"Actually,
Dr. Yardley," Mr. Tappin responded, "I'm asking neither kind of question. The
question which I'm posing is more like the following: given that legitimate questions can
be raised about the availability of polyamines such as spermadine in the Archean era, does
the fact a ribozyme can be experimentally induced to overcome its inherent sequence
specificity under artificial, and prebiotically unrealistic, conditions, really bring us
any closer to answering the question of how life came into being, especially in view of
the very strong possibility that ribozymes might not have been capable of being
synthesized in the prebiotic world?
"In
other words, Professor, many evolutionary researchers seem to be saying: if such and such
a set of conditions holds, then such and such a outcome is possible, and if we assume that
these conditions did hold during the Archean era, then this constitutes evidence in
support of evolutionary theory. Yet, the question which really needs to be asked, and
answered, is this: do we have any plausible means of demonstrating the likelihood that
such a set of conditions existed and that such an outcome did, in fact, take place during
the Archean era?"
"All of
evolutionary theory," Dr. Yardley asserted, "is about establishing and
demonstrating that some conditions, events, processes and outcomes may have been more
likely than other conditions, events, processes and outcomes."
"That
may well be true, Professor, but there seems to be a heavy fog warning which is being
posted with respect to conceptual travel in the areas of 'demonstration' and
'likelihood'," the defense counsel replied. "For instance, you previously said
the spermadine experiment can be considered to constitute evidence in support of
evolutionary theory because, irrespective of whether it is right or wrong, the findings of
the experiment can be used to help shape and modulate that theory, and, yet, at the same
time, the spermadine experiment may have nothing to do with the Archean era, and,
therefore, by implication, the spermadine experiment may have nothing to do with one of
the most important questions facing evolutionary theory - namely, how did life come into
being.
"In
effect, I'm having a little trouble, Dr. Yardley, understanding how you propose to
reconcile these seemingly antagonistic elements. If, and the viability of this 'if' needs
to be examined ... if one can raise questions which cast serious doubt on the degree of
relevance of the spermadine experiment with respect to helping us resolve the
origin-of-life issue, then how does it serve as evidence for evolutionary theory?"
"Science,"
suggested the professor, "is about empirically and conceptually exploring
possibilities concerning the physical/material world in a methodical, rigorous fashion.
Within certain limits, whatever an experiment permits us to eliminate in the way of
possibility, we eliminate. Similarly, within certain limits, whatever an experiment
permits us to retain in the way of possibility, we retain.
"Over
time, the relationship between what has been eliminated and what is retained takes on a
structural form. We describe this relationship through the concrete vocabulary of
hypothesis, conjecture, experiment, methodology, data, evidence, analysis, principles,
laws, theory, and model.
"Unfortunately,
at any given time, there is often a certain amount of ambiguity which surrounds the issue
of what justifiably can be eliminated or retained as a function of the empirical data and
experimental results which may be in our possession. The spermadine experiment gives
expression to a certain amount of this sort of ambiguity.
"On the
one hand, as you rightly point out," affirmed the professor, "we don't know
whether spermadine, or ribozymes for that matter, existed during the Archean era, although
there is evidence which can be offered both for and against such possibilities. Even if we
eliminate the ontological possibilities of spermadine and ribozymes from the picture, we
still can retain the idea that something like them may have existed and which, if they
did, would help resolve certain kinds of problem, so we proceed to try to determine
whether we should eliminate or retain such conceptual possibilities on the basis of
forthcoming empirical data and conceptual reflection.
"On the
other hand, if spermadine and ribozymes did exist during the Archean era - a possibility
concerning which, once again, evidence can be offered both for and against - then the
spermadine experiment is revealing a very interesting possibility that ought to be
retained and explored further. Now, although the available evidence does suggest there are
a variety of factors which mitigate against continuing to retain either spermadine or
ribozymes as viable, plausible pieces of the origin-of-life puzzle, in my opinion, we have
not yet reached a point where these possibilities can justifiably be eliminated from the
picture.
"Quite
frequently, there is a constant dialectic and tug-of-war going on between how we feel
about what, both conceptually and empirically, should be eliminated and what should be
retained at any given time. Consequently, despite the fact something may have a
theoretical status, vis-a-vis elimination and retention, which is ambiguous, nonetheless,
that ambiguous element still can come to have a shaping influence on one's theories,
models, conjectures and hypotheses, even while there are other factors which serve as
counter-indications to this shaping influence."
"What
happens," hypothesized the lawyer, "if your feelings about the proper
relationship between what is to be eliminated and what is to be retained is at odds with
my feelings about the proper relationship between what is to be eliminated and what is to
be eliminated?"
"Then,"
the professor said with a shrug of this shoulders, "we have a difference of
opinion."
"Is
there any way to resolve such a difference of opinion," the defense counsel asked.
"Yes
and no," answered the professor. "One can try to do more science until the
balance of evidence seems to point more in the direction of one kind of relationship of
elimination/retention rather than some other such relationship. However, this often is
easier said than done, and, moreover, there often are other ideas about the proper
relationship between what should be eliminated and retained which arise in the meantime
and complicate any straightforward resolution of the original difference of opinion.
"Progress
does occur in the sense that despite a variety of differences of opinion about numerous
issues concerning what should be retained and what should be eliminated, a broad consensus
develops about some of the things, both empirical and conceptual, which should be
eliminated and some of the things which should be retained. Even here, however, one finds
some people who are resistant to either eliminating possibilities or retaining
possibilities despite the presence of a general consensus among many researchers on such
matters."
"Does
the existence of a consensus," queried the lawyer," necessarily mean this
decision on what, in broad terms, should be eliminated or retained is, in some sense, a
correct one?"
"Not at
all," Dr. Yardley stated. "Yet, one could say that where such consensus exists,
there usually is considerable justification which can be offered through empirical
observations, experimental results and conceptual analysis, in support of such decisions,
and, therefore, anyone who wishes to oppose such decisions will be swimming against the
tide of an informed consensus of opinion.
"Of
course, historically, conceptual revolutions often have come in the form of one or more
people who believed the wrong consensus-decisions had been made about the possibilities
which are being eliminated, retained or even entertained. Apparently, your client Mr.
Corrigan is an individual who feels consensus opinion concerning evolutionary theory is
wrong-headed, but whether his opposition will result in a revolution or merely fall by the
wayside as a very minor historical oddity will be decided, to some extent, by what the
present jury and other, similar forums of public opinion, decide."
