The Concept of Horizon - Part One
The general character of the horizon
According to Van Peursen1, the word "horizon" is traceable to a Greek verb which means "to delimit". Van Peursen argues, however, there is a tremendous diversity in the way in which people go about delimiting certain aspects of experience.
Van Peursen notes there are a number of basic features which are characteristic of the horizonal property. First of all, horizons recede.
In other words, as one approaches what previously had been the horizon, the 'old, horizon is replaced by a new, horizon. Thus, although the horizon is always present, it, simultaneously, seems to elude our grasp.
Secondly, no matter where an individual gazes, whether inwardly or outwardly, there is a horizonal component inherent in all such experience. Moreover, there is a horizonal component present irrespective of the sensory mode an individual uses to engage the world.
Thirdly, each individual both encounters, as well as generates, a horizon. On the one hand, the horizon is a subjective reflection of the individual's circumstances. On the other hand, the horizon seems to be something which is external to us.
Fourthly, although there is an evanescent quality to the horizon, in as much as it is constantly changing its character as one moves about in life, the horizon also serves as a reference point or point of orientation. Consequently, there are both transitory as well as stabilizing characteristics associated with an individual's experience of the horizon.
The combined effect of all these features is, according to Van Peursen, to permeate the experience and idea of the horizon with an aura of the problematic. As such, it constitutes a challenge to the individual, beckoning the individual to explore the mysterious quality of the horizon as it, simultaneously, recedes from us while remaining near by.
Van Peursen emphasizes that a primary characteristic of the horizon is to both recede as well as to be displaced. As a result, the horizon has a fleeting, illusory quality to it. At the same time, there also are objective qualities associated with the horizon which are capable of leaving traces of themselves.
More specifically, the horizon is a relationship in which certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field come together and make contact with certain aspects of ontology. However, this horizonal relationship never occurs except in the context of focal relationships. Consequently, focal relationships give expression to a second, fundamental, thematic current in the process of dialectical engagement between certain aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field and certain aspects of ontology.
The dialectics of focus and horizon
These dialectical relationships between phenomenology and ontology, via the agency of focus and horizon, help frame experience by establishing a spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom. This spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom gives functional expression to certain aspects of the dialectical engagement, or encounter, between the individual and the world.
The aspects of the engagement to which focus and horizon give expression are different from one another, but they also are complementary to one another. In fact, not only are they complementary to one another, but they are intimately related, as well, by virtue of the manner in which they mutually shape, orient, organize, direct, and modulate one another.
In this respect, one should keep in mind that the nature of this dialectical relationship is not just about delimiting experience. There are degrees of freedom which exist side by side with the delimiting or constraining aspects of experience. Indeed, there is a sense in which degrees of freedom help shape the character of a constraint as much as constraints help lend shape to the character of a set of degrees of freedom.
Parts of this dialectical engagement are recorded through learning. Learning is a process through which memories are generated or constructed. Unless the structural character of such memories represents a total fabrication of a given dialectical engagement, memory contains traces of previously encountered aspects of ontology. So although, in one sense, horizons are fleeting in character and disappear or recede as soon as one approaches them, in another sense, we are continually recording bits and pieces of the horizonal relationships which previously had been encountered through hermeneutical engagement of various facets of reality.
Indeed, these bits and pieces of previously encountered horizonal relationships which have been recorded as memory become part of the on-going horizonal dialectical relationship. Through recall, one can actually extract horizonal elements, examine them through focal analysis, and, then, by switching focus to some other aspect of experience, return the elements to a horizonal status where they will continue to exert a certain pressure or force with respect to on-going focal activity.
Consequently, although considered as whole, the horizon is always receding and being displaced, there is a way for certain aspects of previously encountered horizonal relationships to be temporally deactivated as horizonal components and, in the context of focal activity, explored, probed, analyzed, queried, altered, and shaped, before being returned to active duty as horizonal components.
There is another sense in which memory plays a role in helping one to differentiate among a variety of horizonal relationships. Different horizonal relationships are characterized by different ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom. Among the differences involved in these ratios will be various patterns of phase relationships.
For now, one might characterize phase relationships as expressions of the way different aspects of ontology interact with one another while in certain states, conditions, and cycles of manifestation. These states, conditions, and cycles constitute the phases of an object or process during particular modes of being that give expression to various dimensions of possibility inherent in an object’s or process’ being.
While in these phase modalities, the interaction which such modalities have with other modalities of being might be referred to as phase relationships. Moreover, the features of phase through which one object or process can be differentiated from other objects and/or processes, could be referred to as phase differences.
These phase differences are stored in memory and become a basis for recognizing horizonal relationships which previously have been encountered. Thus, one develops a sense of the 'taste' or 'flavor' of a variety of different horizonal relationships even if such relationships are not brought into the realm of focal activity.
In Polanyi's terms, memory of phase differences would be a part of tacit knowledge. This capacity to differentiate among a variety of horizonal relationships plays a fundamental role in helping to shape, orient, and organize the way one goes about hermeneutical processes involving identifying reference, characterization, inferential mappings, congruence functions, model building and so on.
Although traces of previously encountered horizonal relationships may be brought into the sphere of focal activity, there is a level of scale property which accompanies this process. In essence, this means that for every instance of focal spotlighting which occurs, there still will be, nonetheless, a horizonal component that is present.
No matter how broad or general one makes the beam of the focal spotlight, or irrespective of how narrow and particular one makes the beam of the focal spotlight, there will be horizonal factors present which interact with, shape, and are shaped by, focal activity. Consequently, one can explore the structural character of the horizonal relationship across a variety of levels of scale, both with respect to issues of detail, as "well as with respect to more prominent, larger scale themes (whether of a primary, secondary, tertiary, etc. nature) which run as vectoral currents through hermeneutical and phenomenological manifolds.
Entailment, implication and inference
A further aspect of the interactional dialectic between focus and horizon concerns inferential activity or inferential mapping in which one seeks to determine the structural character of the phase relationships that are established between, and among, various aspects of the constraints and degrees of freedom of focus and horizon. During such states of phase relationship, semiotic quanta, sensory quanta and phenomenological quanta are exchanged which give expression to inferential currents that link focus and horizon in the form of entailment relationships, implicational relationships and inferential relationships.
An entailment relationship is a special sort of congruence function. It involves a mutually compatible merging of phase relationships from two or more structures that allows one to hermeneutically root one structure (or an aspect thereof) in another structure (or aspect thereof) in such a way that the rooting has ontological ramifications concerning the manner in which the structures are related.
An implicational relationship is a mapping function which links two or more structures together through phase relationships such that there is a certain degree of mutuality in the process of the exchange of semiotic quanta between, or among, structures. However, the character of this ‘mutuality’ is not able to support or sustain a congruence relationship without being supplemented by further evidence, data, argument, and so on. In short, implicational relationships give expression to certain possibilities but require further work in order to establish them as entailment relationships.
An inferential relationship is a mapping function which an individual projects onto a given subject matter or structure, but which, in and of itself, is not necessarily able to support or sustain either an implicational or entailment relationship. Stated in another way, there may, or may not be, a relative lack of evidence of any mutuality in the semiotic exchange process which has been made possible by the establishing of a state of phase relationships through the inferential mapping.
Nevertheless, the fact there may be a relative lack of evidence to support or sustain an inferential relationship does not mean there is a complete absence of such evidence. It means that a considerable amount of interpolation and/or extrapolation is necessary to link together the aspects of structures which are being joined in a particular inferential relationship. Thus, an inferential relationship is a mapping function which stands in need of even more hermeneutical work than does an implicational relationship, if the former sort of relationship is to be placed on some sort of a defensible basis.
An inferential mapping relationship can have the kernel of a truthful or reflective insight in it. As a result, in time, it may develop into either an implicational relationship or an entailment relationship. An inferential relationship which can be shown, subsequently, to have this sort of kernel of insight inherent in its projection is warranted, whereas an inferential relationship that does not contain such a kernel of insight inherent in its projection is not warranted.
Thus, inferential mapping relationships stand as a basic component in both implicational and entailment relationships. The kind of mapping relationship it is will be determined by the character of the set of phase relationships to which it gives expression, as well as by the nature of the process of semiotic quanta exchange which is manifested within, and through, that set of phase relationships.
Horizons and the nature of human beings
According to Van Peursen, the horizon adds nothing to the world and, consequently, the world would not be impoverished in any way if the horizon were to disappear. He maintains, nonetheless, the world would be altered if the horizon were not present.
For the horizon is, he believes, an inherent feature of what it is to be a human being. Therefore, if the horizon were absent from the world, so too, would man be absent from the world.
He further argues that the property of the horizon is something which is made possible by the biological, sensory or perceptual capabilities of the human body. In other words, the horizonal quality or property is rooted in, and shaped by, corporeality.
The mystics have long made an argument which, in effect, would suggest that while the horizonal property may be part of the structural character of a certain level or condition of human existence, nevertheless, the essence of man is without discernible limits and, therefore, without horizon. According to many mystics, at the very heart of the meaning of the unity of existence is the individual's realization of how everything, including himself or herself, is a manifestation of one Reality.
In the veiled condition of our everyday world of spiritual darkness, we see horizons everywhere due to the delimiting character of such a level or condition of existence. However, the mystics point in the direction of levels or conditions of existence which are not delimitable and, therefore, without horizon.
This latter sort of condition or level of existence is an expression of the essential potential of humankind when all veils have been removed through the purification of the heart and the perfection of the spirit. In fact, one might put forth the argument that the presence of horizons could be an indication or index that veils are present. In other words, the individual who is hemmed in or delimited by horizons has not, yet, come to realize there is a basic unity to multiplicity, as well as a multiplicity to which unity gives expression.
One also might take exception with Van Peursen's contention that horizon is entirely a function of corporeality or the human body. To be sure, the human body plays a fundamental role in generating a variety of horizonal properties. However, one may not be able to successfully reduce either hermeneutics or the phenomenology of the experiential field to being simple, or even complex, functions of the human body.
Both hermeneutics and the phenomenology of the experiential field give expression to a variety of other dimensions which are capable of generating and sustaining horizonal properties. Beliefs, values, attitudes, spirituality, patience, trust, love, repentance, understanding, ideas, concepts, reflexive awareness, identity, and interpretation all tend to give expression to horizonal considerations on different levels of scale. Yet, to date, no one has been able to show how one, plausibly, can reduce such considerations to being entirely the result of brain functioning.
Van Peursen speaks about the horizon's dual quality of being. On the one hand, the horizon is an inaccessible border. On the other hand, the horizon constitutes the outer boundary of a space within which exploration and development is possible. Thus, the horizon both lures one to activity, while, simultaneously, placing limits on that activity. According to Van Peursen, this dualistic aspect of horizon makes the horizon a presupposition for the realization of what being human means.
Van Peursen's position at this point may be somewhat problematic. Before the horizon can lure one, one has to have some motivating curiosity, desire, reason, need or interest in treating the horizon as something worth being lured by. Thus, Van Peursen appears to be failing to pay sufficient attention to the structural character of that which is lured - i.e., the individual.
Van Peursen seems to be saying that what being human means is all a matter of horizon. However, the structural character of the horizon in any given case is, in part, dependent on how the individual goes about attending to experience under a certain set of circumstances. As such, the horizon is but the outermost manifestation of the spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom which give expression to the structural character of experience.
Furthermore, before the horizon can place limits on exploratory activity, it must be grasped as something which has a delimiting quality about it that can have a differential structural character over the course of time. Awareness, focus, and understanding are all necessary for the individual to be able to see the nature and role which the horizon plays in the phenomenology of the experiential field. So, once again, the horizon assumes its value and character only in the context of a particular person, under particular circumstances, with a certain kind of awareness, understanding, memories, and so on. As such, the horizon's delimiting qualities are a complex functional expression of a variety of hermeneutical and phenomenological scalars, vectors and tensors.
In either case, the horizon is not so much a "presupposition for the realization of man", as it is an expression of a man's realization about certain aspects of the structural character of the phenomenology of the experiential field. The horizon is not some sort of Kantian-like category which is necessary for the possibility of one's having experience at all.
It doesn't predate experience, either ontologically or logically. The horizon forms, instead, an important part- but not the only part - of the answer to the question of why experiences, on a certain level of scale, have one kind of structural character rather than another.
The horizon as a complex membrane-manifold
Van Peursen contends "the horizon is the translation of man into the world". Elsewhere, he says the individual is connected to the world through the horizon. He adds that "man lives in the horizon, the horizon is himself ".
The horizon doesn't so much seem to be the "translation of man into the world", as it gives expression to the outermost portion of the individual's zone of exchange with the world. Moreover, the horizon, in and of itself, does not connect the individual to the world.
One also must take focal components into consideration. Consequently, one might be more accurate if one were to say that man lives within the parameters of the constraints and degrees of freedom which are jointly generated, shaped, organized, colored, and constructed by the dialectic of focus and horizon.
The horizon is only one part of a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenological and hermeneutical membrane-manifold which dialectically links the individual with ontology. This membrane-manifold consists of a spectrum of ratios of constraints and degrees of freedom on a variety of levels of scale.
Furthermore, this membrane-manifold marks the boundary through which focus and horizon, together, enter into shifting phase relationships with various aspects of the world or with various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field. The phenomenological/hermeneutical membrane-manifold is the boundary across which, and through which, there is an exchange of quanta of various kinds - chemical, biological, sensory, emotional, spiritual, behavioral, and semiotic. Irrespective of whether or not the individual translates himself/herself into the world, the individual continues to enter into exchanges with the world.
Van Peursen maintains that the "horizon outlines the oriented space whose center is the body". A short while later, he says that "the horizon shows the mental dimension of the human body".
He believes these two senses of horizon are really only flip sides of one-and-the-same coin. As a result, he contends the nature of the horizon is such that it is able to cut through traditional dualisms such as physical/mental, objecttive/subjective and so on. One might be more correct in saying that the horizon outlines the oriented space "whose center is the on-going focal hermeneutic of a given aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field. The body itself is horizon to this on-going focal hermeneutic.
Moreover, many aspects of mental life which are manifested in the phenomenology of the experiential field also form part of the horizonal component. In fact, when one reflexively turns the spotlight of the focal hermeneutic onto itself, different aspects of that hermeneutical activity become horizon to the focus of intentionality.
This aspect of horizonality can be introduced across many levels of scale of focal activity. As a result, certain facets of what, previously, had been an expression of focus, become horizonal, as one examines, with ever increasing depth and detail, a given aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field. Here, the dialectic between focus and horizon manifests its fractal potential.
Consequently, the horizon can, depending on circumstances, give expression to both mental as well as corporeal components. Yet, it is not necessarily reducible to either one of them.
FOOTNOTES
1.) Cornelius A. Van Peursen, "The Horizon" in Elliston, Frederick and McCormick, Peter, eds. Husserl (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 182. Return to Essay
| Next | Part 3 |Return to Philosophy Menu |
|
