Ockham's Razor
A reader asked the following question with respect to the article/essay, 'The Sound of One Hand Clapping':
"Isn't one obligated to defer to long- standing guidelines, like Ockham's razor, when engaging issues such as the debate between evolutionists and creationists, and, if so, doesn't this mean that one should accept evolution as being the simpler of the two accounts concerning origins?"
The foregoing question is an interesting one, and it touches on a number of issues that, potentially, have ramifications for educational theory and practice. Therefore, I have decided to use this 'Feature Article' space to further explore and develop - at least in a limited way - some of the themes that are raised by the above question.
For those who may be unfamiliar with the idea of Ockham's razor - which, sometimes, is referred to as the principle of parsimony, this precept (first stated by William of Ockham in the 13-14th century) maintains, in effect, that: assumptions, terms, and concepts should not be multiplied beyond necessity. One of the problems facing this principle is that we cannot always be sure by what is entailed when the phrase: "beyond necessity" is used.
Theories are, by nature, projections onto a body of data, and, in the process, theories seek to make coherent sense of such data. Unfortunately, the fit between the form of a theory and the structural character of a given data set is, usually, not precise since there tend to be both empirical and logical lacunae in a theory which leave a variety of facets of the data unexplained or associated with questions that cannot be adequately addressed by the theory - that is, so-called anomalous results, facts, or data.
In addition, over time (both short and long term), assumptions, vocabulary, and concepts all change, and, among other things, this makes comparisons between even similar, scientific theories rather difficult, let alone between relatively different approaches to a given body of data such as is the case in relation to evolutionary and creationist accounts of the origins of life on Earth. Consequently, trying to determine which of two theories has, or has not, multiplied terms, concepts, or assumptions 'beyond necessity' is a complex problem, and, often times, an issue that cannot be easily, if at all, resolved.
Furthermore, implicit in the idea of 'beyond necessity' is the assumption that, in any given instance of phenomena, we know what is going on and, therefore, we know what is, and is not, necessary as far as description, understanding, and explanation are concerned in such cases. In truth, we rarely are in a position to be able to ascertain the boundary conditions of necessity with respect to that which is to be treated as requisite - i.e., necessary - terms, conditions, and assumptions.
Now, the 'reality' of 'things' is all there is. And, certainly, no theory should impose something on to 'reality' which does not belong there and, as such, would be 'beyond necessity'.
However, there is nothing which obligates one to accept any given application of Ockham's razor as an expression of universal truth. Ockham's razor is a working principle that, loosely speaking, indicates there is a certain desirable symmetry in having our understanding exhibit congruence - which is itself an ambiguous idea - with the 'data' to which our experiential engagement of reality gives rise. Nevertheless, simply because a theory claims to give expression to this principle, this does not, automatically, mean the principle in question has been served - indeed, a lot of things have been claimed in the name of Ockham's razor, and not all of these claims are necessarily legitimate expressions of this principle in action.
For instance, to work from the assumption of randomness is not necessarily any more parsimonious than to work from an assumption of Divine design. In fact, one can never prove anything to be a function of random events since there always could be some unknown algorithm which is capable of generating a given structure that, heretofore, has been assumed to be an expression of random phenomena.
Alternatively, there is no inherent contradiction in proposing that evolution does occur, and, yet, simultaneously, argue that such evolutionary transformations give expression to Divine design. There has been more than one theistically oriented thinker who has taken this sort of stance (e.g., deChardin and Matthew Fox) - and, one can note this fact quite apart from the matter of the ultimate tenability of these particular theories.
One of the crucial issues - a primary 'sticking' point, as it were - underlying the evolutionist versus creationist debate turns on whether biological origins and/or change is, or is not, a function of purely random events, or, considered from a slightly different perspective, is a function of events that may be determinate but are, in some sense, self-contained and, consequently, quite independent of any need to invoke a theistic dimension to either account for such processes, or to set them in motion, or to regulate them.
If there is no God, then, assuming a Deity in order to account for phenomena which are 'purely' natural is, according to this way of thinking, a violation of Ockham's razor. On the other hand, if there is a God, and God created the physical universe, then, assuming a purely physical account (whether of a random, or a determinate, but non-linear kind) to explain phenomena that, ultimately, are rooted in Divine dynamics of creation is also a violation of Ockham's razor, for it has construed things in a way which takes them 'beyond necessity' - necessity being established by reality, not theory.
Even if one were to demonstrate there were a set of physical, chemical, biological, and thermodynamical laws which were capable of adequately describing and explaining the origins of life on Earth, such a set of laws, in and of itself, does not preclude the possibility that a Deity or Supreme Being has authored, generated and established those laws. In other words, the existence of a complete scientific theory concerning the origins of life cannot be used as grounds for invoking Ockham's razor in order to disallow the possibility that the existence of those laws is due to Divine activity. This is so because the idea of Divine creation could be seen to be fully consistent with such a set of laws and, therefore, the former cannot be either empirically or logically precluded by the presence of the latter laws.
The matter is rationally indeterminate as it stands. And, Ockham's razor is incapable of deciding the issue because what is 'beyond necessity' cannot be settled by a philosophical or methodological principle that cannot, by itself, determine the nature of 'necessity', and, thereby, establish a baseline against which 'beyond' can be measured in any reliable, undeniable fashion.
Aside from what has been said above, there is a further difficulty with the use of Ockham's razor. More specifically, this principle tends to presuppose that the idea of what constitutes 'necessity' is something which is capable of being resolved through rational means - in other words, use of this principle tends to have a rationalistic bias to it ... or, at least, this is how the principle tends to have been employed down through the years, and, moreover, such a bias reflects the phiosophical orientation of its 'inventor', William of Ockham, who was a proponent of scholasticism - a form of thinking that was deeply influenced by the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle.
If, however, the nature of reality is such that it is not capable of being reduced to, or completely circumscribed by, rationalistic methods, then, one has to question the meaning and value of bringing Ockham's razor into the discussion. One cannot assume one's conclusions, and through one's desire for 'rational' accounts of the universe, demand that reality fit into one's rationalistic molds.
One must take 'reality', whatever this might be, on its own terms - as best one can. Maybe, some levels of 'what is' can be understood through rational modalities - as far as the terms, assumptions, and concpets of such modalities go - and that these modalities are, more or less, accurate, or useful, ways of talking about such phenomena - and, indeed, the successes of science, mathematics, and technology are consistent with this sort of perspective.
On the other hand, there may be some dimensions of 'what is' that fall beyond the horizons of rational discourse - not because such realms are irrational, but because they supercede the limitations inherent in the capacity of reason to grasp the nature of 'what is' within such dimensions of Being. If so, then, to invoke rational principles to explain what is supra- rational is a violation of the spirit of Ockham's razor even though, for the most part, this, usually, has not been part of the mind-set underlying use of this philosophical principle.
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