Belief and Knowledge - Part Two
There is a second dimension of the reply to the sceptic (i.e., what reason do I have for maintaining other than what I claim) which has the potential for carrying one beyond a philosophical stand-off with the sceptic. This second dimension is, in some ways, much more fundamental in its scope than the demand, discussed above, that skeptical objections must convey more than mere logical possibility in order to be seriously entertained as challenges to what one maintains in any given epistemic claim.
In absolute terms, and irrespective of whether or not we actually know the epistemological status of a sceptic's postulating of a possibility (i.e., whether it is true or false, accurate or inaccurate), what the sceptic postulates as a possibility is either true or it is not. Consequently, if the sceptic should ask: "How do you know that, say something else - a factor(s) not yet taken into consideration - is not preventing water from reaching the gorge even though you can see that the dam's water gates are allowing water to pass through at the present time?", the answer is likely to be: "I don't."
At the same time, if one were to continue to claim that water is in the gorge by assuming there is nothing blocking the flow of water to the gorge (based on one's understanding of the data currently available to one), and if there is not any obstacle of an unknown nature which is impeding the flow of water into the gorge, then, one's claim about water being in the gorge is correct. Although one does not know one knows, what one understands to be true of a particular aspect of reality is actually a correct understanding.
Essentially, the issue is this. If what one understands to be correct in relation to some given situation is found to be a correct understanding, is this understanding a matter of belief or of knowledge? The problematic aspect in the foregoing appears to revolve about a missing dimension of certainty in relation to an individual's understanding that something is the case when the something in question is in fact the case, but with respect to which an individual has in his or her possession no definite proof that such is the case. Yet, without this dimension of certainty, how is an individual to distinguish between what one believes and what one knows - a distinction which is at the focal point of the problem that Malcolm is posing and with which he is attempting to come to grips in his previously noted article.
One possible solution to Malcolm's problem may involve a distinction between "knowing one knows" and "believing one knows". Let us leave aside for the moment instances in which one not only claims one knows, but one also claims to know that one knows. Let us turn, instead, to the notion of "believing one knows".
This latter notion simulates most aspects of "knowing one knows". This is especially so if what one believes to be the case (i.e., that one knows) is true.
To be sure, the sense of know being used here is not that of knowing that one knows. Rather, it is the sense of know in which what one understands to be the case is, in fact, the case.
In these instances (i.e., when what one understands to be the case is the case), what one understands is not a matter of belief, but of correct understanding. Even though one may not know that what one understands is correct, one's beliefs in this context are really about the truth of one's understanding. Thus, belief in this context is not a central aspect of the main focus of understanding. Instead, it plays a horizonal role.
"Believing one knows" has two main components: 1) the fact which expresses what one understands to be the case about some given issue(s); and, 2) the facet which expresses what one believes about the truth or correctness or accuracy of what one understands. Under these circumstances, one has no doubt about knowing what one's understanding is. There also may be no doubt in one's mind about one's believing that what one understands is true or correct.
Consequently, on at least one level, one can distinguish between what one knows and what one believes about something. In the present case, this distinction involves: a) the character of one's understanding; and, b) the character of one's beliefs about the truth or correctness of such understanding.
In a certain sense, the foregoing distinction is the prototype for all subsequent differentiations between belief and knowing within oneself. Belief in this phenomenological context is a matter of committing oneself to an idea (i.e., accepting the idea to be true) during the process of entertainment with respect to various aspects of the experiential field. On the other hand, knowing, in the restricted sense outlined above, is a matter of correctly understanding what is the case without necessarily knowing that one's understanding is correct.
Presumably, Malcom has something more in mind when he inquires whether or not one can distinguish within oneself between belief and know-ledge. He is not interested in instances in which an individual knows what he or she believes or believes what he or she understands. Malcolm wants to establish whether or not an individual can distinguish between belief and knowledge in relation to some phenomenon other than in the case of belief and understanding in and of themselves as phenomenologically entertained or considered by an individual.
For instance, if we return to the gorge example, can an individual who is not presently at the gorge epistemologically differentiate between claiming he or she knows water is in the gorge, and claiming he or she believes water is in the gorge? Malcolm argues:
"Prichard says that if we reflect we cannot mistake belief for knowledge. In case (4 ) you knew there would be water and in case (5) [cases (4) and (5) refer to the ones which were given in the first quote in the present essay] you merely believed it. Was there any way that you could have discovered by reflection, in case (5), that you did not know? It would have been useless to have reconsidered your grounds for saying that there would be water, because in case (4), where you did know, your grounds were identical. They could be at fault in (5) only if they were at fault in (4), and they were not at fault in (4). Cases (4) and (5) differ only in one respect - namely, that in one case you did subsequently find water and in the other you did not. Prichard says that we can determine by reflection whether we know something or merely believe it. But where, in these cases, is the material that reflection would strike upon? There is none."(p. 60)
One possible response to Malcolm’s rhetorical question: "Where, in these cases, is the material that reflection would strike upon?' ', is the following. The material to be reflected upon depends on an individual who is making the claims in (4) and (5) quoted previously.
For example, the person in question might be a newcomer to the area. As a result, he or she might be making his or her claim on the basis, say, of earlier having seen water in the gorge, but without any concomitant awareness or understanding of all the factors which could cause the water to disappear in the meantime (i.e., between the time of seeing the gorge and the time of making a claim about water being in the gorge).
Given these conditions, one might be inclined to say that not only didn't this individual know in (5), but he or she didn't know in (4) either. This would be the case, even though an individual had a certain amount of grounds to support his or her claim and even though an individual was right about water being in the gorge.
The nature of the evidence and the nature of the understanding of that evidence do not really allow for this individual to have the sort of connecting insight into the situation which would enable an individual to know, even in the aforementioned minimal sense of know, that there is water in the gorge. This is so simply because his or her understanding is limited by an individual's status of being a newcomer to the gorge area.
Even if an individual had extensive geological knowledge of a theoretical sort, he or she likely still would lack an appreciation of the specific characteristics of the gorge region at issue to be able to have a sufficiently extensive data base from which an individual could draw together the proper themes in a hermeneutical package which accurately reflected the realities of the water-in-the-gorge situation. In fact, quite conceivably, some of the potential reasons why water might not be in the gorge could have nothing to do with geological considerations - e.g., if the water were dammed or diverted by a human being or beaver.
At best, one might contend, on the basis of an individual's earlier experience (i.e., having seen water in the gorge when an individual walked by it in the morning), an individual's inference about water being in the gorge was warranted (i.e., a reasonable one without necessarily being correct), regardless of whether water actually turned up in the gorge or not. Moreover, if such a newcomer to the gorge region were honest with himself or herself, that person would recognize the given claim was not a matter of actual knowledge.
One would be more accurate to say that an individual had a belief supported by a certain amount of limited knowledge and surrounded by a great deal of horizonal ignorance concerning details of the behavior of either water in the gorge region, or, for example, Mr. Thoreau behavior with respect to the dam's water gates.
Let us suppose, however, that an individual making the epistemic claims concerning the presence of water in the gorge had many years of experience with the gorge and knew the circumstances when water would and would not be in the gorge. Let us further suppose that he or she was not aware of any existing conditions which would justify giving credence to the possibility that water was not in the gorge. If water should turn out to be, actually, in the gorge, then, one might be inclined to say this person could reflect upon the known factors and determine that he or she actually knew water was in the gorge, and not just that he or she believed water was in the gorge.
With regard to the neophyte, the material which would allow this kind of individual to recognize whether he or she knew, or merely believed, would be, as suggested previously, the honest admission that he or she knew relatively little about the gorge region in question. Therefore, having seen water in the gorge earlier in the day really was not sufficient data to allow the neophyte the kind of insight necessary to establish whether or not water was in the gorge.
In the case of the more experienced individual, this individual could determine whether he or she believed or knew water was in the gorge. First, an individual would examine the array of possibilities which could prevent water from being in the gorge.
By noting which possibilities he or she currently was apprized of, to some extent, and of which possibilities he or she was presently ignorant, an individual could proceed to try to figure out if what he or she presently knew was enough to construct a conceptual geometry from which a connecting insight could arise that indicated water was in the gorge. On the other hand, an individual could try to figure out if what he or she presently knew was merely enough to generate a belief about the possible presence of water in the gorge. If the latter is the case, then, such a belief was missing crucial pieces (whether in the form of data or understanding or both) that would prevent the kind of conceptual geometry forming from which an individual could discern (through connecting insight) the presence of those logical/experiential themes in the conceptual geometry that were reflective of whether water was or was not in the gorge.
If the experienced individual knew countervailing conditions did not exist in the gorge region, or if this individual had good reason to suppose those conditions did not exist, then, provided water was actually in the gorge, one might argue an individual did know water was in the gorge. This would be so in the sense that his or her understanding was correct and rooted in an informed insight into the actual conditions of the gorge region, even though an individual might not be certain the understanding was correct. In this case, an individual would treat his or her understanding as knowledge and not as belief.
Consider the issue from a still further perspective. Let us suppose an individual knew of evidence or reasons to suggest some of the conditions capable of preventing water from being in the gorge actually might be the case.
However, let us also suppose an individual discounted those possibilities on the basis of a variety of experiential/evidential considerations. If water, subsequently, actually was found to be in the gorge, and if the considerations which caused an individual to discount the possibility that water was not in the gorge actually were reflective of what was the case, then, one still might maintain an individual knew water was in the gorge, even though proof that this understanding was correct might not come until later.
On the other hand, in the situation where an experienced person says he or she knows something is the case, yet, the person (or others) subsequently discovers the claim to be erroneous due to the intervention of unforeseen or overlooked factors, then, seemingly, an individual would not be able to distinguish between belief and knowledge in those circumstances. Yet, this sort of instance can be seen as only a limiting case of the general point which is being established.
As such, the limiting case need not undermine the feasibility of an individual in many (if not most) circumstances being able to distinguish between belief and knowledge. At the same time, the greater the latitude which exists for the possibility of the unexpected or unanticipated taking place, the more room there is for committing errors in attempting to differentiate between belief and knowledge in any given case. Nevertheless, the possibility of error need not undermine automatically a claim to knowledge.
Knowledge isn't just a function of: a) being right, or b) being confident, or c) being confident and being right. Knowledge is a function of the kind of understanding which allows one to tie together enough features of an experiential/evidential context to provide a demarcated framework out of which, or through which, one might gain some degree of accurate insight into the nature of the context being focused upon.
While one's understanding must be true in order to be considered knowledge, one need not have any accompanying sense of confidence or belief that what one understands is correct. The necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge is this: true understanding must exist within an individual with respect to the character of the context being considered by that individual.
Therefore, although a neophyte's claim that water is in the gorge on a given occasion may be correct, the claim is not rooted in any real understanding of the character of the behavior of water in the gorgeregion. It is rooted in but one observation - that of having seen water in the gorge when one passed by the gorge earlier in the day.
Such a claim has not taken into consideration any data which might bear upon whether water will continue to be in the gorge later on in the day. Furthermore, knowledge in the foregoing sense does not require one to be an immediate witness to all of the factors which affect one's epistemic claim. The basic requirement for this sense of knowledge would be satisfied if one had a relatively recent familiarity with some minimal number of the fundamental factors surrounding and structuring the given context or issue. These factors would allow one to work at establishing or generating a connecting insight that is true.
The time frame for what constitutes the meaning of "recently" obviously will vary with the nature of the phenomenon being discussed. In any given instance, however, there will be a certain amount of arbitrariness associated with the choice of allowable parameters for a time frame of reference. The maximum lead-way permitted will be a function of the time range 'normally' required for various features of the situation being studied to change and, thereby, alter or affect the situation significantly enough to have ramifications for the accuracy of epistemological claims which might be made about the situation in question.
Truth, Tautology and Connecting Insight
Some people might object to the foregoing analysis and argue that the position being put forth in this chapter is somewhat tautological. If one must assume one's understanding is true in order for something to be considered knowledge, then, one appears to be assuming one's conclusions by building them into one's premises. However, this objection, if it were to occur, tends to misconstrue the nature of the philosophical point being made.
The truth of a given understanding is not assumed. It is either true or false (in whole or in part) as it stands.
If the understanding is true, then, regardless of whether one knows, with certainty, that it is true, and irrespective of one's degree of confidence about what one understands, and quite independently of whether one can justify or prove one's understanding, nevertheless, this understanding represents knowledge precisely because it is true and because it expresses a substantial kind of epistemic link which an individual has with the phenomenon, object, issue, experience, process, condition or idea being considered. Use of the term ‘substantial’ in the previous sentence is intended to indicate that the epistemic state of the individual is rooted a context of having actually interacted with the phenomenon, etc. - interaction that serves as a basis for providing an opportunity for the development or generation of a connecting insight into the actual character of the phenomenon (or whatever) which one is investigating.
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