Educational Purpose as a 5th Commonplace
My starting point revolves around the notion of 'truth'. However, since such a notion is very easily interpreted in a variety of different ways according to the nature of the conceptual frame work through which any given person organizes one’s experience, a few words should be said about what, within the present context, the term does not signify before moving on to briefly outline what is meant by use of "truth" in the context of this essay.
First, the term is not being construed in the sense of a set of propositional functions exhibiting certain formal logical characteristics. This is not to say that so-called 'truth-functional' analysis is necessarily incompatible with "truth" - or some aspect thereof - but, in terms of the perspective being delineated in this essay, such analysis represents, at best, a second order consideration that, more often than not, is preoccupied with the interaction of concepts within a specific, very narrow linguistic context and, metaphysically speaking, is, at least, one step removed from Truth itself since that sort of logical analysis presupposes the 'object', as it were, of its analysis - presupposes not in the sense of a tautology whose conclusion is analytically concealed within the premise(s), but in the manner in which a figure presupposes its ground.
Depending on the structural/logical features of the aforementioned sort of analysis, there may, or may not, be countervailing tensions which spring up between the figure (analysis) and Ground (Truth). Nonetheless, although there need be no inherent antagonism between the two, the Ground cannot be other than it is, whereas the task, as it were, of the figure - that is, the analytical nature of truth-functional analysis - is - to whatever extent it has the capacity to do this - to give expression to, or accurately reflect, the structural character or nature of Ground, or some portion, thereof, and to the extent it does not accomplish this, one hardly can fault the Ground for the short comings of the figure.
Logic, whatever it may be, is a function of, or quality of, intelligence, and whatever intelligence is, it is, by virtue of what the Ground is. To attempt to force the latter to conform to the standards of a normalized 'logic' is to become confused about what is metaphysically dependent on what. Moreover, all too frequently, the term logic is applied to what is systematic or hierarchically ordered according to a variety of arbitrary assumptions and, then, subsequently, assumed (often erroneously) to be synonymous with truth because people tend to believe that what is coherent and ordered in some sense must necessarily reflect, or give expression to, the truth.
Secondly, use of the term "truth" is not meant to refer to that which corresponds to the facts. Such a correspondence theory represents an unacceptable reversal of roles for facts are a function of what is true. It is in, or from, the attempt to reconstruct the truth, or recreate the conditions of truth, or give expression to them accurately that the notion of facts emerges.
When something is said to be factual it implies a correspondence, of some kind, with what is the case in reality - a correspondence that is filtered (with varying degrees of accuracy) through an individual's perceptual/conceptual framework. When something is considered to be not factual, this judgement carries with it - explicitly or implicitly - an understanding that there is an aspect of experience or reality to which one can point as evidence that brings into question the authenticity or legitimacy of a given statement’s capacity to accurately capture, reflect, or give expression to some facet of experience or reality.
Although during any given attempt to uncover the extent of the truth which might be reflected by a specific statement, or set of statements, there, often, is a reference to other facts, ultimately, the issue can be pushed back to the foundations of epistemology, at which point one is no longer employing one fact to substantiate another. Rather, one is confronted with the problem of what constitutes factualness per se in a fundamental, essential sense.
Furthermore, no matter how one resolves the foregoing fundamental problem of epistemology, there comes to be a recognition that there is a dimension of experience which serves to inhibit the degree of arbitrariness that one may be able to build into the concept of fact - namely, eventually, one's notion of fact must be capable of being reconciled with reality( or whatever is the case) in any given situation or with respect to any given phenomenon. In other words, ultimately, reality, itself, is that which will judge facts and not facts which will judge reality.
The tenability of a fact, hypothesis, theory, model, paradigm, world-view, and so on, depends on how well each conceptual or hermeneutical candidate can withstand the comparison with that which each such candidate purports to describe or explain or represent in conjunction with the presence of lacunae (logical or empirical), inconsistencies, ambiguities which might arise in relation to a given conceptual candidate. The degree of success entailed by any hermeneutical candidate is a function of both those facets of ontology or metaphysics which such a candidate is able to reflect accurately, together with its problems in this respect, and this function gives expression to what might be called a 'goodness of fit' between, on the one hand, a particular fact, theory, etc., and, on the other hand, a given phenomenon or set of experiences to which the facts or theories in question are attempting to make identifying reference.
The better the aforementioned ‘goodness of fit function’ is, then, the greater is the claim of legitimacy, accuracy, or authenticity of such a function with respect to a given fact, hypothesis, theory, and so on, in relation to the structural character of some aspect or dimension of truth, reality, ontology, or metaphysics. The worse the aforementioned ‘goodness of fit function’ is, than the less tenable is the claim of accuracy or authenticity of such a function with respect to a given fact - etc., relationship with the structural character of some aspect or dimension of truth.
In short, a fact, hypothesis, theory, model, paradigm, or world-view must be made to fit what, actually, is the case with ontology, reality, or metaphysics. One cannot abandon reality by attempting to force it to conform to the contours of a so-called set of facts - for, to do so, would be to gain distortion and/or error at the expense of truth.
The actual complexities of the interactional dialectics that occur while stalking the elusive prey of truth are, of course, immense. Therefore, the foregoing brief comments are not intended to suggest that the issues involved yield to simple, clear-cut, and straightforward solutions. Indeed, the question of truth has been at the center of, or only slightly removed from, most of the blood (both figuratively and literally) spilled on the philosophical battlefields across the centuries.
Nevertheless, the points made previously in the present essay are intended to highlight certain features of truth that one might have difficulty in disregarding while, simultaneously, trying to presume to believe one could speak of truth in any meaningful sense. For example, although, on the one hand, one might argue, in any given case, about the correctness of this or that conception of truth, on the other hand, to maintain that whatever Truth is, one, legitimately, might equate it with reality, seems relatively unproblematic.
Whatever is true in some sense, is real in the same sense, and whatever is real, in some sense, is true in just the same way. Or, said in a slightly different way, truth, taken in its entirety, gives expression to reality in its entirety and vice versa.
Both the foregoing observations, as well as the commentary which follows, attempt to make clear that the terms "truth" and "reality" are being spoken of in their most fundamental and essential dimension - as constituting the very basis and fabric of why things are the way they are. Nonetheless, at this point, nothing is being said about whether this basic truth/reality of the way ‘things’ are is ultimately physical, material, mental, spiritual or something else - only that whatever is, is, and to deny that reality/truth is, is not only to deny the very notions of truth and reality themselves but to condemn oneself to a totally indefensible position since the defense of such a position requires reference to the truth of its own, underlying reality - or, alternatively, the reality of its own, underlying truth.
While, in some respects, the foregoing contentions may seem trivial, they contain within them several themes of great significance. First, there is a reality, and, therefore, a truth (or vice versa) that permeates all existence and which establishes the characteristics and possibilities of both experience as well as what is experienced. Secondly, and this is derivable from the first principle, that although one's perspective relative to the whole may structure or shape one's perception and understanding of the whole, nevertheless, the whole (i.e., truth/reality) is independent of such a perspective - rather, the perspective is, in some sense, a function of reality/truth and not the reverse.
This is not to say that any given perspective is, therefore, correct, but such a perspective, whatever its degree of accuracy or insight, is a function of the possibilities inherent in reality/truth - that is, what does or will occur depends on what can occur. Thus, even the development of a false or distorted theory is the result of true possibilities, so to speak, contained within reality/truth - that human beings can make errors or allow biases to distort their conception(s) of reality/truth expresses one of the possibilities inherent in the reality and truth of the way ‘things’ are.
The ramifications of the foregoing are fairly substantial since they suggest that reality/truth is not a matter of what human beings (individually or collectively) arbitrarily decide it is to be. Instead, reality/truth is the standard against which the decisions of human beings concerning truth and reality are to be measured.
For whatever motivations, human beings may ignore, or unintentionally (or intentionally) overlook any number of aspects of reality/truth. Eventually, however, human beings will be confronted with, and have to deal with, what is ignored or overlooked in the sense that the hypotheses, theories, models, paradigms, and world-views which are constructed by human beings may prove to be inadequate and/or problematic in a variety of ways precisely because of what has been ignored, left out, or overlooked during the process of conceptual construction.
The foregoing comments also suggest that while our conceptions of, or approaches to, reality/truth may be relative to the many factors that shape and generate such conceptions, reality/truth is not, itself, a relativistic phenomenon. Rather, reality/truth is what it is irrespective of what or how or why we conceive it to be.
In addition, to speak of conceptions of reality/truth does not necessarily mean that one can never have accurate insight into, or correct knowledge/understanding, of various facets or dimensions of the structural character of reality/truth. Rather, the notion of ‘conceptual frameworks’ is merely a way of keeping in mind - that, on the one hand, there is not necessarily any automatic or intrinsic connection between such a framework. and reality/truth, as well as that, on the other hand, the degree to which a conceptual or hermeneutical framework can approximate or represent the reality/truth depends not only on the descriptive and explanatory accuracy of the conceptual system being used, but also depends on the extent to which human beings are conceptually or rationally capable of doing so - that is, according to the inherent limitations/ possibilities of our intellectual faculties with respect to being able to correctly perceive, know, or understand reality/truth. Moreover, these principles of limitation/possibility inherent in our rational faculties are, themselves, a function of reality/truth.
This brings one to a crucial juncture in at least two senses. First, there is the question of just how capable human beings are - that is, to what depth (height) of understanding are we able to descend (ascend) - with respect to grasping the nature of reality/truth - either in part, or in whole? Secondly, and closely related to the first, how can human beings discern the difference between what is true (real) and what one takes to be true - or, in other words, how does one know, for sure, when one has arrived at reality/truth? In other words, how does one determine if there is a difference between where one has arrived conceptually - even if, to varying degrees, such a perspective is correct - relative to the most fundamental or essential layers of possibility inherent in reality/truth?
Obviously, the two foregoing issues are interconnected. The answer to one (or the attempt to do so) tends to carry over to answering the other (or requires one to try).
Given that the history of thought covers a vast range of efforts directed toward solving the difficulties raised and represented by the foregoing questions and given that the winds of dissent and controversy continue to blow across these same problems in the present time, one might tend to believe that, as yet, no adequate framework had been uncovered or developed which held promise of resolving the various issues since if any of the conceptual systems alluded earlier actually did give a faithful representation of all, or part of, reality/truth, then, surely, it would win by acclamation - being something easily recognized by one and all. Such a belief, however, presupposes - erroneously - that: (1) people, necessarily, will acknowledge and give their assent to reality/truth when confronted by it; (2) reality/truth is equally accessible to all - in other words, even if people were to concur (and be correct) that a given conceptual system embraced the truth, either wholly or partially, that all such people understand that system in exactly the same way.
The error in the former belief can be brought out in a variety of ways but, perhaps, the most relevant comes from the numerous instances throughout the history of thought - scientific, political, social, and so on - in which people refused to change their opinions or beliefs despite being confronted with evidence that pointed out the inadequacies and inconsistencies of their beliefs (Thomas Khun's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions gives many good examples of this) The error of the latter belief is reflected in the differences among people’s hermeneutical capabilities - that is, not every one is capable of understanding the complexities and subtleties of nuclear physics, molecular biology, mathematical analysis, astrophysics, or any number of other fields of investigation. In fact, even within such fields there are marked differences of ability, aptitude, experience, creativity, insight, and so on.
Consequently, what people do, or do not, agree to, or do, or do not, acknowledge has no necessary implications for the reality/truth of that which is, or is not, agreed to or acknowledged. Furthermore, given the foregoing, the absence of unanimous agreement at any point in the history of thought does not necessarily imply that none of the systems or frameworks being put forth corresponds to reality/truth. Similarly, the fact that controversy and disagreement continue in the present does not necessarily signify the absence of a way which allows one access to reality/ truth.
The obvious questions at this point, of course, are the following: while acknowledging that the absence of agreement concerning the nature of reality/truth does not necessarily mean a tenable framework or mode of understanding does not exist, can one legitimately contend that such a framework actually does exist, and, if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then, what is the nature, structure, or character of that modality of understanding?
As indicated previously, truth or reality is not a function of democratic elections. Rather, truth and reality are entirely independent of any kind of inter-subjective voting procedure, since the truth or reality cannot be other than what it is. The problem, of course, becomes a matter of trying to arrive at a proper identification and understanding of what the nature is of that which cannot be other than it is.
Presumably, the main worry here is not one of seeking ways of adjusting practice and theory so that the understanding arising out of such practice and theory can become more in line with reality/truth. If this were the main worry, then, the whole notion of research and striving to excavate various levels of reality/truth would be pointless, since one assumes that the essential purpose of any methodology is - or should be - in essence, a continuing process of adjusting what one does in order to render practice and theory to be more transparent to reality and truth.
Rather, the main concern involves the unwarranted adjustments which occur before one knows what constitutes the reality/truth of a given phenomenon or involves methodological and hermeneutical adjustments which occur in defiance of, or result in the distortion and obscuring of, the reality/truth in any given situation. In short, the worry is when a conceptual system is illegitimately equated with some essential dimension of reality truth and, subsequently, substituted for the latter in all judgements, policy considerations, and decisions.
The form of 'dogmatism', as it were, which is illegitimate is not a matter of reality/truth being what it is but a function of the manner in which people make false claims concerning the identity of reality/truth and pass-off (intentionally or unintentionally) the counterfeit as the real. Regardless of one's likes and dislikes concerning reality/truth, the latter cannot be ignored or abandoned without encountering hardship and difficulty in applying false principles, understandings, and so on to how one goes about life.
This is not to say that acknowledgment of, and commitment to, reality/truth (or some portion thereof) is not without its difficulties. However, there seems to be a distinct difference between the problems raised by the latter (i.e., reality/truth) and the problems entailed by the former (i.e., the counterfeit of reality/truth).
Historically, although opinion has differed, considerably, as to which category (truth or its counterfeit) any given conceptual system of understanding should be assigned, nevertheless, generally speaking, the rational - whatever it may be - tends to be construed or interpreted in terms of consisting of a process for identifying the correct nature of reality/ truth and attempting to live one's life in accordance with what has been so identified. The debates have all concerned whether one, actually, has identified reality/truth and whether one is adjusting one's conceptual network in accordance with what has been uncovered with respect to getting one’s actions to conform to, and comply with, reality/truth - indeed, such debates ( especially the issue of identification) have been at the very heart of educational controversy for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.
Aside from the issue of whether today , in present times, educational authorities do so legitimately or not, the people who control and have authority over any given educational system believe they are able to answer the above questions sufficiently well to feel justified in interfering in the lives of children and channeling them in certain directions rather than others. Yet, equally obvious is that, in many instances - too many, unfortunately - reality/truth is coming back to haunt, as it were, those who purport to educate, Both time and bitter experiences are uncovering inadequacy after inadequacy, inconsistency after inconsistency, and problem after problem with respect to the educational theories and models being used.
Seemingly, the difficulties that loom over so many aspects of modern education (which only is a micro-reflection of the difficulties confronting society as a whole) consistently point to important dimensions of reality/ truth that are either ignored or overlooked by the designers, administrators and implementors of educational policy. In fact, one can say this without even having to identify (although one could) what some of these themes are - one merely has to note the fact that the cries of help, confusion, mistrust, truancy, lack of interest, discipline problems, and so on, have reached alarming (if not virtually epidemic) levels within the educational systems of many localities.
There are few communities that have not been affected - though some are more deeply than others - by the basic sort of malaise which hovers in, and around, present educational theory and practice. This malaise is becoming more thoroughly documented with each passing day in numerous Journal articles, newspaper items (including editorials and letters to the editor), boards of education reports, and books of assorted descriptions dealing with various facets of educational problems and issues.
One should not infer from this foregoing that a blanket condemnation of educational practice or theory is being made, but the above does suggest that, among other things, there is a fundamental confusion or uncertainty among many, many people (students, teachers, administrators, politicians, media representatives) about what the purpose of education is and what the nature of humankind is and how the two fit together. Moreover, in many cases, the confusion has been compounded by a variety of efforts to force students to submit to various counterfeit versions of reality/truth, and, then blame students and/or teachers and/or parents for failing to make things work out well.
Other individuals, perhaps panicked by their own confusion - as well as that of others - and desperate for answers, seem to presume that any educational system which manifests a certain degree of internal consistency and hierarchical ordering must necessarily reflect some fundamental dimension of reality/truth. Unfortunately, although they may become perplexed when the theory of the month (or day, or week, or year) runs into difficulty due to the aspects of reality/truth which have been ignored or overlooked, they often, grimly, hang on to what they are doing - evidently, feeling either that if one waits sufficiently long, reality/truth will transform itself into the form of the chosen theory, or, alternatively, if one gives up what one is doing, then, the only choice one has is to stare into the abyss of educational aimlessness, administrative chaos, and methodological paralysis.
Without a firm grasp of reality/truth - at least on a certain minimal level over a given range of topics - one is playing a game of Russian roulette with the minds and lives of students, and just because some students are, and have been, lucky enough to only draw a blank does not necessarily mean an educational system is doing an acceptable job. Consequently, and leaving aside the issue of what constitutes a minimal level of grasping reality/truth as an issue more appropriate to another essay (or series of them), a few comments seem to be in order, at this point, concerning a range of topics that ought to be considered in the formation and development of an educational system if one is going to try to deal with the effects that any such system is likely to have for students and avoid, as much as possible, the destructive possibilities that are potentially hidden in almost any context in which one person undertakes to 'educate' another.
According to Joseph Schwab, the minimum number of topical categories which one needs in order to represent, accurately, an educational setting is four - namely: (1) milieu, (2) subject matter, (3) teacher and (4) learner. Yet, given the previously mentioned difficulties surrounding the confusion and/or malaise that has settled over much of educational theory or practice, especially with respect to the issue of purpose, and how this is caught-up with the questions concerning humankind’s nature and how one comes to know and understand, one might expect the theme of educational purpose to warrant a separate category.
Undoubtedly, there are a variety of reasons why such a theme does not appear as a separate category in Schwab's framework, but one of the more important possibilities may be the following. Perhaps, educational purpose is implicit or contained in one of the other four categories and, therefore, would be redundant as an additional category.
There is, at least, one sense in which the notion of educational purpose might be considered to be implicit in all the four categories noted by Schwab because, by and large, education is an intensional, purposive activity: subjects are taught for particular reasons - even if such reasons are not always well articulated or clearly understood.
Teachers attempt to bring student and subject matter together successfully and, thereby, fulfill - to varying degrees - educational purpose (i.e., the reasons(s) for bringing student and subject matter together). Students, either willingly, or reluctantly, are forced, or encouraged, to learn a certain amount of subject matter for purposes that, ultimately, may elude them - as well as teachers, administrators and trustees - but in the immediate context of the social and educational milieu of the student are embedded in a network of negative and positive reinforcements that structure day-to-day activities.
Finally, in any given milieu, there may be a variety of historical, political, economic, technological, cultural and other influences which demand or suggest or plea for different educational perspectives to direct organized educational activities. Often times, these forces play-off one against the other and generate an educational version of vector or tensor space which show that educational theory and practice are being pulled and push in one, or more, directions, and the direction(s) of the push (and/or pull and/or twist) becomes, by default, the purpose(s) underlying educational pursuits.
However, before concluding that educational purpose represents a redundant category, one must consider two sets of issues. On the one hand, we need to question the extent to which the presence of educational purpose is an expression of something that the other commonplaces presuppose, as opposed to something which is intrinsic to them. On the other hand, one must distinguish between merely having an educational purpose, qua purpose, and having an educational purpose that is intimately tied - or claimed to be - to reality/truth in a fundamental way.
The import of the first issue is fairly straightforward. If the previously listed, four commonplaces presuppose educational purpose rather than entail it, then, educational purpose is something independent of the commonplaces and not merely a superfluous category. The significance of the second issue concerns the difference between having an educational purpose which only touches human beings peripherally or secondarily, if at all, and an educational purpose which is rooted in the essential nature of human beings and, therefore, is directed toward having students merge horizons with reality/truth as a whole - or, at least, as much as such individuals are capable of accomplishing or realizing.
In order to try to determine whether or not the four commonplaces entail educational purpose, one must consider, among other things, whether any logical necessity is involved in such a supposed entailment. If there isn't any such necessity, if one could speak of the four commonplaces, individually, without having to deal with the issue of educational purpose while, simultaneously, avoiding distortion of the commonplaces' basic meaning, then, one might have a prima facie case for concluding that educational purpose is not, or need not be, entailed by any of the commonplaces.
Moreover, if the notion of educational purpose were independent (in the above sense) of the four commonplace categories, one might argue, further, that the uniting bond, as it were, which ties the four categories together and lends a certain amount of organizational direction to their interaction was none other than educational purpose - for, without the presence of such purpose, then, seemingly, there might be little reason to deal with the commonplaces in the first place - after all, why go to all the trouble and expense of creating a context which might be describable as a function of the four commonplaces, if none of this begins at any agreed upon beginning, and works toward no agreed upon end?
With regard to the issue of necessary entailment of educational purpose by the commonplaces, one must be careful to distinguish between the ideas underlying each of the commonplace categories, qua categories, and the roles assumed by each of the categories within the educational context. For example, to speak of a learner qua learner - as one who learns, one may be concerned with all the factors that affect learning, either negatively or positively, or which characterize the learner, either generally or particularly. However, none of these factors necessarily carries any specific stipulations concerning the sort of role which the learner must play within the educational context.
To be sure, the factors that affect learning and characterize a learner establish the parameters within which such roles - suggested above - might take place and through which these roles assume their general structural features. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the concept of a learner that necessitates speaking of a learner only in a formal, institutionalized educational context.
Of course, one might wish to equate education with learning and contend that wherever learning took place, there, too, was education. However, the notion of education generally implies a formally structured set of principles into which a learner is initiated.
While an individual might abandon this traditional distinction and treat learning and education as synonymous terms, eventually, one is likely going to have to acknowledge there are substantial differences between informal, unstructured, unorganized learning situations and learning which takes place within an institutional setting according to certain procedures. In other words, although, within certain limits, informal and unstructured learning still can occur in an institutional setting, one cannot ignore, entirely, the effect that institutionalization has on learning - of even a so-called informal, unstructured sort - and which, as a result, effectively distinguishes the learning that goes on within such a setting from learning which takes place outside, and independently of, an institutional context.
Consequently, regardless of how one labels the distinction, the point being made is that the concept of learner does not contain any necessary entailment with respect to either the specific form which such institutionalization of learning must assume (what many people, in conjunction with other conditions and circumstances, refer to as "education") or, more importantly, the purposes underlying such institutionalization. Clearly, however, such institutionalization must take cognizance of the factors that affect and characterize the learner a great extent.
The learner is, to a great extent, a function of the possibilities inherent in her or him. Moreover, these possibilities remain what they are regardless of whether they are realized and regardless of whether they become involved in an institutionalization of learning referred to as education.
In addition, one does not involve oneself in a contradiction or inconsistency if one speaks of learning which occurs independently of purpose altogether (so-called 'incidental' learning) - institutionalized or otherwise. Therefore, in considering the learner, qua learner - that is, in considering the learner strictly in terms of his or her intrinsic potential as a learner, as an organism capable of incorporating and retaining new information, one need not raise the issue of educational purpose at all - a learner may learn things simply because the learner has the capacity to do so and circumstances of opportunity for doing so were in place with respect to the learner.
An analogous line of reasoning involving the learner commonplace might be applied to the teacher commonplace, as well. For instance, one of the essential characteristics of a teacher is often thought to be that of helping to catalyze a learner's learning in the direction of remembering, understanding, and applying what is learned, and while there may be any number of ways for a teacher to go about doing this, there is no requirement which demands that this be done for an educational purpose - although there may be motives involved (e.g., a teacher may teach because she or he enjoys young people, or because the individual needs a job).
In fact, one might even argue that what a learner learns may have less to do with any given intentional dimension of a teacher-learner interaction which involves specific purposes than successful learning has to do with who the teacher is, how she or he conducts herself/himself, the teacher’s temperament and personality, as well as what that teacher’s general philosophy of life is, together with the kind of integrity through which that philosophy is given expression in and outside the classroom. Another way of saying the foregoing is that, on the one hand, what a teacher teaches intentionally is not always what a learner learns and that, on the other hand, some of the best teachers are those who stimulate a student's desire to learn - a stimulation which often occurs incidentally to, and in directions contrary to, any stated educational purpose.
Someone may wish to object to the foregoing and raise the question of whether a person can be said to be a teacher who does not catalyze the learner's learning in a particular direction; namely, the intended one. In other words, while it talking of incidental learning may make sense, does speaking of incidental teaching make any sense? Furthermore, even if this does make sense, can one treat such teaching as representing an essential dimension of the teacher concept.
Once again, the distinction between a commonplace concept and an institutionalized role seems an important one to make. Although the notion of teacher has taken on a variety of characteristics within the institutionalized setting, as an individual who fulfills certain specific functions, the teacher concept need not be exhausted by reducing the idea of teacher only down to such a collection of roles which an educational context confers on a teacher. An institutionalized context may modify what a teacher does or how that person does it, but the teacher concept pre-dates, as it were, its institutionalization.
Furthermore, what makes a teacher a teacher is not the achievement of a given set of institutionalized directives or of given educational purposes - although such directives and purposes may be fulfilled in the course of a teacher's teaching. A teacher may, or may not begin, with the intention of teaching a specific set of facts, theories, ideas, and so on, but, instead, just may be open to the nuances of student-teacher dynamics during discussions or feed back to essays, or personal, informal interaction, in which certain possibilities are suggested that the student may wish to pursue on his or her own in his or her own way. What is being taught here is more in the way of encouraging a learner to pursue possibilities that may have a constructive effect upon helping the learner to develop his or her potential in a heuristically valuable way which may benefit the learner, and, possibly, others.
In short, intentionality - at least as far as specific purposes are concerned - are not necessarily a primary defining characteristic of the teaching process. As previously suggested the significant dimension of teaching involves the learner's learning being catalyzed in the direction of understanding, either in part or wholly, what is, or has been, learned.
This is not to say that a learner cannot come to understand on his own what is, or has been learned, but it does serve to emphasize that teaching as an activity, qua activity, tends to lead toward, or give encouragement to, the learner's learning in a way that transcends the mere intake of information of insight into, or a deepened awareness of, what is learned. In a sense the teacher helps cock - and, sometimes, trigger conditions which are conducive to the learning and understanding of a learner ... though one cannot suppose that a teacher, thereby, represents a sufficient condition for such understanding to emerge in the learner - obviously, at best, the teacher can never be anything other than a highly propitious predisposing factor for the realization of such understanding since, ultimately, learning and understanding both depend on the learner.
In any case, some of the foregoing/neither requires the teacher to intend that what is learned is what was to have been learned nor does it require that teaching involve any intention at all as far as having a specific purpose is concerned. In fact, sometimes what a teacher teaches learners is what that teacher thinks and feels and believes about the institutional process through which learning and teaching take place - for example, an authoritarian, rigid, opinionated teacher may be teaching students more about the unpleasantness of such qualities and how such qualities tend to interfere with learner’s learning the material which is intended that student’s learn as the official requirements of that class.
As far as the two remaining commonplaces (milieu and subject matter) are concerned, neither one, necessarily, entails educational purpose in any straightforward sense. Subject matter, for example, simply represents a body of information, ideas, beliefs, values, methods, theories, models, etc., that can be learned.
Although someone may develop a purpose for learning the subject matter and although a writer or publisher might produce subject matter that is infused with such purpose, clearly such purpose need not be intrinsic to the material. Indeed, the information, and so on, may consist of a variety of facts, information, theories, models, ideas, and so on which are, in some sort of nebulous sense, considered to be important things to learn, but not necessarily so that they be learned in order that a specific educational purpose be implemented through the learning of such information.
Left to itself, subject matter may entail nothing, at all, in the way of educational purpose. In fact, such subject matter might be taught with no real purpose in mind, and some learner’s might learn it without any specific purpose in mind other than - like Hillary’s response to the question of why did he climb Everest -"Because it was there."
While milieu may be considered to act as a catch-all phrase that, supposedly, takes into account everything not covered by learner, teacher and subject matter, nevertheless, milieu really does not carry within itself any necessary implications concerning educational purpose. To be sure, political, economic, technological, and cultural factors can all have a tremendous shaping, orienting, and directing influence on the three other commonplaces - whether taken individually or in combination - but none of these factors necessarily represents, in and of themselves, something called ‘educational purpose’.
There is a difference between motives and purpose. The fact that the individual motives of students, teachers, administrators, politicians, government officials, and media representatives may be entangled in educational processes, does not, in and of itself, mean that any of these motives either constitute an educational purpose or reflect a stated purpose (or purposes) for education.
Teachers, principals, superintendents, administrators, and government officials may use education to acquire money or further their careers, but this does not mean that the purpose of education is to provide educators with these possibilities. Students may use education to enhance their egos or social standing or to get rewards from their parents, but this does not mean that the purpose of education is, or should be, a function of such things.
None of the foregoing comments mean that a wide range of influences and pressures will not be forthcoming from the various dimensions of the milieu to affect the structure and content of educational purpose. In fact, there is nothing to prevent one facet, or another, of the milieu to seek to impose a particular purpose onto the educational process, but, at the same time, there is nothing to suggest that such purposes will necessarily reflect, or be consonant with, the essential nature of human beings, or will help human beings to acquire an understanding or appreciation of the nature of truth/reality, on whatever level. In short, educational purpose is not necessarily inherent in, or entailed by, the concept of milieu - a lot depends on the particular milieu one is considering.
Some milieus are concerned with the issue of educational purpose, and some are not, but even when such purposes are present, there is no guarantee that they reflect either the essential character of human beings, or the nature of truth or reality. Some milieus seek to imprint certain motives onto the educational process, but these motives are not necessarily synonymous with educational purpose.
Moreover, in those cases when a given milieu were to be concerned with investing the educational process with a purpose that, actually, did reflect the essential nature of human beings and reality/truth, this might be because the milieu had adopted a revolutionary hermeneutical framework devised by an individual teacher or learner and, therefore, strictly speaking, the milieu is not responsible for the presence of educational purpose as much as it has decided to make possible the passing on of the findings of one individual to other individuals - as such, they are the means for implementing purpose, not its original source.
In addition to the foregoing considerations, one can make a distinction between milieu, as a commonplace concept, and milieu, as an actual, existential reality/truth. In one sense, the latter necessarily serves as a 'source', so to speak, for all things - including learner, teacher, subject matter and educational purpose - since it represents a general designation for everything that is in the environment, and, sooner or later, everything that is, forms and represents a part of the environment somewhere.
In this sense the milieu simply signifies what is: the totality of events, processes, phenomena, entities, interactions, forces, tendencies, beliefs, values, ideas, goals, difficulties, resources, and so on which impinge on the present. As such, the milieu is not a 'this' or 'that' but - to use phenomenological terminology - a 'horizon' which is continuously, and indefinitely, expanding beyond the boundaries of intentionality - whether considered individually or collectively . The milieu represents both everything and nothing in particular.
When Schwab uses the term "milieu", however, he introduces a very subtle, but extremely significant dimension. For Schwab, "milieu" is no longer a straightforward designation for what is. Instead, milieu has become sensitized, as it were, along certain dimensions, and, therefore, it has become a vector concept - a vector force that receives, as indicated during the discussion of the milieu commonplace, directional influences from whatever is not an expression of either learner, teacher or subject matter. One is no longer looking at milieu as a general designation for environment but as a concept that filters out everything not directly involved in the educational triad of: learner, teacher, subject matter, but which, nonetheless, may come to have a substantial impact on how, why, and when the aforementioned triad is permitted to proceed.
Alternatively, the learner, teacher, and subject matter - each in its own way - might either resonate with one, or more, of the influences coming from the milieu, or they might resist, undermine, nullify, or disregard such influences - and do so, either with, or without, some educational purpose in mind. In addition, teacher and learner might become aligned against the milieu, or student and subject matter might come into opposition to the milieu, as well as the teacher, to the extent that the latter serves the purposes of the former.
Since the individual can affect or change the milieu (as an existential reality/truth) the latter, at times, becomes a function of the former, and this tends to indicate a certain co-primacy since without milieu the individual (whether in the form of a learner or teacher), per se, could not operate and is, as a result, a function, to some extent, of the milieu. Subject matter, however, may not have any substantial degree of primary because it tends to be a function of the interaction of milieu and individual.
If Schwab had intended to maintain an appropriate degree of existential primacy for milieu with respect to the educational context, he might, more accurately, have contended there are only two commonplaces: the milieu and the individual, with subject matter, learner and teacher (presumably the administrators, school board and trustees are merely nameless faces in the milieu) representing so many particularized perspectives within the general milieu - individual interaction. However, he did not do this.
Although Schwab did not speak in terms of just two commonplaces (i.e., the milieu and the individual) considered from a variety of specific, individual perspectives (e.g., those of teacher, learner, etc.), the idea of "perspective" is an extremely important one since it expresses the dimension of intentionality (both in the sense of attending to an object of consciousness and acting with regard to it) that permeates and underlies much of the discussion concerning the commonplace category issue. In any case, whether one speaks of two commonplaces considered from several different perspectives, or the way in which the different perspectives of five commonplaces play off against one another, the important aspect of the following discussion concerns the issue of "perspective" and not the manner of labeling them.
Indeed, much - if not all - of this issue is a function of the interaction between focal perspective (in the sense of the sphere of intentional consciousness directed reflectively at an area of on-going experience) and the milieu. As a focus, so to speak, changes, so does the shape of one's conceptualization of the milieu.
What was formerly unknown or unattended to by an individual (whether learner, teacher, or writer ... that is, a producer of subject matter), and, therefore, only a possibility on the horizon of consciousness, becomes incorporated, via the change of focus, into the fabric of what constitutes one's on-going phenomenological experience and, as a result, the shape of the horizon changes and with it the shape of one's concept of milieu. However, the possibilities on the horizon of consciousness are, themselves, partly a function of what possibilities are inherent in the milieu as an existential reality/truth (as opposed to a concept of this reality/truth). On the other hand, the milieu - in the sense of a reality/truth - does serve as a point of origin, as it were, for numerous perspectives of people - taken individually or collectively.
The perspectives themselves are not so much really contained within the milieu as much as they represent a function of the dynamic between specific individuals and the rest of the milieu. As such, the milieu really is an expression of the dynamic of individual phenomenological fields coming together in dynamic combinations.
The milieu is really the expression of two simultaneous themes. On the one hand, each individual represents a point or sphere of continuous focus, for which everything outside that field of focus (which necessarily includes other phenomelogical points or spheres of focus) represents milieu. On the other hand, each field of focus necessarily is part of the milieu relative to some other field of focus.
In other words, surroundings or environment is relative to the point of focus being considered and although as long as a given perspective (phenomenological orientation), is, so to speak, out of focus - that is, merely a possibility in the horizon of someone else's conscious experience - it is implicit in the milieu relative to some other point of focus. Nonetheless, when the previously out-of-focus perspective 'becomes' the point of referential focus, then, that focus is no longer part of the milieu but plays off against the latter, and in ways that may, in certain respects, be quite different from anything else within the milieu.
These different foci do not alternate such that, first, one perspective ‘becomes’ the point of referential focus, and, then, another perspective ‘becomes’ the focus. Rather, all perspectives occur simultaneously such that, at any given instant, one and the same individual is both a possibility in the horizon of the phenomenological field of other individuals, as well as a focal point giving expression to a field of consciousness in which other people are merely so many possibilities (some known and felt, and others which are not) on the horizons of such a field.
The implications of the foregoing with respect to educational purpose are many, but among the more important ones, is the way in which the dynamic figure-ground relationship of individual-milieu interaction tends to place the notion of purpose (intentionality, in general, and, in the context of this paper, educational purpose, in particular) outside any specific commonplace category. Rather, purpose seems to emerge out of the interfacing of milieu and individual and is shaped by the way one plays off against the other at these boundary points - as such, quite frequently, it becomes very difficult to identity where the individual leaves off and the milieu begins.
Although educational purpose might be, or could be, as much a function of the reality/truth of the numerous currents running through the milieu as it is a function of the reality/ truth of the numerous currents running through an individual, purpose often tends to appear at the interfacing of individual and milieu within that individual's phenomenological field. This is not to say, of course, that an individual is sui generis - instead, the intention is to draw attention to the fact that the aforementioned interfacing is continually switching between making the individual and the milieu ground or figure (or vice versa) within the phenomenological field, depending on, among other things, what influences various currents in both the individual and milieu are being brought to bear on consciousness.
In any case, what is of most importance here is how this milieu-individual interfacing appears to be prior to any of the other commonplaces, considered individually. By indicating the logical distinction between educational purpose and the other four commonplace concepts the stage seems to be set for contending that educational purpose expresses the theme which ties together the commonplace categories in a particular way which is not necessarily a function of any of the four commonplaces, considered on their own that were cited by Schwab.
An educational context only comes about as a function of the purposive aspect of intentionality, since without this framework of purpose (whatever its particular character), there would be little reason for bringing the commonplaces together. In addition, one might deduce from the foregoing considerations that curriculum (as a general concept) becomes the way in which educational purpose organizes, structures and lends direction to the other commonplaces, for, the nature of one's conception of educational purpose will have a fundamental orienting effect on the significances to which the other commonplaces are perceived to give expression.
Moreover, although, obviously, the other commonplaces also will tend to affect the form of one's educational purpose (and once again one sees a reflection of the basic milieu-individual interaction in which both components of the interaction contain aspects of the other as well as shapes the other) it seems clear, nonetheless, that educational purpose has conceptual primacy in relation to the other commonplace categories since the very categories of "teacher.", "milieu", "subject matter" and "learner" - at least as Schwab uses them - are most consonant with our sense of education when considered within a framework arising out of a sense of purpose which orients all the other four commonplaces, and, while educational purpose without the other commonplaces does not make very much sense, purpose does have intelligibility as an organizing concept that leads one to focus on the inter-relationships of the four commonplaces - an organizing concept that none of the other categories necessarily entails but which all of them presuppose in an educational context.
Having argued so arduously for the existence of educational purpose as a separate commonplace, in addition to the other four, it is somewhat ironic that not much will be said about it in what remains. This is not because there is a lack of things to say concerning it but rather because its delineation is really a topic for other essays.
For now, however, all that needs to be said is that educational purpose returns one to the starting point with which this paper began. For, educational purpose is deeply rooted, and necessarily so, in what the essential nature of a human being involves, together with what our relation is to reality/truth in general.
Irrespective of one's conception of reality/truth, educational purpose receives its impetus from one's understanding concerning what being human entails, together with one’s general understanding concerning the nature of reality/truth. To the extent one's hermeneutical understanding misrepresents the actual nature of reality/truth - including that of what it means to be human - then, one's misrepresentation are likely to come back to haunt one in the form of various problems that plague educational practice. Indeed, in the light of the foregoing , the tremendous difficulties which, at the present time, affect almost every level of educational practice might be construed as one indication, among others, concerning the huge discrepencies which may exist between various understandings of the nature of reality/truth, the educational theories which purport to give expression to those understandings, and the ways in which the latter are serving as obstacles with respect to learner’s being able to find their way to those truths concerning essential human nature that might permit them to better understand the structural character of truth/reality.
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