Belief and Knowledge - Part Five
In the Course of 'Normal' Events
During the last several pages, the terms "normal events" and "normal affairs" have been used on a number of occasions. These terms have been employed in order to avoid requiring a person to have to consider all kinds of highly unlikely or improbably situations before being able to say one knew something to be the case.
This precaution is taken because, as previously discussed, a sceptic could argue that all sorts of things might have happened unbeknown to the person making a claim about water being in the gorge. The sceptic could argue further that an individual failed to take into consideration these possibilities, and, thus, he or she could not claim legitimately one knew water was in the gorge.
For instance, the sceptic might raise the following 'possibilities'. Purple (color of your choice) men (gender of your choice) from Pluto (planet of your choice) could have landed near the gorge and sucked up all the water through a nozzle on the ship's underside. Or, perhaps a demon might have deceived one into thinking there was water in the gorge when no water actually was present.
Alternatively, an undetected earthquake could have altered the geology of the region and somehow prevented water from going through the gorge. On the other hand, somebody might have had a picnic and dumped so many pop cans into the gorge mouth that water couldn't pass through to the gorge. The possibilities are virtually endless.
Any context has about it a variety of usual features which constitute the nature of this sort of context. This is not to say that variations or the unanticipated can never occur.
Nevertheless, one can develop, over time, certain parameters of possibility which characterize the nature of the phenomenon, process, condition or object under consideration. In using the notion of "know" (in the sense of true understanding comprised of the right kind of connecting insight(s)), one should keep the following considerations in mind. Part of what is encompassed by the idea of connecting insight is that the issue, phenomenon, object, context or process in question is being entertained in terms of the possibilities which, in the vast majority of cases, appear to have a bearing upon that to which one is attending and with which one is attempting to establish an epistemological relationship.
Recognition of the parameters of the character of these possibilities takes place over a period of time and is drawn from a variety of experiential contexts which are demarcated according to one's characterization or individuation of those aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field that give expression to the possibilities which one comes to recognize in time. At least, one will come to recognize such possibilities if one's manner of characterization is congruent with, or accurately reflective of, the character of the possibilities being considered.
In effect, one's particularization or individuation of various aspects of the phenomenology become experiential co-ordinate points. These points are tied together into a conceptual geometry of somewhat determinate character according to the nature of the belief or connecting insight that structures and orients the conceptual geometry's character.
The greater the degree of congruency between: a) the character of one's manner of individuating any given experiential co-ordinate point to which one is making identifying reference within the context of the phenomenology of one's current experiential field; and, b) the character of that aspect of the field which one is trying to characterize, then, the more closely does one's understanding approach an accurate reflection of the aspect being considered. Similarly, the greater the degree of congruence [in the hermeneutical sense which bears a ‘family resemblance’ (cf., Wittgenstein) to mathematical congruence but is different] between b) (the character of a given aspect of the experiential field) and c) (the character of that which makes such structural character possible), then, the more accurately does a given aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field express the character of that (i.e., reality or some part thereof) to which the given aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field being attended to is making identifying reference.
By means of one's accurate characterization.of various aspects of the phenomenology of the experiential field, one lays a foundation for coming to recognize and understand the character of the parameters of the range of "events" and "affairs" which are to be construed as "normal". This 'normality' will be construed in terms of the manner in which a given object, process, phenomenon and so on, manifests itself during the phenomenological instances that mark an individual's encounters with such aspects of reality.
On the basis of the foregoing, one might envision the possibility of there being more than one sense of characterization associated with the idea of "normal events" or "normal affairs" which could arise in relation to some aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field, or underlying reality, to which one or more individuals are attending over time. The different senses would be tied functionally to the nature of a given experiential encounter and to the manner in which such an encounter was characterized by the different individuals being considered.
In other words, different people, or one and the same individual, experientially may intersect different facets of the range of possibilities capable of being manifested by an aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field or the underlying aspect of reality which makes such a field possible. Consequently, different individuals (or one individual at different times) may develop alternative senses of the character of that to which they are (or one is) making identifying references. The sense of the character which emerges will reflect, in part, the portion or portions of the range of possibilities they (one) happened to encounter experientially on a given occasion or over a series of occasions.
At the same time, the more extensive one's experiential framework, the more likely one will have encountered a fuller range of possibilities which are capable of being manifested by a given aspect of the phenomenology of the experiential field or underlying reality on which one is focusing. Therefore, the more extensive the range of experiential encounters or two or more people in relation to some aspect of reality, whether phenomenological or metaphysical, the more likely there will be a congruence between two states of affairs.
On the one hand, there is the character of what one person considers to be the range of "normal events" or "normal affairs" with respect to the aspect of reality to which identifying reference is being made. On the other hand, there is the character of what others consider to be the range of "normal events" or "normal affairs" in relation to the aspect of reality to which identifying reference is being made.
Through the collective or inter-subjective recognition of the congruence of structural character among certain experiential contexts, a plausible foundation can be established from which one might posit the possibility that a variety of people each encountered similar aspects of reality covering a mutually recognized or agreed upon range of "normal events" or "normal affairs". Alternatively, where there exists a juxtaposition of: a) a certain amount of congruence of logical character among various perspectives concerning the range of "normal events" in relation to some aspect of reality (phenomenological or metaphysical); as well as, b) a certain amount of disparity with respect to the character of the range of "normal events" associated with the same aspect of reality, then, one can consider drawing up a new sense of, or insight into, the character of the aspect of reality being considered. This would lead to a new sense of the character of the range covered by "normal events" in relation to the aspect of reality being attended to.
As suggested previously, the broader one's experiential horizons in a particular context, the more likely one's epistemological approach to the issue under consideration will encompass a wider and deeper appreciation of what constitutes the character of the normal course of events with respect to the context in question than will the approach of one who is less familiar with, less experienced in, and less knowledgeable about the given context. With such an enhanced sensitivity to the peculiarities, as well as regular features, of the context being attended to comes a growing sense of, or insight into, what seems to "normally" belong with, or be an expression of, the character of the given phenomenological/meta-physical context being identifyingly referred to across a wide variety of experiential circumstances.
In developing this kind of sensitivity, one may commit errors with respect to the assigning of properties, factors, phenomena, and so on, to the character of the context being investigated. In other words, one may assign properties and so on which really do not belong to a given context because they are artificial artifacts of coincidental circumstances that somehow ontologically touched upon, or were contiguous with, the context being considered. As such, these properties had no essential, lasting, regular or inherent relationship with the context in question.
For example, suppose one were at the gorge site and began to eat, but as one began to eat, the water stopped flowing. Conceivably, one could believe that perhaps eating had something to do with the water stoppage which occurred. If one continued to observe the behavior and characteristics of the gorge system over time and across a wide variety of circumstances, one well might come to the conclusion that eating was an artificial artifact which only coincidentally touched upon the issue of whether or not water would be found in the gorge.
As a result, it would be seen to have no essential, regular, lasting or inherent effect upon what was the actual character of the gorge system and the factors which affected the gorge in the course of "normal events". Indeed, part of what generating an appropriate connecting insight is about goes hand in hand with developing the sort of demarcation framework which will allow one to correctly distinguish between essential and incidental, or significant and peripheral, features of experience in relation to some given phenomenon, etc..
By establishing the above sort of framework, one has an opportunity to entertain different experiential possibilities without an epistemological context whose horizons are defined to some extent by the very properties and features whose character one must discern if one is actually to understand the nature of that to which one is attending. On the other hand, if one chooses a demarcation framework whose character is either too narrow or too broad, the choice may prevent one from considering the features which are necessary to generate or come up with the kind of connecting insight that represents a true understanding of the character of the context to which identifying reference is being made.
In the former instance (i.e., too narrow a criterion of selection), one unnecessarily may have excluded from one's demarcation framework essential or significant features of experience which must be taken into consideration. In other words, this must be taken into consideration if one is to construct a conceptual geometry consisting of the "right"sort of experiential co-ordinate points out of which, given the requisite connecting insight concerning the character of the conceptual geometry's various experiential foci, may emerge an understanding whose character is congruent with the character of that to which one's conceptual geometry is making identifying reference. What will constitute the "right" sort of experiential points from which a true understanding can emerge will differ, to a certain extent, from individual to individual, due to the differential penetrating power of varying levels of intelligence with respect to such experiential points of reference.
The other possibility mentioned previously (i.e., too broad a criterion of selection) would occur if one were to become lost amidst an overabundance of experiential co-ordinate points contained within one's conceptual geometry. This would happen if one were to make the criteria for one's method of selection of data for consideration too loose or inclusive.
Under these circumstances, one may camouflage, to some degree, the true identity of the character of that to which one's conceptual geometry is making identifying references. Thus, distortions may seep into the conceptual geometry one uses to structure, regulate and/or generate the character of many of the experiential features one is focusing upon in the phenomenology of one's experiential field.
In the case of the gorge issue, one might leave out from consideration, in one's framework of demarcation, factors (e.g., what bearing Mr. Thoreau's dam has on whether water is in the gorge) which legitimately can be seen as affecting whether or not water will be in the gorge. In this case, one automatically cuts oneself off from those aspects of experiential encounters and/or reality which must be taken into consideration if one is to acquire a proper epistemic foundation. Such a foundation is capable of providing the sort of conceptual geometry out of which a true understanding potentially can arise.
On the other hand, in the gorge issue, one might expand the horizonal parameters of one's framework of demarcation in an arbitrary manner without any plausible or defensible reasoning to substantiate one's expansion. For example, one might begin entertaining whether men from Pluto had visited the gorge region recently, or whether perhaps demons had cast spells upon people which delude such people into believing water is in the gorge when it is not.
Under these circumstances, one would be creating conditions that make the emergence of a connecting insight very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. This is so because one is admitting into one's conceptual geometry experiential co-ordinate points which, when juxtaposed next to the other experiential co-ordinate points in the geometry, obscure or mask the character of that to which one is making identifying reference.
In effect, the extraneous or arbitrary experiential reference points (e.g., purple men from Pluto) impede the formation of a connecting insight which is capable of tying together various facets of one's conceptual geometry. As a result, such arbitrary reference points hinder (if not prevent) the development of an understanding whose character is, to some extent, reflective of the character of that to which the focus of the phenomenology of one's experiential field is attempting to make identifying reference.
The nature of this impediment consists in the way an extraneous or arbitrary experiential co-ordinate point of reference resists being tied to other experiential co-ordinate points of reference in any consistent or defensible manner. Consequently, these extraneous or arbitrary co-ordinate points resist becoming part of any congruence relationship capable of accurately reflecting the character of that to which one is attempting to make identifying reference.
This is the case because the extraneous elements prevent one from developing a proper mode of demarcating, characterizing or thematizing the various experiential co-ordinate points of reference in one's conceptual geometry out of which congruence must emerge. Moreover, to the extent these extraneous or arbitrary experiential points of reference do become part of a would-be congruence relationship, their presence in this sort of relationship undermines the accuracy of reflective properties of the character of the phenomenological side of the congruence relationship.
If one is too inclusive in establishing one's framework of demarcation (by entertaining just any implausible experiential possibility which a sceptic might with to throw out for consideration), then, there tend to be too many essentially unrelated experiential possibilities. As a result, one will experience considerable difficulty in attempting to discover a single, unifying, connecting insight that will cover all the experiential co-ordinate points of reference in one's conceptual geometry which are believed, or understood, to have a bearing on, or are related to, the character of that to which one is making identifying reference.
Therefore, one will encounter numerous obstacles in trying to tie or structure such co-ordinate points together in a way that accurately will reflect the character of that to which one currently is making identifying reference. Consequently, a true connecting insight is unlikely to appear because there will be too many experiential possibilities for which one will be unable manner of characterization.
Ideally, a framework of demarcation or conceptual geometry represents two goals. 1) Maximizing the number of relevant, essential, significant, accurately reflective features (or experiential co-ordinate points of reference) to be entertained in a given set of circumstances to which one is attending; and 2) minimizing the number of irrelevant, inessential, insignificant, inaccurately reflective features (or experiential co-ordinate points of reference) to be entertained.
Out of this kind of focal/horizonal structuring of the phenomenology of one's experiential field, one hopes the appropriate connecting insight(s) will emerge. If they do, they will tie together the various related experiential co-ordinate points of one's conceptual geometry or framework of demarcation into an understanding whose character is accurately reflective of that to which one is attending.
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