Belief and Knowledge - Part Four
Malcolm responds to Prichard's position at this point by maintaining:
"When Prichard says that "nothing can exist which is incompatible with" the truth of that proposition, is he prophesizing that no one will ever have the ingenuity to construct a flawless-looking argument against it? I believe not. When Prichard says that "we know (and implies that he knows) that the proposition is true and know that nothing can exist that is incompatible with its being true, he is not making any predictions to what the future will bring in the way of arguments or measurements. On the contrary, he is asserting that nothing that the future might bring could ever count as evidence against the proposition. He is implying that he would not call any-thing "evidence" against it. He is using "know" in what I shall call its "strong" sense. "Know" is used in this sense when a person's statement "I know that p is true" implies that the person who makes the statement would look upon nothing whatever as evidence that p is false."(p.62)
Malcolm goes on to develop the "weak" sense of "know" by describing a hypothetical situation in which a school boy who experienced a certain amount of doubt about the truth of the Pythagorean theorem would ask an adult if the latter were sure the theorem in question was actually true. Malcolm elaborates further in the following way.
If the adult replies in the affirmative to the boy's query and claims he or she knows the theorem is true, even though the adult may not be capable of furnishing the proof which would be required to substantiate his or her claim, then, this claim is an expression of "know" in the "weak" sense. In using "know" in this sense, an individual, Malcolm argues, is not committing himself or herself irrevocably to the truth of an epistemic claim irrespective of whatever evidence or demonstrations or proofs come to an individual's attention subsequent to the claim. An individual is open to the possibility there might exist some data, either in the present or which may be discovered in the future, that effectively could undermine his or her current claim of knowledge.
There appears to be an implicit charge of blind dogmatism in Malcolm's argument which is being leveled against Prichard. Malcolm is, in effect, saying that one who uses "know" in Prichard's sense, or, more accurately, what Malcolm alleges to be Prichard's sense of 'know', would be impervious to all data, evidence, proofs, and demonstrations which might have a bearing on a given issue, as long as this data were contrary to an individual's claim of knowledge. Such an individual, according to Malcolm, would not be disposed to count any data whatever as evidence, as long as the data were perceived to be in opposition to one's stated claim. Apparently this kind of data would simply be dismissed preemptively as inapplicable, improper, unrelated,or simply wrong.
Undoubtedly, there do exist individuals who equate the idea of knowledge with a dogmatic unwillingness to call or treat anything as legitimate evidence which might tend to undermine or contradict what one claims to know. Yet, this kind of conceptualization really may not do justice to at least part of what Prichard might be getting at.
To be sure, if one actually knew, let us assume, something, then, he or she very likely will reject interpretations of evidence that are antagonistic to what the individual claims to know. Nonetheless, if a person really knows what he or she claims to, then, an individual should be able to account, satisfactorily, for the evidence in question in terms of his or her own knowledge claim. Moreover, if an individual cannot do this, there would be some grounds for arguing that, perhaps, an individual really didn't know what he or she claimed to, after all.
However, under these circumstances, one could not conclude automatically that an individual didn't know what he or she claimed to. This is so since the person's inability to deal with the evidence in question only might mean an individual didn't know or understand the relationship between his or her claim and the given, seemingly contrary evidence. In other words, the evidence might fall outside of, or beyond, the realms of the connecting insight which formed the core of an individual's knowledge claim.
Another possibility is that a person might not be so much incapable of answering or responding to the evidence in question as much as he or she was unwilling, for whatever reason, to provide an answer or response. For example, a mystic who claims to know certain things and, yet, refrains from disclosing to others what he or she knows might very well know what he or she claims to, although that individual may never offer, for reasons of his or her own, any demonstration concerning the legitimacy of the knowledge in question.
One cannot assume a knowledge claim is an inherently all-encompassing phenomenon. It is de-fined by the limits of the parameters of understanding from which the claim is generated.
In any event, knowledge is not a function of what one calls evidence. It is a function of what, in fact, is evidence, correctly understood or interpreted.
One who claims to know need not be pledging eternal and unwavering commitment to one's understanding as true, regardless of what evidence, proofs or reasons are brought forth. Conceivably, this individual may be claiming, minimally speaking, something like the following.
In view of the available data, facts, demonstrations and so on, there appears to be nothing existing within this body of evidence which is capable of controverting the basic understanding that frames the knowledge claim. More specifically, in the case of Prichard's triangle example, one is saying, apparently, that, given what we mean by triangle (namely, a three-sided, two dimensional, straight lined, enclosed figure), there is no logically possible way to demonstrate, at the present time, that a triangle could exhibit properties other than what is currently the case. Moreover, among these properties is the "fact" that the sum of the interior angles of the triangle necessarily equals the sum of two right angles.
However, if one defined "straight" as the shortest distance between two points, one might run into problems with some of the newer geometries of curved space which present the possibility of a triangle-like figure having interior angles whose sum is greater than the sum of two right angles. Therefore, in the present circumstances, one might want to define "straight" as "being without curvature", although such a characterization of "straight" could still raise questions about how one determined whether some line did or did not have curvature.
In any event, if proof were to be forthcoming which placed in doubt "knowledge" about the nature of Euclidian triangles, then, one obviously would have to acknowledge this evidence and either revise or retract the previous claims. On the other hand, as long as no contradictory proof or evidence has been produced, there seems to be nothing to legitimately prevent one from continuing to claim one "knows".
The foregoing would be the case as long as the requisite connecting insight or understanding were present to enable an individual making the claims to demonstrate, to some degree, that the claim of knowledge was backed up with something of conceptual substance. To the extent epistemic claims can effectively withstand challenges, then, an individual making these claims retains the right to maintain the claim to knowledge.
Obviously, there could be considerable controversy about whether or not a given challenge had been withstood successfully. Yet, this possibility does not alter the basic philosophical point being made.
In other words, irrespective of whatever problems there may be about deciding what constitutes an effective or adequate defense against a conceptual or evidential challenge, we would expect truth to prevail over what is false. Nonetheless, this intuitive expectation can be muddied considerably by the numerous extraneous factors which can affect the politics of epistemology and which have often manifested themselves historically. Consequently, the sense of "prevail" intended here is an ideal of sorts toward which "objective" hermeneutics, in the long run, strives.
Where knowledge truly exists for an individual, then, to be other than committed to that understanding which is accurately reflective of the truth would seem to be pointless. In this sense, there is an unavoidable dimension of dogmatism, so to speak, in the case of instances of true understanding, for, in purely formal terms, one might wonder what reason or evidence possibly could be given which would cause one to forsake the truth and embrace its opposite. This sort of dogmatism, however, which is a natural concomitant of any instance in which some given truth, or aspect thereof, is recognized or reflected within one's understanding, is a much different sort of dogmatism than the kind which Malcolm seems to be talking about. Malcolm is concerned with those kinds of epistemic claims which, though wrong or unsubstantiated or questionable, nonetheless are unwaveringly held despite being confronted by a wide variety of conflicting or contradictory data. Unfortunately, Malcolm does not appear to consider the possibility that a somewhat "dogmatic" commitment to a true (we are assuming for the sake of argument) understanding is quite defensible.
After all is said and done, there really are only two broad possibilities which bear upon the foregoing issue. First, what one claims to know is true, and one understands, via connecting insight, the character of that truth. In this case, one's understanding is correct and cannot be overthrown, although this understanding, subsequently, may be modified and/ or expanded. Second, what one currently claims to know, while warranted for the time being (i.e., it represents a tenable, though not necessarily a true, interpretation of the available data), will, in time, be over-thrown by arguments and data which cannot be handled successfully within the framework of the character of the understanding currently underlying one's epistemic claim.
Until the occasion or means of demonstrating the untenable nature of this kind of understanding actually arises, there will be no acknowledged mode of public consensus through which one could differentiate between true knowledge and simulated knowledge. Be this as it may, the absence (or, for that matter, the presence) of publicly agreed upon standards or criteria of epistemic judgement really does not affect what an individual actually knows.
On the other hand, if an individual does know, then, there is no legitimate reason for this person to accept an interpretation of evidence which runs counter to his or her position. As indicated earlier, one might suppose that an individual who really "knew" would, in principle, be able to effectively refute any given contraindicative interpretation by showing the error or problems of such an interpretation.
Of course, pointing out the errors or difficulties of a given conceptual challenge does not prove that someone who claims to know something does, in fact, know that something. The point of view of an epistemological outsider (i.e., privy to the character of the phenomenology of some knowledge claim), the observed capacity of an individual to meet challenges is certainly consistent with what would appear to be a legitimate knowledge claim.
Malcolm's distinction between the "weak" and "strong" senses of "know" tends to collapse upon examination. To begin with, the willingness of someone to acknowledge the possibility of error with respect to a given know ledge claim - which constitutes Malcolm's "weak" sense of "knowing" - need not be a matter of knowing at all.
The only instance in which it would represent a case of knowing would be if one actually did understand something correctly but was uncertain of the veracity of one's understanding, and, therefore, was willing to accept the possibility of error in relation to one's claim of knowledge. In these instances, the problem would not be a matter of an individual's not knowing something. The problem would be a matter of the individual’s attitude toward his or her understanding being tentative.
However, in all those cases in which one actually did not know, then, claims of knowledge notwithstanding, one is not dealing with knowledge per se, but with the belief one has knowledge. And, this belief, subsequently, may be shown to be unwarranted.
Consequently, Malcolm's notion of the "weak" sense of "know" is, at best, really only a specialized subset of the epistemic states which, legitimately, can be classed as knowledge inasmuch as they entail or give expression to true understanding. At worst, the "weak" sense of "know" actually has nothing to do with knowledge since it encompasses mistakes, errors, logical lacunae, and so on. Where these sorts of problems exist, one undermines the possibility of having a true understanding.
Previously, Malcolm's "strong" sense of "know" was shown to be a somewhat shallow, if not distorted, analysis of the character of what "know" means. Naturally, one always must be ready to admit that one illegitimately has conflated or confused simulated knowledge claims with actual knowledge.
As a result, where errors or mistakes are uncovered in the fabric of one's understanding concerning a given knowledge claim, then, one must be prepared to admit one didn't know after all. Nevertheless, in the case of 'real' knowledge, there is no need to admit the possibility of error. This is so since the very idea of knowledge precludes the possibility of error - at least as far as that knowledge extends.
On the other hand, when one believes one's understanding is correct, but one is not certain this is so, there is nothing wrong with maintaining a degree of caution in stating one's claims. There also is nothing wrong with being prepared to admit one's understanding could be mistaken.
Nevertheless, this kind of caution or preparedness is not sufficient reason to differentiate between two senses of "know" in the way Malcolm is attempting to do. There is only one species of knowing, and that is in the sense of true understanding.
The problem in instances where one has some degree of uncertainty concerning one's understanding is not a matter of what constitutes the character of knowledge. The problem is in trying to determine whether or not one's understanding is an instance of true understanding.
Difficulties may arise when one tries to decide (assuming one is very honest with oneself) whether one actually knew (i.e., understood correctly) about a given object or phenomenon, or whether one was only making an in formed judgement. Unlike the former case, an informed judgement lacks the crucial dimension of connecting insight which ties together the various facets of an epistemic situation in an accurate manner.
In other words, sometimes one is not able to easily distinguish between, on the one hand, a true connecting insight, and, on the other hand, a belief or set of beliefs which give expression to an understanding whose character simulates knowing without actually entailing true understanding. This is the case because one of the problems in making these distinctions is that most beliefs encompass dimensions of "knowing about".
For example, someone who was not very familiar with the gorge region still might know certain data about the gorge without actually possessing an understanding of all the factors which might affect whether or not water would be in the gorge at an indicated time. Thus, an individual might know he or she saw water in the gorge when going past it in the morning. An individual also might know about the water gates in Mr. Thoreau's dam and whether or not they were open at a certain time of day. However, an individual might now know of a variety of other factors which could be of significance in determining whether or not water was in the gorge at any given time.
Therefore, because an individual did not know about these other factors, an individual's understanding could not exhibit the properties of what is meant by the notion of connecting insight. In other words, an individual did not have sufficient understanding of the character of the context being considered to be able to draw together all the pertinent factors, influences, and forces inherent in that context such that this ‘drawing together’ accurately reflected the character (or parts thereof) of the situation to which he or she was attending.
As a result, the person in question might not have taken into account Mr. Thoreau's behavior pattern. Or, the individual might have failed to consider that some beavers were about finished in constructing their dam, which would have the effect, when completed, of diverting water away from the gorge. Or, an individual may have failed to realize rain fell very infrequently at this time of year. Consequently, water levels were generally low, and, therefore, water tended to disappear fairly quickly into various subterranean caverns. Or, if an individual neglected to consider anything else which in the course of normal events reasonably might be supposed to influence or affect whether water would or would not be in the gorge, then, one seems justified in contending that this individual really did not have a true understanding of the character of the water-in-the-gorge situation.
Rather, in the foregoing situation, an individual had a certain "knowledge about" the gorge region. This knowledge ‘about’ the gorge permitted him or her to develop or generate a belief whose character was rooted in a limited amount of correct information.
Simply because one saw water in the gorge during a morning walk may not provide one with enough information from which one defensibly could infer water will be in the gorge later in the day. This would be defensible only if it were the case that, in the course of normal affairs, if water is in the gorge in the morning, then, water will be in the gorge in the evening.
Similarly, the fact one saw the water gates of Mr. Thoreau's dam open in the morning may not provide sufficient information to permit an individual tenably to infer water will be in the gorge in the after-noon or evening. One can infer this tenably only if, in the course of normal affairs, the water gates are never closed during the day, and there are no other factors which bear upon whether or not water will be in the gorge at any given time.
As a result, in instances where one's understanding does not encompass a minimally sufficient range of experiential possibilities that tend to frame what constitutes the course of normal events in the gorge system, then, the ideas and/or data one entertains (in relation to the question of whether water will be in the gorge at a specified time of the day) and the concomitant beliefs emerging from this entertainment process will both lack the dimension of connecting insight. This is the kind of insight which makes the understanding underlying the belief an instance of actual knowledge instead of just a belief containing some correct information or accurate data (i.e., the dimension of "knowing about").
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