The Hermeneutics of Experience - Part Three
Subjectivity and historical truth
One of the predominant themes of Palmer's discussion of Bultmann's conception of hermeneutics focuses on the issue of subjective bias which Bultmann believes can never be eliminated from one's view of history. In Palmer's words:
"...each interpretation of history or an historical document is guided by a certain interest, which in turn is based on a certain preliminary understanding of the subject. Out of this interest and understanding, the 'question' put to it is shaped. Without these, no question could arrive, and there would be no interpretation. All interpretation, then, is guided by the interpreter's 'preunderstanding'.... However objectively he may pursue his subject, the historian cannot escape his own understanding." 11
Because the individual allegedly cannot escape from the preunderstanding that ties the individual to the object of study, Palmer likens the situation to a variation on Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. In other words, in both cases, the methodology one uses to observe a given aspect of reality alters the structural character of the way in which the object being engaged behaves or manifests itself. Moreover, in both cases, the subject and object seem to become so inextricably intertwined during the process of observation or methodological engagement that one cannot tell where the subject leaves off and the object begins.
As far as generating an historical understanding is concerned, the bottom line of the foregoing is that history can never be seen for what it objectively is. There always will be individual preunderstandings which prevent the individual from arriving at an unbiased view of the nature and structure of history.
Therefore, according to that perspective, history always must be seen from within history in terms of the interests, meanings and intentions of an individual's preunderstanding. History can never be seen from some vantage point which is objective or external to history.
One question that arises in relation to the above point of view is the following one. Why must historical understanding be required to be seen from some standpoint outside of history in order for that understanding to be considered as an objectively valid interpretation?
Seemingly, to be objective, historical understanding needs to express a correct, epistemological engagement of history on one or more levels of interpretation. If one's historical methodology leads one to the truth (or parts thereof) concerning the structural character of certain aspects of historical events, then, presumably, the primary condition for objectivity would seem to be satisfied. Whether such methodology stands inside or outside of history is irrelevant.
One can examine the foregoing issue from another perspective. One might inquire whether all human "interests" must be biased in a closed-ended manner. In other words, must one suppose that the preunderstanding with which one begins can never be allowed to get outside of itself and change in a direction which is more reflective of the character of the reality (historical or otherwise) being considered or engaged?
For example, what if the "interest" which initially oriented an individual toward a given engagement of historical events (and which, therefore, shaped how the individual dialectically interacted with those events) was a function of a sincere desire to seek the truth, regardless of where that search might lead? Certainly, seeking the truth is based on some sort of preliminary value system of what one believes is necessary to acquire truth, to whatever extent such truth can be acquired.
However, one doesn't start with only these sorts of values. One also starts with an acknowledgment of one's ignorance concerning the unknown factors, themes, issues, and so on, which surround the subject matter that one is engaging.
Ignorance of some sort always accompanies one's hermeneutical perspective since it marks the horizonal limit of understanding's actual penetration of a given area of experience. As such, ignorance is a shadow haunting preunderstanding.
Furthermore, if seriously and sincerely entertained, ignorance is one of the main subjective factors that initially compels one to seek an interpretation or understanding of some aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field. If one already knew (or thought one knew) what one was going to find, one would not approach a given area of experience or reality as a problem needing to be explored or solved or resolved.
Whatever the nature of one's preunderstanding, 'history-as-object' is being studied in order to try to uncover its significance as a reality of experience. In this respect, the problems left unresolved, the questions left unanswered, the inconsistencies left in conflict with one another, and so on, often guide, shape and direct subsequent exploratory and interpretive activity as much as does the preunderstanding with which one began. In short, the unknown and the problematical aspects of experience serve as potential roadways leading away from the present limitations and biases of certain aspects of one’s preunderstanding.
Simply because one is part of history doesn't mean one cannot question, explore, criticize, analyze, probe, and reflect upon that of which one is a part. Furthermore, precisely because one is part of history, one cannot ignore the data, problems and questions which arise in relation to one's engagement of, and engagement by, historical events.
One's preunderstanding and understanding are answerable to the whole range of one's experience, and they must be matched against, and reconciled with, such experience in a way that will permit one to come to grasp the structural character of that which makes experiences of such structural character possible. Just as one does not passively accept what is presented to one through experience, absolute metaphysical reality does not have to passively accept what we present to it in the way of theories, models, concepts, belief systems and so on. Often times, reality's way of responding to such theories, etc., is, in a manner of speaking, to throw back problems, questions, puzzles, paradoxes, challenges, crises, and so on, in the face of our models and belief systems.
If Bultmann believes history cannot be known objectively, then, one might suppose that whatever implications Bultmann claims history has for the Christian faith are entirely arbitrary. One's interpretation of history, whatever its nature, would only represent one's subjective viewpoint and, therefore, would be incapable, if Bultmann is correct, of expressing any ultimate or fundamental insight in relation to the actual nature of history.
Presumably, one of the reasons for doing history is not merely to generate interpretations as an end in themselves. Presumably, one seeks to arrive at interpretations which are capable of accurately reflecting various aspects of the structural character of history. Presumably, one seeks interpretations which are capable of providing one with insight into the meaning and significance, if any exists, of historical events.
Yet, Bultmann's perspective, at least as it is related through Palmer, appears to condemn one to inescapable relativity. In other words, Bultmann's position does not appear to offer one anything which would persuade one that his approach to interpretation provides one with a means of discovering anything called 'historical truth' which is independent of, or free from, the biases of the sort of subjectivity which is impermeable to the things in themselves. In short, Bultmann does not appear to provide one with a defensible basis for: (a) accepting Bultmann's position, while, simultaneously, (b) rejecting the theoretical positions of others.
The process of demythologizing
When discussing Bultmann's views in the context of the translation aspect of hermeneutics, Palmer says:
"... the whole world view of the New Testament times clashes with the modern "scientific" or post-deistic world view. This issue is exactly the one which the German theologian Rudolf Bultmann tried to confront with his controversial project of demythologizing. Bultmann notes that the Biblical message is set in the context of a cosmological conception of the heavens above, the earth in the middle, and the underworld below- the three-level universe. His response to this situation is to assert that the message of the New Testament is not dependent on its cosmology, which is only the context of a message about personal obedience and transformation into a 'new man'. Demythologizing is an attempt to separate the essential message from the cosmological 'mythology' which no modern man can believe."12
As far as the claim is concerned that "no modern man can believe" the cosmological mythology of Christianity - especially its conception of a three-level universe - one might entertain the following possibility. People of the modern era may be as much a product of the presunderstanding which underlies their moderninity as are those who accept the Christian notion of a three-level universe.
If objective, historical truth cannot be determined, then, the inability of people of the modern era to believe in a three-level cosmological mythology has nothing to do with the falsehood or inadequacy or inaccuracy of such a mythology. The inability in question is purely a matter of subjective bias or preferences.
Given the foregoing considerations, one might easily argue that what must be demythologized is not some essential view of man wrapped up in an allegedly outdated cosmological mythology. What must be demythologized is modern man's apparent unwillingness to see that moderninity is inextricably caught up in its own mythology.
This modern mythology is not necessarily better than, or more accurate than, or more insightful than, a three-level Christian cosmological mythology (or any other mythology for that matter). Instead, as would be the case with respect to all mythologies, given the perspective outlined above, the judgements which issue forth from modern mythology are a function of a hierarchy of likes and dislikes rather than a function of being a closer approximation to the truth concerning the nature of reality.
Somewhat ironically, Palmer cites Ricoeur's assessment of the present status of hermeneutical inquiry:
"... there are two very different syndromes of hermeneutics in modern times: one represented by Bultmann's demythologizing, deals lovingly with the symbol in an effort to recover a meaning hidden in it; the other seeks to destroy the symbol as the representation of a false reality. It destroys masks and illusions in a relentless rational effort at 'demystification'."13
The irony in the above quote is that Bultmann seems every bit as intent on destroying a certain religious cosmological perspective or world-view (namely, the three-level universe) as were Freud, Nietzsche or Marx, who are individuals that Ricoeur singles out as demystifiers of an iconoclastic bent. Indeed, Bultmann's wish to salvage something from the religious context (i.e., the "hidden meaning") does not alter the essentially destructive effect which Bultmann intends to produce with respect to the three-level cosmology of traditional Christian eschatology.
Bultmann intends to preserve the symbol (in the present case, a religious cosmology) not because it reflects some essential truth, but because it serves as a convenient gateway to that which lies beneath the symbol (i.e., the 'hidden' meaning). Once one has passed through the threshold of this gateway, it can be dispensed with, or relegated to a purely ceremonial role, since, in and of itself, the gateway/symbol entails nothing of essential significance or value. What is of importance is the hidden meaning on the other side of that gateway/symbol.
One wonders, however, why one should accept Bultmann's judgement in this matter. Moreover, even if one were prepared to endorse the general character of his position, one still could ask why one should accept Bultmann's interpretation of the hidden meaning as the correct one. In addition, one could inquire about the justifiability of the methodological criteria which supposedly permit one to identify the true character of the hidden meaning.
The hermeneutics of experience
Although the preceding discussion has been relatively brief, enough has been said to establish the beginnings of a point of view with respect to the idea of construing metaphysics, in one of its senses, as the hermeneutics of experience. On the one hand, the general intent of hermeneutics (disregarding, for the moment, differences among the particular aspects of various theoretical approaches) seems to be directed toward uncovering the truth about a given work or text. On the other hand, hermeneutics also seems to about the influences and shaping factors which surround, as well as permeate, one's attempt to put forth an interpretation that is intended to uncover, or gain access to, some aspect of the truth concerning the phenomenology of the experiential field or that which makes a field of such structural character possible.
In hermeneutics, one not only seeks to come to grips with the significance of a work or text from the perspective of the creator of the text, one also seeks to discover something about the structural character of the interpretive process that links one to texts and works in general. Nevertheless, the determining of a work's significance in terms of its creator's perspective, and the developing some appreciation for how, in general, interpretive understanding operates and unfolds may not represent the end of the matter.
The central issue of hermeneutics is about making sense of experience. One seeks to determine the significance of something in someone else's eyes in order to be in a position to ask the following sort of questions: (1) what significance does the work in question have for oneself? (2) to what extent do individual conceptions of significance (whether one's own conception of that of other individual) reflect the structural character of that to which such conceptions attempt to give identifying reference? (3) what relevance do individual conceptions of significance have for helping one to understand the structural character, or portions thereof, of the reality which makes possible the sort of experiences through which conceptions of significance are generated?
In order to ask these kinds of question, one, necessarily, must be concerned about the extent to which one can understand 'understanding'. One also needs to be concerned with the extent to which understanding is capable, under the right sort of circumstances, of accurately reflecting or grasping some aspect of absolute metaphysical reality - i.e., that which defines the parameters not only of understanding but of that which engages, or is engaged by, understanding and, as well, gives both experience and understanding their structural character or qualities.
While one may use the works and texts of others as a sort of catalyst for thinking about issues of meaning, significance, understanding, reality and so on, one approaches these works through the field of one's own individual field of experience. In effect, one is using these sorts of experience (i.e., the works and texts of others) as a means of coming to terms with the undeniable reality of one's own experience.
The fundamental text or work with which everyone is preoccupied, either knowingly or unknowingly, is individual experience or the phenomenology of the experiential field. The works, intentions and meanings of all human beings return, as well as presuppose, the reality of that field. When one attempts to understand the nature and meaning of the contents of experience, one is engaging in the hermeneutics of experience in order to journey toward - to whatever extent possible - the absolute metaphysical reality that surrounds, underlies, permeates and extends beyond the realm of individual experience.
Under such circumstances, the task of hermeneutics becomes one of seeking to merge, as much as is possible, the horizons of one's preunderstanding with the horizons of whatever aspect of reality is being engaged. From this point of view, the hermeneutical problem is not only a matter of inquiring how one goes about merging horizons with the text to be understood (i.e., experience and its ontological/metaphysical ground), but whether such a project is possible at all. In Bultmann's terminology, the hermeneutical problem is to determine if a program of demythologization is possible with respect to distinguishing between the myth and reality of the phenomenology of the experiential field in relation to a determination of the structural character of that which makes experience of such structural character possible.
FOOTNOTES
11.) Ibid., p. 51. [Return to Essay]
12.) Ibid., p. 28. [Return to Essay]
13.) Ibid., p. 44.[Return to Essay]
| Part 1 | Part 2 |Return to Philosophy Menu |
|
