Some Thoughts On Indoctrination - Part 3
According to Anthony Flew, in his article, 'Indoctrination and Doctrines':
"In the primary sense, we have suggested, indoctrination, where it is taken to be a bad thing, is a matter of trying to implant firm convictions of the truth of doctrines which are in fact either false or at least not known to be true."
As an example of what he has in mind in the foregoing quote, Flew asserted, earlier in his article, that:
"... the distinctively religious doctrines which are supposed to be taught as elements in religious knowledge are, if not false, at least not by any ordinary standards known to be true. It should, indeed, seem not just unwarranted but also inconsistent to push such doctrines as knowledge when you yourself (a reference to John Wilson's position which Flew is critiquing) propose to characterize the belief that they are true as faith."
First, one could argue, without any fear of self-contradiction, that even though religious doctrines may be steeped in faith, nonetheless, the teaching of such doctrines as knowledge, is only unwarranted or inconsistent if the beliefs are, in fact, not true. If, however, the doctrines are true, then, having faith in such doctrines, as well as teaching them as knowledge, represents a logically consistent and defensible stance.
Simply because one may not be able to demonstrate, in some universally acceptable way, the truth of that in which one has faith is not, in and of itself, sufficient reason to justify the contention that such doctrines do not, or could not, represent knowledge. The basic issue is not a matter of what can be proven to be true but of what is true and the extent to which one understands the character of such truth.
Proof that some given proposition, statement, or doctrine is true does not make the proposition or statement more true. Rather, the presence of proof merely indicates, in a formal manner, that the proposition, in question, accurately reflects, to some degree, a facet or aspect of experience and/or reality.
Of course, where proof or evidence is available, this helps to lend additional conviction to one's beliefs and, in the process, tends to dispel the aura of anxiety or uncertainty which often accompanies matters of belief. However, in many instances involving questions of religion, philosophy, politics, history, psychology and even in relation to the so-called 'hard' sciences, one does not always have the luxury of being able to call upon the sort of 'proof' which is able to establish whether various statements are true or false. Rather, one frequently becomes involved in the dialectics of trying to analyze, evaluate, and make judgments concerning the advantages and disadvantages of competing interpretive and orienting frameworks with respect to the same body of experiential evidence.
Flew's statement that "... religious doctrines ... are, if not false, at least not by any ordinary standards known to be true", carries within it the implicit assumption that what are called "ordinary standards" (whatever these might be) deserve one's allegiance. Yet, without examining such standards and understanding their etiology - that is, how they came to be accepted as standards, as well as the nature of their strengths and weaknesses - then, applying those standards means one cannot know whether, or not, the end result of that application is, actually true or false.
In effect, what Flew is doing is attempting to establish a starting point for an interpretive or orienting framework that is to serve as the standard of what he believes should be considered to be grounds of ordinary or acceptable knowledge. Basically, Flew's standard ties knowledge to what is publicly verifiable or acceptable according to various criteria and methodologies that have arisen over a period of time among a certain community of people.
Apparently, Flew seems not to have considered the possibility that knowledge may be a function of someone's understanding that something is true, and not, necessarily, a function of a set of methodological techniques, etc., which might be used to verify or demonstrate something to be true. For example, if someone makes a claim that 'x' is true (e.g., Angels exists), and, then, proceeds to generate methods (assuming that the requisite methods could be established) for attempting to verify such a claim, these methods, even if successful, do not establish truth.
In fact, the understanding underlying a given statement was either true or false (or some combination of the two) before a methodology was ever applied to a given situation. Methodology represents a means of attempting to differentiate, in a defensible manner, true claims from false ones, but the truth, or falsity, of any particular claim is independent of any associated methodology.
In short, the ultimate arbiter of truth is reality itself. Good methodology does not generate truth, but, instead, reveals the nature of its presence.
Moreover, consider the following. The acceptance of something as true - which is true (regardless of whether this can be proven to be so or not) - has, virtually, the same, if not the same, operational status in terms of its effectiveness, as knowledge which is supported by a variety of methodological and evidential considerations.
In other words, the former (i.e., acceptance of something as true without proof) places one in a position to be able to do much, if not most, of what the latter (i.e., acceptance based on proof) allows one to do. As long as the understanding associated with a given understanding is rooted in some manner of grasping the truth, then, irrespective of whether that understanding is a function of science, philosophy, revelation, spiritual inspiration, lived experience, or merely held to be true (with, or without, good reason), may make little, real difference to being able to effectively operate in the world.
If following the steps of a proof helps a person better understand the nature of that aspect of reality toward which a proof is directed, then all well and good. Nevertheless, some other individual may understand the same situation quite well without any knowledge of, or need for running through, the steps of such a proof.
For example (and to take a religious theme in order to meet Flew head on, as it were), if a person believes there is an afterlife in which one will reap what one has sown in the course of a lifetime on earth and, therefore, arranges her or his life on earth accordingly, how will this individual's life be different in its orientation or conduct from one who is able to prove (assuming this could be done) there is an afterlife? Operating on the assumption that a belief is true permits a person to go about her or his life much as would an individual who possesses proof that such a belief is true.
In fact, rightly or wrongly, in many of life's circumstances, very likely, most people tend to operate on assumptions that various things are true, without necessarily having any proof that the underlying assumptions are capable of being backed-up or substantiated with evidence. If the assumptions turn out to be true, then, adherence to it and use of it as a working principle allows people to proceed as appropriately as having proof concerning such matters would have allowed them to do.
At this point, Flew might wish to extend his position and maintain that even if one were to accept the previous line of argument, there seems to be a decided difference between, for instance, scientific claims to knowledge and religious claims to knowledge. For, among other things, the former (that is scientific claims) allow one to know that what we claim to be true, is true, by virtue of processes of methodological confirmation - processes which, supposedly, are absent from religious claims to knowledge.
However, more often than not, the crucial issue does not revolve about the presence or absence of methodology. Instead, differences arise over the value, reliability, appropriateness, and rigor of the methodologies to be used.
Furthermore, if the presence or absence of a certain kind of methodology is to be the line of demarcation separating 'real' knowledge from 'mere' belief, one might raise the question of whether most people can be said to really know anything in this sense. For, as indicated in Part 2, even when teachers, experts, or scientists offer arguments, evidence, and proofs in support of various ideas or theories, there are few people who will be able to assess, with any degree of competence and thoroughness, the strengths and weaknesses of such arguments, evidence and proofs.
While it seems clear that if, for instance, a person makes use of scientific data and methods, the individual knows 'something', nevertheless, what is not clear is whether what this person knows is that the ideas in question are true. An individual may know the basic nature of the methodology or be familiar with some of the data or a portion of the history of how that data was derived, or may have some understanding of the underlying theory in which the data and methodology are rooted, but none of this is, necessarily, synonymous with knowing that the relevant theory is true.
If Flew were to argue that scientific theories still constitute knowledge for people in general because there is a body of people (i.e., scientists) who are capable of coming to some basic agreement about it and are capable of justifying such knowledge and providing evidence for it, he really doesn't strengthen his position about "ordinary standards" of knowing. This is so, because one also could point to a body of people (e.g., mystics, saints, Prophets) who were capable of agreeing about certain things - such as the methodology of spiritual development (e.g., fasting, chanting, seclusion, prayer, meditation, contemplation, service to others, taming of the ego, etc - and these practices remain in evidence right across spiritual traditions.), and who would be capable of providing evidence in support of the foregoing with respect to the quality of moral character, capacity for love, wisdom, and so on, of those who actively applied the spiritual methodology.
To be sure, there are different interpretations with respect to ideas of soul, Divinity, after life, and evil - to name but a few - among various spiritual communities. However, one should keep in mind that there also often are significant differences of opinion within science concerning the nature of such phenomena as: gravitation, quantum reality, origins of life, randomness, or the foundations of mathematics - to name a few fundamental areas of controversy in science.
What are the "ordinary standards" of knowledge? The minimal criteria for whether a belief or statement constitutes knowledge is that: (a) the belief or statement actually must be reflective, to some degree, of certain aspects of experience and/or reality as mediated by experience; (b) there be some sort of awareness or understanding which is capable of tying belief and experience together in a manner which gives expression to the reflectivity quality of (a).
Given the foregoing, there are several considerations to meditate upon. (1) much of what we call 'knowledge' may not be such because it fails to satisfy either one, or both, of the foregoing criteria. (2) what some people refuse to consider as 'knowledge' because relevant claims cannot be proven to be true, may, nonetheless, still be true and, to varying degrees, understood to be so.
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