beyond the scope of sight. Therefore, horizon marks the point at which what is beyond comes into partial contact with what is experienced.
Furthermore, horizon does not just occur in relation to sight. Horizon gives shape to the spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which are manifested in the context of all sensory modalities. What we hear, smell, feel, touch, or taste, as well as the way we hear, smell, feel, touch, and taste, or what we do and do not attend to when we hear, smell, and so on, all give expression to the structural character of horizon.
A third issue which needs to be raised revolves around Van Peursen's contention that "all human life owes its existence to the horizon". While one might be prepared to accept the idea that horizon has a role to play in helping to shape various human activities, nevertheless, horizons, themselves, get shaped and generated by focal activities. Horizons also get shaped and generated by the impact of forces which fall outside of what is normally meant by conscious awareness (e.g. physiological processes).
Moreover, one cannot necessarily argue that human life presupposes, or is predicated on, the presence of horizons. In fact, horizons will not get generated without the presence of life. In addition, the kind of horizons which emerge often will be functionally dependent on, and reflective of, the sorts of institutional practices, cultural rituals, and rational activities that exist in, and around, the individual.
According to Van Peursen, "man finds his bearings in the horizon in front of him". However, the horizon is not just in front of one. Man is surrounded and permeated by all manner of horizons.
In addition, given that the horizon forms the outermost parameter of a focal-horizonal dialectic which extends across a large number of levels of scale, this dialectic generates an extremely complex fractal membrane-manifold, consisting of many convolutions, themes, currents, layers, niches, and so on. Consequently, one's focal orientation is established in the context of an extremely rich set of horizonal vectors which impinge on focal activity from all manner of sources and not just in terms of what is in front of one - physically, emotionally, psychologically, socially, or spiritually.
Horizons, orientation and the hermeneutical operator
Orientation is not just a matter of the realm of focal activity passively acquiescing to horizonal vectoring. Orientation also is a function of reflecting on the structural character of such vectoring in accordance with, among other things, the activity of the hermeneutical operator.
In other words, the operations of: (1) identifying reference, (2) reflexive awareness, (3) characterization, (4) the interrogative imperative, (5) inferential mapping, and (6) congruence functions engage the various horizonal considerations and work toward a hermeneutical orientation. Thus, orientation is as much a function of focal, reflexive activity as it is of horizonal vectoring.
The aspect of reflexive awareness does not seem to be reducible to being a function of any of the other components of the hermeneutical operator, taken either individually or collectively. Reflexive awareness seems, instead, simultaneously, to accompany the other components - illuminating them, joining them, surrounding them, permeating them, and so on. Indeed, there is a sense in which reflexive awareness is sort of the glue which holds the hermeneutical operator together, as well as the medium through which the various components of the hermeneutical operator communicate with one another or exchange semiotic quanta with one another.
Reflexive awareness keeps something within the boundaries of primary focal awareness so that it can be engaged by other aspects of the hermeneutical operator. Reflexive awareness also permits one to keep short-term tract of the products of various facets of hermeneutical activity. As a result, one is in a position to decide about further disposition of such products (for example, should it be stored in memory; or, should it be operated on further; or, should it form the hermeneutical basis of some sort of action).
There may be an oscillatory character to the way non-reflexive awareness and reflexive awareness relate to one another under various circumstances. Much of the time, we seem to be capable of proceeding with just non-reflexive awareness operating. However, such non-reflexive awareness is often interspersed with elements of reflexive awareness. Consequently, there can be an alternating, or shifting back and forth between the two, depending on circumstances.
In any event, the two, together, give expression to the awareness component of the phenomenology of the experiential field. Primary focal awareness would be a manifestation of reflexive awareness, whereas secondary focal awareness would be a manifestation of non-reflexive awareness.
On the other hand, whether one is dealing with reflexive or non-reflexive awareness, one does not seem able to reduce the other components of the hermeneutical operator to being functions of either kind of awareness. That is, awareness, in and of itself, whether of a high-grade quality or a low-grade quality, does not seem to be capable of generating the other components of the hermeneutical operator. The basic function of awareness seems to be to make focal activity, whether of a concentrated or diffuse nature, possible.
For example, the structural character of the identifying reference operation is to introduce an element of selection into the realm of the phenomenology of the experiential field. Awareness or phenomenology, in and of itself, does not introduce this directed component.
One might be more accurate if one were to say there is a diffuse awareness of various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field and that identifying reference (as an expression of intentionality and focus) singles out some region of the field as a candidate for closer scrutiny. Once an aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field has been singled out, then, a decision can be made (or, perhaps, it happens spontaneously or is induced) as to whether reflexive awareness should be brought into the matter.
Thus, non-reflexive awareness did not introduce the element of identifying reference as much as it: (a) provided a medium through which that component could be expressed, and (b) provided the initial, diffuse illumination of the phenomenology of the experiential field from which identifying reference selected a candidate for directed intentionality. Furthermore, reflexive awareness does not introduce the element of identifying reference, as much as it provides an opportunity to be oriented, in a reflexive manner, toward what identifying reference has singled out for attention.
Identifying reference is one of the ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which is part of the spectrum of such ratios that constitutes the structural character of the hermeneutical operator (which gives expression to the interaction of the 6, previously noted components). Indeed, all of the components of the hermeneutical operator give expression to one of the ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which form part of the spectrum of such ratios that constitute the structural character of the hermeneutical operator.
Visibility, vision and perspective
Van Peursen argues that the visible world forms a ground for an endless probing of the possibilities which emerge through the horizon. If Van Peursen means, by the idea of ground, to refer to the visible world as a staging area from which various kinds of exploratory, probing or investigatory activity are to be launched, then, one might accept this. However, even if this is the case, one may have to qualify Van Peursen's position somewhat.
For instance, one might not be willing to concede, as Van Peursen seems to be suggesting should be the case, that the physical/material world is the only form of the visible world from which an exploratory probe can be launched. To be sure, Van Peursen does point out he believes that the mental domain forms part of the visible world, but, often times, his article seems to be suggesting that, ultimately, everything is rooted in, and a function of, the physical/material world - whether construed in terms of the external ecology in which the corporeal body is immersed, or construed in terms of just the corporeal body considered on its own.
Visibility is a function of vision, and one cannot necessarily restrict vision to the purely sensory variety. There is, in addition, emotional vision, intellectual vision, creative vision, as well as spiritual vision. The visible world is whatever vision - in this extended sense - makes manifest.
Furthermore, irrespective of whatever kind of visibility one is considering, what is visible does not necessarily constitute the ground for what is possible. Of course, in one sense, what is visible to one, tends to place limits on what one considers to be possible. On the other hand, what is visible is itself an expression of that which makes possible a visible world of such structural character.
The visible world is not self-sufficient and autonomous. It is not capable of generating itself. it does not explain its presence or its structural character. The visible world, on whatever level of scale, stands in need of explanation with respect to how it is possible and what makes a visible world of such structural character possible.
Consequently, the visible world is not so much the ground of possibility (although it is a staging area from which one can launch an exploration of certain aspects of possibility) as it is one of the expressions or manifestations of what an unknown Ground makes possible in the way of constraints and degrees of freedom.
As such, the present visible world is just one of the doorways through which one may encounter and engage the possibilities to which the horizon alludes. Indeed, the very fact there is an aspect of the horizon which transcends, or lies beyond, the world which is currently visible to an individual, suggests the ground of possibility is rooted in something that extends beyond the visible world.
Similarly, the fact there can be inter-subjective differences of opinion about what constitutes the visible world suggests there is some ground which encompasses all of these differences and makes them possible but which cannot be reduced to any one experience of the visible world - or not necessarily even to any combination of such experiences. When the visible world changes, as a result of alterations of vision (e.g., such as come with changes in levels of scale, or as come with a deepening of understanding), then, new doorways open up which link the individual with a different aspect of the underlying ground of such possibilities.
A term which Van Peursen uses in conjunction with horizon is "perspective". Just as, according to Van Peursen, one cannot escape the presence of the horizon, so too, he feels, one cannot escape the presence of perspective.
In other words, one has difficulty avoiding the basic fact - at least, on a non-mystical level - that one cannot view a thing simultaneously from all sides. One is required to engage a given subject matter or object or event, a little bit at a time. As a result, any given engagement will exhibit itself in terms of the perspective which unfolds through the structural character of that engagement.
As far as Peursen is concerned, however, one needs perspective in order to be situated in the world and in order to be oriented. He contends that if one were to suddenly lose perspective, one would be cast adrift without any means to orient oneself. One would not even be able to locate oneself spatially since terms like "here" and "there" would have lost all semblance of meaning.
Van Peursen goes on to speak about the complementary relationship which horizon and perspective have with one another. On the one hand, Van Peursen believes perspective lends clarity to the idea of horizon since perspective shows that horizon permeates every aspect of the way in which one experiences, structures, and understands the world. On the other hand, he feels the horizon not only forces the individual to adopt a perspective, but he also maintains the horizon represents a summary of all the perspectives which are available to the individual.
Van Peursen argues that there is no such thing as a pure expression of facticity. All facts are situated within a horizon and oriented by a perspective which has been called into existence by that horizon.
As such, all facts are horizon-laden. All facts are perspective-laden.
Facts exist only in the context of the coherency of a given horizon and perspective. That is to say, no fact comes in an isolated, autonomous, independent form.
Any given fact relates to, or refers to, or alludes to, other facts. It is this network of facts that hangs together. This network of facts lends coherency to those facts by virtue of the way they fall within the parameters of the horizons which summarize the perspectives to which such facts give expression.
Van Peursen's way of stating things is seriously misleading, if not fundamentally flawed. To be sure, we usually do encounter reality from within, or through, the horizonal frames of a given perspective or set of perspectives.
What Van Peursen fails to take into account, however, is that the structural character of a given perspective is, in part, a vectoral function of those facets of ontology which have impinged upon, tangentially touched, engaged, encountered, and interacted with the individual's phenomenology of the experiential field. Therefore, to varying degrees, the contours of perspective are, or can be, shaped, vectored, structured, organized and oriented by that (i.e., reality, ontology) which both transcends, as well as makes contact with, the individual's outermost perimeter of being - namely the horizon.
Unless one wishes to adopt a solipsistic position, one cannot avoid acknowledging that human consciousness did not generate ontology or the 'objects', events, conditions, states, processes, relationships, etc., to which such ontology gives expression. Indeed, one of the major obstacles standing in the way of advocating a solipsistic position are the following considerations.
One can neither explain, in terms of human consciousness taken in and of itself, why such consciousness has the structural character it does, nor can one explain how the solipsistically projected world is filled with a collection of objects, events, and so on which can be shown to be pure functions of different states of such consciousness.
In both cases, human consciousness cannot produce an adequate account of its own experiences strictly in terms of itself. In each case, human consciousness is forced to go beyond its own properties in an attempt to provide a more accurate, more tenable, and more complete account of why experiences of such structural character are possible.
Once one acknowledges that ontology is not reducible to human consciousness, one is faced with the following problem. How does one determine what the structural character of the relationship is between ontology in general and the particular manifestation of ontology which is referred to as human consciousness.
The two come into contact. They interact. They leave traces of themselves with one another. They shape one another in various ways. However, they confront one with the problem of trying to determine what the structural character of this process of dialectical exchange or interaction is.
Congruence and the manifold problem
Kant, of course, argued2, in principle, one could never resolve the foregoing problem- which might be dubbed the manifold problem. The noumena, the things-in-themselves, are forever beyond our reach. All that we can know is a function of the categories which are indigenous to the human understanding and which are conditions for the very possibility of having any sort of experience at all. Thus, we can never have direct contact with the noumena. We only can have contact with the categories which are imposed on experience and which experience presupposes.
However, Kant never really provides an answer for the following questions. How do we know how to assign different categories to various parts of the experiential manifold in order to generate a consistent, coherent set of experiences? What are the criteria for organizing the application of categories to generate a coherent picture of experience? What is it that determines when , where, to what extent, and in what combinations the different categories should be applied or assigned to various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field? What is the precise nature of the process which induces categories to be assigned in a differential manner? That is, why are categories assigned in one way on one occasion, and in another way on another occasion?
Although Kant accepts that we receive sensory impressions as a result of coming into contact, in some sense of the word, with the noumenal world, he never explains the process of transduction which allows one to generate a series of sense impressions - especially in view of the fact that he says we can never know things in themselves. In other words, if we can never know the noumena, then, how do sensory impressions arise with the structural character they do? How do we know how to assign values to experiences such that one can give differential categorical expression to them?
In short, Kant never solves the manifold problem. instead, in a sense, he assumes his conclusions. He takes the structural character of sensory experience as a given, then, he argues that categories provide the explanation for why experience has the observed structural character it does.
He also argues that these categories are a condition for even the possibility of such experience. Yet, if the latter assertion is true, then, one cannot take the structural character of sensory experience as a given. That structural character stands in need of an explanation - namely, how and why did the precise alignment of the assignment of categories take place to generate sensory experience of the observed structural character?
Ultimately, one seems forced to come to the conclusion there is some kind of contact with noumena which permits one, within certain limits, to know something of the noumena's structural character. If this is so, then, the task is to solve the manifold problem in a way that allows one to separate out, to whatever extent one can, the contributions of the noumena from the contributions of the phenomenal side of things, so that one can put forth an account of why experience has the structural character it does.
In view of the foregoing, one senses that the response which Van Peursen has given is far too simplistic. His contention that all facts are perspective-laden, or all facts are horizon-laden, is, strictly speaking, ambiguous. One could agree with his position without feeling obligated to suppose one never has contact with, in some sense of the term, or sight of, the bare facts of existence.
To say facts are perspective-laden or horizon-laden doesn't really give clear expression to the following consideration. Part of the structural character of perspective and of horizon can be a function of, or shaped by, the way noumena engage, and are engaged by, the phenomenology of the experiential field and the hermeneutical operator.
Consequently, to say the 'facts, cohere is not enough. There must be a congruence between the structural character of the two sides of the manifold. This manifold is formed by the engagement of, on the one hand, the focal/horizonal dialectic and, on the other hand, that which vectors and shapes the horizon from beyond the phenomenological side of that horizon.
Thus, when Van Peursen says "reality can be considered as a coherence", there must be a double sense of coherence that is present if his statement is to be accepted. There must be a coherence to the way that one's understanding or perspective hangs together, in and of itself. In addition, there also must be a coherence to the manner in which one's perspective accounts for why a certain aspect of ontology and/or the phenomenology of the experiential field has the structural character it does.
If one's understanding does not include this double sense of coherence (which could be referred to as congruence), then, there is something of a puzzle inherent in the coherency of one's perspective considered in and of itself. Indeed, this is exactly why Van Peursen's position at this juncture is problematic for it is missing the requisite element of double coherence or congruence.
The aspect of ontology which lies on the other side of the phenomenological side of the horizon engages, and is engaged by, the phenomenological side of the horizon in a number of places. Sometimes these points of contact are in the form of tangential point-structures. Sometimes these points of contact are in the form of neighborhoods (Roughly speaking, a neighborhood is a collection of points which exhibit certain relational properties.). Sometimes these points of contact are in the form of latticeworks (One might characterize a ‘latticwork’ as a group of neighborhoods that are linked through phase relationships of a coherent kind.)
One of the hermeneutical tasks facing the individual is to take cognizance of the structural character of these points of contact and, then, proceed to generate, or construct, a latticework that is capable of organizing these points of contact into a coherent perspective which is capable of accounting for why those points of contact have the structural character they do. This means one must be able to express such points of contact as a simple or complex function of the vectoral/tensoral contributions which are made by factors on both sides of the horizonal membrane-manifold.
FOOTNOTES
2.) Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1965), p. 74; pp. 266 - 275; pp. 290 - 294; p. 382; Ewing, A. C. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 190 - 194. Return to Essay
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